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INTRODUCTION

LAWYER self-dealing on a grand scale is not new.

At the

end of Bleak House, Jarndyce and Jarndyce-the suit that

had made the fortunes of generations of lawyers'-"lapses and
melts away, ' 2 because "the whole estate is found to have been
absorbed in costs." '3 Dickens' description of the last lawyer to
leave the court is masterfully damning: "[H]e gave one gasp as
if he had swallowed the last morsel of his client, and his black
buttoned-up unwholesome figure glided away to the low door at
the end of the Hall."'4 "Fog everywhere, ' 5 Dickens wrote. And
in that fog creep lawyers with bundles of money stepping neatly
over the bodies of their destitute clients. An unwholesome
picture indeed, but one that the American public has come to
believe portrays the behavior of lawyers in class action suits. 6
The public has heard enough about class lawyers to justify this
image. 7 It has heard about the class lawyers in the GM Truck
Charles Dickens, Bleak House 2-3, 18 (Oxford University Press 1987) (1853).
at 867.
3 Id.
4 Id.
5 Id. at 1.
6 This picture of class action lawyers, in part generated by politicians and
representatives of the business community and in part exploited by them, was "Exhibit
A" in the recent campaign to revamp the nation's securities laws and was also used
in the effort to pass so-called tort reform legislation. See, e.g., William Claiborne,
Battle Over Lawsuits Raging In California; Ballot Initiatives Pit Silicon Valley
Computer Titans Against Trial Lawyers' Lobby, Wash. Post, Mar. 17, 1996, at A3; Ed
Mendel, All Three Tort-reform Measures Rejected; New Fight on Horizon, S.D.
Union-Trib., Mar. 28, 1996, at A-5; Ed Mendel, Measure Aims to Curb Lawsuits Over
Stocks, S.D. Union-Trib., Mar. 20, 1996, at A-3.
7 Some of the public disaffection with class lawyers is undoubtedly a reaction to
nothing more than the big fees awarded some class action lawyers. See, e.g., Kurt
Eichenwald, Millions for Us, Pennies for You, N.Y. Times, Dec. 19, 1993, § 3, at 1;
Robert Manor, Lawyers' Cases Are in a Class of Their Own; "I Am Told We Have
Made a Lot of Enemies," St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Apr. 14, 1996, at 1A; Paul Taylor,
A Lawyers' Fee-for-All: $610 an Hour?; Feeding Frenzy as the Legal Sharks Circle
A Pool of the Consumer's Money, Wash. Post, Apr. 10, 1983, at Cl; Saundra Torry,
Going to the Head of the Class Action Settlement, Wash. Post, Apr. 8, 1996, (Wash.
Bus.) at F7. Some significant segment of the American public seems to take affront
when the compensation of others reaches above six figures, at least when the money
is being taken home by corporate executives or lawyers as opposed to rock singers and
movie stars. Compare Peter Carlson, Chairman of the Bucks, Wash. Post, Apr. 5,
1

2 Id.
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case, who negotiated a settlement in which the lawyers would
receive $9.5 million in fees, while their clients were to get coupons to buy another GM Truck. 8 It has heard about the class
lawyers in the Ford Bronco II case, who requested $4 million in
fees for negotiating a settlement in which their clients were to
receive a warning sticker, a safe driving videotape, a road atlas,
an owner's manual, a flashlight and a free vehicle inspection
(but not free vehicle repairs) as compensation for having purchased a vehicle that allegedly was prone to roll over.9
Is this unwholesome image accurate? And if so, what should
be done about the problem? At one end of the spectrum are
1992, (Mag.) at 11; Graef S. Crystal, At the Top: An Explosion of Pay Packages, N.Y.
Times, Dec. 3, 1989, (Mag.) at 25; Arthur M. Louis, Executive Pay Has Gone Hog
Wild; Problem Is Many Boards Won't Say No to CEOs, S.F. Chron., May 24, 1993,
at Cl; Ronald E. Yates, Adding Up Arguments on CEO Pay, Chi. Trib., Mar. 3, 1996,
(Bus.) at 1 (all decrying excessive corporate compensation packages) with Mal
Vincent, Gimme Moore; $12.5 Million-a-Film Actress is Known for Getting Her Way
in Hollywood, Virginian-Pilot (Norfolk), Oct. 18, 1995, at El; Bernard Weinraub,
Skyrocketing Star Salaries, N.Y. Times, Sept. 18, 1995, at D1 (both discussing
compensation of celebrities such as movie stars and sports figures). Although the 1994
baseball strike generated some criticism for the highsalaries routinely sought-and
routinely earned-by sports figures, see, e.g., Bill Livingston, Growing 'Board' of
Baseball's Greed, Plain Dealer (Cleveland), Sept. 4, 1994, at 1D (criticizing exorbitant
salaries for players); Baseball Strike Plans, L.A. Times, Aug. 4, 1994, at B10 (Letter
to the Editor) (same), little of the criticism that has been directed at corporate
America and the legal profession has spilled over into criticism of athletes or
entertainers.
But keying the pay of agents to the rewards they reap for their principals does not
reflect only greed or malapportionment; such linkage is one way of aligning the
interests of principals and their agents. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the
Plaintiff's Attorney: The Implications of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement
of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 669, 696-99 (1986)
(discussing the implications of paying class lawyers on contingency basis that gives the
lawyer a greater percentage for greater awards). See generally Paul Milgrom & John
Roberts, Economics, Organizations and Management 423-46 (1992) (discussing agency
issues related to executive compensation). Such payment systems may result in some
agents making megabucks, but they also may promote more faithful performance on
the part of all agents thus compensated. In any event, our target is neither high fees
nor the lawyers who make them legitimately. We also think it unlikely that all of the
public's hostility stems from ideological aversion to others making lots of money.
8 Saundra Torry & Warren Brown, GM Truck Settlement Overturned on Appeal,
Wash. Post, Apr. 18, 1995, at D1. For a discussion of the GM case and other class
action settlements in which claimants receive non-cash benefits, see Note, In-Kind
Class Action Settlements, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 810 (1996).
9 Jesus Sanchez & Donald W. Nauss, Court Rejects GM Settlement on Value of
Pickup Trucks, L.A. Times, Apr. 18, 1995, at D1, D15 (describing settlements in Ford
Bronco II case and GM pickup truck case); Torry & Brown, supra note 8, at D6.
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those who would deny that a serious problem with the current
class action system exists, 10 or who would maintain that the existing system, perhaps with a few minor modifications here and
there," can handle any serious problems. After all, courts rejected both the Ford and the GM settlements, and in each case
the court cited the likelihood of collusion between class lawyers
and defendants as a prime reason for doing so.' 2 At the other
end are those who view the class action device as so inherently
corrupt that its availability should be restricted, either by making such suits harder to win or by reducing the monetary rewards for lawyers and claimants who bring them. 13 In the "middle" are those who advocate incremental changes in the class
action system to alleviate the most serious problems. 14 We take
10David Rosenberg, Individual Justice and Collectivizing Risk-Based Claims in MassExposure Cases, 71 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 210 (1996).
It This approach is the one currently being considered in the proposed amendments
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, which were published for public notice and
comment just as this Article was being prepared for publication. Committee on Rules
of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States, Preliminary
Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Appellate, Civil, and Criminal
Procedure, August 1996 [hereinafter Preliminary Draft]. In our view, these proposed
amendments not only do nothing to cure the abuse now present, but in fact, invite
more collusion through a new provision that would sanction-with no apparent
limit-the settlement of large class actions that could not be tried. We discuss this
proposal infra Section II.E.
12In re General Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d
768, 803 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 88 (1995); In re Ford Motor Co. Bronco II
Prods. Liab. Litig., Civ.-MDL-991, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3507, at *27-28 (E.D. La.
Mar. 15, 1995) (finding that proceedings were tainted with appearance of impropriety
on part of class counsel).
13This approach is the one taken by the recent reform legislation in the securities
and tort areas. See Note, Investor Empowerment Strategies in the Congressional
Reform of Securities Class Actions, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 2056 (1996) (discussing and
critiquing provisions of new statute that restricts the choice of representative plaintiffs
and encourages greater participation by high-stakes investors in securities class
actions); Note, "Common Sense" Legislation: The Birth of Neoclassical Tort Reform,
109 Harv. L. Rev. 1765 (1996) (discussing and critiquing tort reform bills designed to
restrict the availability of punitive damages, eliminate joint and several liability, and
adopt the English rule on attorney's fees). It is also the approach advocated by Wall
Street Journal editorial page writer Max Boot. See Max Boot, Stop Appeasing the
Class Action Monster, Wall St. J., May 8, 1996, at A15 (arguing for abolition of class
actions in mass tort cases); Max Boot, Judges Rebel Against Mass Tort Excesses,
Wall. St. J., Apr. 3, 1996 (same).
14See, e.g., Judith Resnick, Dennis E. Curtis & Deborah R. Hensler, Individuals
Within the Aggregate: Relationships, Representation, and Fees, 71 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 296
(1996) (raising issues to be addressed by "intermediate solutions" to rules of
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a different approach. We agree with those who argue that lawyer abuse in class actions is rampant and that the current system, far from keeping this abuse in check, is set up to shield
lawyers from the consequences of their misdeeds. But our proposed solution is not to restrict the availability of class actions;
this overbroad approach risks leaving too much corporate and
government misconduct undeterred without addressing lawyer
self-dealing. Nor is our proposed solution to work within the
class action system itself to improve it, though we certainly support such efforts; 15 the participants in the system are likely to
render such improvements inadequate. Instead, we propose
removing the shield, or if you will, turning the system on itself.
In this Article, we discuss examples of class action settlements
in which the conduct allegedly engaged in by class counsel-and
in some instances by the defendants and their lawyers--could
constitute a civil wrong or a criminal act under state or federal
law, but a court nevertheless blessed the conduct by approving
the settlement. We argue that the findings made by federal and
state courts in blessing these settlements, namely, findings on
the adequacy of class counsel, the lack of collusion between
class counsel and the defendants, and the fairness of the settlement terms, should not immunize the conduct of the settling
parties from the reach of state tort law, consumer protection
law, criminal law or state and federal antitrust statutes. The
process that results in these findings is simply not "full" or
"fair" enough to allow those findings to trump the operation of
other state or federal law designed to protect clients and the
public from the misdeeds of lawyers. Moreover, we argue that
aggregation reform proposals).
15 For example, we support currently pending legislation that would require class
action notices sent to class members to be written in plain English, so that these class
members could better understand the proposed terms, and that would also require
state attorneys general to receive notice of class action proceedings, so that they might
monitor the course of these actions. See infra notes 106-109. discussing such
legislation. Moreover, we believe that stricter standards should be applied in assessing
the adequacy of class counsel-standards that could be developed through the
common law process, the adoption of court rules or the amendment of Rule 23 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See, e.g., Susan P. Koniak, Feasting While the
Widow Weeps: Georgine v. Amchem Products, Inc., 80 Cornell L. Rev. 1045, 11151126 (1995) (discussing the inadequacy of courts' adequacy review as they now
conduct it and arguing that more stringent standards are needed).
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the doctrines that work to exempt state action, the action of
federal agencies and the conduct of partiesin litigation from the
purview of the antitrust laws do not, and should not, apply to
the conduct of class counsel in negotiating a settlement or to the
terms of the contract subsequently approved as a class settlement by a court.
In short, our answer to class action abuse is "sue the bastards." In more polite terms, through this Article we hope to
dispel any notion that the procedural law used to facilitate the
settlement of class actions should somehow operate to cancel
the substantive law designed to protect us all from the wrongful
conduct of our supposed champions.
I. JUDICIALLY BLESSED WRONGDOING

A. How Many Wrongs Make a Right?

1. As Maine Goes, So Goes the Nation16
Imagine opening a statement from the bank that holds the
mortgage to your home and discovering a "miscellaneous deduction" of $145.65 from your escrow account. You call the bank
to inquire about this debit and are told that a state court in
Alabama authorized the bank to deduct this money to pay the
16 Hoffman v. BancBoston Mortgage Corp., No. 91-1880 (Ala. Cir. Ct. Jan. 24, 1994).
The discussion of Hoffman in this Article is based on the following documents on file
with the Virginia Law Review Association: the January 24, 1994 Alabama Circuit
Court opinion; the January 24, 1994 Consent Decree issued by the court; the Notice
sent to class members; the brief filed by the Florida Attorney General's office
objecting to the settlement and to the manner of awarding attorney's fees; a letter
from Burr & Forman, Counsel to BancBoston, to Dexter J. Kamilewicz, a class
member, explaining what happened in this suit and why the bank did not object to the
award of attorney's fees; and a column written in the Maine Lawyers Review
describing the effect of this settlement on Maine constituents. These materials were
sent to Professor Koniak by the office of Senator William Cohen of Maine. See supra
note *. We recognize that these documents may in some way misrepresent what
actually occurred in this case; for example, the parties may not actually have followed
the court's order. We therefore caution the reader that the discussion in this Article
proceeds by assuming that the parties followed the court order, that the bank's lawyer
honestly described the bank's position in the negotiation and class counsel's ultimatum
to the bank, and that the Florida Attorney General's brief accurately presents the facts
in evidence at the January 10-11, 1994 fairness hearing. If any of these assumptions
proves incorrect, our description of what happened and the conclusions we draw from
that description might need to be altered.
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lawyers who were appointed by that court to represent you in
a class action suit brought ostensibly on your behalf. You live
in Maine.
You remember receiving a Notice in the mail about a year
ago, informing you that there was such a suit pending. You
read it, although you needed your reading glasses to do so be17
cause the print on the eight page document was very small,
and, being a lawyer, you understood it more or less. It told you
that your bank allegedly had been requiring you to keep more
money in your escrow account than it had a right to demand
and that this suit had been brought to stop that practice. 8
"Good," you thought at the time. You read on and discovered
that class counsel had negotiated a settlement with the bank:
The bank was to stop requiring you to keep an excessive cushion in your account; and it was to return to you the excess
money that had accumulated in your account by deducting an
equivalent sum from the interest payments due on your mortgage, or, upon your request, the bank would either apply the
excess toward your principal or return it to you directly. 19 You
made a mental note to request at the appropriate time that the
bank send your money home-a mental note you promptly forgot. There was more good news in the Notice: "interest payments" were to be paid to class members on the surplus that the
20
bank had been keeping these past years.
You could, the Notice explained, opt out of this settlement, if
you chose. Page eight of the fine-print Notice said that.21 The
Notice stated, however, that anyone who opted out would "not
receive any of the benefits set forth in the proposed [agreement]."22 You read that statement to mean that if you opted
out, the bank could keep requiring the excessive cushion in your
escrow account and you would not receive any interest payments under the settlement. The choice to stay in the class
seemed a no-brainer: You would stay in and get whatever bene17Notice of Hearing on Proposed Settlement of Class Action, Hoffman v. BancBoston Mortgage Corp., No. 91-1880 (Ala. Cir. Ct. July 2, 1993) [hereinafter Notice].
18Id. at 1.
19Id. at 3.
20Id. at 4.
21 Id.

22Id.

at 8.
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fit the settlement provided. Moreover, staying in required no
effort on your part. You were in as long as you did not return
the opt-out card.23
You understood that the benefit to you would likely be modest, as even without a lawsuit the bank would have returned the
surplus in your escrow account to you when you finished paying
off your mortgage. It was, after all, your money. The bank
never maintained otherwise. What the lawsuit promised you
was the opportunity to get your money now instead of having to
wait for its return upon the expiration of your mortgage. You
liked that idea: Money today is worth more than money tomorrow. The lawsuit gave you the opportunity to spend that money
today or invest it as you pleased for the future, and while that
benefit to you would be small, it was something. You also figured out that the interest payments you were likely to receive
on the surplus that the bank had been carrying on your account
in past years would be small. You found the interest formula
buried in Paragraph (D)(7)(A) of the Notice:
BancBoston will make a one-time payment to the Subclass members
in an amount equal to fifty percent (50%) multiplied by seven point
five (7.5) multiplied by (four (4) percent minus the interest rate paid
on escrow, if any), multiplied by the average escrow surplus, which
has been determined to be $58.41.24

Math had never been your best subject, but you were able to
tell without any calculation that this formula would not produce
any windfall for you.2 5 The $58.41 figure in this formula, repre23 Id.
24 Id. at 4.
25 Neither

the Notice nor the unpublished court opinion approving the settlement
explains the formula used to calculate past-due interest. It is easy enough to figure
out that 4% is the interest rate the bank has agreed to pay on the past surplus,
particularly given the provision that any interest actually paid is to be deducted from
the 4% figure, although the interest is obviously not compounded. Notice at 4. In
trying to account for the 7.5 number, we imagined that it might represent the average
number of years that a surplus had been maintained in the escrow accounts. We were
not creative enough to imagine what the 50% figure was doing in the equation. Are
you?
We gained some insight into this formula by reading an opinion in another case
approving a similar formula. GMAC Mortgage Corp. v. Stapleton, 603 N.E.2d 767
(IlI. App. Ct. 1992). In that case, also involving allegations of excessive escrow
cushions, the defendant company agreed to pay: ".40 x (3.3 years) x (5 1/2% interest)
x (ending escrow surplus)." Id. at 772. The court explained that "the .40 figure
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senting the average escrow surplus, confirmed that the benefit

of having your surplus returned today instead of some years
from now would also be small. After all, how much money
could you make investing $58.41? Given how small your gross
recovery was likely to be, it did not seem worth it to retrieve
your bank statement to check how much interest you had been
receiving (a number you would need to be able to use the above

formula) or to search for your calculator to multiply the numbers out. You were satisfied with the general knowledge that

your recovery would be small, although probably just.
You noticed that your lawyers would be requesting that the
court award "a reasonable attorney's fee to be paid out of each
escrow account, '26 and wondered why the defendant bank was
not being asked to pay class counsel's fee, given how small the
recoveries to class members would be. However, not being an
expert in such matters, you were willing to assume that this
method of paying class lawyers was acceptable, perhaps even
routine. You thought of asking your colleague on the faculty
who teaches complex civil litigation about this, but forgot or
decided it was not worth worrying about. After all, the Notice
made clear that the fee to be requested would not exceed
"one-third of the economic benefit conferred" 27 and lawyers
represents a litigation risk factor, and the 3.3 years figure pertains to the applicable
statute of limitations period." Id. This explanation suggests that the 50% figure is
also a litigation risk factor, although this figure seems somewhat low (that is, the
assumed risk of losing seems too high) given that the Stapleton case, which had used
a .40 risk factor, preceded Hoffman, and that in Hoffman, proving liability seemed
relatively straightforward. The 7.5 figure, however, remains a puzzle. It does not
seem to reflect the applicable statute of limitation period, so we are left with our
previous guess that it represents the average length of time the bank had held the
escrow surplus. Support for this guess comes from Law v. First Ala. Bancshares, No.
CV-90-003351 (Ala. Cir. Ct. Oct. 3, 1995) (unpublished opinion) (on file with the
Virginia Law Review Association), another bank escrow class action in which there
was testimony that the average length of time until the mortgages would be satisfied
was 7.5 years. Id. at 6. This doesn't completely explain the relevance of that figure
for computing past interest. Perhaps the generous year figure may have something to
do with the stingy litigation risk figure, or perhaps the .50 is not a litigation risk figure
at all but rather simply an adjustment to the 7.5 years to account for the fact that
those deserving back interest had already been paying down their mortgage and so
may have had less than 7.5 years remaining on average. But, as you can see, we are
left with only hazy speculation on how this formula was conceived.
26 Notice, supra note 17, at 5.
27 Id.
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getting one-third sounded unremarkable enough. More important, you already had wasted enough time making your way
through this complicated Notice. Soon you forgot about the
whole thing.
Now a year later you are being told that the bank has debited
the lawyers' fees, but obviously there has been a mistake. You
cannot bring to mind the formula for calculating your interest
payments, or any of the other details of the settlement for that
matter, but you have a vague recollection that the amount you
expected to receive was small. How could the lawyers' fee be
so high? The lawyers were to get only a third. If the lawyers'
fee is $145.65, the "economic benefit" to you should be at least
$436.95: much higher than you had imagined, but either that is
what you are owed or the bank took too much out of your account for the lawyers. The bank employee insists there is no
mistake: "The lawyers' fee is $145.65, and you already received
28
your benefit. See that $2.19 credit?"
Chances are that you do not live in Maine and that, wherever
you live, yours was not one of the over three hundred thousand
families nationwide directly affected by the settlement in Hoffman v. BancBoston Mortgage Corporation. But BancBoston
was not the only bank to be sued for keeping excessive money
in escrow accounts, and it was not the only bank to have made
a settlement agreement with class lawyers that provided for class
members to pay attorney's fees under a formula that left many

28 See Will Lund, Mainers Contribute Toward $12 Million Legal Fee, Me. Laws.
Rev., Feb. 15, 1995, at 17.
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class members suffering a net out-of-pocket loss. 29 In Hoffman
and the cases like it, the winners lost, and their lawyers got rich.
The class lawyers devised the payment scheme, proposed it to
the courts and defended it as fair.30 Moreover, according to
BancBoston's lawyer, class counsel insisted that to settle the

Hoffman suit the bank would have to agree not to object to
class counsel's fee proposal. 1 Although the Bank was obliged as
a fiduciary to manage its customers' funds responsibly, it agreed

to the plan.32 In other words, the bank decided to give away its

customers' money to resolve its liability to those very customers. 33 Finally, the Alabama court, like all class action courts,
was supposedly sitting as guardian of the class's interests. 34 Fine

29According to a letter written by BancBoston's counsel, Secor Bank entered into
a similar settlement with the class lawyers who later represented the Hoffman class.
Letter from T. Thomas Cottingham, Counsel to BancBoston Mortgage Corporation
and Bank of Boston in Hoffman, to Dexter J. Kamilewicz 3 (Mar. 30, 1995) (on file
with the Virginia Law Review Association) [hereinafter Cottingham Letter]. The First
Bank of New Hampshire recently agreed to a similar scheme with another group of
lawyers. Williams v. First N.H. Mortgage Corp., No. 94-5993 (Ala. Cir. Ct. Dec. 1,
1995). However, after the New Hampshire and Vermont Attorneys General objected
to the attorney's fee formula, the bank and the class lawyers agreed to change the
formula for calculating attorney's fees. Conversation with Walter Maroney, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, State of New Hampshire, Feb. 8, 1996. Both the Secor
and First Bank of New Hampshire settlements were filed in Alabama. Moreover,
through confidential sources, we have learned that many other similar settlement
agreements have been entered in excessive escrow cases involving banks throughout
the nation. It appears that a good number of these class actions have been filed in
Alabama.
30On the propriety of the lawyers' actions, see discussion infra text accompanying
notes 48-52.
31Cottingham Letter, supra note 29, at 2-3.
32Id. at 3. Note that according to BancBoston's lawyer, the bank simultaneously
agreed or decided to kick in some of its own money toward the payment of attorney's
fees, presumably to soften the blow that was about to be delivered to its customers.
Id. We do not know how much money, if any, the bank kicked in. Nor do we know
how any such contribution affected the money charged to class members. What seems
clear is that the bank did not pay the entire amount of attorney's fees and that it did
not kick in enough to avoid charging some class members more than they recovered.
See Lund, supra note 28, at 19 and discussion infra notes 38-46 and accompanying
text.
33On the propriety of the bank making such a concession, see discussion infra text
accompanying notes 58-62.
34 "Under Rule 23(e) the district court acts as a fiduciary who must serve as a
guardian of the rights of absent class members." Grunin v. International House of
Pancakes, 513 F.2d 114, 123 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 864 (1975). See also
Plummer v. Chem. Bank, 668 F.2d 654, 659 n.4 (2d Cir. 1982) ("[A] court may not
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in theory, but obviously inadequate in fact. With fiduciaries like
these, the class lawyers and corporate defendants who offer
coupons to class members begin to look good by comparison.
The scheme in Hoffman was actually quite simple. Class
counsel asked for attorney's fees equaling 33 1/3% of all the
money the bank was wrongfully holding in escrow; that is,
one-third of all the excessive cushion money. The trick was in
characterizing all that money as money recovered by this lawsuit.35 Had there been no lawsuit, 100% of the excess cushion
would have been returned to class members at the time their
mortgages were repaid. Therefore, what the lawsuit recovered
for each class member was (in addition to the back interest)
only the difference between the value of the excess cushion
money in the class member's hands today and the value of the
money had the bank held it until the mortgage was paid off.
The lawsuit and class counsel did not "recover" the excessive
cushion money being held in escrow because that money was
never lost. All that the class members had lost by the bank's
allegedly wrongful acts was the use of that money today and the
use of that money in years past.
Class counsel backed up their fee request with testimony at
the fairness hearing stating that "a fee equal to one-third of the
settlement proceeds was reasonable and fair under Alabama
law," and that in this case a fee of even 40% would be justified. 36 The Alabama court awarded class counsel only 28% of
the surplus. 37 The problem, however, lies not in the percent
delegate to counsel the performance of its duty to protect the interests of absent class
members."); Greenfield v. Villager Indus., 483 F.2d 824, 832 (3d Cir. 1973) (discussing
the district court's broad powers "as the guardian of the rights of the absentees");
Liebman v. J.W. Petersen Coal & Oil Co., 73 F.R.D. 531, 534 (N.D. Ill.
1973) (in
assessing the fairness of a settlement, the court sits "as the guardian of the interests
of the absent members of the class").
35 While the fairness hearing transcript reveals some confusion on this point, it
appears that class counsel used the total excess amount as some kind of rough
measure of the worth of this lawsuit to the class instead of arguing that the excess
money was recovered by the suit. Fairness Hearing Transcript, Hoffman v.
BancBoston Mortgage Corp., No. 91-1880 (Ala. Cir. Ct. Jan. 10-11, 1994) (on file with
the Virginia Law Review Association) [hereinafter Fairness Hearing]. Of course, the
result is the same: The class is charged a percentage of all the excess money as if the
excess money were a common fund created by the suit.
36 Hoffman (No. 91-1880), Order & Opinion, Jan. 24, 1994, at 9.
31Id. at 13.
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awarded. One-third of the "economic benefit" conferred by the
suit, as the Notice put it, might indeed have been a reasonable
fee. On the other hand, 389% of the economic benefit is not.
Nor is 4,155%. Nor is the charging of any fee to a class member who received no economic benefit whatsoever. But, as we
shall see, each of these scenarios was possible under the settlement.
For example let us consider a homeowner from Maine (or
from any other state that requires, as Maine does, that banks
pay 3% interest on money held in escrow) with eight years re-

maining on her mortgage and a surplus of $100.00 in escrow. A
reasonable calculation of the economic benefit derived from this
settlement is $7.19. 38 Using the court's 28% attorney's fee
38 We have chosen the numbers in the first example to be close to the benefit that
an "average" homeowner might expect to get from the class action settlement.
According to the Florida Attorney General, the average surplus was $134.50 per
account, which is close to the $100 we are assuming for simplicity. See Brief of
Intervenor, Florida Attorney General's Office 3, Hoffmnan (No. 91-1880) (filed Jan. 21,
1994) [hereinafter Florida Attorney General's Brief]. We also assume that a
homeowner who found herself with an extra $100 might put that money in a bank
account yielding 3.5% interest; a higher rate of return would be fairly unrealistic given
the small amount to be invested. Finally, we assume eight years remaining on the
mortgage because apparently this was the average time remaining on the mortgages
in question. Id. at 12. An additional reason for using eight years is that the benefit
to the class members from changing the method of escrow accounting would shortly
have accrued to those class members even absent the class action. According to the
court in Law v. First Ala. Bancshares, No. CV-90-03351, at 6-7 (Ala. Cir. Ct. Oct. 3,
1995) (unpublished opinion) (on file with the Virginia Law Review Association):
On October 26, 1994 [nine months after Hoffman], the Department of Housing
and Urban Development ("HUD") published a rule, effective on May 24, 1995,
establishing escrow accounting procedures under the Real Estate Settlement
Procedures Act, 12 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq., 59 Fed. Reg. 53890 (Oct. 26, 1994). HUD
has acknowledged that its rule was in part initiated by private class actions such as
this suit. 59 Fed. Reg. at 53890. These regulations prescribe methods of accounting
for escrow accounts that include members of the Class. 24 C.F.R. §3500.17; 60 Fed.
Reg. 8812 (Feb. 15, 1995). Under the new regulations [the bank] must apply the
"aggregate" or "cash" method of accounting to all escrow account analyses
conducted after October 26, 1997. Escrow accounts must be analyzed at least once
a year, so under these new regulations, the members of the Class would have
received their refunds no later than October 1998 ....
Although it is uncertain whether the lawyers in Hoffman could have anticipated this
change in the rule, and whether Hoffman was one of the cases that induced HUD to
act, the rule change at least argues for a conservative estimate of the length of time
during which the class members would achieve benefits from the suit.
Given these assumptions, we compute the economic benefit to this "average" class
member, which consists of back interest plus the benefit from getting the $100 back
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figure and class counsel's formulation of the benefit of this suit
sooner so the class member can invest it herself. First, we compute the back interest
by referring to the formula in note 25, and by making use of the fact that Maine
requires banks to pay 3% interest on escrow accounts. The formula yields $2.19 in
back interest:
.50 * 7.5 * (4% - 3%) * $58.41 = $2.19.
(Note that despite the fact that the class member is assumed to have a $100 surplus,
the back interest formula conclusively presumes that the surplus in past years was only
$58.41.) Next, we compute the amount the class member can earn with her extra
$100. In eight years, 3.5% interest compounded would yield a return of 32% or $32
on $100. Had the bank kept the surplus for those eight years and then returned it to
the customer at the 3% compounded interest rate required by the state, the customer
would get a return of 27%, or $27. Thus, the economic benefit from being able to
invest the $100 at the higher interest rate would be $5.00. Adding $5.00 to the $2.19
back interest benefit yields $7.19, which we claim is a reasonable calculation of the
economic benefit of this settlement to the "average" class member.
Economically oriented readers will recognize that the $5 benefit would have to be
discounted to present value, because the $5 represents the difference in value between
the homeowner's potential return in eight years and the bank's expected payment in
eight years. Put another way, if the bank asked its customer today to give it $100 in
return for a piece of paper worth $127 in eight years, the question is how much the
bank would have to compensate the customer to take the deal. The bank would not
have to pay the full $5 difference in value today but only the amount that would yield
$5 if invested (which when added to the $127 yields a total of $132) in eight years.
If we use 3.5% as the relevant discount rate in the present value formula the present
value of the $5 is $3.79:
5/(1+.035) 8 = 3.79.
Nevertheless we do not use the discounted figure in this or subsequent examples for
the following reason. The escrow surplus resulted from the fact that the bank kept an
extra amount of prorated real estate taxes in the escrow account. If real estate values,
and hence real estate taxes, were increasing over time, then the $100 escrow surplus
would not stay constant but would increase at the same rate at which real estate taxes
increased. If, for simplicity, we assume that real estate taxes (and hence the surplus)
were increasing at the same 3.5% we have been using to calculate the interest the
homeowner could have earned on the $100, then the present value discount would be
cancelled out, and $5 would again be the relevant benefit. In essence, the $100 surplus
would grow with inflation. For those so inclined, the relevant formula for the benefit
to the hypothetical class member is:
100 * (1 + i)nI(1 + r)n * [(1 - r)n - (1 - r)n]
where i represents the inflation rate for real estate taxes (assumed to be .035), r is the
interest rate the homeowner could earn as well as the discount rate (also assumed to
be .035), r' represents the interest rate the bank is required to pay on escrow accounts
(.03 in Maine) and n is the number of years (assumed to be eight). The expression
within the brackets represents the difference between money invested at the market
rate of interest and money invested at the bank's required rate of interest, which we
have found to be $5. If r = i, then the first expression equals one and becomes
irrelevant; the discount rate and the inflation rate offset each other. We note that
even if i is 10% (and every other value stays the same), the benefit is only $8.11,
which when added to the $2.19 back interest, yields a total benefit of $10.30, which
still results in attorney's fees of 272%.
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to the class, our hypothetical homeowner would be charged
$28.00 in attorney's fees-fees that amount to 389% of the $7.19

39
economic benefit conferred upon her.
But the situation gets even worse because the formula in fact
used to calculate attorney's fees to be deducted from a class
member's escrow account was not based on the actual surplus

of any class member. Instead, the formula provided that BancBoston was to add up all of the money it was holding in escrow
accounts and calculate what percentage of that amount was
surplus money, which it should not have been holding; that percentage, calculated at one point to be about 19%, would then be
used to calculate how much attorney's fees each class member
owed.40 Each class member would then pay attorney's fees
39 (28/7.19) * 100 = 389%. It is important to note that the more protection a state
offered bank customers under its laws, the smaller the economic benefit; and thus, the
worse that state's residents did under the settlement. Using the same method of
calculating economic benefit we outlined supra note 38, our hypothetical mortgage
holder in a state mandating 2% interest on money held in escrow would pay 144% in
attorney's fees. Past interest is $4.38:
.50 * 7.5 * (.04 - .02) * $58.41 = $4.38.
The remaining economic benefit (assuming that the discount rate and the inflation rate
are the same), see supra note 38, is:
100 * [(1 + .035)8 - (1 + .02)8] = 100 * (.32 - .17) = $15.
Thus, total benefit is $15 + $4.38 = $19.38. Assuming this person was charged 28%
of only the $100 actual surplus yields attorney's fees of 144%:
(28/19.38) * 100 = 144%. Similar calculations reveal that in a state mandating 1.5% interest our hypothetical
homeowner would pay 114% in attorney's fees. Past interest is $5.48:
.50 * 7.5 * (4% - 1.5%) * $58.41 = $5.48.
The remaining economic benefit is:
100 * [(1 + .035)8 - (1 + .015)8] = 100 * (.32 - .13) = $19.

Thus the total benefit is $19 + $5.48 = 24.48. This benefit yields attorney's fees of
114%.
Similar calculations reveal that in a state mandating 1% interest the homeowner
would pay 93% in attorney's fees; and finally, in a state that did not require banks to
pay any interest on money held in escrow this person would pay 69% in attorney's
fees.
40 See Order of Settlement Approval & Final Judgment, Hoffman (No. 91-1880) at
9. The 19% assumption is based on a preliminary calculation, made by BancBoston
sometime prior to the fairness hearing in Hoffman, that 19% of all the money it was
holding in escrow was surplus (excessive cushion) money. Florida Attorney General
Brief, supra note 38, at 3. However, there was no finding that this 19% average was
constant across the nation, and the Florida Attorney General argued that there was
substantial variation in the percent that was surplus in mortgage holders accounts
depending on the type of mortgage contract one had signed. Id. at 4. We remind our
readers that 19% was simply the ballpark figure used at the Fairness Hearing. The
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equal to 19% (or some percentage near it) of the total escrow

money in her individual account times 28%, which means attorney's fees equal to about 5% of the total money in her escrow
account. That charge would be assessed against the escrow
account regardless of the size of the actual surplus and even if
there were no surplus at all. 41 There is no question that there
were some class members who had no surplus in their escrow
accounts and that the lawyers and the court were aware of this
fact. 42 The maximum benefit these people could get from the

settlement was the $2.19 back interest payment. This is precisely the situation in which Dexter Kamilewicz claims to have
found himself.43 Yet he was allegedly assessed attorney's fees

of $91 (presumably representing about 5% of the total in his
escrow account).44 These attorney's fees are 4155% of the benefit Kamilewicz allegedly received from the class settlement.
understanding of the parties was that the figure would subsequently be adjusted based
on more complete information. The figure was later adjusted and reduced, and it was
this smaller percentage that was used to calculate the actual attorney's fees.
41Note that even if the 19% presumption were correct for every homeowner, it
would be highly unlikely for anyone in Maine to have paid less than 100% in
attorney's fees. To see this, compare the attorney's fees a class member would have
to pay with the benefits she would presumably receive. If we let x represent the total
amount held for this class member in escrow, then the "break-even" point at which
the class member would pay in attorney's fees the full benefit received (that is 100%
attorney's fees) can be computed by solving the following equation for x:
(.28 * .19)x = [(.32 - .27) * .19]x + 2.19
The lefthand side of the equation represents the attorney's fees paid by the class
members, made up of a contingency rate of 28% multiplied by the percentage of the
total amount held in escrow that is deemed to be surplus, namely 19%. The righthand
side of the equation represents the economic benefit for Maine mortgage holders.
This benefit consists of the extra interest that the class members could have received
by investing the money themselves (.32-.27), see supra note 38, multiplied by the 19%
of the total amount held in escrow that is deemed to be surplus (assuming that this
19% is an accurate estimate of the surplus), multiplied by x plus the $2.19 in back
interest, see supra note 38. Solving the equation we get:
.05x = .01x + 2.19
x = $54.75
Thus, every class member with more than $54.75 in her escrow account would pay
more than 100% attorney's fees. For example, a class member with $60 in escrow
would pay $3 in attorney's fees, but receive only $2.79 in benefit.
42 See Order of Settlement & Approval, Hoffinan (No. 91-1880) at 7 (discussing both
surplus and shortage in escrow accounts).
43 Kamilewicz v. Bank of Boston Corp., 92 F.3d 506 (7th Cir. 1996) (petition for
reh'g denied Nov. 22, 1996).
44 Id.
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But we are still not finished. Not all class members were entitled to the back interest benefit. In particular, those whose
escrow accounts were more than 30 days in arrears or who had
obtained loans after September 1, 1990, did not qualify for the
back interest benefit.45 Certainly those in arrears, and probably
some others, did not have an escrow surplus either. Yet, as long
as they had some money in their escrow account, they too paid
attorney's fees as if 19% or some comparable figure of the total
money in their accounts was surplus.46 We have now reached
attorney's fee fantasyland: To infinity and beyond! The existence of these infinity cases should not, however, cause anyone
to lose sight of how extreme the non-infinity cases were in their
own right: 4155% attorney's fees, 389% attorney's fees. Indeed,
all the people who paid more than 100% attorney's fees would
have been better off if class counsel had lost the case. Some
deal.
The Alabama court, ostensibly sitting as guardian for the class,
approved these fees, and reaffirmed its judgment when it revisited the matter following the initiation of a lawsuit challenging
class counsel's conduct in federal district court in Illinois. 47 Before we reach the central question of whether a class action
court's approval of such fees should bar later litigation about the
fees, let us consider what remedies would be available to an
ordinary client in an analogous situation.
2. All Blessings Aside
If a lawyer in an ordinary lawsuit behaved the way the lawyers
allegedly behaved in Hoffman, the client would have numerous
remedies available. It is black letter law that lawyer-client contracts "must be fully and fairly explained to the client, and are
45Notice,

supra note 17, at 4.

46See supra note 40. Ted Benn, a class member who filed suit against BancBoston,
claims to be one of the class members who received no benefit whatsoever yet was
assessed attorney's fees. Brief in Opposition to BancBoston Mortgage Corporation's
Motion to Dismiss, at 9, Benn v. BancBoston Mortgage Corp., No. 96-CV-0974-J, filed
May 13, 1996 (N.D. Tex.).
47Although the decision was affirmed by the state court, see Order of Jan. 30, 1996,
Hoffman (No. 91-1880) (on file with the Virginia Law Review Association),
disgruntled class members undertook a collateral challenge to the settlement in federal
court. See Kamilewicz, 92 F.3d 506.
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strictly construed against the attorney." 48 If a lawyer told an
ordinary client that legal fees would be one-third of the economic benefit recovered for the client in the suit, it would not
take strict construction of the contract to hold that the lawyer
was not entitled to one-third of money the client indisputably
owned. Thus, if a lawyer for an ordinary client tried to keep
one-third of the client's excessive escrow cushion based on such
a contract, a client could bring suit to require the lawyer to
disgorge most of the fee she had collected. And the client
should win. 49 But the client's remedies would not be limited to
disgorgement.
Individual clients could also sue their lawyers for malpractice
and seek punitive damages for conduct like that apparently engaged in by class counsel in Hoffman. Punitive damages are
available in legal malpractice cases in which the lawyer's breach
of fiduciary duty amounts to constructive or explicit fraud. 0 In
general, an award of punitive damages is deemed appropriate
upon a showing that the tortfeasor's actions were intentional,
fraudulent or committed in wanton disregard of another's
rights. 51 Individual clients whose lawyer had advised them to
48Mar Oil, S.A. v. Morrisey, 782 F. Supp. 899, 911 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (citations
omitted), aff'd in relevant part, 982 F.2d 830, 838-40 (2d Cir. 1993).
49See, e.g., Newman v. Silver, 553 F. Supp. 485, 496 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), affd in
relevant part, 713 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1983) (holding that amount of fee, particularly in
light of services rendered and the lack of specific contract, was enough to demonstrate
that "a legal fraud was perpetrated on [the client]"). In Hoffman, testimony at the
fairness hearing apparently demonstrated that class counsel had worked 10,000 hours
in total. Florida Attorney General Brief, supra note 38, at 14 n.5. Class counsel's

fees in total amounted to about $11,800,000 or $1,180 an hour. See Lund, supra note
28, at 19. Moreover, the circumstances in Hoffman, including the deceptive Notice
provision on calculation of fees, do nothing to ameliorate the presumption of
overreaching created by the amount of the fee itself.
50See, e.g., Mar Oil, 982 F.2d at 843-44 (finding no abuse of discretion in trial court's
refusal to award punitive damages against lawyer who withdrew money from client's
escrow account based on buried language providing for such fees, but noting in dicta
that award of punitive damages would probably have been sustained on appeal); Hall
v. Wright, 156 N.W.2d 661 (Iowa 1968) (upholding award of punitive damages against
lawyer who had knowingly and falsely represented to client that seller had clear title
to home that client was to purchase). See generally Annotation, Allowance of
Punitive Damages in Action Against Attorney for Malpractice, 13 A.L.R. 4th 95
(1995).
51See, e.g., McClain v. Faraone, 369 A.2d 1090 (Del. Super. Ct. 1977) (no punitive
damages without showing that lawyer's conduct demonstrated ill will, malice or an
intent to cause injury); Welder v. Mercer, 448 S.W.2d 952, 954 (Ark. 1970) (requiring
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settle their claims for a negative recovery would have an easy

time establishing that their lawyers had demonstrated wanton
disregard for their interests.5 2

Moreover, there is other evidence available on the conduct of
the lawyers in Hoffman that would seem to support a claim for
punitive damages based on intentional wrongdoing or reckless
disregard for the clients' interests. According to a letter written
to a disgruntled class member by BancBoston's lawyer, the bank
had offered to pay class counsel's fees and to provide the class
"essentially the same terms" ultimately accepted by class counsel. 53 BancBoston's lawyer explained that class counsel had
refused the bank's offer to pay attorney's fees and instead had
insisted that they were entitled to "a percentage of the 'economic benefit of the settlement to the class.' 54 The lawyer stated in the letter that after many months of negotiations the bank
"decided to agree to the plaintiffs' position on attorneys fees on
condition that BancBoston be allowed to object to the attorneys

showing of intentional wrong or conscious indifference to rights of the client before
punitive damages award justified).
52 In Rodriguez v. Horton, 622 P.2d 261 (N.M. App. 1980), the court upheld an
award of punitive damages amounting to two times the award of actual damages
against a lawyer who had advised his client to accept an unreasonably low settlement
award. The lawyer had represented to his client that the client would receive sums
from other lawsuits, which did not happen, and the lawyer failed properly to advise
the client of rights to certain compensation under state law. Id. at 264-65. The lawyer
in that case had advised settling for $8,000, which advice the client accepted. Actual
damages were assessed at $10,574.81, punitive damages at $25,000. Id. at 263. If
treble damages are appropriate when one's lawyer advises settling for 30g on the
dollar-a court should have no difficulty awarding them when the lawyer advises
accepting a settlement that amounts to negative $3.89 on the dollar. Even those
people whose banks would otherwise have paid them no interest on their surplus
escrow money apparently ended up receiving only about 31V on each dollar of actual
economic benefit. See supra note 39 and accompanying text (explaining how some
such clients may have paid 69% of the economic benefit in attorney's fees).
53 Cottingham Letter, supra note 29, at 2.
54 Id. It is interesting that BancBoston's lawyer placed the words "economic benefit
of the settlement to the class" in quotation marks. That phrase is a verbatim quote
from the Notice sent to the class, but BancBoston's lawyer was referring to the
settlement negotiations, not the Notice, when he used the quotation marks. By
quoting this language the author of the letter avoids having to explain to the addressee
(a class member and BancBoston customer) exactly what money was used to pay
attorney's fees and avoids personally vouching for the accuracy of the description
enclosed in the quotes.
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fees at a fairness hearing to be scheduled by the court. '55 But
class counsel "would not even accept that position and insisted
that they would not settle unless they were allowed to apply to
the court for a percentage of the settlement without any objection by BancBoston." 56 The bank thought it over and gave in,
agreeing not to object to class counsel's scheme.5 7
We will return to the bank's decision not to object to the fees
in a moment. First, consider what this account of the events
appears to demonstrate about class counsel's intent to make off
with client money being held in trust by the bank. According
to BancBoston's lawyer, class counsel held up the settlement of
their clients' claims until the bank promised not to speak up on
behalf of those clients. According to BancBoston's lawyer, class
counsel proposed that BancBoston keep the money it had offered to pay in attorney's fees and instead give up its customers'
money (class counsel's clients' money) to the class lawyers. And
according to BancBoston's lawyer, even that deal was not sweet
enough to convince the bank to agree to raid its customers accounts, so the lawyers added a new incentive for the bank:
avoiding the costs of a trial. The class lawyers added that incentive when they allegedly made the settlement contingent on
BancBoston's agreeing not to object to the fee proposal. If this
is what happened, to describe it as an intentional breach of a
lawyer's duty to his client or wanton disregard for the client's
interest seems mild.
As to the bank, it too stands in a fiduciary relationship to the
class, its customers. The money that the bank agreed to help
class counsel obtain by not objecting to the request for attorney's fees was money the bank held in escrow for its customers.
A depository may be guilty of conversion when it disburses
55Id. (emphasis added).
56 Id.
37 Id.

at 3. However, before accepting this posture, the bank had filed objections to
the settlement. Those objections demonstrate that the bank knew what effect the
scheme would have on their customers. The objections stated that if the court

approved class counsel's formula for calculating attorney's fees "every class member
will suffer an actual net out-of-pocket loss as a result of this lawsuit." Defendants'
Objections to Plaintiffs' Proposed Notice of Class Action, at 5, Hoffman, (No. 911880) [hereinfafter Defendants' Objections]. "That loss," the bank continued, "will
be paid to their lawyers." Id. These objections were apparently withdrawn and
labeled "moot" after the bank accepted class counsel's proposal.
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money held in escrow contrary to the express terms of the escrow agreement.5 8 The bank apparently agreed to allow such a
disbursement because the bank determined it was in its own
59
financial interest to go along with class counsel on this matter.
58 See Secor Bank v. Hackle, 644 So. 2d 1138, 1142 (La. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that
without express contractual language in escrow agreement authorizing deduction of
attorney's fees incurred by bank to collect money from mortgagor, the bank cannot
unilaterally apply mortgage funds to such fees). See also Rubin Quinn Moss Heaney
& Patterson, P.C. v. Kennel, 832 F. Supp. 922, 931-32 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (applying
Pennsylvania law); Hunnicutt v. Higginbotham, 35 So. 469, 470 (Ala. 1903); Carter v.
Hornsby, 23 S.E.2d 95, 97 (Ga. Ct. App. 1942); Lewis v. Shawnee State Bank of
Shawnee, 596 P.2d 116, 120 (Kan. 1979); Pierce v. Underwood, 61 N.W. 344 (Mich.
1894); Globe Say. Bank v. National Bank of Comm., 89 N.W. 1030, 1032 (Neb. 1902).
59 Considering [certain cases cited by BancBoston's lawyer for the proposition that
attorney's fees of one-third of a settlement fund were reasonable] the fact that
the court had granted a motion for partial summary judgment in favor of the
plaintiffs, and the fact that a trial was scheduled, with all its attendant
uncertainties and expenditure of time and money by BancBoston, BancBoston
finally agreed to the lawyers for the plaintiffs and the class' position on
attorney's fees.
Cottingham Letter, supra note 29, at 3.
In fact, the cases cited by BancBoston's counsel do not support the position that
class counsel's fee request was reasonable. Three of the four cases cited stand for the
proposition that between 18% and 33 1/3% of the fund recovered by the settlement
is an appropriate measure of attorney's fees. City of Ozark v. Trawick, 604 So. 2d 360
(Ala. 1992); Ex parte Brown, 562 So. 2d 485 (Ala. 1990); Reynolds v. First Ala. Bank
of Montgomery, 471 So. 2d 1238 (Ala. 1985). None of those cases supports the notion
that an appropriate award of attorney's fees is one-third of money no one disputed
belonged to the clients. In all of the cases cited, the common fund was a pot of
money that belonged to the class, after the class action, as a result of class counsel's
efforts, not a pot of money whose ownership was never in dispute. "[A] litigant or
lawyer who recovers a common fund for the benefit of persons other than himself or
his client is entitled to a reasonable fee from the fund as a whole." Brown, 562 So.
2d at 495 (emphasis added).
In the fourth case cited, an unpublished opinion in a case against another bank
involving allegations similar to those against BancBoston and brought by the same
class lawyers, the court purportedly bought the same scheme as the one advanced
here-awarding one-third of the surplus escrow money in attorney's fees. Cottingham
letter, supra note 29, at 3. BancBoston's lawyer provides no citation for this case in
his letter, nor does he supply a court, state or date for this decision. Thus, we have
not verified that another court actually approved a similar scheme. On the other
hand, we have no reason to doubt this assertion. Secor Bank, which the letter
identifies as the settling defendant in this other case, is apparently headquarted in
Alabama. If class counsel sued in Alabama and got a judge there to accept this novel
scheme for the awarding of attorney's fees, it may explain why the suit against
BancBoston was brought in Alabama-a choice that otherwise appears difficult to
explain. These lawyers might have wanted to stick with a winning forum.
One unreported state trial court decision hardly seems compelling precedent. The
bank's reliance on this precedent seems even less compelling given its citation of
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Ordinarily, punitive damages are available in an action against
a fiduciary for willful breach of the duties owed the beneficiary. 60 Therefore, absent the Alabama court's approval of the
attorney's fee request, a plaintiff would stand an excellent chance of recovering punitive damages against the bank based on its
agreement to cooperate with class counsel in their request for
attorney's fees, particularly given that the bank stood to gain
financially by going along with class counsel's request. 61 Finally,
had the bank proposed this scheme and sold it to class counsel
Reynolds, a reported opinion by the Alabama Supreme Court. In Reynolds, class
counsel had been awarded one-third of the judgment rendered against the defendant
bank and the class plaintiffs appealed, arguing that the bank had an obligation to pay
the attorney's fees, not the class, given the court's order that the class be made whole
for the defendant's breach of its fiduciary duty. Id. at 1241. As the Reynolds court
explained, class counsel was not seeking any more money:
.They agree that they have been adequately compensated for their hours...,
but they appear before us because they believe they have a professional
responsibility to see that their clients are made whole as per the law of the case
as expressed by Judge Hooper and by this Court. The sole purpose of the
appeal is to shift the responsibility of the fee from [the class's] shoulders to the
bank.
Id. at 1241.
The Alabama Supreme Court agreed on the ground that "ample authority"
supported a state court's power to shift attorney's fees from "the beneficiaries to their
paid trustee." Id. at 1244. It thus reversed the trial court's refusal to shift the cost of
attorney's fees to the bank and ordered the bank to pay those fees. Id. Clearly, then,
BancBoston was aware of precedent suggesting that it could be required to pay fees
based on some percentage of the actual recovery. Cf. Secor Bank, 644 So. 2d at 1142
(suggesting in dicta that an express provision in escrow agreement making the
mortgagor liable for attorney's fees incurred by the bank in action it brings against
mortgagor would raise an issue of public policy).
60 See Rivero v. Thomas, 194 P.2d 533, 542 (Cal. Ct. App. 1948) (punitive damages
permissible against trustee when there is evidence of fraud or malice, express or
implied); DeToro v. Dervan Inves. Ltd., 483 So. 2d 717,723 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985),
on reh'g, op. replaced in part, 11 Fl. Law. Wk. 739 (punitive damages permissible for
breach of fiduciary duty and evidence of profit made by fiduciary admissible to show
willfulness of breach); In re Marriage of Pagano, 607 N.E.2d 1242, 1250 (II1. 1992)
(punitive damages permissible when trust relationship violated, there is gross fraud or
wilfullness is shown).
61 See Ramsey v. Culpepper, 738 F.2d 1092 (10th Cir. 1984) (applying New Mexico
law in upholding punitive damages awarded against agent who intentionally and
recklessly misled principal about principal's real estate to encourage principal to accept
a deal beneficial to the financial interests of the agent). The Notice sent to class
members mentioned that BancBoston had agreed not to object to the attorney's fees.
Notice, supra note 17, at 5. The bank apparently acquiesced in the distribution of this
Notice to class members without ever asking the court to order a clearer description
of the method for calculating attorney's fees in the Notice.
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instead of what appears to have happened here, the bank might
be liable, whether or not it had a fiduciary duty to the class, for
inducing other fiduciaries (class counsel) to breach their duties
to the class. 62
This observation brings us back to class counsel. Like the
bank, class counsel also might be liable for punitive damages for
inducing the bank to breach its fiduciary obligations to its customers by remaining silent about class counsel's request for
attorney's fees. Thus, we have shown that several legal theories
would support the award of punitive damages to a non-classaction client who proved that her lawyer and her bank had engaged in conduct similar to that which we have described. But,
as to the apparent misconduct of the lawyers, there is more.
In Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts,63 the Supreme Court held

that a state court could exercise jurisdiction over plaintiff class
members from other states in an action for money damages
without violating due process, provided that: (1) those representing the class (the named plaintiffs and class counsel) adequately
represent the class's interests; (2) absent class members are provided notice; and (3) absent class members are given an opportunity to opt out of the litigation.64 Shutts provides the basis for
the Hoffman court's jurisdiction over class members from states
other than Alabama. The class members in Hoffman were provided some form of notice and some opportunity to opt out,
although we do not believe the notice or opt-out rights were
sufficient to satisfy the due process requirement elaborated in
Shutts.65 But those matters aside, it is still highly questionable
66
whether Shutts licenses the jurisdiction exercised in this case.
62Restatement (Second) of Torts § 774A (1979) (punitive damages recoverable in
appropriate circumstances for the intentional tort of interfering with a contractual
relationship).
63472 U.S. 797 (1985).
(4 Id. at 811-12.
65We believe that the Notice was constitutionally deficient because it did not provide
enough information for a rational actor to be able to determine whether it was in his
economic interest to remain in this suit-indeed, it misled class members with its
faulty description of how attorney's fees would be calculated. Further, we believe that
the Notice denied a meaningful opportunity to opt out because it did not explain that
negative recovery was possible or how high attorney's fees would actually be for some
class members.
6 We thank Rhonda Wasserman for bringing this point to our attention.
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In Shutts, the defendants had argued that state court jurisdiction over absent out-of-state plaintiff class members should be
no greater than state court jurisdiction over out-of-state defendants. 67 The Court rejected this argument: "The burdens placed
by a State upon an absent class-action plaintiff are not of the
same order or magnitude as those it places upon an absent defendant. ' 68 A defendant may "be forced to respond in damages," and "may also face liability for court cost and attorney's
fees. ' 69 In contrast, absent class-action plaintiffs "are almost
never subject to counterclaims or cross-claims, or liability for
fees or costs. ' 70 Here, the Court inserted this footnote:
Petitioner places emphasis on the fact that absent class members
might be subject to discovery, counterclaims, cross-claims, or court
costs. Petitioner cites no cases involving any such imposition upon
plaintiffs, however. We are convinced that such burdens are rarely
imposed upon plaintiff class members, and that the disposition of
these issues is best left to a case which presents them in a more
concrete way.71
Enter Hoffman, in which a foreign state court apparently ordered absent class members to pay more money than they received-a concrete case presenting the issue left open by Shutts.
A lawyer who neglects to raise jurisdictional objections to a
court order that will cost his client money, when there are serious grounds for making such an objection, will be liable for the
72
damages caused by this neglect.
But here there appears to have been more than ordinary neglect. The lawyers did more than fail to assert their clients'
rights under the Due Process Clause; they urged the state court
67472

U.S. at 802.

68Id. at 808.

(emphasis added).
at 810 (footnote omitted).
71 Id. at 810 n.2.
72See generally 3 Ronald E. Mallen and Jeffrey M. Smith, Legal Malpractice § 29.21
(4th ed. 1996) (discussing issues and citing cases concerning attorney's liability for
failure to establish defense). Cf. id. § 29.26 (regarding errors in selecting venue and
jurisdiction). The jurisdiction problem under Shutts, which we have just discussed,
provides another reason to deny collateral estoppel effect to the ruling of the Alabama
court. On the assumption that most state courts avoid taking money from out-of-state
absent class members, we do not refer to this argument later when we address whether
later suits should generally be estopped based on the prior approval of the class action.
69Id.
70 Id.
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to enter the order on attorney's fees, the constitutionality of
which is in serious question. Moreover, they apparently urged
this course of action to further their own financial interests.
This motive for neglecting the constitutional problems with the
settlement proposed, combined with the active role played by
the lawyers in devising and advocating the arguably unconstitutional result, should suffice to show intentional disregard of the
clients' interests or, at the very least, wanton disregard for their
clients' rights. Either of these showings would justify an award
of punitive damages. 73
In addition, an individual client whose lawyer had acted like
the class lawyers in Hoffman appear to have acted would have
a viable cause of action against the lawyer for common law
fraudulent misrepresentation. The basic elements of the intentional tort of fraudulent misrepresentation are: (1) a false statement of a material fact or, when there is a duty to disclose, an
omission without which the statement made is materially misleading; (2) knowledge or belief by the speaker that the representation is false; (3) the intent to deceive; (4) reasonable reliance by the person to whom the statement is made; and (5)
consequent harm. 74 The statement presumably drafted by class
counsel for inclusion in the Notice to their clients said that the
lawyers would not request a fee that exceeded one-third of the
economic benefit realized from the settlement. 75 This statement
is false, if, as we have argued, the lawyers requested a fee
amounting to somewhere between 69% and 4155% (or more)
of the economic benefit conferred on individual class members. 76
At best, the statements on attorney's fees appear to be materially misleading in that they fail to mention that a client might
73 The deprivation of the class members' constitutional rights could also give rise to
an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994). "Although [lawyers] are themselves private
actors, private parties who corruptly conspire with a judge in conjunction with the
judge's performance of an official judicial act are acting under color of state law for
the purpose of § 1983 ......
Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir. 1996)
(holding that attorneys accused in § 1983 action of conspiring with judge to deprive
plaintiff of constitutional rights cannot, consistent with Supremacy Clause, invoke state
law litigation privilege, nor do they enjoy common law immunity under federal law).
74W. Page Keeton et. al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts, § 106, at 728-38
(5th ed. 1984).

75Notice, supra note 17, at 5.

76See supra text accompanying notes 38-46.
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end up paying more money in attorney's fees than she realizes
from the suit.77 Intent to deceive may be demonstrated by evidence that the speaker knew the statement was false or materially misleading when it was made and that he made it to induce
another to act in reliance on it.78 Given that class counsel apparently devised the attorney's fee proposal, a jury could infer
that class counsel knew that the fee proposal would leave individual class members paying more than one-third of their economic benefit in fees. The intent to induce reliance is shown by
class counsel's apparently having offered these statements for
inclusion in the Notice, upon which class counsel knew people
would rely in deciding whether to stay in the class and thus
incur an obligation to pay attorney's fees.
Actual reliance would have to be demonstrated by testimony
that class members read the statements on attorney's fees in the
Notice,79 but presumably some number of the class read the
Notice and relied on these statements. At the least, damages
would equal the difference between what the clients paid in
attorney's fees and what they might have paid had the statement
been true.80 Moreover, the entire fee paid to the lawyers might
be considered damages, given BancBoston's statements that it
was ready itself to pay class counsel a reasonable fee and provide the class with essentially equivalent relief-another instance
of material information not disclosed to the class. 8' And, collateral estoppel problems aside for the moment, the fact that the
Notice was authorized by a court should not present a serious
obstacle to showing that the lawyers' conduct caused the damage, given that it should be easy to show that the statements
contained in the Notice were either actually or constructively
those of class counsel.8 2

17 In addition to common law fraud, such omission constitutes a breach of fiduciary
duty. As a fiduciary, a lawyer has a duty to his client not to omit material information
from statements upon which the client might reasonably rely. Restatement (Second)
Agency § 381 (1958).
78 Keeton et. al., supra note 74 § 107.
79 Id. § 108.

80Id. § 110.

Cottingham Letter, supra note 29, at 2.
81 See infra text accompanying notes 381-82.
81
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Punitive damages are available in cases of intentional misrepresentation. 83 And, to the extent that the bank understood the

wrongfulness of what the lawyers proposed 84 and knew that
those lawyers owed a fiduciary duty to the class, the bank's
agreement to cooperate with class counsel in what we have just
argued was intentionally tortious conduct might render the bank
liable as a joint tortfeasor, irrespective of and in addition to its
85
independent fiduciary duties to its customers.
Finally, every state has enacted some form of consumer protection statute.8 6 Many of these statutes provide for double,
treble or punitive damages and the award of attorney's fees,
even in the absence of proof of bad faith. 87 Several states have

83 See, e.g., Hoff v. Bower, 492 N.W.2d 912 (S.D. 1992) (punitive damages award
proper for intentional misrepresentation); Keeton et. al., supra note 74 § 2, at 9-10
("Where the defendant's wrongdoing has been intentional and deliberate, and has the
character of outrage frequently associated with crime, all but a few courts have
permitted the jury to award ... 'punitive' or 'exemplary' damages .... ") (footnote
omitted). Further, class counsel might be liable under the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations (RICO) statute, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1994), which also
provides for treble damages. RICO includes mail and wire fraud as "racketeering
activit[ies]." Id. § 1961. This makes lawyers vulnerable to RICO charges. See United
States v. Teitler, 802 F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1986) (applying RICO statute to law firm and
its members as "enterprise" in connection with lawyer's insurance fraud scheme).
RICO prohibits, in any activity involving interstate commerce, the following: (1)
investing income derived from a pattern of racketeering; (2) acquiring or maintaining
an interest through a pattern of racketeering; (3) participating in the enterprise's
affairs through a pattern of racketeering; and (4) conspiring to engage in any of these
activities. Id. § 1962. Two acts of racketeering and the threat of continuing
racketeering activity suffice to establish a "pattern" of racketeering. Id. § 1961(5).
A criminal conviction is not necessary to support civil RICO liability. A private party
who prevails on the merits in a RICO action is entitled to treble damages and
litigation expenses, including attorney's fees. Id. § 1964(c).
Even if the BancBoston scheme were considered only one predicate act of fraud
notwithstanding that it affected over 300,000 mortgagors, RICO liability would lie if
there were evidence that class counsel perpetrated the same wrongs in an earlier suit.
See supra note 59.
84 See Defendant's Objections, supra note 57, at 5 (quoting bank's own papers to
demonstrate that the bank knew the effect of the attorney's fee proposal).
8 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 875 (1979) (each of two or more persons whose
tortious conduct is a legal cause of a single and indivisible harm to the injured party
is subject to liability to the injured party for the entire harm).
86Shelley D. Gatlin, Note, Attorney Liability Under Deceptive Trade Practices Acts,
15 Rev. of Litig. 397, 399-400 (1996).
87 See John A. Spanogle, et. al., Consumer Law 79 (2d ed. 1991); Gatlin, supra note
86, at 397-400; Randall S. Hetrick, Comment, Unfair Trade Practices Acts Applied to
Attorney Conduct: A National Review, 18 J. Legal Prof. 329, 329-30 (1993).
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applied those laws to lawyer-client contracts. 88 These laws generally prohibit, as deceptive, acts that have the "likelihood of
inducing a state of mind in a consumer that is not in accord with
the facts," 89 whether those acts are written or verbal and when
8 See Gatlin, supra note 86, at 402-08. Courts in at least four states-Connecticut,
Louisiana, Massachusetts and Texas-have upheld suits against attorneys under

consumer protection statutes. Heslin v. Connecticut Law Clinic of Trantolo, 461 A.2d
938 (Conn. 1983) (Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act applies to'attorneys for
purposes of an investigatory demand); Reed v. Allison & Perrone, 376 So. 2d 1067
(La. Ct. App. 1979) (applying Louisiana Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer
Protection Law to attorney advertising); Guenard v. Burke, 443 N.E.2d 892, 896

(Mass. 1982) (use of unlawful contingency fee agreement by attorney may be "unfair
or deceptive act or practice"); DeBakey v. Staggs 605 S.W.2d 631, 633 (Tex. Civ. App.
1980) (applying Deceptive Trade Practices Act to purchase of legal services). Courts
in four other states-Montana, Oregon, South Carolina and Washington-have
suggested such claims would be upheld in appropriate circumstances. Matthews v.
Berryman, 637 P.2d 822, 826 (Mont. 1981) (finding attorney's acts did not constitute
fraud, duress or undue influence so as to violate Montana Unfair Trade Practices and
Consumer Protection Act of 1973); Roach v. Mead, 722 P.2d 1229, 1234-45 (Or. 1986)
(holding on facts of case that Oregon's Unlawful Trade Practices Act did not regulate
legal services rendered for investment of money rather than personal use); Camp v.
Springs Mortgage Corp., 414 S.E.2d 784, 786 (S.C. App. 1991), aff'd in part, rev'd in
part, 426 S.E.2d 304 (S.C. 1993) ("There is no question but what [sic] legal services
come within the definition of [the Unfair Trade Practices Act]."); Short v. Demopolis,
691 P.2d 163, 168 (Wash. 1984) (holding that "entrepeneurial aspects of the practice
of the law" are subject to Washington's Consumer Protection Act). Three
states-Maryland, North Carolina and Ohio-have statutes that exclude lawyers from
coverage. Md. Code Ann., Com. Law § 13-104 (1990 & Supp. 1994); N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 75-1.1(b) (1994); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1345.01(A) (Baldwin 1988). Cases in three
more states-Illinois, New Hampshire and New Jersey-have rejected the application
of consumer protection statutes to lawyers. Lurz v. Panek, 527 N.E.2d 663, 670 (I11.
App. Ct. 1988) (Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act does not
regulate attorney's furnishing of legal services); Frahm v. Urkovich, 447 N.E.2d 1001
(IIl. App. Ct. 1983) ("trade or commerce" term in Consumer Fraud and Deceptive
Practices Act does not include actual practice of law); Rousseau v. Eshleman, 519
A.2d 243 (N.H. 1986) (regulation of attorneys falls within exception to scope of
Consumer Protection Act); Vort v. Hollander, 607 A.2d 1339 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div.), cert. denied, 617 A.2d 1221 (N.J. 1992) (attorney's services do not fall within
intendment of Consumer Fraud Act). Cases in Arkansas, Idaho and Pennsylvania
suggest that lawyers may be exempt from liability under consumer protection statutes
in those states. Robertson v. White, 633 F. Supp. 954, 978 (W.D. Ark. 1986) (holding
in alternative that Arkansas Consumer Protection Act not designed to regulate
attorney-client relationship); Keyser v. St. Mary's Hosp., 662 F. Supp. 191, 194 (D.
Idaho 1987) (holding that statute requiring proof of negligence in claim against
physician barred action under Idaho Consumer Protection Act); Gatten v. Merzi, 579
A.2d 974, 976 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1990), app. denied, 596 A.2d 157 (Pa. 1991) (finding
Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law not intended to apply to
physicians rendering medical services).
89 See, e.g., Uniform Consumer Sales Practices Act § 3(a) cmt., 7A U.L.A. 237
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ever the misrepresentation is accomplished through affirmative

words or by nondisclosure. 90 The statutes commonly define as
per se deceptive any act misrepresenting the actual price to be

paid for the services rendered. 91 Telling a client that she will be
charged one-third of the economic benefit of the settlement,
when the attorney's fees she is actually to be charged exceed

100% of her actual recovery (or equal 69% of that recovery)
would seem to fit into this per se category and also within the

general definition of a deceptive practice given above. 92
The statutes also commonly proscribe unconscionable practices. 93 In determining what constitutes an unconscionable practice these statutes generally instruct courts to consider whether
the seller knew or had reason to know that she: took advantage
of the consumer's "inability to understand the language of an
agreement"; 94 sold the services at a price "grossly exceed[ing]
the price" of similar services readily available to like consumers;95 sold the services to consumers unable to receive any substantial benefit from the transaction; 96 or induced the consumer
to enter into a transaction "excessively one-sided in favor of the
supplier. ' 97 Arguably, all of these factors are present here. 98
(1971) [hereinafter UCSPA]. While few states have adopted this model in its entirety,
many states use it as a model in enacting their own statutes. See Spanogle et. al.,
supra note 87, at 70.
90 UCSPA, supra note 89, § 3(a) cmt., at 237.
91 Id.§ 3(b)(8) cmt.
92 One commentator has endorsed the approach taken by Texas, see Tex. Bus. &
Com. Code Ann. § 17.49 (West 1987 & Supp. 1995), and Washington, see Short, 691
P.2d at 168, which limits the application of consumer protection laws to lawyer
conduct involving "entrepreneurial" aspects of the attorney-client relationship, such
as pricing, billing and collecting fees. See Gatlin, supra note 86, at 413. The conduct
alleged in Hoffman unquestionably falls within the entrepreneurial category.
93UCSPA, supra note 89, at § 4(b).
94Id. § 4(c)(1).
95Id. § 4(c)(2).
96Id. § 4(c)(3).
97Id. § 4(c)(5).
98The consumer fraud laws generally provide some form of exemption for acts
required by federal or state law, id. § 14(a)(1), or in some versions of these statutes
acts "in compliance with," or "permitted under" federal or state law. See, e.g., Or.
Rev. Stat. § 646.612 (1988); R.I. Gen. Laws § 6-13.1-3 (1992). The broad question of
whether conduct that would otherwise be malpractice, fraud or some other violation
of law should be considered immunized by the implicit or explicit licensing of that
conduct by a court in the process of approving a class action settlement is addressed
infra Part III. Given our position that any such approval or licensing should not be
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3. All I Know is What I Read in the Papers
It is tempting to imagine that Hoffman is an aberration. We
believe, however, that it is all too representative of the kind of
treatment class members in suits for money damages receive.
Not only do the incentives of the active participants-class law-

yers, defendants and their lawyers, and the courts-lead us to
this conclusion, but unfortunately, recent experience confirms it.
In Part II, we explain why the incentives of the participants
would lead to such abuse, but first a word about the anecdotal
evidence available.
The decision in Hoffman was not published.

Nor was the

similar settlement against Secor Bank alluded to by BancBos-

ton's lawyer in his letter explaining what went on in Hoffman.99
Neither settlement is available on LEXIS. 10° Nor could one
considered a substantive determination of those questions for purposes of collateral
estoppel, see infra text accompanying notes 308-352, it follows that the findings made
by a court approving a class action settlement should not be considered as "law" for
purposes of the standard exemption in consumer fraud statutes. Here, we simply note
that even if these exemptions were read to prevent a challenge in Maine to Hoffmanlike conduct approved by a Maine court or a federal court in a class action settlement,
a Maine court would not be likely to read this to exempt the conduct approved by a
court in Alabama. If a foreign state licenses an act otherwise prohibited under the
forum state's consumer protection law, the reach of forum law is determined, not by
the exemption provision mentioned above, but by: (1) the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, which requires a forum state to have an interest sufficient
to justify the exercise of sovereignty; (2) the Full Faith and Credit Clause, which
requires a balancing of the possible competing interests of separate state sovereignties;
and (3) the Commerce Clause, which requires a determination of whether the state's
choice of law discriminates against or otherwise unduly burdens interstate commerce.
Aldens, Inc. v. Packel, 524 F.2d 38 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 943 (1975). Of this
list, we believe only the Full Faith and Credit Clause is relevant to an assessment of
whether a court in Maine would be required to hold that the Alabama court's
approval of the attorney's fee award in Hoffman prevents the operation of Maine's (or
any other state's) consumer protection law. Given the arguments we offer infra Part
III, we believe the Full Faith and Credit Clause would not apply because the original
Alabama judgment would have limited estoppel effects. The Full Faith and Credit
Clause requires that courts give only that effect to a foreign court judgment that such
judgment would receive in the jurisdiction of origin. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1994).
99 Cottingham Letter, supra note 29, at 3.
100Moreover, a NEXIS search on August 31, 1995, uncovered only one article on
Hoffman, which announced that the Florida Attorney General would intervene in the
case, but otherwise gave few details on the proposed settlement in that case. See
Kimberly Blanton, Florida Sues Boston Bank in Escrow Case, Boston Globe, Nov. 26,
1993, at 89. The article by Will Lund, supra note 28, was published in the Maine
Lawyers Review, which does not appear on NEXIS. On October 2, 1995, the
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find out from published opinions that three similar settlements
were offered to three separate courts, two in New York state
and one in Alabama. 101 We know about those three cases only
because the following people read drafts of this Article and then
reported to us that they had received notices in those cases: a

law professor,102 a lawyer in private practice
offices of attorneys general.

04

03 and lawyers

in the

Had these people not brought

these Hoffman clones to our attention, we would never have
known about them. In short, had Senator Cohen's office not
brought Hoffman to our attention, we would have been unaware

and unable to find these other examples of apparent class action

abuse. 05
In response to the problem of inadequate information about
class action settlements, 106 Senator Cohen, at our suggestion and
Hoffman settlement was briefly discussed (and criticized) by Jane Bryant Quinn in her
Newsweek question and answer column. See Jane Bryant Quinn, Leading Questions,

Newsweek, Oct. 2, 1995, at 71.
101See infra notes 102-103.

102 After presentation of a draft of this paper at Boston University Law School,
Professor Robert Seidman of B.U. received a class action notice that he thought
looked suspiciously like the Hoffman settlement discussed in our draft and brought the
notice to our attention. Notice of Class Action Proposed Settlement and Hearing,
Murray v. Shawmut Mortgage Co., No. 3037/94 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 12, 1996) (on file
with the Virginia Law Review Association). We thank him.
103 Ralph Wellington of Schnader, Harrison, Segal & Lewis, the lawyer to whom
Professor Koniak referred the class members who believed themselves wronged by the
judgment in Hoffman and the lawyer who now represents those class members, himself
received notice that he was a member of a class settlement that looked suspiciously
like that in Hoffman. See Susan Adams, Deliberate Obfuscation, Forbes, Sept. 9,
1996, at 152-53. Mr. Wellington filed objections to the settlement, which resulted in
the lawyers agreeing to refrain from seeking fees from the mortgage accounts of their
clients. Id. The judge nonetheless rejected the proposed settlement on the ground
that the class received no real benefit from the settlement proposed. Mr. Wellington
sent us the judge's unpublished opinion, a copy of which he received from the judge
in the case. See Objections to the Terms of the Settlement Agreement, Lerose v.
PHH U.S. Mortgage Co., No. 08544 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 23, 1996) (on file with the
Virginia Law Review Association).
104 Conversation with Walter Maroney, Senior Assistant Attorney General, State of
New Hampshire, Feb. 8, 1996.
105
Since the filing of the lawsuit against the Hoffman lawyers, the case has garnered
considerably more media attention. See Susan Adams, Fighting Back: How the
Outraged "Winners" of an Egregious Class Action Settlement Are Taking Their Own
Lawyers to Court, Forbes, Apr. 22, 1996, at 12; Max Boot, Judges Rebel Against Mass
Tort Excesses, Wall St. J., Apr. 3, 1996, at A15; Barry Meier, Math of a Class-Action
Suit: 'Winning' $2.19 Costs $91.33, N.Y. Times, Nov. 21, 1995, at Al.
106 Some information about class action settlements does exist in certain types of
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with our help, introduced legislation designed to increase available information about these settlements. 107 The bill would

require attorneys for class action plaintiffs to give notice of proposed settlements 120 days prior to any hearing on those settlements to the Department of Justice and state attorneys general
from states where class members reside, so that these agencies
might have the information and time necessary to intervene to
protect the interests of class members. 08 The bill also specifies
that court orders in class actions must be made available for

publication in court reporters, so that lawyers, academics and
the press can monitor such cases. Last, but certainly not least,
the bill contains plain-language requiremenis for communica-

tions to class members. 109

Given the present state of affairs, one simply cannot say how
many viable claims of malpractice or breach of fiduciary duty
exist. What we do know, however, is that Hoffman and other

cases. For example, the Federal Securities Law Reports include information about
proposed and actual settlements in class actions, as do the Class Action Reports. We
believe that the available information is inadequate, however.
107 Protecting Class Action Plaintiffs Act of 1995, S.1501, 104th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1995), was introduced by Senator William S. Cohen (R-Me.) on December 12, 1995.
141 Cong. Rec. S519,250 (daily ed. Dec. 22, 1995). For a synopsis of the bill's main
provisions, see Congress: Proposed Legislation, Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) No. 402, at
3-4 (Jan. 10, 1996).
108
See Protecting Class Action Plaintiffs Act, supra note 107, § 1711(c)-(d).
109
See id. § 1711 (f)-(g). The most recent available empirical study suggests that
"[m]any, perhaps most, of the notices present technical information in legal jargon"
and concludes that "most notices are not comprehensible to the lay reader." Thomas
E. Willging, Laural L. Hooper & Robert J. Niemic, An Empirical Analysis of Rule 23
to Address the Rulemaking Challenges, 71 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 74,134 (1996). Moreover,
the study found that "notices did not appear to include sufficient information for an
individual class member to appraise the net value of a settlement to the class or to
calculate an expected personal share in the settlement." Id. at 133. Even notices that
provide relevant information may do so in a deceptive way. For example, the notice
for one of the bank escrow cases contains a paragraph that states: "[Bank] agrees to
make a payment toward court-awarded attorney's fees, costs and expenses not to
exceed $150,000." Adams, supra note 103, at 152. Does this provision ensure that the
class lawyers will not ask for more than $150,000 and that no money will be paid by
class members for the attorney's fees? Read it again carefully.
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bank cases like itn O are not the only class action suits that might
give rise to later suits against the settling parties.
We do not have the space here to discuss other cases with the
attention to detail that would be necessary to demonstrate with
any certainty that they involve malpractice, breach of fiduciary
duty or fraud. And, unfortunately, hypotheticals do not help;
they would only leave us open to the charge that courts would
never approve settlements like those in our hypotheticals.
Would you have believed courts have approved settlements like
the one in Hoffman had we suggested as much through a hypothetical? Nevertheless, those tempted to believe that Hoffnan
and its sister bank cases are the only cases egregious enough to
warrant the remedy we propose, we provide the following brief
summaries of settlements approved by federal district courts to
dispel that notion.

110In addition to the bank cases we have just alluded to, see Brundidge v. Glendale

Federal Bank, 659 N.E.2d 909, 911 (Ill. 1995) (discusing class action settlement in bank
escrow case in which lawyers apparently asked for percentage of the total refund, but
not revealing who was to pay those fees).
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In Georgine v. Amchem Products, Inc.,"' a federal district
court approved a class action settlement involving hundreds of
thousands of claims arising from exposure to products containing asbestos. Class counsel defined the class to include all people who were presently ill from exposure to the defendants'
asbestos products, as well as all those who might become ill
from exposure to those products in the future-well, almost
all." 2 The definition excluded thousands of people with asbestos
claims indistinguishable from those included within the class
except for the fact that the excluded people were "present clients" of class counsel or other asbestos lawyers." 3 The gerrymandered
111157 F.R.D. 246 (E.D. Pa. 1994), vacated, 83 F.3d 610 (3d Cir. 1996), cert. granted
sub nom. Amchem Prods. v. George Windsor, 65 USLW 338 (U.S., Nov. 1, 1996) (No.
96-270). For a description of the wrongdoing in Georgine that provides an example
of the level of detail necessary to demonstrate that misconduct occurred, see Koniak,
supra note 15. Professor Koniak served as a paid expert witness for the objectors to
the Georgine settlement, testifying on the ethics of class counsel's conduct. Id. at
1146-47. Georgine is the case that first got us thinking about the importance of later
suits for misconduct in class actions. We thank Roger Cramton for helping us to
develop our thoughts on the misconduct in Georgine.
The Third Circuit recently overturned the Georgine settlement. 83 F.3d 610 (3d Cir.
1996). But as we argue below, this form of redress for class action abuse is rare. See
infra note 186 (citing empirical evidence on the small number of class settlements
overturned on appeal). In our view, the fact that the Georgine settlement was
overturned is attributable not to the fact that the conduct in that case was so much
more egregious than in other class actions, but rather to the fact that in that case,
unlike most others, the objectors were well-financed and therefore able to mount an
impressive (and very expensive) challenge to the settlement. Other asbestos lawyers
had a significant incentive to challenge the Georgine settlement because, if approved,
it would have significantly restricted the future income they might otherwise have
expected to achieve through handling asbestos cases individually. But the lawyers who
financed the challenge to the Georgine settlement have told us that, given what
everyone understands to be the small chance of derailing such a deal, they believe
class counsel and the defendants were surprised that they were met with a
well-financed challenge and had calculated that no more than a challenge-on-the-cheap
would be mounted. Interview with with Fred Baron, Counsel for Objectors in
Georgine,Jan. 1994.
112 The class included all people exposed to the asbestos products of the twenty
defendant corporations (and their immediate family members) except those people
who had filed suit against the companies by Jan. 15, 1993. Georgine, 157 F.R.D. at
257-58.
113 Id. at 296. Because class counsel knew the cut-off date before the class settlement
was filed with the court, they were able to exclude people from the class at will by
getting a lawsuit on file with a court prior to Jan. 15, 1993. Moreover, there is
evidence that class counsel did just that. Koniak, supra note 15, at 1057-59. The
phrase "present clients" was used by class counsel to refer exclusively to those
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class definition allowed class counsel to settle approximately

14,000 individual cases against the defendants for amounts that
appear to be much higher than the recoveries provided class
members under the class settlement.11 4 But neither the absent

class members nor the named class representatives were informed that their lawyers had negotiated better deals on identi-

cal claims against the same defendants for their 14,000 "present
clients" than the lawyers had negotiated for the class." 5 Nor
was the class informed that the defendants told class counsel
that a condition of settling those 14,000 cases was a class settle-

ment that would roll up all the future cases that might be filed
against the defendants and settle them at a price the defendants
could accept." 6 In our opinion, these facts give rise to a plausi-

ble malpractice suit against class counsel because they strongly
suggest that class counsel sold out the class in favor of 14,000

non-class members to further class counsel's own interest in
their share of the attorney's fees from those 14,000 cases, which

is money paid to class counsel by the defendants in addition to
the fees awarded by the district court for representing the class.
An ordinary client whose lawyer traded part of the value of that

client's claim to further the financial interest of some other person, such as the 14,000 "present clients," would have a viable

claim of malpractice against her lawyer and a fair chance of
excluded from the class. Id. at 1059. We put the phrase in quotation marks because
class counsel had an obligation to class members to treat them as if they were present
clients too. Id. at 1056-57. See also id. at 1074-78 (explaining how class counsel's
efforts to distinguish the claims of their present clients from those of class members
were specious, although adopted by the federal district court).
114 Id. at 1064-74 (describing evidence that appears to show that one of the law firms
serving as class counsel in Georgine negotiated settlements for its "present clients" that
were 54% better than those negotiated for the class, and that the other firm negotiated
settlements that were 72% better).
115 Id. at 1137-42.
116 To quote testimony from one of the representatives of the defendants offered at
the fairness hearing: "Without a degree of confidence that the Georgine discussions
would be successful, we would not have done the present inventory settlements with
[class counsel] or the other numerous unaffiliated [plaintiffs'] firms [that] we did
inventory deals with, that is correct." Transcript of Fairness Hearing at 193-94,
Georgine v. Amchem Prods., No. 93-0215 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 23, 1994) quoted in Koniak,
supra note 15, at 1081-82 (testimony of Lawrence Fitzpatrick) [hereinafter Georgine
Fairness Hearing]. See also id. at 1078-86 (describing evidence that the present clients'
settlements were made in exchange for defendants getting the class settlement they
wanted in Georgine).
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receiving punitive damages. 117 Although the Third Circuit rejected the Georgine settlement, the Fifth Circuit in Ahearn v.
Fibreboard"8 recently approved a similar scheme in another
asbestos class action developed by some of the same lawyers as
the lawyers in Georgine. And we know of at least one other

class suit, involving polybutylene pipe, in which the same
scheme has been used. 119 Because lawyers are quick to recognize a profitable opportunity, we would expect that Georginestyle class gerrymandering will (if Rule 23 and the courts continue to permit it) become at least as ubiquitous as Hoffman-

style "benefit enhancement" apparently is.
One final example before we move on. In 1990, lawyers for
Imperial Corporation of America (ICA), the parent company of
Imperial Savings Association (ISA), a failed savings and loan,

negotiated a $13 million settlement of shareholder derivative
claims and class action claims arising out of ICA's investments
in junk bonds and consumer loans in the late 1980s.120 ICA's

insurers were to pay $12.5 million toward the settlement and
ICA, $500,000.121

The settlement provided that of the $12.5

million paid by the insurers, $2.5 million was to be "deemed" in
settlement of the derivative suit; the rest was "deemed" in set117
See supra notes 73-85 and accompanying text.
118
See Ahearn v. Fibreboard, 162 F.R.D. 505, (E.D. Tex. 1995), aff'd on appeal, In
re Asbestos Litig., 90 F.3d 963 (5th Cir. 1996) (petition for reh'g pending) (approving
class action settlement which, like the Georgine settlement, appears to define the class
so as to exclude other clients of class counsel).
119See Spencer v. Shell Oil Co., No. 94-074 (Ala. Cir. Ct. 1995) (on file with the
Virginia Law Review Association). For more on the polybutylene pipe class actions,
see Richard B. Schmitt, Leaky System: Suits Over Plastic Pipe Finally Bring Relief,
Especially for Lawyers, Wall St. J., Nov. 20, 1995, at Al (discussing polybutylene
("PB") pipe case then pending in Alabama in which class definition excluded clients
who individually signed a retainer with class counsel). That case was one of several
class suits filed in several state courts on behalf of homeowners with PB piping. John
C. Coffee, Jr. & Susan P. Koniak, Rule of Law: The Latest Class Action Scam, Wall
St. J., Dec. 27, 1995, at 11. Ultimately, the plaintiffs' lawyers in these various suits,
which sought to include all the same people or overlapping groups of homeowners,
agreed to join one "global" settlement to be executed by a state court in Tennessee.
Schmitt, supra, at A5. The Alabama suit was dropped in favor of the Tennessee
settlement, id., but we have no reason to believe that the side settlements negotiated
as 2part
of the Alabama suit were affected in any way.
1 0 Durkin v. Shea & Gould, 92 F.3d 1510 (9th Cir. 1996); Robert Ablon, Settlements
Don't Bar Malpractice Suits, Circuit Says, The Recorder, Aug. 20, 1996, at 1 available
in LEXIS, News Library Curnws file.
121Durkin, 92 F.3d at 1512.
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tlement of the class actions.'2 The settlement released the directors and officers of ICA from any claims related to the risky
investments that those directors allegedly promoted or approved. 123 After obtaining approval of the settlement from
ICA's Board of Directors, ICA's lawyers and the shareholders'
lawyers jointly petitioned a federal court to approve the consolidated settlement of the class and derivative claims. 124 The district court obliged. 25 On the same day that the judge approved
the settlement, federal regulators ordered the seizure of ISA
and placed it into conservatorship under the Resolution Trust
Corporation (RTC).126 One week later, ICA filed for bankruptcy. 127

The bankruptcy trustee subsequently sued ICA's lawyers,
ICA's directors and the plaintiff shareholders' lawyers alleging:
(1) the directors assisted by ICA's lawyers and the shareholders
lawyers breached their fiduciary duties to the company and engaged in a fraudulent transfer of the corporation's funds by
virtue of arranging the settlement; (2) that ICA's lawyers and
the plaintiffs' lawyers colluded to keep the court in the dark
about ICA's insolvency, the imminent seizure of ICA by the
regulators, and the strength of the case that could be made
against the directors; (3) that ICA's lawyers failed to advise the
directors either of the conflict of interest the directors had in
approving the settlement or of the unfairness of settling the
shareholder derivative claims for a mere $2.5 million; and, (4)
that the plaintiffs' lawyers committed malpractice, although the
128
basis of that claim is not spelled out in the court opinion.
Although the district court dismissed the malpractice claims
against the plaintiffs' lawyers, 12 9 and the court of appeals
122 Id.
123Id.
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 Id. at 1513.
127 Id.
128 Id.
129 Id. at 1514.

Just as the court of appeals does not explain on what theory the
bankruptcy trustee sued the plaintiffs' lawyers for malpractice, the court does not
explain on what grounds the district court dismissed the claim. We were unable to get
a copy of the unpublished district court opinion or any of the unpublished orders
issued by the district court in time to include it in this Article, so we are unable to
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dismissed the claims against the directors, 130 the Ninth Circuit in
Durkin v. Shea & Gould held that the malpractice claims against
ICA's lawyers could proceed, the prior court's approval of the
settlement notwithstanding. 131 Moreover, the court of appeals
did not rule on the breach of fiduciary claims and fraudulent
transfer claims that are apparently still pending against both
ICA's lawyers and the lawyers for the shareholders. 132
Durkin, which was decided as this Article was in the process
of being published, not only tracks our argument on the inapplicability of collateral estoppel to the kinds of suits we advocate, 133 it provides another example of the kind of abuse that
may well be widespread in the settlement of class and derivative
actions-company lawyers arranging a settlement that shortchanges the company and its shareholders but serves the interests of directors by releasing them from liability at no cost to
those directors. Once again, the fairness hearing process does
not appear adequate to prevent this abuse. And once again
there is no reason to think this abuse is rare. Moreover, malpractice and fraud are not the only form of wrongdoing that
may lurk beneath the surface of class and derivative suit settlements. We now turn to the antitrust violations that may occur
in connection with settling these cases.
B. Is There a Trust in This Class?
To most people, and certainly to most lawyers, it is unthinkable that the antitrust laws could possibly have anything to do
with regulating lawyer conduct in litigation. And in simpler
times, this view made perfect sense. Lawyers were "professionals," not "businessmen" competing in some market. Even if
they were businessmen to some extent, at least when they put
on their litigators' hats they were not engaging in economic
competition in some market, but competition of a different sort.
enlighten our readers further on the claims against the plaintiff firm.
130The case against the directors was dismissed in a companion opinion to Durkin,
In re Imperial Corp., 92 F.3d 1503 (9th Cir. 1996). We come back to the reasoning
on claim preclusion in that opinion later. See infra Section III.B. and notes 291,306.
131Durkin, 92 F.3d at 1518.
132 Id. at 1514-15.
133See infra text accompanying notes 329-331.
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Even if their conduct in litigation affected some market, courts
oversaw and regulated this conduct, and everyone knew that
once government regulation intruded on the marketplace, it
blunted any antitrust enforcement. Finally, even if court oversight was imperfect, lawyers wefe representing their clients'
interests in litigation, and any attempt to beat down their conduct with the antitrust club would at the same time strike the
helpless client whose access to the courts would thereby be

threatened.
But these simpler times have vanished.

Because of the

increased use of the class action device, especially in mass tort

cases, as well as the evolution of antitrust law, the once unthinkable is now thinkable. And it is time that lawyers started
thinking hard. In the face of the sometimes-expressed view that

the antitrust laws are effectively dead, the Supreme Court has
in fact been chipping away at protections lawyers might reasonably have thought they had. It has found that the antitrust laws

can reach lawyer conduct, especially when their fees are in-

volved.134 It has rejected the notion that either "pervasive"
regulation or the approval of a government agent automatically
displaces the antitrust laws. And it has recognized that private
parties cannot shield themselves from the antitrust laws by incidentally connecting their activities to some government
agency. 135 As people have come to recognize the limits of regu-

134See Federal Trade Comm'n v. Superior Ct. Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411
(1990) (holding per se illegal boycott in support of higher wages by lawyers
representing indigent criminal defendants); Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S.
773 (1975) (holding minimum fee schedule for lawyers enforced by state bar
association a violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act). The Trial Lawyers case is
especially significant, because it applied the per se rule despite some indications in
earlier cases that professionals were entitled to rule of reason treatment. See FTC v.
Indiana Federation of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 458 (1986) (applying the rule of reason
to a boycott by a group of dentists in part because "we have been slow to condemn
rules adopted by professional associations as unreasonable per se"); National Soc'y of
Prof. Eng. v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978). But see Arizona v. Maricopa County
Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982) (maximum price-fixing scheme by doctor group
held per se illegal). The Court's approach parallels the approach of some states in
applying their consumer protection laws to lawyer conduct, see supra notes 88-92:
where fee agreements are involved, lawyers get no special antitrust treatment.
135See infra Sections IV.B. and IV.C.
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lation that displaces the market, antitrust has in fact enjoyed
new stature as regulation that supports the market. 136
There are at least three practices connected to the settlement
of class action suits that raise serious questions under the antitrust laws. The first practice is agreements among plaintiffs'
lawyers to support each other's bid to be class counsel in a particular suit. Consider, for example, what happened when Oracle
Systems Corporation's stock dropped sharply on March 27,1990.
Within a week of the stock plunge, fourteen separate class actions had been filed on behalf of the various classes of Oracle
shareholders, and four more were filed the following week.137
"[M]ore than 25 of the leading plaintiffs' class action law firms
in the country" had filed suit on behalf of someone in that short
span of time. 138
By April 2, 1990, two of the firms filing class actions were
busy setting up a meeting of the plaintiffs' firms to achieve
"consensus" on how the "litigation should be structured' 39
Two firms refused to attend, "sensing that they would be outvoted on any decisions made at the meeting. 140 But fifteen
firms sent lawyers to the meeting, which was held on April 12.141
At the meeting, these lawyers "voted on an organization of the
litigation and a leadership structure of two co-lead counsel."' 42
Nominations for the post of lead counsel were made, and thereafter a vote was taken, resulting in an agreement among these
firms on the two firms to be presented to the court as co-lead
counsel in this litigation. 143 On May 4, 1990, the two firms elected sought the court's "ratification" of the agreement. The two
firms that had boycotted the April 12 meeting objected. "The

136 See Herbert Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust Policy: The Law of Competition and
Its Practice § 19.2, at 649 (1994) (arguing that the deregulation movement of the 1970s
and 1980s has greatly increased the role of antitrust in regulated industries).
137 In re Oracle Sec. Litig., 131 F.R.D. 688, 690 (N.D. Cal. 1990).
138 Id.
139Id.
140Id.
141Id.
142Id. (citation omitted).

143Id. Minutes of the meeting were prepared and signed, presumably by the attendees. Id.

1092

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 82:1051

two camps... squared off, sending volleys of disparagement at
each other." 144
Judge Vaughn Walker asked the two camps to compete for
the position of lead counsel on the basis of price, requesting
each camp to submit an anticipated budget for the litigation
within ten days. 4 5 Upon request, the court granted a brief extension, but "[w]hen that deadline rolled around, the [two
camps] filed a joint proposal to serve as co-lead counsel." 146
According to the court "[t]he prospect of competition, it seems,
had whistled an end to the shouting match."147
Judge Walker rejected this joint bid and ordered the firms to
compete by submitting, in camera, applications to the court for
the post of lead counsel, detailing the applicant firm's qualifications for the post and "specifying the percentage of any recovery" the firm would charge "as fees and costs."'148 The lead
firm's costs were to include any fees or costs that firm found
necessary to pay any firm that it hired to assist in the litigation. 49 Most interesting, the court believed it necessary to order
each firm submitting a bid to certify to the court that "its compensation proposal was prepared independently and that no part
thereof was revealed to any other bidder prior to filing with the
court" and, further, to order the applicants "not to confer in any
manner with other firms during the preparation of bids. ' 150 The
judge apparently believed that absent his order the lawyers
would continue to engage in conduct that, in any other setting,
would be considered a violation of the antitrust laws.
Our point, of course, is not that Judge Walker was wrong to
question what more these lawyers might do to forestall competition. The April 12 meeting and the joint bid proposal gave him
more than just cause to be concerned. And we applaud the
judge's efforts to insist that these lawyers compete, 5 ' particular
144

Id.

145Id. at

690.

146Id. at 691.
147Id.

148 Id. at 697.
149

Id.

150Id.
151Other commentators have endorsed and enlarged upon Judge Walker's approach.
See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, A Market Approach to Tort Reform

1996]

Under Cloak of Settlement

1093

ly given how few courts have made any similar efforts. 152 Rather, our point is that this judge, who represents the outer limits
of concern with competition in the class action setting, was apparently willing to overlook the antitrust problems with the
April 12 meeting. He asked the two camps to submit competing

bids. It was not until the two remaining competitors decided to
forego competition that he expressed concern with the meeting

that ensured that only two camps would be competing in the
first place.
In fairness to Judge Walker, in his opinion rejecting the joint
bid from the two camps, he did remark in a footnote that the

April 12 meeting demonstrated "a rather cavalier indifference
to at least the spirit of the anti-trust laws" on the part of lawVia Rule 23, 80 Cornell L. Rev. 909, 912, 917 (1995) (arguing for "auction" approach
to class actions); John C. Coffee, Jr., Regulating Plaintiffs' Attorneys, N.Y. LU., Sept.
22, 1994, at 5 (assessing problems and possibilities of auctions in regulating plaintiff s
attorney conduct). Our point here is not to debate the merits of any particular
bidding scheme, but rather to insist (as apparently no one yet has) that the antitrust
laws regulate any such scheme.
152 Judge Walker was apparently the first federal judge to try to institute competitive
bidding for class counsel. See In re Amino Acid Lysine Antitrust Litig., 918 F. Supp.
1190,1192 n.6 (N.D. Ill. 1996); Howard Mintz, Judge Levels Collusion Charge at Class
Counsel, The Recorder, Aug. 8, 1995, at 1 available in LEXIS, Genfed Library, Pubs
File. Since Oracle, he has tried the same scheme in two more class actions. See In
re Wells Fargo Sec. Litig., 156 F.R.D. 223, 225 (N.D. Cal. 1994); In re California
Micro Devices Sec. Litig. No. C-94-2817-VRW, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1361, at *1
(N.D. Cal. Feb. 2, 1996).
At least one other judge has attempted to follow Judge Walker's lead. See In re
Amino Acid Lysine Antitrust Litig., 918 F. Supp. 1190 (Shadur, J.). In that case, the
court conducted an auction and awarded the class counsel position to a firm that
offered a fee of 20% of the first $5 million recovered, 15% of the next $10 million,
and 10% of the next $10 million, with no additional fee for any recovery over $25
million. Id. at 1198. Thus the bid capped the lawyers' fees at $3.5 million:
.2 * $5M + .15 * $10M + .1 * $10M = $1M + $1.5M + $1M = $3.5M.
The problem with this bid was that by capping the lawyers' fees, it eliminated any
incentive for the lawyers to secure a recovery greater than $25 million. Although the
court apparently recognized this problem and suggested that it would "give
consideration to a motion for the award of some bonus fee" for any recovery in excess
of $25 million, id. at 1199, the chosen lawyers settled the case three months later for
an amount many have argued is inadequate. See Laurie Cohen, Thomas M. Burton
& Scott Kilman, Bargainat the Bar: Archer-Daniels Cuts Surprisingly Good Deal in
Price-Fixing Suit, Wall St. J., Apr. 12, 1996, at Al, A6. The settlement agreement,
filed with the court on April 12, is reprinted in CCH Trade Regulation Reports.
Lysine Price Fixing-Class Action Settlement, 416 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 50,155,
at 49,177 (Apr. 17, 1996).
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yers, "many of whom claim expertise" in those laws.153 But even
this comment is revealing. Why "spirit?" Put aside, as we
asked you to do earlier, the fact that class counsel's selection
was ratified ultimately by a court. Is there much doubt that in
any other setting the conduct just described would violate more
than the spirit of the antitrust laws? 154

Nor is the conduct engaged in by the plaintiff's firms in Oracle
rare. To the contrary, it is apparently commonplace, albeit perhaps not always so well documented. 155 Every class action suit
displaces competition among lawyers for individual litigants and
by consolidating cases creates what might be thought of as a
153Oracle, 131 F.R.D. at 690 n.3. Judge Walker also made reference to the antitrust
laws in his more recent efforts to maintain competition. When two of the leading class
action plaintiff firms that had been acting as "de facto" class counsel offered to submit
a joint bid and act as co-counsel, Judge Walker warned that "joint ventures which
substantially lessen competition are not tolerated under our competition laws." Wells
Fargo, 156 F.R.D. at 226 (citing sources). Moreover, Judge Shadur responded to a
request by lawyers to submit a joint bid or to discuss the case among themselves in
Amino Acid Lysine by stating that it is:
[M]ore than somewhat ironic in this litigation, finding its origin as it does in the
antitrust laws, because any such cooperation among counsel that could cut back
on the number of prospective bidders or could otherwise inhibit the independent
judgment of those who bid would clearly seem to operate in restraint of trade.
918 F. Supp. at 1192 n.7.
154Market allocation by competitors is per se illegal under the antitrust laws. See
Palmer v. BRG, 498 U.S. 46, 49 (1990) (per curiam). In fact, many view market
allocation as more anticompetitive than ordinary price fixing, because it eliminates all
competition, not just price competition, among competitors. See, e.g., Stephen F.
Ross, Principles of Antitrust Law 148 (1993) ("[M]arket division schemes are more
insidious than price-fixing agreements. A firm that enters into a price-fixing
agreement can.., still engage in non-price competition-by offering ... products of
higher quality or better or quicker service. By contrast, a market division scheme
eliminates any competition among the carteleers.") Moreover, agreements among
competitors to rotate bids constitutes "bid rigging," which is punishable criminally
under the antitrust laws. See generally United States v. Heffernan, 43 F.3d 1144 (7th
Cir. 1994) (Posner, C.J.) (discussing meaning of bid rigging for purposes of sentencing
guidelines).
155 This is certainly Judge Walker's view. See Oracle, 136 F.R.D. at 649 (explaining
how competitive bidding might break up "the lawyer consortiums" often found in class
action cases); Wells Fargo, 156 F.R.D. at 226-27 (noting that "the steering committee
device ... puts a real damper on competition" and suggesting that "this is why
plaintiff class action lawyers like the device so much"); In re California Micro Devices
Sec. Litig., No. C-94-2817-VRW, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11587, at *13 (N.D. Cal., Aug.
8, 1995) (suggesting that the fact that Judge Walker received competitive bids from
only two out of twelve firms that had originally been involved in the litigation was an
"indicia of ... cooperation" which "raises serious doubts about the conditions of
competition in this segment of the legal services industry").
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monopoly. But nothing about that fact necessitates the elimination of competition to represent the monopoly. Lawyers apparently feel free to eliminate that competition on their own by
entering agreements not to compete. 156
156 We do not mean to suggest that all aggregations of lawyers in litigation raise
antitrust concerns. "Litigation groups" evidently developed in mass tort cases where
lawyers representing individual clients found it useful to join in a group to share
information and conduct joint discovery. See Paul D. Rheingold, The Development
of Litigation Groups, 6 Am. J. Trial Advoc. 1 (1982). Such cost-saving activity is akin
to "trade association" exchanges of information which receive rule of reason treatment
under the antitrust laws. United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 440-41 &
441 n.16 (1978). Agreements among lawyers from different firms to conduct class
action litigation jointly, combining their resources and sharing the risks and rewards,
would be a joint venture and might also receive more lenient antitrust treatment.
Such agreements have occurred in mass tort class actions. See Richard A. Nagareda,
Turning from Tort to Administration, 94 Mich. L. Rev. 899, 910 & nn.38, 39 (1996).
But in many class actions (such as those involving securities, antitrust and consumer
law), clients are all but an after-thought, necessary to the suit but easy to find when
a suit looks promising. Thus, there is no evident need for joint activity, other than for
risk-sharing purposes. In these cases, "allowing all the interested plaintiff lawyers to
form a steering committee for each class action in which more than one plaintiff firm
is interested essentially permits these lawyers to create an ad hoc monopoly in each
such case." Wells Fargo, 156 F.R.D. at 226. Moreover, as Judge Walker also
recognized, "to permit a joint bid by two dominant firms.., might very well eliminate
whatever possibility remains ... of a meaningful competition to secure class counsel
designation." Id. Nor would joint bidding be necessary to achieve cost saving if, as
in Wells Fargo, the firms seeking to bid jointly were "two of the largest and most
amply capitalized plaintiff law firms in the country," which "have demonstrated that
they know exactly how to go about achieving leverage and risk spreading in their
practices." Id. at 227.
Even if the formation of a litigation group is itself a lawful joint venture under the
antitrust laws, that does not mean that all agreements made by that group would be
lawful. For example, in Jones Knitting Corp. v. Morgan, 244 F. Supp. 235 (E.D.Pa.
1965), rev'd on other grounds, aff'd in relevant part, 361 F.2d 451 (3d Cir. 1966), a
group of manufacturers jointly hired a lawyer to investigate possible challenges to the
validity of a patent held by a competitor. The group agreed further that "[n]o
member was to approach [the patent holder] individually regarding a license until after
completion of the search [by the lawyer], without first consulting with the others," and
if approached by the patent holder a "member would do nothing until after he had
notified others in the group." 244 F. Supp. at 236. After the lawyer recommended
that the group file a declaratory judgment action against the patent holder, the group
agreed to fund the action. Furthermore, the "agreement... that no member would
negotiate with [the patent holder] without notfiying the others was to continue in
effect until a judicial decision was obtained." Id. at 237. The court held this
agreement to be a group boycott, per se illegal under the antitrust laws. The court
found that the "group was formed not only for purposes of bringing suit, but also for
purposes -of refusing to negotiate with [the patent holder] for licenses," and that the
"freedom of each plaintiff to deal freely with [the patent holder] was restrained by the
requirement of giving notice." Id. at 239. Cf. Lemelson v. Bendix Corp., 104 F.R.D.
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In Oracle, the April 12 meeting was well documented. Minutes
were kept and participants signed in.157 We assume in most

cases that anti-competitive agreements are more hidden. 158 If
13, 18 (D. Del. 1984) (rejecting the position that the "exchange of settlement
information, in the context of a joint defense with common counsel representing both
of the alleged conspirators, constitutes prima facie evidence of an agreement not to
settle or take a license except upon terms approved by the group," and thus holding
that the plaintiff may not invoke the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client
privilege and work product doctrine); Gould v. Control Laser Corp., 462 F. Supp. 685,
691-92 (M.D. Fla. 1978) (suggesting that agreement by group challenging patent
similar to agreement in Jones Knitting might not be a per se violation of the antitrust
laws but refusing to resolve issue definitively because agreement may violate rule of
reason and so defendant's motion to dismiss must be denied). Although it is possible
that recent case law might support rule of reason treatment for the agreement in Jones
Knitting, see Northwest Wholesale Stationers v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co., 472
U.S. 284 (1985) (holding that expulsion of a member from a purchasing cooperative
is not a per se illegal boycott but is subject to the rule of reason), the Supreme Court
has continued to apply the per se rule to certain boycotts, see Federal Trade Comm'n
v. Superior Ct. Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411 (1990) (holding per se illegal boycott
in support of higher wages by lawyers representing indigent criminal defendants). We
do not attempt to resolve all issues of antitrust liability here, but merely to raise issues
that have so far gone largely unexplored.
157 131 F.R.D. at 690.
158
In Judge Walker's most recent class action suit, he suggested that the fact that he
received only two competitive bids although more than a dozen firms had been
involved earlier in the litigation was evidence of collusion. CaliforniaMicro Devices,
No. C-94-2817-VRW, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11587 at *12. Of course, the nonbidding
firms vehemently denied the accusation and chastised the judge for not holding an
evidentiary hearing before leveling his charge of collusion. Howard Mintz, A Class
Action in Disarray, The Recorder, Feb. 20, 1996, at 1 available in LEXIS Genfed
Library, Pubs File. Several firms suggested that the "case was simply not lucrative
enough to justify that much work," even though the company had all but admitted
fraudulent activity. More interesting, several firms blamed Judge Walker's innovative
bidding scheme itself, claiming that it "deterred any desire to take a lead role in his
court." Id. One lawyer called Judge Walker a "loose cannon on deck," while another
asked, "Why fool around in his laboratory?" Id. Others have argued that "lawyers
are hesitant to compete in the judicial forum." Resnik, Curtis & Hensler, supra note
14, at 388. These same commentators suggest that the fact that the defendant's
lawyers had already conducted secret settlement negotiations with a leading plaintiffs'
firm made other plaintiffs' lawyers "understandably reluctant to compete for
appointment as lead counsel," id., even though the judge had rejected conditional
approval of this settlement and specifically invited new bidders. California Micro
Devices, No. C-94-2817-VRW, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11587 at *3-*4.
We do not argue that Judge Walker's charge of collusion was necessarily correct;
rather, we argue that because it would have been very difficult and costly for him to
determine the validity of the claim at the time, the question would best be addressed
in a subsequent suit under the antitrust laws. Under the antitrust laws, the question
would be whether the reasons given for refusing to allow bids by other firms are really
"independent" business reasons that would motivate rationally self-interested firms,
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so, should the fact that a court later approves the law firm as
class counsel and finds that the firm adequately represented the
class immunize the earlier anti-competitive behavior? And even
if the court knows about the anti-competitive agreement, and
approves class counsel then, should that suffice to immunize the
anti-competitive conduct? We will argue that the answer to
both questions is no.
Although the agreements we have just discussed interfere with
the market to represent the class, the other two practices connected to class action suits that raise serious antitrust questions
interfere with a different market: the market for legal services
in the private dispute resolution system set up by the class action settlement. 159 It has become common in the settlement of
mass tort class actions for the settlement agreement to set up a
dispute resolution system administered by private parties for the
purpose of processing the individual claims of class members.
What is "settled" for individual class members is that their
claims will be resolved, not in the court system, but in this private system. Generally, the settlement sets out the structure of
the new process: who will serve as decisionmakers, what appeal
from decisions, if any, will be allowed, and what conditions, if
any, will allow class members to exit the process to seek recovery in a court of law. The settlement generally sets out the
criteria for establishing a class member's right to some recovery
or whether the decisions make sense only if there were an implicit understanding
among the plaintiff firms not to bid; that is, whether the decisions were really
"interdependent." See Hovenkamp, supra note 136 § 4.5, at 167-69.
159 Professor Nagareda refers to this market as an "aftermarket." Nagareda, supra
note 156, at 936. This use of "aftermarket" is not the same as the use of the term in
antitrust law. Antitrust law understands "aftermarkets" to involve purchases by
consumers of a "system," composed of components purchased at different points in
time, which "lock-in" consumers in the sense that consumers have an interest in
sticking with that system to recover their "sunk costs" rather than switching to a new
system. See Carl Shapiro, Aftermarkets and Consumer Welfare: Making Sense of
Kodak, 63 Antitrust L.J. 483, 486 (1995). The Supreme Court affirmed that the
antitrust laws can reach anticompetitive conduct in a derivative aftermarket even if the
primary market is competitive. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs. 504
U.S. 451 (1992). To the extent that private administrative compensation systems in
class actions are set up for future claimants rather than current clients (ignoring for
the moment that future claimants should be viewed as current clients for purposes of
class counsel's ethical obligations), then the "market" the future claimants face is not
really an aftermarket in the antitrust sense. They are getting a new "system."
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under the system and dictates a range of recoveries for class
members who can demonstrate specific injuries. In short, these
settlements set up a potential new market for legal services: the
market for representing individual claimants in the private administrative system set up by the settlement. And like any mar-

ket it is subject to both collusive and exclusionary behavior.
The potential for collusive behavior stems from the fact that

class action settlements that set up private administrative systems may include a ceiling on the fee that a lawyer working
within that system may charge. These caps may be written into
the settlement agreement by class counsel and the defendants

and later approved by the class action court, as opposed to being imposed by the court on its own motion. Class courts have
so far been enthralled with these caps, describing them as benefits to class members who might otherwise be gouged by lawyers

charging unconscionable contingent fees in a system that eliminates most, if not all, of the contingency that would attend a

trial of the same claim.160 Although in antitrust cases the judiciary is quite skeptical of the proposition that capping prices by
self-interested groups benefits consumers, 161 in approving class
settlements courts accept this proposition without a moment's
160See, e.g., In re Joint Eastern & Southern Dists. Asbestos Litig. (Johns-Manville),
878 F. Supp. 473, 556-58 (E. & S.D.N.Y. 1995) aff'd in relevant part, vacated and
remanded in part, 78 F.3d 764 (2d Cir. 1996) (finding reasonable 25% cap on
attorney's fees for representing future claimants in subsequent administrative
procedure); id. at 561 ("The fee cap provision strikes an appropriate balance and
assures reasonable compensation to future attorney and claimants alike."); Georgine,
157 F.R.D. 246, 285 (E.D. Pa. 1994), vacated 83 F.3d 610 (3d Cir. 1996), cert. granted
sub. nom. Amchem Prods. v. George Windsor, 1996 WL 480936 (U.S. Nov. 1, 1996)
(No. 96-270) (finding 20-25% cap on attorney's fees for representing future claimants
in subsequent administrative procedure "reasonable and fair to the class"); Ahearn v.
Fibreboard Corp., 162 F.R.D. 505, 530 (E.D.Tex. 1995) (approving of 25% cap as
superior to attorney fee provisions in alternative proposed settlement), aff'd, 90 F.3d
963 (5th Cir. 1996).
161 See Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982). In that
case, the Court held per se illegal a maximum fee schedule agreed upon by doctors
for purposes of obtaining reimbursement for health services provided from insurance
companies. The main source of the Court's skepticism was the fact that it was not
necessary for the doctors to do the price fixing. Id. at 352-54. According to the
Court, the same asserted benefits of lower prices and reduced administrative costs
could be achieved without the anticompetitive risks if the insurance companies or the
government set the schedules. The same argument could be made in the class action
context: The court could set, rather than merely approve, the fee schedule in the
private administrative system.
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hesitation. 162 Most strange, however, courts have so far agreed
not just that caps are good, but that the caps they approve are
too high.163
This apparent paradox can be explained only if courts are not
freely choosing the cap to be applied as an exercise of some
independent power to regulate the bar, but rather are accepting

ceilings on fees that have been agreed to first by some group of
lawyers, in most cases those on the plaintiffs' steering committee.164 Were it not for court approval these caps would seem to
162
This is ironic because one of the main criticisms of Maricopa-thatsophisticated
and powerful insurance company buyers of medical services would thwart any attempt
by doctors to convert a maximum price into a cartel minimum price, see Hovenkamp,
supra note 136, § 5.6, at 236-is not applicable in the class action context. Class
member "buyers" have no meaningful control over their lawyers and, as we argue
below, neither the defendants (who could be viewed as providing "insurance" to class
members, see Nagareda, supra note 156, at 926, 963) nor the judges adequately protect
class members against cartel prices.
163For example, in In re Joint Eastern & Southern Districts Asbestos Litigation
(Johns-Manville Corp.), 878 F. Supp. 473, 557, (E. & S.D.N.Y. 1995), aff'd in relevant
part, vacated and remanded in part, 78 F.3d 764 (2d Cir. 1996), Judge Weinstein noted
that the court "initially requested that attorney's fees for future representation of
Trust claimants be limited to 20% of each claimants recovery.... [o]n the persistent
insistence of plaintiffs' counsel, the contingency fee percentage was raised to a
compromise figure of 25%, which the Courts approved as 'reasonable' . . ." Judge
Weinstein went on to add:
Undoubtedly, there are some instances where the 25% cap will lead to a large
windfall for lawyers on an hourly basis. This is highly probable given the large
concentration of asbestos cases in the hands of a few attorneys. In other
instances, particularly in view of the relatively fixed and small amounts of
recovery available under the [settlement] the fee limitation may result in too
small a fee to warrant legal representation. Such unfairness is almost impossible
to avoid without consideration of individual claims. The transactional costs that
would accompany consideration of fees for each claim are too great in view of
the small amounts involved. As to the relatively small claims, in almost all
instances no attorney will be required under the settlement arrangement. If an
attorney is required the claims structure insures that in almost all cases the
amount of work will [be] minimal.
Id. at 557-58. Although Judge Weinstein's statement might at first seem to suggest
that lawyers in the subsequent administrative system will be overcompensated in some
cases and undercompensated in others, in fact what it says is that lawyers will either
be overcompensated or not used. So much for a meaningful cap. But see Georgine,
157 F.R.D. at 285 (noting that "the availability of counsel to class members, based
upon traditional considerations, is improved when counsel are adequately
compensated").
164If the court imposed the cap unilaterally and the lawyers simply adhered to it
there would be no "agreement" for antitrust purposes. See Fisher v. City of Berkeley,
475 U.S. 260, 267 (1986) ("A restraint imposed unilaterally by government does not
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violate the antitrust laws. The question is what, if anything,
165
about court approval should change that result.
Class settlements may contain even more troublesome restrictions than caps on lawyer fees. Lawyers may try to include
provisions that exclude competitors from the market for representing claimants post-settlement in the private administrative
system. The class settlement in Georgine, for example, contained provisions designed to ensure that historically strong
competitors in the market for asbestos clients in the tort system
retained their advantage in the market that was to be created by
the settlement.1 66 The intention of the class lawyers and their
cohorts in drafting this provision (if not in crafting the entire
settlement) was to eliminate competition. 167 In the Georgine
become concerted-action within the meaning of [§ 1 of the Sherman Act] simply
because it has a coercive effect upon parties who must obey the law."). On the other
hand "[w]here private actors are ... granted 'a degree of private regulatory power,'
...the regulatory scheme may be attacked under § 1." Id. at 268.
165It may be difficult to prove that the steering committee members "agreed" to the
cap if they were not class counsel. And co-class counsel might be treated as "a single
enterprise" for antitrust purposes. See Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube
Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 753 (1984). But express agreement is not necessary under the
antitrust laws. See Interstate Circuit v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 227 (1939)
("Acceptance by competitors, without previous agreement, of an invitation to
participate in a plan, the necessary consequence of which, if carried out, is restraint
of interstate commerce, is sufficient to establish an unlawful conspiracy under the
Sherman Act."). An agreement might be inferred in Georgine from the fact that
plaintiffs' lawyers settled their "inventory" cases with the defendants on the condition
that the settlement be approved. This condition made the acquiescence of the other
plaintiff firms a necessary part of the deal. Ironically, Professor Nagareda cites the
agreement between the Georgine defendants and the non-class counsel lawyers as
evidence of the fairness of the deal. Nagareda, supra note 156, at 967. He argues that
class counsel's willingness to offer the fee cap was a solution to the "holdout" problem
caused by recalcitrant members of the steering committee. Id. Under our scenario,
such "holdouts" may have been nothing more than unwilling participants in a cartel.
In antitrust law, such holdouts are desirable; some attempts to solve holdout
"problems" may do nothing more than facilitate a cartel that might not otherwise
succeed.
166157 F.R.D. at 281.
167See Koniak, supra note 15, at 110 n.312 and accompanying text (referring to
testimony by plaintiff's lawyer at Georgine fairness hearing expressing concern that
"new lawyers [who] were getting into the asbestos litigation, feeding on the success of
the original plaintiffs [sic] bar," which "led plaintiffs' lawyers to begin "consolidating
trials" and "fil[ing] class actions" to prevent the new lawyers from "kill[ing] the goose
that was laying the golden egg"). Moreover, there was testimony that suggested the
provision arose out of an agreement among more plaintiffs' lawyers than just class
counsel. See id. (quoting testimony from CEO of defendant organization that
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settlement, one of the factors in determining a claimant's recovery under the settlement's dispute resolution system was the

identity of the law firm representing the claimant. 168 Claimants
who hired law firms with a historically high settlement average
against the defendants in Georgine-that is, firms that were
successful in the pre-settlement market-were to be offered
more money than claimants who hired law firms without such
a record.1 69 We view such exclusionary restraints as more troubling than caps on attorney's fees because there is no plausible
cover story that can be told about the restraint that explains
how it benefits class members. 70 Yet the district court in
Georgine approved a settlement that included such a provision.
The court seemed unenthusiastic about the provision, but put
provision was "negotiated [at the request of class counsel] after a report [from]...
many plaintiffs' counsel").
168Georgine, 157 F.R.D. at 281.
169Id.
170One could try to tell the following efficiency story. Lawyers need to recoup their
investments in "generic assets" (discovery, expert witness fees, and the like) made in
developing their cases in the tort system. See Nagareda, supra note 156, at 909. If
provisions allowing such recoupment are prohibited by the antitrust laws, class counsel
will either (1) not make these investments (and perhaps not bring meritorious class
actions); (2) charge a higher fee for their role as class counsel; (3) refuse to settle; or
(4) settle for too little because their fees will be lower. There are various objections
that could be made to this story-the main one being that it is far from clear that a
restraint that gives certain lawyers a guaranteed market advantage is necessary to
prevent such consequences. Courts have long been skeptical of similar justifications
for private price-fixing arrangements. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co.,
310 U.S. 150, 221 (1940):
Ruinous competition, financial disaster, evils of price cutting and the like appear
throughout our history as ostensible justifications for price-fixing. If the socalled competitive abuses were to be appraised here, the reasonableness of
prices would necessarily become an issue in every price-fixing case. In that
event the Sherman Act would soon be emasculated ....
Moreover, there are reasons to think that such arrangements are broader than
necessary to protect any legitimate interests plaintiffs' lawyers might have. (It should
be noted that Professor Nagareda does not specifically support Georgine's market
advantage provision in his article; he does not discuss it at all.) Even without such a
provision, claimants would probably continue to make use of these firms anyway and
perhaps be willing to pay a premium for their experience in handling such cases if that
would mean a faster recovery. See Nagareda, supra note 156, at 935-36 (discussing
fact that Dalkon Shield claimants continued to use lawyer services in filing of
administrative compensation claims and noting advantage that class counsel would
have in attracting clients under administrative system). Moreover, investments are not
necessarily specific to one class action. They can be recouped over the course of many
lawsuits. See id. at 936-37.
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whatever doubts it had about the matter to the side on the

ground that settlements should be judged as a whole. 7' Approval, in other words, would not be denied based on one troubling provision. What's a little anti-competitive agreement
among friends?
II.

THE NEED FOR SUBSEQUENT SUITS

In this Part, we argue that subsequent suits against class counsel are necessary to deter class action misconduct. Other remedies for abuse are inadequate and the incentives of the main

participants in class actions will lead these participants to thwart
any other solution. Thus, we believe that courts should allow
subsequent suits regardless of what current doctrines say. But
as we shall see in the next Part, current doctrine does not stand

in the way.
A. Abuse by the Truckload

Class members harmed by a trial court's approval of an unfair
or collusive settlement have remedies. Objectors, if there are
any, may be permitted to appeal the trial court's approval of the
settlement and claim that the court's judgment on the fairness
of the settlement, the adequacy of representation or the reasonableness of the attorney's fees was an abuse of discretion. 172
Even after an appeal has been denied or the time for appeal has
Georgine, 158 F.R.D. at 281, 322-23.
e.g., Plummer v. Chemical Bank, 668 F.2d 654, 655 (2d Cir. 1982) (holding
that district court's rejection of settlement proposal due to concerns raised by
objectors was not abuse of discretion); City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448
(2d Cir. 1974) (rejecting objector's contention that settlement and fairness hearings
were inadequate but holding fee award excessive). Some courts have held that absent
class members have no absolute right to appeal. See, e.g., Croyden Assocs. v. Alleco,
Inc., 969 F.2d 675, 680 (8th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 908 (1993); Gottlieb v.
Q.T. Wiles, 11 F.3d 1004, 1013 (10th Cir. 1993); Walker v. City of Mesquite, 858 F.2d
1071, 1074 (5th Cir. 1988); Guthrie v. Evan, 815 F.2d 626, 628 (11th Cir. 1987). See
generally 2 Newberg on Class Actions § 11.60, (Alba Conte ed., 3d ed. 1992)
(discussing appeal of judgment after settlement approval under an abuse of discretion
standard); Christopher R. Thyer, Note, Un-Appealing Class Action Settlements: Why
No One Has Standing to Challenge Settlements after Haberman v. Lisle, 49 Ark. L.
Rev. 375 (1996) (discussing Arkansas Supreme Court decision dismissing on lack of
standing grounds a class member's appeal of the portion of a class settlement
pertaining to attorney's fees); Timothy A. Duffy, Note, The Appealability of Class
Action Settlements by Unnamed Parties, 60 U. Chi. L. Rev. 933 (1993).
17

172 See,
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lapsed, absent class members may challenge the binding effect
of the settlement by bringing another action against the settling
defendant for the same wrong. If they can show that they were
not adequately represented in the first action, the class settlement will not preclude their maintenance of this second suit.173
Finally, members of the class may seek to escape the effects of
a class settlement by invoking procedural rules that provide for
reopening or vacating final judgments. 174
Why aren't those remedies, offered in addition to the trial
court's obligation to conduct a fairness hearing to determine
that the settlement is fair, the representation adequate and that
there has been no collusion, enough? The simplest answer is
that none of those remedies provides adequate incentives for
lawyers and defendants to desist from illegal conduct in negotiating a class action settlement. All of those remedies share this
in common: If a court finds misconduct, it simply denies wrongdoers the benefit of their misdeeds. That penalty, given the
small risk of its being inflicted and the substantial sums to be
made through misconduct, is inadequate to deter lawyers from
abusing the class action settlement process. 175
The incentive structure created by the current system of class
action settlements suggests that abuse is rampant. All lawyer-client relationships create agency problems because the interests of lawyers and clients are not perfectly aligned. Lawyers
are interested primarily in the size of their fees. Clients are
interested primarily in the size of their recovery. Lawyers may
engage in conduct that increases their fees even if this comes at
173In

Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 45 (1940) the Supreme Court allowed plaintiffs

to bring a suit that was already ostensibly resolved in a prior class action on the
grounds that an absent class member not adequately represented in the class action
was not bound by the first judgment. See also Richards v. Jefferson County, 116 S.Ct.

1761, 1769 (1996) ("Because petitioners received neither notice of, nor sufficient
representation in, [prior] litigation, that adjudication, as a matter of federal due
process, may not bind them and thus cannot bar them from challenging an allegedly
unconstitutional deprivation of their property."). See generally 2 Newberg on Class

Actions, supra note 172, § 11.64 (alternative to Rule 60(b) relief is collateral suit
challenging judgement in original suit).
174 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b); 2 Newberg on Class Actions, supra note 172, § 11.63

(discussing vacating settlement judgments).
17s This, of course, is one of the traditional justifications for punitive damages that
many class lawyers rely on in their class action suits. See Keeton et. al., supra note 74,

§ 2, at 9-10.
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the expense of the client's recovery. Class actions exacerbate

this problem.
In ordinary lawyer-client relationships, clients can mitigate the
agency problem in two ways: ex ante contracting and ex post
monitoring. These solutions are unavailable or particularly ineffective in the class action setting. The reason is that absent class

members, by definition the majority of the class, neither contract
with the lawyer, nor are present to monitor the lawyers' actions. 176 Although client monitoring of lawyer performance is,
at best, an imperfect check on lawyer self-dealing in ordinary
cases, it is effectively unavailable in almost all class actions.
That is, of course, the reason Rule 23(e) requires court monitoring of class action settlements, but that check too is ineffective.
We believe that court monitoring is ineffective as a check on
abuse, for two reasons: The fairness hearings that courts typi-

cally hold are, by and large, non-adversarial proceedings, mak-

177
ing it relatively easy for lawyers to hide abuse from the court;
176Class representatives are present, but in general courts have not insisted that class
counsel consult with these representatives about the progress of the suit. Lewis v.
Curtis, 671 F.2d 779, 789 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982) (representation
is found to be adequate despite the fact that class representative "displayed a complete
ignorance of facts concerning the transaction that he was challenging"); J/H Real
Estate v. Abramson, No. 95-4176, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1546, at *8 n.3 (E.D. Pa.,
Feb. 9, 1996) ("class counsel, not the class representative, guides and orchestrates the
litigation") (citing the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit as
authority).
Indeed, class settlements are regularly approved even though the class representative
has only the vaguest idea of what the settlement provides. As the United States Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit stated in 1981:
[T]he class representative's role is limited. It was found not to be enough to
defeat a class certification in Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 383 U.S. 363,366,
86 S.Ct. 845, 847, 15 L.Ed.2d 807 (1966), that the named plaintiff did not
understand her complaint at all, could not explain the statements in it, had little
knowledge of what the lawsuit was about, did not know the defendants by
name, nor even the nature of the misconduct of the defendants.
Eggleston v. Chicago Journeymen Plumbers' Local Union No. 130, 657 F.2d 890, 896
(7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1017 (1982). See also Heastie v. Community
Bank of Greater Peoria, 125 F.R.D. 669, 676-77 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (quoting Eggleston
and accepting as adequate a named plaintiff who was unfamiliar with the details of the
claim).
177The proposed amendment to Rule 23(e) would simply require all courts to do
what almost all courts now do anyway-hold a fairness hearing before accepting the
dismissal or settlement of a class action. The drafters of the accompanying Advisory
Committee Note apparently believe that codifying the prevailing practice will
somehow solve the problems associated with class action settlements:
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and, judges are biased in favor of settlements, particularly in
class suits, and are thus ineffective monitors of abuse. We put
aside the question of judicial self-interest for the moment because we recognize that many judges and even some legal academics take umbrage at the suggestion that judges allow their
own interests to interfere with their duty to protect absent class
members. 178 To these defenders of judicial integrity, judicial
self-interest is all but an oxymoron, which, if it exists in some
obscure corner of reality, plays no role in class action litigation.
Because we believe, to the contrary, that judicial self-interest is
an important part of the class action abuse story and that denial
of this fact leads to misguided efforts to increase the already
considerable discretion of judges to accept settlements and approve them on appeal, we will later discuss in some detail these
judicial incentives (with apologies in advance to all those who
see this point as somewhat obvious). 179 The case that judges are
ineffective monitors of class settlements is fairly strong, however, judicial self-interest aside.
Fairness hearings are more akin to ex parte proceedings than
adversarial ones. A recent empirical study by the Federal Judicial Center of class actions in four federal district courts found
that 42% to 64% of the fairness hearings were concluded without any presentation of objections to the proposed settlement by
"class members and other objectors."' 80 In many of the cases
The parties to the settlement cease to be adversaries in presenting the
settlement for approval, and objectors may find it difficult to command the
information or resources necessary for effective opposition. These problems
may be exacerbated when a proposed settlement is presented at, or close to the
beginning, of the action. A hearing should be held to explore a proposed
settlement even if the proponents seek to waive the hearing and no objectors
have appeared.
Preliminary Draft, supra note 11, at 54. Unfortunately, as we argue, the "cure" the
drafters propose for the problems they recognize-a nonadversarial fairness
hearing-is no cure at all.
178 One academic colleague, who has read a draft of this Article, stated that he
considered the "accusation" that judges approve class settlements that are collusive
because they are blinded by self-interest, defamatory. When asked why he did not
think discussing lawyer self-interest in selling out their clients was similarly
defamatory, he replied: "Because the judge self-interest story isn't true." When
pressed for the basis for his conviction, this colleague simply repeated that he knew
judges were not self-interested in accepting class settlements and that was that.
179 See discussion infra Section II.C.
180
Willging, Hooper & Niemic, supra note 109, at 140. See also Thomas E. Willging,
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with objectors, the objections were made, not in person, but in
writing before the hearing. According to court files, class members, other than the named plaintiffs, or objectors actually attended only 7% to 14% of the settlement hearings.18' In the
absence of anyone to present the problems with a proposed
settlement, the likelihood that a judge could ferret out corruption or illegality leading to or embedded in a proposal presented
jointly by class and defense counsel, who come well prepared to
portray the deal as fair, legal and just, is quite small. 8 2
Moreover, pro se objectors will generally be no match for the
lawyers presenting the settlement as fair. The Federal Judicial
Center study does not say how many of the small number of

objectors who appeared at fairness hearings had counsel, but it
is probably safe to assume that many objections to class action

settlements are raised pro se.183 The current system provides
little incentive for lawyers to seek out corruption or illegality in
proposed settlements. Objecting lawyers stand little chance of
Laural L. Hooper & Robert J. Niemic, Federal Judicial Center, Empirical Study of
Class Actions in Four Federal District Courts: Final Report to the Advisory
Committee on Civil Rules 57, 178 (Tbl. 38) (1996) (on file with author) [hereinafter
FJC Study]. For some anecdotal evidence, see California Micro Devices, 1996 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 1361 at *28 (citing letter written on behalf of objectors claiming that
"'once plaintiff and defense counsel agree to settle a securities class action, there is
typically no one before the court with an incentive to challenge the merits of the
settlement'); see also Woodward v. Nor-Am Chem. Co., No. 94-0780-CB-C, 1996 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 7372, at *27 (S.D. Ala. May 23, 1996) (noting that at the fairness hearing
on the proposed class action settlement the "Court heard arguments presented by
Class Counsel and counsel for the defendant. At the hearing the Court specifically
asked whether anyone in attendance wished to object to the fairness of the Settlement;
no one objected.").
181FJC Study, supra note 180, at 57, 139 (Fig. 53).
182For example, in the recent California Micro Devices class action, a big issue in
evaluating the fairness of the settlement was whether or not the defendant was on the
verge of bankruptcy. The lawyers proposing the settlement claimed to have
"confirmatory evidence" of this fact, but declined to share this evidence with either
the court or other class members. 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1361 at *30. Judge Walker
struck down the settlement without knowing the validity of the bankruptcy claim.
Although he may have been correct in doing so, the downside risk was large. This
may explain why according to one plaintiff's lawyer involved in the case, "'If it was
before any other judge.., it would have been a done deal."' Howard Mintz, A Class
Action in Disarray, The Recorder, Feb. 20, 1996, at 1, available in LEXIS, Genfed
Library, Pubs File.
183See, e.g., California Micro Devices, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1361 at *31 (noting
that "input from actual class members and indirectly affected parties who have hired
independent counsel ... is very unusual in securities class actions.").
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receiving fees or even the reimbursement of expenses incurred
in mounting a challenge. 84 Lawyers are sometimes motivated
to challenge proposed settlements in the hope of reaping some
later economic benefit, such as success in one's own bid to be
class counsel in a later suit or continued income from individual
suits, which would be more lucrative than processing people
through a claims procedure set up for class members under a

proposed settlement. However, because the chances of convincing a trial judge to reject a settlement are extremely slim, 185 and
184 In the Federal Judicial Center study, the researchers found "no fee awards to, and
few fee requests by counsel other than plaintiffs' counsel." Willging, Hooper &
Niemic, supra note 109, at 155. We have found no case in which a court has awarded
attorney's fees to objecting counsel for raising arguments that caused the court to
disapprove a class action settlement. In approving a settlement, courts sometimes
award fees to objectors upon a finding that the objectors conferred a monetary benefit
upon the class by raising objections that resulted in the court modifying some part of
the settlement (usually class counsel's request for attorney's fees). See Uselton v.
Commercial Lovelace Motor Freight, 9 F.3d 849, 855 (10th Cir. 1993) (fee awarded
to objecting counsel, citing Herbert Newberg, Attorney Fee Awards § 2.24, at 84
(1986)); Ace Heating & Plumbing Co. v. Crane Co., 453 F.2d 30 (3d Cir. 1971) (an
objecting attorney should not be denied reasonable compensation for a benefit
conferred on the class); Bowling v. Pfizer, Inc., 922 F. Supp. 1261, 1285 (S.D. Ohio
1996) (awarding attorney's fees to objectors for their role in improving the settlement
for the class); 1 Alba Conte & Herbert Newberg, Attorney Fee Awards § 2.25, at 9192 (2d ed. 1993). But see Grunin v. International House of Pancakes, 513 F.2d 114,
126-27 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 864 (1975) (objector denied fees). See also
Alpine Pharmacy v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 481 F.2d 1045, 1053-54 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 1092 (1973); Milstein v. Werner, 58 F.R.D. 544, 552 (S.D.N.Y. 1973);
Newman v. Stein, 58 F.R.D. 540, 543-44 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (securities cases denying fees
to settlement objectors who conferred no class benefit).
When a court rejects a settlement, there is by definition no common fund from which
to award attorney's fees to objecting counsel. To award counsel fees to objecting
counsel who exposed a settlement as the product of collusion and thus unworthy of
approval, would require the courts to find some other source of funds from which to
pay those fees. Thus far, no court has taken that step, and there are no pending
changes to Rule 23 that would authorize courts to pay objecting counsel when
rejecting a settlement. Most troubling, the surest way for objecting counsel to receive
fees is to drop their objections in exchange for a piece of the fees to be awarded to
class counsel. For examples of cases in which objecting counsel switched sides to
become cooperating class counsel or mysteriously disappeared, see Bowling, 922 F.
Supp. at 1265,1271-73; (most of the objecting lawyers became co-counsel for class and
requested attorney's fees); Price v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., No. 94-0647-B-S, (S.D. Ala.
1995) (all objecting counsel dropped their objections, although changes to settlement
were minor).
185 FJC Study, supra note 180, at 58. "Approximately 90% or more of the proposed
settlements were approved without changes in each of the four districts." Id. Courts
made changes to 9 out of 117 settlements, id. at 178 (Tbl. 38), or 8%. With respect
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the chances on appeal may not be high enough to justify the

added expenses, 8 6 the expected benefit from derailing the settlement would have to be enormous to make it rational to launch
a serious challenge. 8 7
We support proposals that would encourage objectors to
mount challenges to collusive settlements, such as Senator Cohen's bill that would provide state attorneys general with notice

of class suits in which citizens of their respective states were

absent class members. 188 We also encourage courts and rulemakers to devise methods to pay objectors who are successful
in scuttling a class action settlement. But we recognize the
problems with such proposals. State attorneys general have
already expressed doubts about Senator Cohen's bill, which they
are afraid will raise expectations that they will intervene to stop
abusive settlements when they lack the resources to meet those
expectations. 8 9 As for paying attorney's fees and costs to lawyers who persuade a judge to reject a proposed settlement,
where would the money come from? If the parties were required to post a bond to settle, would that not encourage frivoto attorney's fees, objections were made in 21 cases (18%), but in 19 of those cases
the court awarded the full fee requested. Id. Thus, the likelihood that proposed
attorney's fees would be reduced was only 2% of all settlements and 10% of all
settlements in which objections were raised.
186 In the Federal Judicial Center study, only three approved settlements were
appealed, and one of those three, the only appeal filed by objectors, was reversed. In
re General Motors Pick-Up Truck Litig., 55 F.3d 768 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct.
88 (1995); FJC Study, supra note 180, at 191 (Tbl. 51), 193 (Tl. 53). Ten appeals,
including GM Truck, were filed concerning attorney's fee issues. Of the remaining
appeals, two courts affirmed the fee award, two courts dismissed the appeal, one court
reversed a denial of fees, one court reversed a trial court's reduction of fees, one court
remanded for reconsideration and two other appeals were pending. Id. at 77, 191-94
(This. 51-54). The data, though sketchy, suggest that the chances of overturning a trial
court's approval of a fee award or making a trial court's reduction of fees stick is no
more than 40%, and probably significantly less.
187It happens. Georgine, 157 F.R.D. at 246. See also CaliforniaMicro Devices, 1996
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1361 at *1 (rejecting proposed securities class action settlement in
light of objections by various institutional investors); Henry J. Reske, Two Wins for
Class Action Objectors, 82 A.B.A. J., June 1996, at 36 (discussing successful objections
to class settlements in recent antitrust and heart-valve mass tort cases). However, the
economics suggest that it will happen rarely.
188S.1501, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1995).
See supra notes 106-109 and

accompanying text.

189Conversation with staff members from Senator Cohen's and Senator Kohl's
offices, August 1996 (reporting on comments from state attorneys general).

1996]

Under Cloak of Settlement

1109

lous objections? Would not the settling parties simply pay off
potential objectors, keep most of the benefits of the collusive
deal and save everyone a lot of work? How would such pay-offs
be detected? 19

Even if these problems could be overcome, another obstacle
remains: The discovery accorded objectors in the settlement
process is limited. In the small number of class actions in which
objectors appear, discovery is not currently a right but a privi-

lege. 191 When courts allow discovery, they severely limit its
scope. It is not uncommon for a court to allow the objector to
take the deposition of the named plaintiffs to ascertain their

adequacy. 192 It is, however, all but unheard of to grant objectors

the right to depose class counsel or the defense lawyers on the
course of the negotiations-the type of deposition that would be

most useful for uncovering the type of wrongdoing with which
we are concerned. 93 Although we agree with those courts that
190 See supra note 184. One solution to this problem, which we support, has been
suggested to us by John Leubsdorf: requiring courts to appoint advocates for the class
whose job would be to raise any non-frivolous objections to the settlement.
Unfortunately, this idea received a chilly reception from judges and lawyers alike at
a November 22, 1996 hearing of the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, and we do not foresee its implementation in the near future.
191"While an objectant must be given leave to be heard, to examine witnesses and
to submit evidence, it is within the Court's discretion to limit the proceedings to

whatever is necessary to aid it in reaching an informed, just and reasoned decision."
Glicken v. Bradford, 35 F.R.D. 144, 148 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) (citing Cohen v. Young, 127
F.2d 721 (6th Cir. 1942)). Cf. In re General Motors Corp. Engine Interchange Litig.,
594 F.2d 1106, 1124 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 870 (1979) (court abused
discretion by not allowing objectors discovery or examination of settlement
negotiations). See generally 2 Newberg, supra note 172, §§ 11.45, 11.57 (noting that
if negotiations violated the pretrial order, plaintiff objectors would be entitled to
discovery and outlining the factors relevant to the court's decision to permit
discovery).
192See In re NASDAQ Market-Makers Antitrust Litig., 94 Civ. 3996,1996 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 4969, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 18, 1996) (depositions of class representatives are
allowed when the nature of the deposition bears on adequacy of representation); Beck
v. Status Game Corp., 89 Civ. 2923, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9978 (S.D.N.Y. July 14,
1995) (class representatives had been deposed in order to ascertain adequacy);
Robertson v. Seidman & Seidman, [1980 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
197,524 (S.D.N.Y. May 23, 1980) (same).
193 See Georgine,157 F.R.D. at 260 n.9 (court maintains that it gave the objectors the
"opportunity to probe into facts surrounding that proposed settlement through
depositions of relevant persons."). The Georgine court did not mention that it refused
to order the depositions of the two most relevant individuals, class counsel and the
lawyers for the defendant, Center for Claims Resolution (CCR). This left the
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have held that discovery, including depositions of class and defense counsel, should be granted in those cases in which the
objectors can make out a plausible case that collusion or other
wrongdoing has occurred in the course of the negotiation, 194 we
also understand that there are reasons for a rule that generally
disfavors the taking of such depositions. Those reasons include
"the sensitive nature of the material exchanged in the settlement
negotiations, the undue delay and expense of deposing the nego-

tiating lawyers, and the potential that routine discovery into
settlement negotiations may deter settlements, unduly protract

negotiations, or chill candid conversation."1 95

Finally, special masters appointed by the court to review class
settlements, or guardians appointed by the court to protect absent class members' interests, suffer from many of the obstacles
that now face objecting counsel: insufficient funds to do a thorough job, necessary reliance on the settling parties' unsworn
characterization of their association and the benefits of the deal
to the class and, unfortunately, their own self-interest in cultivating a reputation for not scuttling deals. Anyone who gained
that reputation might never work as a class guardian again. The
next pair of settling parties would vigorously protest the apobjectors the ability to question only witnesses whose knowledge of the negotiations
was largely secondhand.
194
See, e.g., Mars Steel Corp. v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust, 834 F.2d 677,
684 (7th Cir. 1987) (objectors may discover the details of a class counsel's negotiations
with the defendants only when the objectors lay a foundation by adducing from
independent sources evidence that the settlement may be collusive); Bowling v. Pfizer
143 F.R.D. 141, 146 (S.D. Ohio 1992) (same). Compare Koniak, supra note 15, at
1097-98 (suggesting that such requests should be granted when it is necessary to
provide additional protections of the due process rights of the class, that is, when
adequacy of counsel is put into question by the settling parties' simultaneous
settlements of extraneous matters). See generally Note, The Attorney-Client Privilege
in Class Actions: Fashioning an Exception to Promote Adequacy of Representation,
97 Harv.L. Rev. 947 (1984) (advocating narrowly-drawn exception to attorney-client
privilege when class member seeks discovery in a challenge to adequcy of class
counsel's representation).
195Koniak, supra note 15, at 1127 n.376. Although we recognize that the discovery
available in the post-settlement suits that we propose might create some similar
problems, we believe discovery that takes place after a settlement has been approved
by a court (and only when a lawyer believes there is a good enough chance of
demonstrating wrongdoing to bring the later case) would be less disruptive of candid
conversation than extensive discovery granted as a matter of right in connection with
every class and derivative suit settlement proffered to a court.
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pointment of such a person and a court would be unlikely to

insist in the face of that protest.196 Moreover, we can report
without attribution, for whatever it may be worth, that the
guardians we have talked to understand their job is to approve
the deal that the settling parties have constructed, after suggest-

ing a few minor changes, not to recommend that the settlement
be chucked. For all the above reasons, even if judges were thor-

oughly motivated to weed out collusive settlements (something
we do not believe), they would be hard-pressed to find facts that
would betray abuse in the class settlement system. This problem would not be so troubling if there were reasons to think
that abuse is rare. But unfortunately, there are good reasons to
think that serious abuse is rampant.
Defendants and their lawyers understand the powerful agency

problem in class suits created by the inability of class members
to monitor their lawyers. They understand that judges are well
motivated to accept settlements, and how difficult it would be
for courts, even if they were not predisposed toward settlement,

to ferret out abuse in fairness hearings. Defendants understand
how valuable class settlement can be: liability and transaction
costs can be minimized and finality achieved. 197 Moreover, defendants care only about the total amount they must pay out in
settlement, not how the payoff is distributed between class

members and the class lawyer. Thus, they are well-positioned
196We note that the Civil Rules Advisory Committee rejected the suggestion that
Rule 23(e) be amended to require or encourage the use of special masters to ensure
some form of independent review, particularly when no objectors appear. We think
it likely that the Committee did this not because of the problems we identify, but
simply because of the fear that the special masters would make class action settlements
more costly. See Draft Minutes in Preliminary Draft, supra note 11, at 38 (rejecting
suggestion that Rule 23(e) be amended to require or encourage the use of special
masters to ensure some form of independent review, particularly when no objectors
appear).
197Defense attorneys helped develop the notion of "settlement class actions," class
actions in which the suit and settlement agreement are filed simultaneously, for just
such purposes. See Note, Back to the Drawing Board: The Settlement Class Action
and the Limits of Rule 23 109 Harv. L. Rev. 828, 843 (1996) ("When defense attorneys
first started to experiment with the settlement class action model, they did so with one
clear goal in mind: to achieve a global settlement with res judicata effect on as many
present and future claimants as possible."); Roger C. Cramton, Individualized Justice,
Mass Torts, and "Settlement Class Actions": An Introduction, 80 Cornell L. Rev. 811
(1995); James A. Henderson, Jr., Comment, Settlement Class Actions and the Limits
of Adjudication, 80 Cornell L. Rev. 1014 (1995).
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and well-motivated to propose a deal that gives class counsel a
huge slice (high attorney's fees) of a small pie (a low overall
settlement for the class) and pretty well-assured that class counsel will accept it, given how expensive and risky it can be to get
a class action certified and ready for trial.198
Collusion between class counsel and defendants and their lawyers to sell out the class is facilitated by the fact that class coun-

sel typically does not bargain in advance of the settlement with
the class representative or the court over the fee arrangements.

Indeed, in contrast to ordinary clients, class members do not
even know at the start of the litigation, all questions of bargaining aside, what the lawyer will later claim that fee to be. This
is another example of the consequences of inadequate monitoring by the class of class counsel, and another reason the agency
problem discussed earlier is exacerbated in the class action context. Because class counsel's fee is not set in advance, collusion
can occur no matter how this fee is structured. If the court uses
the "lodestar" method, which involves multiplying the number

of hours worked by some hourly rate and then adjusting further
based on a risk factor, then class counsel can collude with defen-

dants and their lawyers by exaggerating or unnecessarily running

up the class lawyer's hours. 199 When class counsel's fee is based
on a percentage of the recovery, class counsel can collude with

defendants and their lawyers by agreeing to support a higher

contingency rate in return for a lower settlement.200 Even if the
198 Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs' Attorney's Role in Class
Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for
Reform, 58 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1 (1991). See also Roberta Romano, The Shareholder
Suit: Litigation without Foundation?, 7 J.L., Econ. & Org. 55, 84 (1991) ("The
principal beneficiaries of [derivative] litigation therefore appear to be attorneys, who
win fee awards in 90 percent of settled suits."); Andrew Rosenfield, An Empirical Test
of Class-Action Settlement, 5 J. Legal Stud. 113, 119-20 (1976) (settlements of class
action suits tend to result in monetary bonuses to attorneys at the expense of class'
interests).
199 See Coffee, supra note 7, at 717-18; Macey & Miller, supra note 198, at 22-26.
2o See John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action,
95 Colum. L. Rev. 1343, 1349 (1995) [hereinafter Coffee, Class Wars]. Other analyses
have tended to focus on the fact that fees'based on a percentage of the recovery give
lawyers an incentive to settle early for an amount lower than the client would want.
The reason is that a self-interested lawyer would spend an extra dollar to continue the
litigation only if it was less than the additional expected benefit to him from his share
of the additional recovery. The client, on the other hand, wants the lawyer to
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lawyers cannot manipulate the contingency rate, they may be
able to control other variables and so achieve a collusive result.
In Georgine, the lawyers manipulated the definition of the

class. 201 In Hoffman, they manipulated the definition of "economic benefit." 202 When monitoring is absent, fraud flourishes.
Of course, honorable plaintiffs' lawyers could try to resist offering or accepting collusive settlement with defendants. But if
plaintiffs' lawyers balk at the prospect of selling out their clients,
the defendant can engage in what Professor Coffee has dubbed
a "reverse auction 203 by offering the right to bargain on behalf
of the class to lawyers willing to accept the lowest payment for
class members. The fact that defendants often have effective

control over who represents the class may seem surprising.
They get that control as a result of several features of class action law. First, the defendant can credibly threaten to resist

class certification. Winning certification for a class action when
the defendant is committed to resisting certification is likely to
be a difficult, expensive and, in many large mass tort cases, an
all but impossible feat.2 04 Second, if courts allow "settlement
continue the litigation as long as his share of the expected additional recovery is
positive, without regard to the lawyer's costs. Thus, the self-interested lawyer would
want to settle in some cases in which the client would want to press on. An attorney
might be inclined to settle a class action or derivative case early for a lower sum than
he could obtain by prosecuting the case further because the attorney may conclude
that his economic return from additional effort in the case would not be worth the
time involved. Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Auctioning Class Action and
Derivative Suits: A Rejoinder, 87 Nw. U. L. Rev. 458, 459 (1993) (footnote omitted).
Class actions exacerbate this problem because of the inadequacy of client and court
monitoring of the settlement. See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation: Balancing Fairness and Efficiency in the Large Class Action, 54
U. Chi. L. Rev. 877, 887-94 (1987) [hereinafter Coffee, Regulation]; John C. Coffee,
Jr., The Unfaithful Champion: The Plaintiff as Monitor in Shareholder Litigation, 48
L. & Contemp. Problems 5, 17-33 (1985) [hereinafter Coffee, Unfaithful Champion].
201 See supra text accompanying notes 111-117.
202 See supra text accompanying notes 35-46.
203 Coffee, Class Wars, supra note 200, at 1354.
20 See generally, Coffee, Class Wars, supra note 200, at 1384. In large mass tort
cases, courts are quick to point to the heterogeneity of the plaintiffs' claims as a bar
to class certification. See, e.g., Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734 (5th
Cir. 1996) (rejecting class certification for proposed class of all nicotine-dependent
persons, their estates, families, and heirs, in tort action against tobacco companies
alleging injury from nicotine addiction on the grounds, inter alia, that such a diverse
class fails predominance and superiority requirements of Rule 23(b)(3)); In re RhonePoulenc Rorer, 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir.) (Posner, CJ.), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 184
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class actions," that is, class actions that are filed and settled
simultaneously, then the defendant can easily shop around for
the most desirable plaintiffs' lawyers. 205 Finally, if defendants do
not like the proceedings in one forum, they can have (or threaten to have) a second class action suit instituted against them in
a different forum. They can then stall the first suit and settle
the second suit, leaving the class lawyers in the first suit unpaid.206

Thus, even without considering judicial self-interest, we have
a situation in which agency problems make the potential for
abuse enormous and in which the mechanism for checking that
(1995) (granting defendants' mandamus petition to deny class certification in mass tort
class action by hemophiliacs alleging they became contaminated with HIV after blood
transfusions involving blood processed by defendants, in part because a federal sitting
in diversity cannot apply a single federal legal standard under Erie,but must apply the
law of the relevant state). Cf. Valentino v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 97 F.3d 1227 (9th Cir.
1996) (holding that there is no absolute bar to the certification of multi-state product
liability class action, but finding that the district court abused its discretion in
certifying the class because there was no showing that common issues predominated
over individual ones). Note that the same circuit that refused to certify the class in
Castano on the grounds that it was too large and heterogeneous some months later
certified a class "for purposes of settlement," which was as heterogeneous on the
ground that heterogeneity was no bar to settlement, just to trial. Ahearn v.
Fibreboard, 162 F.R.D. 505, (E.D. Tex. 1995), aff'd on appeal, In re Asbestos Litig.,
90 F.3d 963 (5th Cir. 1996). We return to the problems with this approach later. See
infra Section II.E.
205These two problems are likely to get worse, not better, because recent proposals
for "reform" promise simultaneously to make it more difficult to secure class
certification when the defendant is opposed and easier when it is in the interest of the
defendant to dispose of all its liability in one fell swoop, in a so-called global
settlement. We have in mind the recently proposed revisions to Rule 23, which make
it more difficult to secure certification in a class action for money damages, but allow
courts to certify such class actions for settlement purposes, despite the fact that they
could not be certified for trial. We come back to this proposal later. See infra Section
II.E.
206This is no mere theoretical problem: the GM Truck settlement was refiled in
Texas state court complete with the coupon relief already rejected by the Third
Circuit. See Joe Darby, Suit May Spell Cash for Parish, The Times Picayune, July 10,
1996, at B4 available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File. And the PB pipe national
class action failed first in Texas, was refiled with some changes in Alabama and
Tennessee, and ultimately approved by the Tennessee court. See supra note 119.
Note that even if one court rejects class certification, there is generally no collateral
estoppel effect on the ability of a second court in a different jurisdiction to consider
certifying the class. See, e.g., J.R. Clearwater, Inc. v. Ashland Chem. Co., 93 F.3d 176
(5th Cir. 1996) (federal district court's denial of class certification does not permit
federal court to enjoin state court from certifying similar class action in state court).
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potential, judicial review and approval of the settlement, is poorly constructed, and to a large extent inherently il-suited, for its
assigned task. For these reasons, we maintain that class action
abuse in which the class is sold out to benefit others must be
quite common, not rare, and that new approaches to this problem are necessary. 207

B. He Who Lives by the Sword
To see the inadequacy of disgorgement and the advantage of

the availability of subsequent legal action against class lawyers
with the possibility of punitive damages, we will consider a simple numerical example based on Hoffman. Had the class lawyers in a case like Hoffman asked for what we contend would
be the upper limits of a reasonable fee-one-third of the actual
economic benefit conferred on the class-they would have real-

ized no more than $5 million.208 On the other hand, by agreeing

207Further evidence can be found in Professor Romano's study of all shareholder
suits brought from the late 1960s through 1987, which found that the court-approved
settlements in these cases exhibited "two striking features." Romano, supra note 198,
at 61. "First, only half of all settlements have a monetary recovery (46 of 83).
Second, awards are paid to attorneys far more frequently than to shareholders (75 of
83). In seven cases (8 percent) the only relief was attorney's fees." Id. (footnote
omitted). After examining both the monetary recoveries and structural changes
provided by these settlements, Professor Romano concluded that monetary recovery
to the class was infrequent; when such recovery was provided, per share recovery was
small; and structural relief was generally cosmetic. Id. at 84. In short, defendants'
lawyers and plaintiffs' lawyers benefited from these suits, but neither the corporation
nor the shareholders that constitute it did. Of course, one interpretation of this data
is that shareholders and corporations are never ripped off for substantial sums by
incompetent, disloyal or otherwise dishonest officers and directors and that the
securities laws are overwritten, if not totally unnecessary. But an equally plausible,
indeed we believe more plausible, explanation is that the corporation and shareholders
are often abused twice: first by their officers and next by the lawyers who represent
them in these shareholder suits.
208 Although we do not know how much BancBoston finally calculated to be the total
amount of escrow surplus, according to the Florida Attorney General's brief objecting
to the settlement, the available evidence at the time of the fairness hearing showed
that the total escrow surplus was about $42 million. Florida Attorney General's Brief,
supra note 38, at 4; see also supra note 40 (noting the fact that the surplus figure used
at the hearing was an approximation that was to be, and was, adjusted later). The
maximum possible benefit would accrue to people in states where banks are not
required to pay any interest on mortgage escrow accounts. Those homeowners could
have earned on average 32% more on their money had they been able to have it
today to invest. See supra note 38. Thus, the maximum possible benefit to the class
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with the bank that the class would pay the attorney's fees, the

lawyers arguably stood to gain as much as $14 million on the
same investment.2 09 The risk of ending up with no money due
to the disgorgement remedies discussed above210 would have to
exceed 64% for a risk-neutral actor to refrain from the conduct
211
alleged in Hoffnan.

from returning the surplus money would be ($42 million surplus * .32) = $13.44
million. To this must be added the back interest benefit. In a zero interest state, back
interest would be $8.76 per homeowner. There were approximately 315,000 mortgage
holders, so the total maximum back interest would be $8.76 * 315,000 = $2.76 million.
Total economic benefit would then be $16.2 million (= $13.44 million + $2.76 million).
Assuming a reasonable attorney fee is 33 1/3%, attorney's fees would be $5.4 million.
We round this down to $5 million because we know there were mortgage holders who
did not receive the maximum benefit because they lived in states that required banks
to pay interest on their escrow accounts. We recognize that $5 million is still higher
than a reasonable attorney's fee would probably be, but we use this generous figure
to emphasize that even at this high rate, the incentives to engage in wrongdoing would
be substantial.
209 The $14 million figure is based on the assumption that the lawyers reasonably
could have assumed that they could get an award of one-third of the total escrow
surplus of $42 million, see supra note 208, even though the court in fact awarded only
28%. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text. If we assume that the bank
would not have assented to paying the $14 million in attorney's fees, then the bank
stood to gain the $5 million in "reasonable" attorney's fees, see supra note 208, by
agreeing to class counsel's attorney fee proposal to have the class pay $14 million in
attorney's fees.
210See supra text accompanying notes 83-92.
211A risk-neutral actor is one who bases investment decisions only on expected
values. See A. Mitchell Polinsky, An Introduction to Law and Economics 53-58 (2d
ed. 1989). Risk neutrality may be a reasonable assumption if the class lawyer has a
portfolio of lawsuits pending simultaneously, as many prominent class action lawyers
do.
Assume that a class lawyer could obtain a settlement with 100% certainty if he
requests that the bank pay $5 million in attorney's fees, and that if he requests $14
million in fees to be paid by class members there is some risk that the court will
reject the settlement, leaving him with nothing. Assume further that the lawyer's
costs, c, are less than $5 million, so that an honest lawyer would take the case, and
that these costs are the same regardless of which settlement he proposes. The lawyer
will propose the risky settlement if:
P(14 - c) + (1 - P)(0 - c) > 5 - c,

where P is the probabiliy that the court will accept the settlement. Solving for P, we
get:
14P - cP + cP - c> 5 - c
14P > 5
P > .36.
Because a 36% probability of making $14 million dollars is equivalent to $5 million
guatanteed, the lawyer will take the chance if the probability of court approval is
equal to or greater than 36%, or equivalently, if the odds of rejection by the court are
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But, as we have discussed, the risk of the class lawyers winding
up with nothing is simply not that high. The Federal Judicial

Center Study found only one case in which class counsel who
agreed to a settlement got no recovery because the settlement
was overturned and two cases in which attorney's fees were
reduced, but not to zero. 212 Thus, although there is no precise
data available, the risk of having a settlement undone by collateral attack for inadequate representation, or vacated for some
other reason, seems quite slim. 213 Although we cannot offer a
64% or lower.
Note that this analysis assumes that the lawyer faces no risk by proposing that the
bank pay a $5 million fee. But if the bank would rather not pay this amount and can
shop around for a lawyer who would accept a higher fee in return for a lower
settlement, then the alternative to the risky fee might be zero (or negative if the
lawyer incurred costs before making the decision to accept the settlement terms). This
could significantly increase the likelihood of the lawyer's accepting the settlement.
The lawyer now accepts the settlement if:
P(14 - c) + (1 - P)(0 - c) > 0.
Solving for P now yields:
14P - cP + cP - c > 0
14P > c
P > c114.
Recall that we assumed c < 5. If c = 1, then P = .07. Thus the settlement rejection
rate would have to be over 93% for a rational lawyer to reject this deal.
212See supra notes 180-187 and accompanying text. It is important to note that even
when plaintiff firms are rebuffed in their attempts to be class counsel and their
proposed settlements are rejected, they may still wind up with more than nothing. A
recent example occurred in the CaliforniaMicro Devices case discussed supra note 158
and accompanying text. Judge Walker, after rejecting the bid and the settlement of
the Lieff Cabraser firm, and essentially accusing the firm of collusion, allowed the firm
to serve as local counsel for the designated class counsel, at an hourly rate with the
possibility of a multiplier. See Robert Ablon, Defrocked Lieff, Cabraser Back on Cal
Micro Case as Local Counsel, The Recorder, May 14, 1996, at 4 available in LEXIS,
Genfed Libarary, Pubs File. This is also another example of the judicial incentive

problem discussed below. See infra Section II.C.
213See generally 2 Newberg on Class Actions, supra note 172, § 11.64, at 11-176; 11177 (discussing collateral attack on judgment and noting that "[t]here has been limited
consideration of the nature and scope of collateral review of class action judgments,"
also that the class action goal of conserving judicial resources might be lost if collateral
review were too liberally allowed). Although Newberg states that the standard of
review on collateral attacks is de novo, id., this becomes irrelevant if the case is
returned to the judge who made the initial ruling, because there is little likelihood that
the judge will overturn himself. The example of Judge Weinstein's ruling in Ryan v.
Dow Chem. Co. (In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig.), 781 F. Supp. 902
(E.D.N.Y. 1991), aff'd, 996 F.2d 1425 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1140
(1994), demonstrates the strong propensity of judges to reach the same outcome they
did the first time around. In Agent Orange, a group of veterans and their family
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precise estimate of the likelihood of lawyers winding up with
nothing, it would seem that any reasonable estimate would be
much less than the 64% that would214deter a rational class lawyer
from wrongdoing in our example.

On the other hand, punitive or treble damage awards resulting
from subsequent suits would significantly affect the incentives of

counsel by not only increasing the size of the potential loss for
the lawyers but also increasing the probability that they will
suffer this loss. To return to our Hoffman-based example, suppose that the risk of paying treble or punitive damages in a
subsequent action against the class lawyers was the same as the
risk of settlement rejection and fee disgorgement. If we assume
members had brought suit in Texas state court alleging injuries resulting from their
exposure to Agent Orange. Id. at 904. The case was removed to federal court and
transferred from Texas to the courtroom of Judge Weinstein in New York, id. at 913,
who years earlier had approved a class settlement on behalf of all veterans and their
families who would claim injury in the future from Agent Orange, as well as all those
who had already made such claims. Id. at 908 (describing the settlement approved by
-Judge Weinstein in 1985). After the Texas suit was removed and transferred, the
defendants argued that the plaintiffs were bound by the prior class settlement, while
the plaintiffs responded that they were not bound because they were denied due
process, adequate notice and adequate representation in the first proceeding. Id. at
918-19. Judge Weinstein, who held in the first proceeding that the notice and
representation were adequate, see In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F.
Supp. 740 (E.D.N.Y. 1984), 611 F. Supp. 1296 (1985) (reaffirming approval of
settlement), again considered these issues and came to the same conclusions. Agent
Orange, 781 F. Supp. 918-919. On appeal, the Second Circuit, which also had
previously considered these matters and found the notice and representation adequate,
see In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied,
484 U.S. 1004 (1988), considered them again and also came to the same conclusions
it had reached earlier.
214To see how important the settlement acceptance rate is, return to our previous
example. See supra note 211. Let H be the collusive (high) rate (which we assumed
was $14 million above) and L be the noncollusive (low) rate (which we assumed was
$5 million above), and assume c=-0 for simplicity. The lawyer will accept the collusive
fees if:
PH + (1 - P)0 > L
PH > L
H/L > lP.
Equivalently, (H - L)/L > (1/P - 1). The left-hand side is the minimum percentage
increase over the noncollusive fee that the collusive fee would have to be for the
lawyer to accept the settlement. For example, if the settlement acceptance rate P is
99%, the collusive fee H would need to be only 1% higher than the noncollusive fee
L. If the settlement acceptance rate drops to 90%, the collusive fee would need to be
only 11% higher. One can easily see that the temptation to sell out the class members
would be very great given the likly values in our example.
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an unrealistically high risk of disgorgement, say 10%, then damages of $76 million-more than treble damages of $42 million-would be necessary to deter rational class lawyers from
the kind of conduct that appears to have occurred in Hoff-

man.2 15 If, however, the risk of having to pay treble damages
increased just slightly to 16%, that would be sufficient to deter
lawyer misbehavior.216 And actually, the risk of treble damages
would not have to be that high because the award of treble
damages is more likely to result in costs not typically a consequence of the disgorgement type remedies we have described.217
The collateral consequences we have in mind include a decreased likelihood of having a court approve one's bid to be
class counsel in subsequent cases and some possibility of disciplinary action.218

215Let D be the damage measure and assume c=0 for simplicity. The lawyer would
make or accept the high fee proposal if:

14P + (-D)(1 - P) > 5
14P - D + DP > 5
D(1 - P) < 14P - 5
D < (14P - 5)1(1 - P).

If P=.90 (corresponding to a 10% risk of disgorgement), then the lawyer would accept
the collusive fees for any damages less than $76 million.
Actual damages to the class would be the entire $14 million fee because the
defendants ordinarily would have paid the class attorney's fees. Thus, treble damages
would be $42 million: not enough to deter lawyer misbehavior.
216Assume that the only two possibilities are that the settlement is accepted or that
the lawyer is successfully sued in a subsequent action and again that costs are zero.
The lawyer would make the high fee proposal if:
14P + (-D)(1 - P) > 5
14P - D + DP > 5
P(D + 14) > 5 + D
P > (5 + D)/(14 + D).

If actual damages are 14, so treble damages are 42, then the likelihood of having to
pay these damages would have to be at least 1 - [(5 + 42)/(14 + 42)] or 16%.
217To go back to our numerical example, the lawyer would not be deterred if P >
(5 + D)/(14 + D). See supra note 216 Added costs are essentially like a higher
damage payment. The higher D is, the closer to 1 the fraction would get; that is, the
likelihood of successful misbehavior would have to get higher. Conversely, the
probability of a successful action against the class lawyers (1 - P) necessary to deter
lawyers [1 - (5 + D)/(14 + D)] would get closer to zero as D increased.
218In malpractice actions in which the allegations amount to constructive fraud,
courts may refer the matter to disciplinary authorities. See, e.g., Greycas, Inc. v.
Proud, 826 F.2d 1560, 1568 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1043 (1988). On the
implausibility of disciplinary action being taken against class counsel class counsel in
the absence of the kinds of suits we propose, see infra notes 220-221 and
accompanying text.
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The lawsuits we propose would not only increase the size of
the punishment assessed against misbehaving class lawyers, but
would also increase the likelihood of punishment. The main
reason is that treble or punitive damages, as well as attorney's
fees, which are available in many of the suits we propose, provide adequate incentive for lawyers to discover and litigate instances of class action abuse. If serious challenges to collusive
or otherwise illegal settlement deals are to be brought, we believe that they must be brought by attorneys, not pro se objectors. As the reader understands by now, class settlements are
replete with complex terms and obscure formulas, and sophisticated proponents (class and defense counsel) are present at
every fairness hearing and well-motivated to defend the deals
they have cut. To encourage adequate challenges requires an
examination, not of the incentives of class members injured by
a corrupt deal, but of the lawyers who might act on their
behalf. 219 If we assume that attorney's fees in a subsequent
treble damage action against the previous class lawyers would
be about one-third of the award to the class, lawyers would have
as much incentive to ferret out corruption, thereby deterring
future misconduct, as class lawyers now have to engage in the
corruption.
In theory, one could create the same incentive structure other
ways. One set of solutions would involve attempting to increase
greatly the chance of having collusive settlements rejected by
trial courts or appellate courts. Theory, however, is one thing;
practice, another. There is no chance in the real world that
class settlements will ever be rejected at a high enough rate
(recall that a 64% rejection rate would have been necessary in
our Hoffman-based example). Moreover, if courts rejected settlements that often, much of the incentive to spend time crafting
good settlements would likely dissipate. One advantage of our
solution is that an otherwise acceptable settlement, for example,
one that enjoined a bank from keeping excessive escrow on
deposit, could be left intact, while the fraudulent conduct associated with the settlement, like paying class counsel over 100%
219See Coffee, Regulation, supra note 200, at 896-904 (criticizing law and economics
analyses based on the incentives of class members instead of the incentives of class
lawyers).
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attorney's fees, could be punished and deterred by an award of
damages.
An alternative solution would be to impose a high penalty on
misbehaving class lawyers outside the liability system, namely
through discipline. Again, however, there is no chance that
misbehaving class lawyers will be disciplined with a high enough
probability and a severe enough sanction to deter most misbehavior. Class members would often be ignorant of the wrong or
reluctant to incur the time and expense of filing and pursuing a
complaint.2 20 Disciplinary boards are notoriously underfunded
and would be unable or reluctant to mount the effort needed to
do battle with wealthy class action lawyers and powerful members of the defense bar.22 1 Moreover, it is in the institutional
interests of the defendants' bar and an influential subgroup of
the plaintiffs' bar (class action lawyers) as well as the judiciary-a matter we will discuss next-to promote the kinds of
class action settlements we are criticizing here. To expect the
disciplinary authorities to resist these interests to the degree
necessary to deter significant lawyer misconduct-with absolutely no monetary incentive to do so-is simply wishful thinking.
So far, we have tried to show that allowing subsequent suits
against misbehaving class lawyers-suits that are allowed against
lawyers in any other context-would be the most effective meth220 See David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 799, 829

(1992). Much of the argument we use to support our thesis-that a fairness hearing
on approving a class action settlement is a poor forum in which to regulate lawyer
misconduct associated with class actions and that independent legal actions are needed
to do that work-parallels the analysis set forth by Professor Wilkins in his excellent
article.
221 Id. See also Charles W. Wolfram, Mass Torts-Messy Ethics, 80 Cornell L. Rev.

1228, 1234 (1995):
Professional discipline of class-action lawyers who have been suspiciously
generous with themselves at the expense of the class is out of the question.

Most disciplinary staffs are overworked and underfinanced and can rather
readily be out-lawyered if the stakes are sufficiently high.
Moreover,
disciplinary counsel would have to take on the class-action bar in a matter
already decided by the judge adversely to a possible prosecution.
For an example of this problem, see the discussion of the numerous difficulties the

Texas State Bar faced in prosecuting ethics charges against John O'Quinn, a
prominent plaintiffs attorney, in Max Boot, The Untouchable Lawyer, Wall St. J.,
Feb. 1, 1996, at A18.
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od for deterring the collusive behavior that the class action incentive structure encourages. Of course, allowing such suits
would be costly and we must consider whether those costs might
outweigh the benefits.

But before we turn to the matter of

costs, the matter of judicial self-interest has been long enough
delayed. It is time to speak of judges.
C. Blind, Not Merely Blindfolded, Judges
Courts in class actions are supposed to fulfill the monitoring

role that the client cannot. Ostensibly, the court stands in for
the client as a fiduciary to ensure that the settlement is fair to
the client and does not merely serve the lawyer's interest. But

this arrangement simply replaces one imperfect agent (class
counsel) with another (the court). Although the court has no
monetary interest in the settlement, its interests are not per-

fectly aligned with the interests of class members.222 Judicial

self-interest may lead judges to seek power, prestige, and autonomy,223 or may lead them to seek greater leisure.224 Courts'
strong disposition toward settlements 225 stems from both types
222

The self-interested behavior of judges has only recently begun to receive serious
scholarly attention. See Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges Maximize? (The Same
Thing Everybody Else Does), 3 Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. 1, 3-4 & nn.3 & 4 (1993)
(collecting articles analyzing judicial behavior from economic perspective). For a
recent study of the role of judicial self-interest in issues such as court administration
and bureaucracy, judicial salaries and habeas corpus reform, see Christopher E. Smith,
Judicial Self-Interest: Federal Judges and Court Administration (1995).
223 See Smith, supra note 222, at 7. For example, Justice Scalia in his first major
address to the ABA after being appointed to the Supreme Court, gave a speech in
which he argued that the federal courts have lost their elite status because they are
overloaded with too many, and in particular too many routine, cases. Id at 75-76.
224 See Posner, supra note 222, at 10 ("Because the judiciary has been placed on a
nonprofit basis, we should expect that judges on average do not work as hard as
lawyers of comparable age and ability.")
See Coffee, supra note 7, at 714 n.121:
Judge Henry Friendly observed that "[a]ll the dynamics conduce to judicial
approval of [the] settlemento" once the adversaries have agreed. See Alleghany
Corp. v. Kirby, 333 F.2d 327, 347 (2d Cir. 1964) (Friendly, J., dissenting), affd
en banc by equally divided court, 340 F.2d 311 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. dismissed,
384 U.S. 28 (1966). Although the case law may require full and elaborate
judicial review before a settlement is approved, it is doubtful that courts have
much incentive to be very demanding. Their deferential attitude is probably best
expressed by one recent decision which acknowledged that: "'In deciding
whether to approve this settlement proposal, the court starts from the familiar

1996]

Under Cloak of Settlement

1123

of judicial self-interest: Settlements dispose of cases that do not

involve "interesting" legal issues; and settlements clear crowded
dockets with minimal court effort. Class actions magnify these
effects, because the alternatives-trying the class action or,
worse yet, trying the multitude of suits that make up the class

action individually-are particularly burdensome alternatives.
Either of those alternatives would take up significant court time
and resources, and the second would have judges presiding over
repetitive individual suits that they may view as boring, if not
trivial.22 6 On the other hand, while presiding over a major class
action settlement may entail a significant amount of work, a
judge seeking power, and even prestige, could hardly do better
than to preside over the settlement of such a suit. 227 Moreover,
while presiding over most class action settlements will not bring
prestige or power, neither is it onerous duty. The Federal Judiaxiom that a bad settlement is almost always better than a good trial."' In re
Warner Communications Sec. Litig., 618 F. Supp. 735, 740 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
226See Macey & Miller, supra note 198, at 4546. See also Sylvia R. Lazlos, Note,
Abuse in Plaintiff Class Action Settlements: The Need for a Guardian During Pretrial
Settlement Negotiations, 84 Mich. L. Rev. 308 nn.1 & 2 (1985) (discussing the judicial
policy of encouraging settlements in both ordinary civil and class action suits).
It is interesting to note that even Judge Posner, who is usually quite sensitive to the
possibility of self-interested behavior, overlooked the extent of this problem in his
recent Rhone-Poulenc decision. In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 184 (1995). In overturning the district court's certification of
a class action, he noted: "We do not mean to suggest that the district judge is engaged
in a deliberate power-grab. We have no reason to suppose that he wants to preside
over an unwieldy class action." Id. at 1299. But if the class action is likely to settle
and the alternative is multiple individual suits, that may be exactly what the judge
wants. Judge Posner did recognize the problem of judicial incentives in asbestos
litigation, remarking that "[t]he number of asbestos cases was so great as to exert a
well-nigh irresistable pressure to bend the normal rules." Id. at 1304. In our view,
asbestos litigation is not the exception in this regard.
227 For example, Judge Weinstein, the judge who presided over the Agent Orange
class action settlement, has received an enormous amount of attention and prestige
due to his handling of that case. See, e.g., Peter Schuck, Agent Orange On Trial:
Mass Toxic Disasters in the Courts 111-42 (1987) (describing Judge Weinstein's
handling of this major litigation); Wayne Roth-Nelson & Kathey Verdeal, Risk
Evidence in Toxic Torts, 2 Envtl. Law. 405 (1996) (discussing Judge Weinstein's views
of scientific evidence in Agent Orange litigation); Wade Lambert, Peter D. Sleeth &
Foster Church, Critics Call Lawsuits by Groups 'Rackets,' Portland Oregonian, Apr.
23, 1996 at B16. See also Implants: A Spark of Hope, The Detroit News, June 5,
1996, at A10 (discussing U.S. District Court Judge Pointer's handling of breast implant
litigation); Jay Reeves, Unbiased Expert on Breast Implants Hard to Find, The
Cincinnati Enquirer, June 7, 1996, at A20 (same).
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cial Center's Study shows that the average fairness hearing takes
up about 40 minutes of court time, putting aside the outlier class

actions that involve more time but also have a greater chance of
228
bringing prestige.
It is possible that trial courts' enthusiasm for settlement could
be tempered by the possibility of reversal on appeal. One might
think that appellate judges, one step removed from the mess of
clogged dockets and the prospect of repetitive trials, have considerably less interest in approving every class settlement that a
trial judge has accepted.22 9 But being one step removed also
means that appellate judges are to a large extent necessarily
dependent on the findings of the trial judge as to the fairness of
the terms, the adequacy of the representation and the appropriateness of the request for attorney's fees. As a consequence of
this distance, appellate courts review such matters under the
abuse of discretion standard,2 30 which seems appropriate, but
which also makes it easy for appellate judges to accept settlements. The question remains, however, what incentives, if any,
would encourage appellate judges to ignore the possibility that
trial judges routinely abuse their discretion in their haste to

approve every class settlement-which is what we contend is
going on. Empathy for the plight of lower court colleagues and
228See FJC Study, supra note 180, at 169 (Table 19).
229

In some important cases appellate judges are not so removed from the negotiation
of the settlement. In the Ahearn case, the district judge appointed Judge Patrick
Higginbotham of the Fifth Circuit as "settlement facilitator." Yet even the dissent,
which objected to the district court's involvement in the settlement, stated that "there
can be no criticism of Judge Higginbotham's role." In re Asbestos Litig. (Flanagan
v. Ahearn), 90 F.3d 963, 1014 n.73 (5th Cir. 1996) (Smith, J., dissenting). The dissent
can perhaps be forgiven for not wanting to criticize the role played by a fellow jurist.
But the point is that, however honorable Judge Higginbotham's intentions and
however effective his actions as mediator, it is hard to believe that his participation
in the settlement (and the fact that the trial judge was now also a colleague on the
court of appeals) did not influence the judgment of his colleagues on the Fifth Circuit
who were asked to review the settlement agreement.
230The abuse of discretion standard is the most deferential standard of review.
"[A]ny rulings that are within the discretion of the trial judge will be reviewed under
an abuse of discretion standard.... [which means that] [o]nly if an appellate court is
convinced that the court below was clearly wrong will it reverse a discretionary
decision." Jack H. Friedenthal, Mary Kay Kane & Arthur R. Miller, Civil Procedure
§ 13.4, at 608 (2d ed. 1993). See, e.g., Saunderson v. Saunderson, 379 So. 2d 91, 92
(Ala. Civ. App. 1980); Keith Gas Co. v. Jackson Creek Cattle Co., 570 P.2d 918, 921
(N.M. 1977); Primm v. Primm, 299 P.2d 231, 235 (Cal. 1950).
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a frustration with the apparent indifference of the public and
politicians to what appellate and trial judges insist is an onerous
workload seems to make appellate judges as fond, or nearly as
fond, of class action settlements as trial judges. 231 Appellate
judges' own preferences for leisure may also play a role in their
willingness to uphold class settlements approved by lower

courts.232
It is true that courts have an interest in promoting their reputation for fairness. That interest should encourage them to safeguard the interests of absent class members. At least so far,
however, individual judges have little reason to expect negative
reputational effects from approving bad class deals. 233 The press
231 Dean Mary Kay Kane of the Hastings College of Law, who served as Reporter
for the U.S. Judicial Conference Ad Hoc Committee on Asbestos Litigation, a
committee appointed by Chief Justice Rehnquist, testified at the Georgine fairness

hearing that the judges on the Ad Hoc Committee

were "very concerned" with cases "piling up ...[and] clogging the court
system." She testified that "they were concerned that not only were the courts
being cluttered with criminal litigation, but now asbestos was coming in as a
major piece of litigation ....The judges decided ...not to "suggest to Congress

that they were indeed legislating because that was not their task, and that it
would be more prudent instead simply to write a report.., to be forwarded to
Congress setting out the history, the kinds of problems that were posed by

asbestos litigation,"... The judges, however, apparently thought it unlikely that
Congress would make an active effort to pass comprehensive legislation. They
were concerned that ... [such legislation] "as a practical matter . . . simply

wasn't going to happen."
Koniak, supra note 15, at 1148-49 (quoting from Kane's testimony at Georginefairness
hearing). See also Richard L. Marcus, They Can't Do That, Can They? Tort Reform
Via Rule 23, 80 Cornell L. Rev. 858, 860-66, 902-04 (1995) (describing how the
"substantive preferences" of federal appellate and trial judges for reform of state tort
law may be interfering with the duty of those judges to protect the legal rights of
absent class members). Professor Marcus's point parallels our own, although what he
labels "substantive preferences," we see as "preferences" for fewer cases and less
work. In any event, we agree that trial and appellate judges have interests that may
make them poor guardians for absent class members.
232See Posner, supra note 222, at 21 (discussing variety of devices used by appellate
judges that enable them "to reduce their work as well as to avoid the hassle involved
in wrestling with difficult, politically sensitive issues").
233A good example of judicial attitudes toward settlements in class action cases as
well as toward the fairness hearings objecting to these settlements can be found in
Hoffman. The class lawyers put on the testimony of an accountant who argued that
if the class members had taken their refunds and applied it to reduce the principal of
their mortgages or to reduce high-interest credit card debt, the "benefit" to the class
could be in excess of the "surplus" (the class members' money, recall) wrongly held
On
Hoffman, Fairness Hearing, supra note 35, at 17-22.
by the bank.
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and academia have imperfect access to class settlements, a problem the legislation we have proposed and Senator Cohen has
introduced is designed to help remedy. 234 Even when settlement
documents are readily accessible, they are likely to be so lengthy

and complex that sorting out what happened is very difficult.
Class settlements are, if nothing else, heavily-lawyered affairs,
and discerning fraud through reams of legalese drafted to conceal any such activity requires effort few reporters, few lawyers
and few academics have thus far made. To the extent the general public, media or academics blame anyone for the abuse
they perceive, albeit find difficult to document, that blame tends
to land on the doorstep of lawyers, not the judiciary. We believe too that judges may, in part, have escaped their share of
responsibility for whatever class action abuse exists because

criticizing judges for self-interested behavior-turning a blind
eye to facts that would be discomforting for them to see-is
considered by many to be as profane as accusing the Pope of a
lecherous eye, a charge well-nigh outside the bounds of civilized
discourse. 235 And we believe judges understand all of this, which
cross-examination, the Florida Attorney General, Hoffman (no relation to the named
plaintiff), tried to make two points: first, that the accountant's calculations were based
on an average length of time remaining on mortgages that did not take into account
the possibility of refinancing; second, that using the refund to pay down the principal
on a class member's mortgage was not the default, or even a recommended, usage,
and was therefore unlikely to occur and should not be presumed. Id. at 22-34. The
court responded to this line of inquiry as follows:
Mr. Hoffman, I don't know how you all do it in Florida, but we're not going to
sit around here all day and ask inane questions. I'm not interested in-if this
is the best settlement for the class, what they can do with the money or can't do
with the money is immaterial to the issue of whether or not they are getting the
best deal. What I want you to do is get to the point and let's get on with it.
Id. at 30. Perhaps if the judge had known that the Hoffman settlement would wind
up being publicized to the degree it has, he would have been more judicious in
conducting the hearing.
234 See supra notes 106-109 and accompanying text.
235 See Posner, supra note 222, at 25-26 (referring to "the piety in which the public
discussion of judges is usually wrapped" as one reason people have not considered
self-interested interpretation of judicial behavior). While some other academics have
pointed out the judiciary's self-interest in approving class actions, which have all the
markings of a sell-out, most soften the point by either suggesting that the problem is
limited to a few "lazy or overworked judge[s]," Wolfram, supra note 221, at 1233, or
by suggesting that the "preferences" of judges are preferences worthy of respect and
that only in cases of extreme system overload will judges allow these preferences to
override the rights of absent class members or otherwise distort the law. Marcus,
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means that they would see little risk of negative reputational
effects from approving a class settlement that looks amazingly
like a collusive deal, or a settlement that suggests questionable
conduct under the antitrust laws.
Even more important, courts worry not only and perhaps not
chiefly about their reputation among the general public, but
about their reputation with their peers-other judges and lawyers. 236 Accepting a settlement that clears the dockets of one's
colleagues is very likely to win one-praise from those colleagues
as well as gratitude from the lawyers presenting the deal;237 rejecting such a settlement, on the other hand, may subject the
judge or panel of judges to not-so-subtle rebuke from colleagues. That judge or panel may expect to suffer negative
reputational effects from the lawyers involved in the deal as well
as other lawyers who see the rejection as bad news for deals
38
they might someday advance.2
In addition to self-interest, the judicial habit of neutrality may
lead judges to accept class action settlements too readily. The
traditional paradigm of judging is that of a neutral arbiter, rather than partisan or protector. In a fairness hearing, this paradigm may interfere with the court's role as guardian of, and
fiduciary for, the class members. What could seem more "neutral" than accepting a settlement agreed to by both sides? And
what could seem less neutral than rejecting a settlement on the
ground that one side, the class members, got a raw deal? While
the judiciary's obligation to protect absent class members seems
too weak to break through the paradigm of "neutrality" the
judiciary's fondness for settlements does not. All too often
judges appear to be acting as advocates for the settlement itself,
a troubling role for a guardian who is supposedly there to ensure that the settlement, arrived at without the actual consent of
supra note 231, at 904, 907-08.
236 See Robert D. Cooter, The Objectives of Private and Public Judges, 41 Public
Choice 107, 129 (1983).
237 It is also quite plausible that in states in which the judiciary is elected, such as
Alabama (where Hoffman occurred), this "gratitude" will take the concrete form of
campaign contributions to help finance the judge's reelection bid.
238 See Koniak, supra note 15, at 1116-17, 1119 (describing courts' reluctance to
suggest that lawyers before them colluded or otherwise broke the law in connection
with a class settlement or any other matter); see also supra notes 152-158, 212 and
accompanying text.
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absent class members and in some cases over their objections,
is good for the class and not just the judicial system or the lawyers.239 For the reasons given in this Part and those expressed

earlier on the defects inherent in the fairness hearing procedure,
it is predictable that courts would be generally unreliable monitors of class counsel's performance and ineffective protectors of
class members' interests.
By arguing that judicial incentives and not just the procedure
in fairness hearings make judges ineffective monitors of class

action abuse, however, we raise the following problem for ourselves: Perhaps judges will be as hostile to the later suits we
4°
propose as they are to stopping class action abuse ab initio.2
Unfortunately, there is some evidence that this is true,241 and
239 See Marcus, supra note 231, at 900 (arguing that the judicial policy in favor of
settlements should not be imported wholesale into the class action arena).
Some commentators have noted that too little attention has been paid to the
potential problems created when judges involve themselves in the dynamics of class
action settlement negotiations and then purport to judge the fairness of settlements
they have helped to create. See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics and the
Settlements of Mass Torts: When the Rules Meet the Road, 80 Cornell L. Rev. 1159,
1183 (1995) ("The Code of Judicial Conduct provides little guidance, and few
standards in the rules or cases set limits on when a judge should refrain from
examining the fairness of a settlement he has helped broker.") (footnote omitted).
This problem seems ripe for more serious attention, however. Compare In re
Asbestos Litig. 90 F.3d 963, 989 (5th Cir. 1996) (finding that the district judge did not
need to recuse himself from deciding the fairness of the settlement because his
involvement was "insubstantial") with id. at 1013-1015 (Smith, J., dissenting) (arguing
that the judge should have recused himself because he "had a personal stake in finding
[the settlement] to be fair," and because the settlement negotiations took place before
any lawsuit had been filed).
240 The courts' self-interest in settlement would not be entirely eliminated. Courts
might surmise that allowing the kinds of suits we propose to Succeed could result in
a higher future caseload by deterring class action settlements. And entertaining
subsequent suits would entail at least an indirect finding that the court should not have
approved the class settlement, a finding courts might be loath to make.
24, For example, in Diaz v. Sheppard, 85 F.3d 1502, 1506 n.5 (11th Cir. 1996),
although the court remanded to state court, on the ground that removal was improper,
the plaintiff's malpractice action against class counsel who purported to represent him
in settlement of a federal class action, the appellate judges could not refrain from
adding: "We have read the dissent [arguing against recognition of a malpractice claim
against class counsel] and personally would not be sorry if the law compelled the result
Judge Logan advocates for this case." Notice that while two appellate judges were
able to resist such a broad holding, they could not refrain from expressing their desire
for such a rule and one judge was ready to put in place a complete ban on such
actions. The majority stressed that they were not deciding the merits of the
malpractice claim. Id. at 1505.
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one of our aims is to make judges more aware of the interests
they might have before they too quickly block this path to deterring class action abuse. But aside from our hope that this
Article will help forestall judges from dismissing these later suits
without adequately considering the benefits thereby lost, there
are other reasons to believe that judicial self-interest will play
less of a role in the later suits we advocate than in the initial
approval of class settlements. First, interfering with these suits
would require, as we shall endeavor to show, some major rewriting of longstanding doctrine on res judicata, collateral estoppel
and/or the constitutional protections afforded absent class members. 242 Second, the suits we propose are less of an interference
with class action settlements than rejecting class settlements
would be. A settlement can be left intact, while damages are
awarded for malpractice or fraud, for example, committed on
the class in the course of the representation. 243 Third, should
injured class members and others (e.g., the Justice Department
in the case of an alleged antitrust violation) be allowed to maintain the suits we propose, a jury would be available to assess
whether wrongdoing had in fact occurred, which distinguishes
our suits from fairness hearings or independent actions for fraud
under rules like Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) in which
the fact-finder is a judge. If juries, who we have no reason to
believe are biased in favor of class settlements, were allowed to
decide what conduct by counsel breached legal duties to the
class or otherwise violated the law, we believe that alone might
Diaz is not the only evidence that the "anything goes" attitude might interfere with
the later suits we propose. In Kamilewicz v. Bank of Boston, 92 F.3d 506, 512 (7th
Cir. 1996), the case spawned by the escrow class action described in Section I.A.1. of

this Article, the unanimous panel justifies its holding that a federal suit against the
class lawyers, and the bank for conduct in a state court class action cannot be
maintained in federal court, in part, on the ground that such a suit "could have
ramifications far beyond this case." And in In re VMS Limited Partnership Sec. Litig.,

976 F.2d 362, 369 (7th Cir. 1992), the court in denying the plaintiffs' attempt to appeal
the district court's approval of the class settlement, mentions that the plaintiffs may

have other remedies (presumably a suit against class counsel) but refuses to elaborate
because it might "encourage one or more avenues of alternate litigation." This last
quotation made us consider calling this Article or some section of it, "The Suits That

Dare Not Speak Their Name," but, having no desire to encourage such judicial
squeamishness, we elected not to.
242See infra Sections III.B.,C.
243See

infra text and accompanying note 286.
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help restore some public confidence in the class settlement process deemed so essential by judges and other interested observers. That result might serve at least the long-range interests of
judges and everyone else in the country too.
D. The Costs of Allowing Later Suits
Having set forth the need for subsequent suits against lawyers
involved in class actions, we need to consider the costs of these
suits. One set of costs that we may readily dispose of is the
potential loss of public confidence in the legal system that later
suits might occasion. Indeed, we have just argued that our suits
might restore public confidence. Nonetheless, it is true that the
lawsuits we propose all imply that the court which approved the
class action settlement failed to protect the class in some important respect. The question is whether the gain we have outlined
in reduced corruption outweighs any loss in public confidence
that might follow from regular admissions by the court system
that, as guardians in class actions, judges often leave much to be
desired. That question, however, assumes that there is some
level of public confidence present to be eroded; it is not at all
clear that this is so when it comes to class actions. 244 Outside
the class action arena the public is quite comfortable with the
availability of malpractice actions against lawyers. Moreover, as
we have already suggested, allowing juries of ordinary citizens
to judge the behavior of lawyers should serve in the class action
context, and we believe does serve in ordinary malpractice suits,
to enhance public confidence in the legal system, not to diminish
it. We assume that most citizens would be appalled by a legal
system that would immunize lawyers for wrongdoing that they
somehow slipped past a judge, and would applaud efforts to
hold those lawyers accountable for their misdeeds. In short, a
judicial system willing to admit and provide some redress for the
244The public's attitude toward class actions may be summed up by a recent comic
strip in which an enterprising lawyer awakens an unsuspecting person and announces,
"Good Morning, Sir ... My Name is Bernard, and I'll be your attorney for today.
May I suggest starting with our special class action lawsuit against a major
manufacturer?" After getting rid of the lawyer with a perfunctory "Sure, what the

hell," the homeowner returns to bed exclaiming, "Wake me when the nineties are over
.. " Wiley, Non Sequitur, The Daily Progress (Charlottesville, Va.) Jan. 21, 1996.
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wrongs everyone seems to understand are now tolerated by the
system would inspire more, not less, confidence. 245
A second set of costs associated with subsequent suits against

class action lawyers involves the transaction and institutional
costs of further litigation, the costs of encouraging satellite liti-

gation generated by an earlier suit. But restricting the availability of subsequent suits to save these costs seems particularly

unpersuasive. 246 Conserving court time and decreasing the transaction costs of parties are reasons that have already been used,
so to speak, to justify both the class action device and the power
of a court to bind absent class members to what is essentially a
contract drawn up by lawyers they never hired and the defendant who allegedly caused the class harm. Those cost-saving
devices themselves often produce significant costs---costs imposed on the class itself, the original aggrieved party. The subsequent suits we propose are designed to correct for that unjustified result.
There is no reason to expect subsequent suits to cancel all the

cost savings legitimately realized by the availability of class action suits or procedural devices that encourage their settlement.
Given the fact that the suits we propose impose no novel obliga245
Moreover, we do not believe that procedural rules against relitigation are actually
or appropriately aimed at bolstering public confidence in the courts, particularly if
those rules prevent the unearthing of corruption or illegality connected to previous
court process. Writing in praise of Justice Traynor for having boldly extended the ban
against relitigating issues in subsequent proceedings, see Traynor's landmark decision
in Bernhard v. Bank of Am. Nat. Trust & Savings Ass'n., 122 P.2d 892 (Cal. 1942),
Professor Geoffrey Hazard scorned the idea that the rule could be justified as a means
of inspiring public confidence in the judiciary: "Res judicata doctrine has little direct
relevance to maintaining 'public confidence' in the courts. Whatever the number and
significance of the elements that instill such confidence, a more or less inhibiting
relitigation rule is surely minor compared to such problems as corruption, delay and
inconsistency." Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Res Nova in Res Judicata, 44 S. Cal. L. Rev.
1036, 1041 (1971). Nor do the antitrust immunity doctrines we discuss below have
anything to do with promoting or maintaining public confidence in courts or other
government agencies.
246It also seems unrelated to the purpose behind the policy against relitigation.
These concerns could be used to justify or condemn any procedural rule, which leads
us to believe that some more specific social benefit undergirds the rule against
relitigation. As Professor Hazard put it: "The burdens of time and inconvenience
involved in a policy which liberally allows relitigation are minuscule when compared
with those burdens now imposed by elaborate discovery and pre-trial procedures,
prolonged trials, and multiple appeals." Hazard, supra note 245, at 1041.
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tions on lawyers, and that they would entail great difficulties of

proof as well as being significantly costly to maintain, we are
confident that courts would not be flooded with subsequent
suits. 247 To conclude that subsequent suits of the type we propose would kill off all cost-saving benefits of class action settlements, one must assume either that all class actions are corrupt
or otherwise unlawful; or that the procedural devices to prevent
frivolous suits are so inadequate that we can no longer afford to
recognize long-standing causes of action, such as malpractice,
breach of fiduciary duty or antitrust violations. We reject both
those possibilities.2 48 If we are wrong, and corruption or illegality permeates every class action settlement, then ending such
settlements is a good idea. And, if the rules on frivolous suits
are so weak that later suits threaten good settlements as well as
bad ones, then the rules designed to deter frivolous suits are the
247The Connnecticut Supreme Court recently reached the same conclusion in a case
in which the court allowed a claim for malpractice arising out of a divorce settlement.
Grayson v. Wofsey, Rosen, Kweskin & Kuriansky, 646 A.2d 195 (Conn. 1995). In
rejecting the defendants' assertion that allowing such suits would open the floodgates,
the court responded:
[W]e have no reason to believe that our resolution of the defendants' claim will
prompt an increase in malpractice suits against attorneys because, in declining
to narrow the existing common law remedy for attorney malpractice, we create
no new claim or theory of recovery. Moreover, as the New Jersey Supreme
Court has recently stated in response to the same concern expressed by the
defendants here, "plaintiffs must allege particular facts in support of their claims
of attorney incompetence and may not litigate complaints containing mere
generalized assertions of malpractice. We are mindful that attorneys cannot be
held liable simply because they are not successful in persuading an opposing
party to accept certain terms. Similarly, we acknowledge that attorneys who
pursue reasonable strategies in handling their cases and who render reasonable
advice to their clients cannot be held liable for the failure of their strategies or
for any unprofitable outcomes that result because their clients took their advice.
The law demands that attorneys handle their cases with knowledge, skill, and
diligence but it does not demand that they be perfect or infallible, and it does
not demand that they always secure optimum outcomes for their clients.
Id. at 200-01 (quoting Ziegelheim v. Apollo, 607 A.2d 1298, 1306 (NJ. 1992)).
248 In Grayson the Connecticut Supreme Court rejected an argument by the
defendant lawyers that allowing malpractice suits would discourage settlements:
"Because settlements will often be in their clients' best interests, we harbor no doubt
that attorneys will continue to give advice concerning the resolution of cases in a
manner consistent with their professional and ethical responsibilities." Id. at 200. If
malpractice suits against class action lawyers were allowed, we believe the same would
hold true for them. For a further discussion of Grayson and similar cases, see infra
notes 321-323 and accompanying text.
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problem, not our proposal, and those rules should be strengthened-a course of action we support. 249

Others may object to our proposal on the ground that the
lawyers who bring the subsequent suits against the class lawyers
or defendants will face the same incentive problems and, therefore, could be liable themselves in yet another round of subsequent suits. Our response to this objection is threefold. First,
the same potential exists for lawyers outside the class action
setting who represent plaintiffs in legal malpractice actions.
And we assume that no one would advocate eliminating lawyer
malpractice actions for this reason. 2 0 Second, allowing our suits
should deter both misconduct in the original class action as well

as misconduct in the malpractice class action. Third, we believe
that when a lawyer brings a malpractice suit, he is ordinarily
acutely aware that he must himself be well-nigh beyond re-

proach. In fact, malpractice suits against malpractice lawyers
2

are extremely rare birds. 1
Finally, having addressed some of the costs of allowing the

suits we advocate as a remedy for class action abuse, we want
to encourage other "reformers" in this area to do the same.

249 Indeed, although we do not believe these rules are so weak as to be useless, we
do believe that they should be stricter. See, e.g., Geoffrey C. Hazard, Susan P.
Koniak & Roger C. Cramton, The Law and Ethics of Lawyering 414-17 (2d ed. 1994)
(detailing the debate over sanctioning lawyers for filing frivolous cases).
250 See Wilkins, supra note 220, at 830-35 (discussing costs and benefits of malpractice actions compared to other methods of attorney regulation).
251For an example of lawyer misbehavior in a malpractice suit that occurred in
somewhat unique circumstances and resulted in sanctions under Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, see
Jackson v. O'Hara, Ruberg, Osborn & Taylor, 875 F.2d 1224 (6th Cir. 1989). In that
case, a lawyer for the plaintiff in a wrongful death action against a truck driver and
his employer brought a malpractice suit against the employer's lawyers after obtaining
an assignment of this supposed claim from the truck driver. The lawyer for the
plaintiff was sanctioned because the employer's lawyers had refused to represent the
truck driver in the wrongful death action, which the plaintiff's lawyer could have
discovered by reasonable inquiry, because the truck driver had not suffered any
damages that could be proved in a malpractice claim, and because the plaintiff's
lawyer had filed the malpractice suit for improper purposes. Id. at 1230-31. Needless
to say, this is not a typical malpractice case.
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E. The Inadequacy of the CurrentProposalto Amend Rule 23
As we were revising this Article in April 1996, the Committee
on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference
of the United States approved for publication and comment
revisions of Rule 23 recommended by the Advisory Committee
on Civil Rules.252 Although we doubt that any reform of Rule
23 would obviate the need for the types of suits we propose, we
feel compelled to add a few words about the reforms that have
been proposed for those who would like to believe that procedural reform is a more promising and less costly solution than
subsequent suits. We have two general responses to the Comnittee's proposed revisions. 253 First, both the substance of the
revisions and the process leading up to their adoption support
our assertions about the incentives of all the players in the class
action game to advance their own interests at the expense of
class members. Second, and related, the specific changes made
by the revisions would actually make matters worse for class
members and therefore make our proposed subsequent suits
more, rather than less, necessary.
Most notably, Proposed Rule 23(b)(4) broadly licenses courts
to certify for settlement purposes class actions in which the defendants and some plaintiffs' lawyer (unappointed and unsupervised during the negotiation process by any judge) have agreed,
prior to the filing of a class action in court, to settle some set of
cases that might otherwise not qualify to be tried as a class action. 254 The proponents of this provision are adamant in their
252Preliminary

Draft, supra note 11.
do not address all aspects of the proposed revisions here. Some parts of the
Committee's proposal seem innocuous enough to us and may even do some good; for
example, proposed Rule 23(f) makes appeal of a district court's decision to grant or
deny class certification more readily subject to judicial review. Other reforms we
support are suggested in the Committee Note accompanying the Rule, but not in the
Rule itself. See id. at 53 ("One of the most important contributions a court can make
is to ensure that the notice fairly decribes the litigation and the terms of the
settlement."). On the danger of using committee notes to make substantive changes
or additions to the text, see Laurens Walker, Writings on the Margins of American
Law: Committee Notes, Comments, and Commentary, 29 Ga. L. Rev. 993 (1995)
(courts should give little if any weight to commentary).
254Proposed Rule 23(b)(4) reads: "An action may be maintained as a class action if
the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition ...the parties to a
settlement request certification under subdivision (b)(3) for purposes of settlement
253We
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assertion that this change is "minimalist,"255 arguing that so-called settlement class actions are old-hat and that this provision
is designed to do no more than clarify that such actions are
proper in light of the Third Circuit's decisions in Georgine and
GM Truck, which suggest that settlement classes are not sanctioned by Rule 23. 2S6 Even if the claim of modest revision were
true,257 it is no answer to the argument that such settlement class
actions, old or new, are particularly prone to abuse-a point

that the proponents of this Rule do not dispute or address.258

even though the requirements of subdivision (b)(3) might not be met for purposes of
trial." Id. at 41-43.
255Draft Minutes in Preliminary Draft, supra note 11, at 35. See also Committee
Note in Preliminary Draft, supra note 11, at 44 (amendments are "modest").
256 See Committee Note in Preliminary Draft, supra note 11, at 51:
Subdivision (b)(4) is new. It permits certification of a class under subdivision
(b)(3) for settlement purposes, even though the same class might not be certified
for trial. Many courts have adopted the practice reflected in this new provision.
See, e.g., Weinberger v. Kendrick, 698 F.2d 61, 72-3 (2d Cir. 1982); In re Beef
Industry Antitrust Litigation, 607 F.2d 167, 170-171, 173-178 (5th Cir. 1979).
Some very recent decisions, however, have stated that a class cannot be certified
for settlement purposes unless the same class would be certified for trial
purposes. See Georgine v. Amchem Products, Inc., 83 F.3d 610 (3d Cir. 1996);
In re GeneralMotors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Litigation,55 F.3d 768 (3d
Cir. 1995). This amendment is designed to resolve this newly apparent
disagreement.
257It is debatable whether the provision recognizes something old-hat or not.
Although courts have been considering the fact of settlement for some time in
deciding whether to certify a class, See, e.g., Weinberger v. Kendrick, 698 F.2d 61, 7273 (2d Cir. 1982); In re Beef Indus. Antitrust Litig., 607 F.2d 167, 170-71, 173-78 (5th
Cir. 1979), one could argue that those decisions stand for nothing more than the quite
sensible proposition that in cases in which no party has contested whether a class
meets Rule 23's requirements for certification (because the parties have agreed to
settle) the court can say no more than that the class appears to be certifiable, but that
judgment is necessarily contingent on the settlement because no one has argued any
differently. That statement is quite different than what the court in Ahearn said and
the court in Georgine was invited to say, which is that a class that could not be
certified for trial may be certified for settlement. This arguably "new" statement
raises problems that the "old" statement does not.
258According to the unofficial Committee minutes, one Committee member warned
that settlement classes "offer a bribe to plaintiffs' counsel to take a dive and sell res
judicata" and offered that "Professor Jack Coffee's views on this subject are sound."
Draft Minutes in Preliminary Draft, supra note 11, at 35. The only response to this
point noted in the minutes was that "[c]lass members will opt out if the settlement
represents a bargain to sell res judicata on terms favorable to the defendant." Id. at
36. We note that the proposed Rule 23(b)(4) does not explicitly guarantee opt out
rights, though the Committee Notes insist they are preserved. See Committee Note,
in id. at 51. Nor does it include any reforms to ensure that class members will have
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Class actions that can be settled, but not tried, are particularly
prone to abuse because they invite defendants to shop around
for the plaintiffs' lawyer who will sell out the class at the cheapest price.25 9 Although most class actions are settled anyway,

licensing settlements when no class action trial is possible gives
all the leverage in the settlement negotiation to one side, the

defendant. The would-be class lawyer cannot threaten to bring
the case to trial. If he walks away from the settlement negotia-

tion, he gets at most the fees for handling the individual clients
who have actually retained him, assuming he settles or successfully tries those cases. But rejecting a defendant's inadequate
settlement on behalf of the inchoate class makes him automatically ineligible for any class attorney's fees. The next lawyer
who sits down and cuts the deal gets those fees. 260

Moreover, the proponents of this provision acknowledge that
it does make one change from current practice. The new provision-at least as interpreted by the Committee Note-demands
that a settlement be fully in hand and agreed to before lawyers
can request (b)(4) status for the inchoate class. 261 Although the
Advisory Committee Note states that this requirement gives
added protection for the class, we believe that the opposite is
true. Contrast the Committee's approach with an alternative:
that settlement class status would be granted only to those law-

yers whom a court had both appointed for the purpose of negotiating the settlement on behalf of some set of people, and had
monitored during the negotiation process through some agent
sufficient information to make a rational decision whether to opt out. The Committee
defeated a motion to omit any reference to settlement clases in the revised rule by a
vote of 8 to 5. Committee Note, in Preliminary Draft, supra note 11, at 51.
259 See supra notes 231-239.
260See Letter from Steering Committee to Oppose Proposed Rule 23, to the Hon.
Alicemarie Stotler, Chair, Standing Committee on Rules and Procedure 5 (May 28,
.1996) (on file with the Virginia Law Review Association). Professor Koniak played
a leading role in organizing the "Steering Commitee," and along with Professor Cohen
and over 140 other academics signed the letter.
261 "Certification is not authorized simply to assist parties who are interested in
exploring settlement, not even when they represent that they are close to agreement
and that clear definition of a class would facilitate final agreement." Committee Note
in Preliminary Draft, supra note 11, at 52. This limitation does not explicitly appear
in the text of the Rule itself, but the Committee believes it implicit in the use of the
phrase "parties to a settlement," because it rejected the insertion of "proposed" before
"settlement." Draft Minutes in Preliminary Draft, supra note 11, at 37-38.
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or device. That alternative (which we are not championing
because of our extreme doubts about the entire concept of settlement classes but which we set out to make a point) would
demonstrate that the judges and others who were responsible
for writing these rules were taking the risk of abuse seriously,
instead of merely promoting class settlements at any cost. The.
approach of the Committee, however, ensures only that abuse
will be more difficult to ferret out because all the action will
take place off-stage, so to speak. The new come-with-settlement

twist may protect defendants from coerced settlements, as the
Minutes of the Advisory Committee suggest was the drafters'

intent,262 in contrast to what the Committee Note says about
protecting the class, but it leaves class members only more vulnerable. 263
262Draft Minutes in Preliminary Draft, supra note 11, at 38:
A later motion to reconsider proposed (b)(4) to add "proposed," so that it
would recognize a request for certification by the parties to "a proposed
settlement." [sic] It was objected that this change would encourage certification
that could coerce settlement, based in part on the fear that the certification
might be carried forward to trial of an unmanageable class. Certification for
settlement purposes should not be available merely because the parties "have
an idea about settlement." The motion failed with 2 supporting votes and 11
opposing votes.
263The Committee Notes offer no clue as to how proposed Rule 23(b)(4) might
benefit class members. The only suggestion in the Draft Minutes is the following:
Clients are better off, particularly when the defendants have insurance.
Settlement also has the advantage of treating alike people who, although
similarly situated, would be treated differently in separate actions. Choice-oflaw, differences in local courts and procedure, problems of proving individual
causation, and the like ensure disparate treatment if class disposition is not
available.
Draft Minutes in Preliminary Draft, supra note 11, at 36. It is not clear to us how the
presence of insurance makes settlement classes more desirable for class members.
Differences in applicable law, local courts and procedure seem to be the essence of
our federal system, and it is odd in this era of "devolution" that the one area in which
citizens should be thought to prefer national (or, to use class action jargon "global")
solutions is class actions. Finally, difficulties of proof may lead some "class members"
to favor a settlement class (though even that depends on what the alternatives are),
but others who do not face these difficulties would oppose it. The idea that "the class
as a whole" would be better off is far from obvious. In fact, the Committee Notes
themselves recognize this problem:
Definition of the class also must be approached with care, lest the attractions
of settlement lead too easily to an over-broad definition. Particular care should
be taken to ensure that there are no disabling conflicts of interest among people
who are urged to form a single class.
Committe Notes in Preliminary Draft, supra note 11, at 53. It is reasonable to ask,
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The proposed amendments include only one change specifically designed to address the problems of collusive or otherwise
illegal conduct associated with class action settlements: Rule
23(e) would be amended to require that courts hold fairness

hearings before approving a settlement-something courts already do as a routine matter. 264 The Advisory Committee decided not to include in the Rule any specific suggestion, much
less a requirement, that trial courts appoint special masters or
guardians. 265 The Committee did not even include such a requirement or encouragement for those class actions in which no
objectors appear to present an adversarial view of the settlement.266 Nor did the Committee do anything to ensure that

objectors who do show up have easier access to the information
needed to mount a plausible challenge, although the Advisory
Note recognizes this is a problem without suggesting any solutions. 267 The Committee declined to set forth factors to guide

(and possibly constrain) a trial court's discretion in approving a

settlement, 268 included no mention in the Notes or the text of
the Rule of the signs that might indicate collusion, and-in what
we can only call an excess of diplomacy-refrained from identifying a greater chance of collusion as one of the "special risks"
associated with settlement classes. 269 In short, despite the Coingiven these reservations, whether the Committee really thought that Rule 23(b)(4)
would redound to the benefit of class members.
264Committee Note in Preliminary Draft, supra note 11, at 54.
265The Committee specifically rejected a "special master provision" recommended
at a prior meeting. Draft Minutes in Preliminary Draft, supra note 11, at 38-39. The
Draft Minutes also make reference to an "independent counsel [who] might be
appointed to assist in evaluation of a proposed settlement," but only to state that the
Committee has not "considered the question" of whether such an independent counsel
might be desirable. Id. at 35.
266See Committee Note in Preliminary Draft, supra note 11, at 54 ("A hearing
should be held to explore a proposed settlement even if the proponents seek to waive
the hearing and no objectors have appeared.")
267Id. at 52.
268 The Draft Minutes record that someone proposed an option "amending [Rule
23(e)] to include the list of factors for reviewing settlements recommended by Judge
Schwarzer in his Cornell Law Review article." Draft Minutes in Preliminary Draft,
supra note 11, at 35 (referring to but not citing, William W. Schwarzer, Settlement of
Mass Tort Class Actions: Order Out of Chaos, 80 Cornell L. Rev. 837 (1995)).
Nothing more is said about this (or any other similar) proposal.
269Id. at 52:
For all the potential benefits, settlement classes also pose special risks. The
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mittee's understanding that "[t]here is evidence that some state
court judges are simply rubber-stamping class settlements,"27 0
the Committee recommended no substantial steps to address

abusive settlements; instead, it approved in Proposed Rule
23(b)(4) a broad new provision encouraging so-called settlement
class actions-class actions that can be settled but could not be
tried. If ever there were a provision that seems tailor-made to
meet the interests of judges in encouraging class settlements and
the interests of lawyers and defendants who would short-change
the class for their own gain or violate other laws designed to
protect the public, like the antitrust laws, Proposed Rule
23(b)(4) is it. What the proposed amendment does do is ensure
that the time and resources of judges will be taxed as little as
possible,27 ' while preserving the possibility of a judge garnering

prestige for having presided over some gigantic settlement that
solves some overwhelming problem of personal injury inflicted
by some defendant's product or practice. The Proposed Rule

also ensures that abuse will flourish.
Along with over one hundred other law professors, we urged
the Standing Committee to reject this rule and demand that the
Advisory Committee come up with a more responsible draft,2 72
but the pleas of academics had no discernible effect on the Stan-

ding Committee's membership.27 3 We still hope that the settle-

court's Rule 23(e) obligation to review and approve a class settlement
commonly must surmount the informational difficulties that arise when the
major adversaries join forces as proponents of their settlement agreement.
Objectors frequently appear to reduce these difficulties, but it may be difficult
for objectors to obtain the information required for a fully informed challenge.
The reassurance provided by official adjudication is missing. These difficulties
may seem especially troubling if the class would not have been certified for
litigation, or was shaped by a settlement agreement worked out even before the
action was filed.
270 Draft Minutes in Preliminary Draft, supra note 11, at 38. Notice that the
Committee made up largely of federal judges acknowledged this evidence as to state
judges, but not as to their own colleagues.
271Some members of the Committee acknowledged this problem as well. See id. at
35 ("Opposition to [approval of settlement class provision] was expressed on the
ground that it might encourage judges to certify classes simply in the hope that a
settlement would clear the docket.") As with other objections, this one was ignored.
272See supra note 260.
273Letter from Peter G. McCabe, Secretary, Standing Committee on Rules of
Practice and Procedure, to Susan P. Koniak, Steering Committee to Oppose Proposed
Rule 23 (July 2, 1996) ("Although there was some disagreement [at the June 19-20
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ment class provision will be rejected after the public comment
period, but given our assessment of the institutional interests at
play we are not confident that reason will prevail. Yet however
dangerous we view the proposed rule to be, our main point is
that for those who expect procedural reforms to check the abuse
that we have described and somehow make unnecessary the
suits we propose, we submit that the current state of procedural
"reform" and the apparent priorities of the rule-makers makes
that expectation a long shot and the suits we propose more necessary.
III. WHERE ESTOPPEL STOPS

The later suits we have proposed are novel. To our knowledge, no successful malpractice suit has ever been brought
against class action lawyers, though as of this writing several are
pending.27 4 There are several possible explanations for this phenomenon. One is that the malpractice elements of causation
and damages, always difficult to prove, would be especially difficult in the class action settlement context.275 But that is not
always the case. We focus in this Part on a second possible
reason for the lack of such suits: Lawyers considering bringing
such suits fear that they would be barred by claim or issue preclusion, or some similar procedural doctrine. We have been
able to find only a handful of opinions that address the question
of whether malpractice suits can be brought against lawyers
involved in class action settlements. Some cases simply take it
for granted that such suits are viable without discussing the
question in any detail. 276 A few courts have held such suits are
meeting of the Standing Committee], the text of the proposed amendment to the rules
was unchanged.") (on file with the Virginia Law Review Association).
274
Note that we are limiting our inquiry to suits against class counsel who agree to
settlements that a court approves. Other suits against class counsel are possible. For
a recent example, see Mark Hansen, A Drive to Stifle Litigation, 82 A.B.A. J. 22
(June 1996) (describing recently filed malpractice suit by Chrysler against lawyer who
had filed a class action suit against it on the grounds that the class lawyers had
previously represented Chrysler and used confidential information about Chrysler to
launch the class action).
275See Nicolet Instrument Corp. v. Lindquist & Vennum, 34 F.3d 453 (7th Cir. 1994)
(Posner, CJ.); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Settlement Black Box, 75 B.U. L. Rev.
1257, 1263 n.25 (1995).
276 Diaz v. Sheppard, 85 F.3d 1502 & n.2 (11th Cir. 1996) (holding that a state law
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277

A few other cases

barred by one of the relitigation doctrines.

have held such suits to be maintainable, and have either explicitly or implicitly rejected defenses based on the doctrines against

relitigation.2 8 We argue in this Part that the doctrines barring
relitigation do not and should not apply to the suits we propose.
Courts that have barred these suits have done so by playing fast
and loose with the elements and purposes of these doctrines.
A. The Reasons for the Rules against Relitigation

Before delving into doctrinal detail, we begin by asking what
purposes undergird the rules against relitigation, and whether
we risk jeopardizing those purposes with our proposal.

Al-

though the answer may seem counterintuitive or even shocking,
the rules against relitigation confer substantial, efficient and
legitimate social benefits by leaving most wrong verdicts in
place. In general, our procedural system rejects relitigation as
a method of correcting court decisions that simply get it
"wrong"; that is, decisions in which the found facts supporting
malpractice claim brought in state court against class counsel in a prisoner's rights
class action cannot be removed to federal court simply because the state court might
have to consider federal law in adjudicating the claim, but declining to rule on whether
such suits are permissible as a matter of state law and referring to res judicata and
collateral estoppel only to make the point that they are affirmative defenses that have
no bearing on federal jurisdiction); Peters v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 966 F.2d
1483, 1487 & n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (rejecting collateral attack on class action
settlement, stating that "redress, if any, should come from those responsible for
causing his harm," and citing Zimmer Paper Prods. v. Berger & Montague P.C., 758
F.2d 86 (3d Cir. 1985) for the proposition that later suits against class counsel for
malpractice are viable); In re California Micro Devices Secs. Litig., 1995 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 11587, *9 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 1995) (considering the extent of a firm's
malpractice insurance as an important factor in assessing a firm's fitness to serve as
class counsel); In re Wells Fargo Secs. Litig., 157 F.R.D. 467, 473 (N.D. Cal. 1994)
(same); In re Oracle Secs. Litig., 136 F.R.D. 639, 649 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (explaining that
one advantage to be gained from making law firms compete to be class counsel is that
disappointed bidders might help monitor class counsel's performance and in extreme
cases bring a malpractice suit against the "winning, but bungling, bidder").
277Kamilewicz v. Bank of Boston Corp., 92 F.3d 506, 512 (7th Cir. 1996) (RookerFeldman doctrine bars claims); Golden v. Pacific Maritime Ass'n, 786 F.2d 1425 (9th
Cir. 1986); Laskey v. International Union, 638 F.2d 954 (6th Cir. 1981) (collateral
estoppel bars claims).
278Durkin v. Shea & Gould, 92 F.3d 1510, 1516 (9th Cir. 1996); Derrickson v. City
of Danville, 845 F.2d 715 (7th Cir. 1988); Zimmer Paper Prods. v. Berger & Montague,
P.C., 758 F.2d 86 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 902 (1985).
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279
the judgment deviate from an accurate account of the event.
De novo review of factual determinations is the rare exception,
not the rule. 28 0 Proceduralists as diverse as Geoffrey Hazard
and Robert Cover have recognized these social benefits as central to the rules against relitigation.2 81 Professor Hazard suc279Appellate courts review factual findings under the "clearly erroneous" standard,
which is designed to allow most judgments based on simple factual inaccuracies to
stand. Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a). "A finding is 'clearly erroneous' when although there
is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed." United States v.
U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948). The more limited view is that this
standard "would prevent reversal unless the judge based his finding on a
misunderstanding of the law or it was without adequate evidentiary support."
Friedenthal, Kane & Miller, supra note 230, § 13.4, at 604-05 (footnote omitted). "It
is not enough that we might give the facts another construction, resolve the
ambiguities differently, and find a more sinister cast to actions which the District
Court apparently deemed innocent." U.S. v. National Ass'n of Real Estate Bds., 339
U.S. 485, 495 (1950). A new trial is ordered based on factual errors only when those
errors are so blatant that only the willfully blind, corrupt or seriously inattentive could
fail to see them. This standard suggests that the purpose of ordering a new trial in
such instances is not a belief that relitigation is appropriate to correct ordinary error
but that relitigation is appropriate to correct error that suggests corruption, bias or
some other serious institutional defect in the original forum.
28o See supra note 213. The Supreme Court's recent pronouncements suggesting that
the innocence of a prisoner condemned to death is not in itself enough to justify de
novo review of otherwise final judgments reflects just how far the general principle
against relitigation as a method of correcting errors has been stretched. See, e.g.,
Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993) (newly discovered evidence showing possible
innocence does not require de novo review); Jacobs v. Scott, 31 F.3d 1319 (5th Cir.
1994), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 711 (1995) (same). Our reference to these cases should
not be read as sympathetic. While irrelevant to the argument we present here, which
is based on the premise that "errors" in class action settlements are not the product
of ordinary factual error, we believe that the consequences of ordinary error should
be a factor in considering whether and how stringently to apply the general rule
against relitigation to correct ordinary error. See Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence
Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. Chi. L. Rev. 142 (1970).
On the question of whether criminal convictions should be subject to liberal federal
habeas review because there are significant institutional biases present in state courts
and important counterbalancing biases present in federal courts, compare Robert M.
Cover & T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism: Habeas Corpus and the
Court, 86 Yale L.J. 1035 (1977), with Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and
Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 Harv. L. Rev. 441 (1963).
281See Hazard, supra note 245, at 1041-42 ("If our trial procedure produced truth at
every trial, the need for doctrines against relitigation would be relatively weak; all that
we would be assuring against is the cost of relitigation-a value, but not a compelling
one if everyone knew the results would always be the same.") (quoting with approval
Professor Preble in conversation). See also note 245 and accompanying text.
As for Professor Cover, he put it thus:
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cinctly described the social benefit to be derived from leaving
most mistaken verdicts alone:
The law, particularly litigation, is in Harry Kalven's phrase, a
system for managing doubt and doubt requires strict management because its dissolving power is so strong. Where the system of procedure gives, as ours does, ample opportunity for
developing contentions and discovering evidence, as ours does,
a correspondingly extensive rule against relitigation is not merely warranted, but is essential for otherwise the procedural armory is turned on itself.2

The good to be realized by leaving wrong decisions alone is not,
however, boundless. These proceduralists agree that it makes
sense to leave uncorrected almost all erroneous decisions in
which the error is attributable to the inevitable tendency of
humans and their institutions to make mistakes-when the error
is simple error and not error due to bias or some other defect
inherent in the court that decided the case. But they also agree
that the general rule against relitigation should end when the
error is not simple, but is instead a function of forum bias or
284
defect. 28 3 And our procedural rules generally reflect that view.
It is, of course, possible to use multiple forums to deal with the potential of
mere error, and we do so occasionally in providing for a de novo review. But
it is very expensive and the coordination principles necessary to deal with
inconsistent outcomes may become cumbersome. Within a single forum and
proceeding, the contradictions among witnesses or between different statements
of a single witness may be evaluated in a single act of judgment which
encompasses a view of all the contradictory material. The output of a system
of redundant forums, however, is either confirmatory or contradictory verdicts.
Presented with such verdicts, one cannot easily pass judgment on questions of
error in reconstructing events without first unpacking what might be called
forum effects.
Robert M. Cover, The Uses of Jurisdictional Redundancy: Interest, Ideology, and
Innovation, 22 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 639, 654-56 (1981). These observations led
Professor Cover to conclude that to correct (or avoid) simple or "mere" errors
redundant procedures within a single proceeding, such as direct and cross-examination,
made sense, but redundant proceedings did not. Id. at 657. The latter produce only
further uncertainty, given that there is no principled way to choose between two
inconsistent verdicts that might be rendered. This concern about creating doubt to no
apparent purpose is the precise social cost emphasized by Professor Hazard in his
discussion of the rules against relitigation. See Hazard, supra note 245.
2s2 Hazard, supra note 245, at 1042-43.
283 Id. at 1041-42; Cover, supra note 281, at 658-68.
2" For example, federal rules provide that a judgment may be vacated many years
after it is entered, if it shown that it was obtained as the result of fraud on the court.
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The suits we propose do not aim to redress simple error.
Rather, they aim to redress the effect of self-dealing made possible by the absence of real parties in interest from the first proceeding, as well as the other inherent defects and biases in the
first proceeding that make detection of such self-dealing unlikely. Thus, our proposal does not interfere with the primary
social good served by our rules against relitigation: the management of doubt created by inevitable and otherwise innocent
error. On the other hand, allowing a system infected with sys-

tematically biased behavior to continue unchecked is not a goal
of our rules against relitigation nor is it a goal any civilized legal
system should promote.
The rules against relitigation do serve another legitimate goal:

ensuring that individuals are not subject to inconsistent verdicts.285 But our suits would not compromise that goal. Nothing
about the suits we propose would necessitate subjecting anyone

to conflicting obligations. For example, the lawyers in Hoffman
could simultaneously pay damages and carry out whatever obligations they might have under the class action settlement. They

would face no conflicting obligations. 28 6 The bank, it is true,

might be liable for damages for doing what it was ordered to do

by the Alabama court-disburse escrow money to the lawyers-but it would appear that the bank caused this problem for
Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6). Another example is the general principle that an issue may
be relitigated when the previous proceeding did not provide a full and fair opportunity
to litigate it in the first instance. See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 26
(1982) (claim may be relitigated when first procedure excluded opportunity to present
theory or remedy advanced in second proceeding).
285 Professor Hazard identifies this as one of the two satisfactory justifications for the
general rules against relitigation, the other being the management of doubt created by
simple error. "[Slo far as possible, the courts should avoid imposing conflicting legal
obligations on a single individual." Hazard, supra note 245, at 1042.
286To give an even more extreme example, in Derricksonv. City of Danville,which
we discuss in detail below, the Seventh Circuit held that a court-approved voting rights
settlement that preserved the jobs of currrent city officials did not preclude
prosecution of those officials for violating state conflict-of-interest laws. 845 F.2d at
723 (7th Cir. 1988). In the midst of describing the defendant's argument, the court
made the following parenthetical aside: "Mayor Curley of Boston showed that one can
run a city from jail; anyway, the resignation of a Department Head would not change
or violate the decree." Id. at 720. If prosecution of participants in a settlement does
not interfere with the settlement, then surely the payment of damages by participants
does not interfere with the settlement.
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itself by breaching its duty to protect that money when287
it agreed
not to raise any objections to the attorney's fee plan.
B. Claim Preclusion
Under the doctrine of claim preclusion, sometimes referred to
as res judicata, a party who has once had the chance to litigate
a matter is generally denied the opportunity to relitigate it
against the same opposing party.288 Claim preclusion, when it
applies, bars later litigation of any claim a plaintiff could have
raised against the defendant arising out of the transaction or
occurrence that was the subject of the earlier suit, whether or
not those claims were actually raised.289 It also bars any defenses a defendant could have raised to the claim presented in
the earlier suit and any compulsory counterclaims that were
available at the time of the first suit.290
Because claim preclusion applies only when the parties in the
second action are the same as those in the first action,291 it
would not apply in most of the suits we propose. Class lawyers
are not parties to the settlement of class actions (the first proceeding), so claim preclusion should not bar later suits brought
by class members (or anyone else) against class counsel for allegedly illegal conduct in connection with a class settlement. 292
27 We address below arguments that it would be fundamentally unfair to punish
people for conduct a court had in some manner blessed, see infra Section III.D.
288 Fleming James, Jr., Geoffrey Hazard, Jr. & John Leubsdorf, Civil Procedure
§ 11.7, at 586 (4th ed. 1992).
289 Id. § 11.7, at 589.
290Id. § 11.15, at 603-05. Noncompulsory counterclaims are not barred. See, e.g.,
Mercoid Corp v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661, 671 (1944) (failure to bring
separate statutory antitrust counterclaim in patent validity suit does not render patent
validity judgment res judicata with respect to the antitrust suit).
291 Generally, the parties to the first suit are the persons and entities designated as
such in the complaint and other pleadings. James et. al., supra note 288 § 11.7, at 58687. There are, however, a few situations in which the parties for purposes of claim
preclusion are not limited to those designated as such in the pleadings. Id. See, e.g.,
In re Imperial Corp. of America, 92 F.3d 1503, 1507-08 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that
a wholly-owned subsidiary with a board identical to its parent is entitled to be treated
as a party for purposes of claim preclusion, although only the parent was technically
a defendant in the first suit, a class action).
292 "A party appearing in an action in one capacity, individual or representative, is
not thereby bound by or entitled to the benefits of the rules of res judicata in a
subsequent action in which he appears in another capacity." Restatement (Second)
of Judgments § 36(2) (1980).
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The same is true for suits against the lawyers who represented
the defendant in the class settlement; defense counsel are also
not considered parties to the class action settlement. 293 In only
two situations would the parties to the second suit be identical
to the parties in the underlying class action thus satisfying this
requirement of claim preclusion. First, class members might
bring a subsequent suit against the defendants for engaging in
illegal conduct in connection with the class action settlement, for
example, conspiring with class counsel to defraud the class and
its guardian, the court, by misrepresenting the costs and benefits
to the class of the settlement or of class counsel's petition for
attorney's fees.294 Second, a state or the federal government

might bring a subsequent suit against the defendants for fraud
or some other illegal activity connected to the settlement negoti-

ation (such as violating the antitrust laws) when the government
295
entity had previously intervened to object to the settlement.

Identity of parties is not, however, all there is to claim preclusion; not every later suit between parties who have previously
been adversaries is barred. In general, only those claims that are
part of the same transaction or occurrence as the claims alleged
None of the cases that preclude later suit against class counsel invokes claim
preclusion to achieve that result. See Kamilewicz v. Bank of Boston Corp., 92 F.3d
506, 512 (7th Cir. 1996) (Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars claims); Golden v. Pacific
Maritime, 786 F.2d 1425, 1428-29 (9th Cir. 1986) (issue preclusion); Laskey v.
Internation Union et al., 638 F.2d 954, 957 (6th Cir. 1981) (issue preclusion); Valerio
v. Boise Cascade Corp., 80 F.R.D. 626, 632-34 (N.D. Cal. 1978), aff'd, 645 F.2d 699,
700 (adopting district court's opinion), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1126 (1981) (statute of
limitations). Rather, recognizing that class counsel was not a party to the first
proceeding but the plaintiffs in the later suit were, the courts rely on issue preclusion,
which does not generally require identity of parties, see infra Section III.C. (discussing
elements of issue preclusion), or some other procedural bar like the statute of
limitations.
293See, e.g., Durkin v. Shea & Gould, 92 F.3d 1510, 1518 (9th Cir. 1996) (allowing
suit against defense counsel for conduct connected to settling a derivative action and
rejecting both claim and issue preclusion as bars to such a suit).
294E.g., Benn v. BancBoston Mortgage Corp., No-96-CV-0974-J, filed May 13, 1996
(N.D. Tex.) (another suit arising out of the Hoffman class action, but naming only the
bank as a defendant). Even in this situation, the first element of claim preclusion,
identity of parties, is not a simple matter. If those suing in the second suit had been
absent class members in the first suit, they should not be presumed conclusively to
have been parties in the first suit. Absent class members are bound by a judgment
only if they were adequately represented. Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940). Cf.
text accompanying notes 409-414.
295See, e.g., Derrickson v. City of Danville, 845 F.2d 715 (7th Cir. 1988).
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in the first suit are barred. 296 By definition, the wrongs that our
later suits are designed to redress arise out of a different transaction or occurrence than the wrongs that were settled on behalf
of the class.
Consider the facts in Derrickson v. City of Danville.297 The
Derricksonstory begins with a voting rights class action against
the City of Danville, Illinois, in which class counsel and four city
officials assisted by the city's lawyer negotiated a settlement.
The settlement included a provision allowing the four officials
to retain their jobs during a three-year transition period to a
new form of elected government set forth in the settlement. 298
The state conflict-of-interest law made it a crime for city officials to negotiate on behalf of the city a contract that included
provisions inuring to the personal benefit of city negotiators. 299

The state attorney general believed that by negotiating the settlement with its three-year job guarantee, the city officials and
city lawyer had violated that law and convened a grand jury to
indict them. The federal judge, before whom the voting rights
settlement was pending, enjoined the attorney general's attempt
to indict the city negotiators, and, upon motion of the plaintiffs,
made the state attorney general a party to the class action
suit.300 The federal district court then approved the settlement
after conducting a fairness hearing on the deal. No one appealed. 301 After the court approved the class action settlement,
the state attorney general reconvened the grand jury and secured the indictments he had tried to secure earlier, and for the
second time, the federal district court enjoined him.302 The Seventh Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Easterbrook, reversed the
district court, lifted the injunction and allowed the state prosecution to proceed, holding that neither claim nor issue preclusion
barred the later state action against those who had negotiated
the class settlement.303
296See Cound, et. al., Civil Procedure 1228-29 (6th ed. 1993).

297 845 F.2d at 716 (7th Cir. 1988).
298 Id.

299 Id.
300Id.

30, Id.
302Id.

303
Id. at 721.
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Claim preclusion was an issue in Derricksonbecause the state
attorney general had been made a party to the class action proceeding, albeit against his will, and the defendants he sought to
prosecute in the later suit were also parties to the class action
suit. Judge Easterbrook, however, had no trouble seeing that
the self-dealing alleged to be criminal by the state attorney general was not the same "transaction or occurrence" as the voting

rights violation that was resolved by the class action settlement.304 Moreover, the Illinois Supreme Court later adopted

this analysis in its decision upholding the convictions that the
state attorney general eventually obtained. 305 Were these courts

too narrowly defining "transaction or occurrence?"
We think not. The underlying class action was about one
occurrence (a form of city government that allegedly denied

people rights guaranteed by the voting rights law), while the
later prosecution was about another (the use of public office for
personal gain in the process of settling a lawsuit). The facts and
law necessary to establish the first cause of action were not the
same as those important to the second case. And the same

would be true in the other situations in which claim preclusion
might arguably be relevant to the later suits we propose. For
example, the facts and law necessary to establish whether Banc-

Boston committed a wrong by demanding that its customers
deposit more money in escrow than their contracts required are
different than the facts and law that would be relevant to determining whether the bank breached a fiduciary duty to its customers by agreeing not to object to class counsel's request for
304 Id. ("The criminal prosecution also did not grow out of the same 'transaction or
occurrence' as the Voting Rights Act claim.") Judge Easterbrook gave a number of
reasons why claim preclusion was inapplicable to the case before him. In addition to
the different transaction argument, he relied on the rule that only compulsory
counterclaims are considered barred by res judicata (claim preclusion) in later suits
brought by a defendant against his former adversary. Id. at 721. The attorney general
had been "a defendant" in the class action proceeding. "A state criminal prosecution
is not a compulsory counterclaim in a federal civil suit, not least because the forum
lacks the jurisdiction to try the criminal case." Id. Moreover, Judge Easterbrook
explained, the authority of a government agent to enter into a settlement may
generally be challenged later if overlooked in the first proceeding. Id. (citing, inter
alia, United States v. Beebe, 180 U.S. 343, 351-55 (1901) and Stone v. Bank of
Commerce, 174 U.S. 412 (1899)).
35 People v. Scharlau, 565 N.E.2d 1319, 1329-30 (Ill. 1990) (adopting the Seventh
Circuit's claim preclusion analysis).
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attorney's fees.3°6 To argue that wrongs committed in the process of litigation are properly treated as arising from the same
transaction as the wrong originally litigated requires one to accept some ridiculous results. For example, that argument suggests that all later prosecutions for perjury or bribery of witnesses should be barred because such acts necessarily occur in
the process of resolving a prior legal controversy.
Of course, when the parties are the same, even if the later suit
is not barred by claim preclusion, it may be barred by issue
preclusion, otherwise known as collateral estoppel. We turn
next to that matter.
C. Issue Preclusion
In most later suits of the type we propose, the identity of parties necessary for an assertion of claim preclusion is lacking: the
class suing its counsel; the class suing the defendant's lawyers;
a government that had not objected suing or prosecuting class
counsel or the defendants; other plaintiffs' lawyers suing class
counsel for violations of the antitrust laws. In those cases, as
well as the cases in which the assertion of claim preclusion
would meet the "identity of parties" requirement but fail the
"same transaction" requirement, the relevant relitigation question would be whether the party bringing the second suit was
precluded from litigating an issue because it had been determined in the first proceeding. "Issue preclusion applies when an
issue (a) was actually decided, (b) after a full and fair opportunity to litigate, and (c) was necessary to the decision. '307 We
consider these requirements in turn.

306But see In re Imperial Corp. of America, 92 F.3d 1503, 1507-08 (9th Cir. 1996)
(holding that claim preclusion bars a later suit against the defendant when the new
claims of breach of fiduciary duty and mismanagement repeat claims made in the class
action litigation, e.g., that the defendant invested in bad loans and failed to establish
reserves).
307Derrickson,845 F.2d at 721 (citing Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322

(1979)); United States v. Ryan, 810 F.2d 650, 654 (7th Cir. 1987); Schellong v. INS, 805
F.2d 655, 658-59 (7th Cir. 1986); Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 27 (1980)).
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1. Was the Issue Actually Decided in the FirstSuit?
In many of the suits we propose, the issue will not have been

"actually decided." For example, the district court in Georgine
did not consider, no less decide, whether the terms of the settle-

ment that gave certain plaintiffs' firms a built-in advantage in
the market created by the settlement violated the antitrust laws,
or, for that matter, whether the caps on attorney's fees violated
those laws.30 8 Indeed, we know of no decision approving a class
settlement that purports to have decided that the antitrust laws

were complied with in selecting class counsel, that those laws
were not violated by the terms of the settlement or that the
attorney fee caps for the market created by the settlement are

valid under the antitrust laws. Furthermore, in approving class
action settlements courts do not make findings on whether the
defendant, as opposed to the class, was adequately represented.
Thus, a later malpractice or fraud action against defense lawyers
who negotiated and recommended to their client a class action

settlement that harms the client, for example by unduly shifting
officer liability to the corporate-defendant, would not involve
the redetermination of an issue previously determined in the
3°9
prior proceeding.
In approving a class action settlement the court is supposed to
(and generally does)31° decide that the class was adequately rep308 Moreover, as we shall discuss later in detail, any explicit or implicit finding that
such terms were "reasonable" is not the equivalent of a finding that no violation, of
the antitrust laws has occurred, see infra Section IV.C.1.
309 In Durkin, which involved just such a suit by the corporation's successor-ininterest against the defense lawyers who negotiated and recommended the class
settlement, the Ninth Circuit in rejecting issue preclusion made precisely this point:
[A]s required by Rule 23.1 ....
[the class action judge] determined that the
shareholder plaintiffs adequately represented similarly situated shareholders.
[He] did not decide that the shareholder plaintiffs and their attorneys
adequately represented the full corporate interests of [the defendant]; nor did
[he] specifically find that [the defense lawyers] adequately represented the
interests of a corporation on the eve of its bankruptcy.
92 F.3d at 1516 (citation omitted).
310 In approving class action settlements, courts do not always remember to make the
required findings. Of course, we take this to be further evidence of how inattentive
many judges are to their responsibilities as guardians for the class. Whether it shows
that or not, the fact remains that the "required" findings do not always appear on the
record. For example, in Laskey v. International Union, 638 F.2d 954 (6th Cir. 1981),
which held that issue preclusion prevented a later suit for malpractice against class
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resented, that the settlement terms are fair and reasonable and
that the attorney's fees awarded to class counsel are reasonable.
Do these findings mean that the class action court has actually
decided whether class counsel committed malpractice or fraud
upon the class? We are convinced that the answer in both instances is no, although we hasten to add that even were our
answer yes, the absence of a full and fair opportunity for absent
class members to litigate these matters would, as we shall later
argue, still defeat issue preclusion.31 '
The purpose of a class action court's inquiry into whether the
class was adequately represented is to ensure that absent class
members have received due process, and that the requirements
of Rule 23(a) or its state counterpart are met.312 Courts are
notoriously vague on what constitutes "adequate representation. ' 313 In particular, they do not define "adequate" to be
counsel, the district court may have neglected to find class counsel adequate, and the
appellate court in its rush to find preclusion fudged the question of whether there was
an "actual decision" on the issue. The appellate court said:
Since appellants had the opportunity to object to the legal representation at the
prior settlement hearing and since a finding that the class was adequately
represented is necessary for finding the settlement was fair and reasonable,
which in turn was essential to approving the settlement, appellants are
collaterally estopped from now asserting that the legal representation was not
adequate and that the UAW committed legal malpractice. ,
Id. at 957 (internal citation omitted). When parsed, this sentence falls short of stating
that the question of adequacy was actually decided. Why? An examination of the
lower court decision in Laskey, rendered by the same court that had previously
approved the underlying class action, strongly suggests that the class action court did
not make a separate finding on adequacy, a lapse perhaps attributable to the fact that
no one challenged adequacy during the fairness hearings. All the district court says
it "expressly found" was that the terms of the settlement were "fair and reasonable
to the absent members of the plaintiff class in light of the merits of this action and
other pertinent factors, and that the settlement is in the best interests of the class
members." Laskey v. International Union, 27 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 473, 478 (E.D. Mich.
1978). Although courts often base their finding of adequacy of representation on the
fact that the terms of the settlement were fair, see infra notes 315-320 and
accompanying text, the court did not even make this connection (weak as we later
argue it is) explicit. Given the apparent absence of an actual earlier decision on this
matter, the Sixth Circuit's attitude toward this element of issue preclusion can only be
described as lax.
311See infra Section III.C.3.
312Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a); 2 Newberg on Class Actions, supra note 172, § 11.41, at 1185 to 11-89.
313 See Koniak, supra note 15, at 1116-17 (describing the emptiness of "adequacy"
as a standard for judging class counsel's representation).
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"nonnegligent" or "without fraud." Given the lax standards on
"adequacy," as evidenced by the high approval rates for class
action settlements, it is difficult to understand how a court attentive to the elements of issue preclusion could hold that a

finding of adequacy amounts to a decision that class counsel
caused no damages to any part of the class through carelessness
or fraud in the representation, the issue to be decided in a mal314

practice case.
The little that class action courts do say about the finding of
"adequate representation" supports our view that this finding
bears little relationship to the issues to be decided in a malpractice suit. 31 5 Most telling, courts often reduce the question of
adequacy to a question of whether the settlement terms are fair
and reasonable. In the oft-quoted words of the Fifth Circuit:
It is, ultimately, in the settlement terms that the class representatives' judgment and the adequacy of their representation is ei314 Compare the collateral estoppel treatment of a different issue in class actions,
namely whether the finding by a federal court that a proposed class action does not
satisfy the certification requirements of Rule 23 collaterally estops a subsequent state
class action alleging the same facts and making the same legal claims. Even if the
state has a class action rule similar to Rule 23, courts have held that because state
courts might apply the relevant criteria differently, the subsequent class action is not
collaterally estopped. Morgan v. Deere Credit, 889 S.W.2d 360 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994).
If collateral estoppel does not bar a subsequent class action suit when the issues are
this similar, how could it bar a subsequent malpractice suit when the issues are not
even defined in a similar way?
315 In addition to the quite common refrain on adequacy that we discuss next in the
text, courts often treat violations of the ethics rules as irrelevant to the question of
adequacy. See, e.g., Georgine, 157 F.R.D. at 330 ("This Court need not decide,
however, whether or not a state bar disciplinary board would conclude that . . .
[counsel] technically violated [ethics] Rule 5.6 [by having bound themselves in another
settlement with the defendants to recommend to others the settlement being put
before the court] since that issue is not before this Court in determining the adequacy
of counsel."); Harris v. General Dev. Corp., 127 F.R.D. 655, 662 (N.D. Ii. 1989)
("[A]lthough the fee arrangement may give rise to a technical deviation from ethical
standards, denial of class certification [based on a finding of inadequate
representation] is unwarranted."). However, in malpractice actions a violation of an
ethics rule is admissable and occasionally creates a rebuttable presumption that the
lawyer has breached his duty to the client, an essential element of the malpractice
claim. See Hazard, Koniak & Cramton, supra note 249, at 190. For a rare example
of a class action court taking an ethics violation seriously, see Wagner v. Lehman
Bros. Kuhn Loeb, 646 F. Supp. 643, 662 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (holding that the ethics
violation rendered class counsel unfit to represent the class). It is interesting to note
that the ruling in Wagner did not require the court to reject a class settlement because
no settlement had been reached. Id. at 645.
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ther vindicated or found wanting. If the terms themselves are
fair, reasonable and adequate, the district court may fairly assume that they were negotiated by competent and adequate
counsel; in such cases, whether another team of negotiators
might have accomplished a better settlement is a matter equally
comprised of conjecture and irrelevance.316
But a finding based on an assumption is fundamentally different
than one based on evidence, and a finding that the settlement
terms are fair is a far cry from a decision on whether malpractice, fraud or a violation of the antitrust laws has occurred. This
is especially true given the fact that, in assessing fairness, the
court is to consider the settlement as a whole,317 which allows
courts to approve settlements as fair even when those settlements include provisions that damage the class or some subgroup within it, and which would not have been included absent
the lawyer's breach or self-dealing.
Moreover, in an ordinary malpractice action, a finding that the
settlement terms were reasonable will not relieve the lawyer of
responsibility for malpractice in negotiating or recommending
the settlement. In class action suits, the idea that a reasonablelooking settlement might nonetheless be the product of woefully
inadequate representation is considered, in the words of the
Fifth Circuit, too "conjectural" and in any event, "irrelevant."
But lawyers for ordinary clients may be held liable for their
negligence whenever the negligence is shown to have caused the
client a loss. 318 That showing is always conjectural in some sense
because it is counterfactual, but courts in lawyer malpractice
suits take it for granted that such a showing may be made.
Most jurisdictions that have addressed the question have held
that if the plaintiff can show that the lawyer's lack of diligence
or breach of loyalty caused a settlement to be lower than it
316 In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig., 643 F.2d 195, 212 (5th Cir. 1981)
(emphasis added). See also Georgine, 157 F.R.D. at 326 (quoting Corrugated

Container);and In re Asbestos Litig. (Flanagan v. Ahearn), 90 F.3d 963, 975 (5th Cir.
1996) (same).
317See, e.g., Armstrong v. Board of Sch. Dirs., 616 F.2d 305, 315 (7th Cir. 1980)

(individual components of an agreement are to be evaluated in light of the settlement
as a whole).
318 See generally Charles W. Wolfram, Modem Legal Ethics, §§ 5.6.2-5.6.3, at 209-23
(1986) (reviewing elements of legal malpractice and negligence generally).
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would have been absent the lawyer's breach, the lawyer may be

found liable for the resulting harm. 319
As the New Jersey Supreme Court put it: "The fact that a
party received a settlement that was 'fair and equitable' does

not mean necessarily that the party's attorney was competent or
that the party would not have received a more favorable settle' 320
ment had the party's incompetent attorney been competent.

Thus, the legal finding that a settlement is objectively fair is
319See, e.g., Edmondson v. Dressman, 469 So. 2d 571, 574 (Ala. 1985) (allowing suit
for malpractice in settlement to go forward); Grayson v. Wofsey, Rosen, Kweskin, &
Kuriansky, 646 A.2d 195, 199 (Conn. 1994) (holding that client's agreement to a
settlement does not preclude later malpractice action); Keramati v. Schackow, 553 So.
2d 741, 746 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (malpractice claim not estopped, although
clients had agreed to the settlement); McCarthy v. Pederson & Houpt, 621 N.E.2d 97,
101-02 (Ill. App. Ct.), app. denied, 624 N.E.2d 809 (1993) (malpractice suit not barred,
although plaintiff had agreed to settle the underlying case after the settlement was
reviewed by independent counsel); Sanders v. Townsend, 509 N.E.2d 860 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1987), aff'd in relevant part, vacated in part, 582 N.E.2d 355 (Ind. 1991)
(malpractice suit not barred, but holding on facts that summary judgment was properly
granted in attorney's favor because the plaintiff failed to show that had the attorney
not been negligent, the settlement or verdict award would have been greater); Braud
v. New Eng. Ins. Co., 534 So. 2d 13 (La. Ct. App. 1988) (same); Fishman v. Brooks,
487 N.E.2d 1377 (Mass. 1986) (same); Lowman v. Karp, 476 N.W.2d 428, 431 (Mich.
App. 1991) (per curiam) (client's agreement to settle does not bar later suit against
lawyer for malpractice); Cook v. Connolly, 366 N.W.2d 287 (Minn. 1985) (same);
McWhirt v. Heavey, 550 N.W.2d 327 (Neb. 1996) (client's agreement to divorce
settlement does not bar subsequent malpractice action against client's lawyer for
alleged negligence in settlement advice); Malfabon v. Garcia, 898 P.2d 107, 110 (Nev.
1995) (per curiam) (client may sue lawyer for malpractice even after agreeing to a
settlement); Ziegelheim v. Apollo, 607 A.2d. 1298, 1304 (N.J. 1992) (malpractice suit
proper when lawyer fails to exercise the same level of skill, knowledge and diligence
with respect to a settlement that is required of lawyers in other contexts); Mazzei v.
Pokorny, Schrenzel & Pokorny, 509 N.Y.S.2d 100 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986) (same). But
cf. Douglas v. Parks, 315 S.E.2d 84 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that because plaintiff
affirmed the settlement agreement, he was precluded from bringing a malpractice suit
against the attorney who represented him in the original action); Muhammad v.
Strassburger, McKenna, Messer, Shilobod & Gutnick, 598 A.2d 27 (Pa.), cert. denied,
112 S.Ct. 196 (1991) (barring malpractice suit against former lawyers when client
agreed to the settlement absent some showing of fraud by the attorney); Schlomer v.
Perina, 473 N.W.2d 6 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991), aff'd, 485 N.W.2d 399 (Wis. 1992)
(rejecting as against public policy a malpractice claim that attorney's three years of
inactivity caused a lesser settlement and caused the client loss of use of money from
an earlier and larger settlement). See generally James L. Regelhaupt, Jr., Annotation,
Legal Malpractice in Settling or Failing to Settle Client's Case, 87 A.L.R.3d 168, §§ 35 (1978) (collecting cases where malpractice alleged due to attorney's settlement of
case for unreasonable amounts).
320 Ziegelheim, 607 A.2d at 1305.
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distinguishable from a finding that the client was not damaged
by the lawyer's breach. The fact, assuming it is a fact, that the
result in the underlying lawsuit was objectively fair may make
it more difficult for the client suing for malpractice to show that
a better result would have been obtained, but there is no reason
for it to be a fatal fact as a matter of law.
Indeed, outside the class action context, courts have held that
clients may sue their lawyer for malpractice in negotiating and
recommending a settlement that was not only explicitly accepted
by the client, but also found to be fair by an earlier court
charged with the responsibility of reviewing the settlement to
ensure that the client was protected. 321 For example, in Grayson
v. Wofsey, Rosen, Kweskin & Kuriansky, the Connecticut Supreme Court refused to bar malpractice actions involving the
settlement of divorce proceedings, despite the fact that in such
proceedings courts are obligated "to conduct a searching inquiry
to make sure that the settlement agreement is substantively fair
and has been knowingly negotiated. ' 322 The Connecticut court
put the point succinctly:
[T]he court's inquiry does not serve as a substitute for the diligent investigation and preparation for which counsel is responsible. Indeed, the dissolution court may be unable to elicit the
information necessary to make a fully informed evaluation of
the settlement agreement if counsel for either of the parties has
failed properly to discover and analyze the facts that are relevant to a fair and equitable settlement. 323
True, malpractice suits involving court-approved settlements,
like Grayson, generally involve divorce settlements, not class
action settlements. But what is so special about class actions
that they require greater immunization of participating lawyers
321 See,

e.g., Grayson, 646 A.2d at 200 (court review of the settlement does not

immunize lawyer from later claim of malpractice); Ruffalo v. Patterson, 285 Cal. Rptr.
647,648 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (court approval of settlement does not preclude later suit
for malpractice against lawyer); Garcia v. Borelli, 180 Cal. Rptr. 768, 772 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1982) (same); McWhirt, 550 N.W.2d at 335 (court review of divorce settlement
and determination that settlement was not unconscionable does not preclude

subsequent malpractice action); Cook, 366 N.W.2d at 291 (rejecting collateral estoppel
argument because "at a hearing on approval of a proposed minor settlement, the trial
court is not adjudicating issues of legal malpractice").
322Grayson, 646 A.2d at 200.
323Id. (citations omitted).
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In fact, the differences between class

actions and divorce cases, if anything, cut in favor of less protection for class action lawyers, not more. The risks of negligent
and fraudulent behavior surely increase as the likelihood of
meaningful monitoring by the client decreases, but as surely as
the client in a divorce action may have trouble monitoring the
lawyer, the absent class member will have more trouble still.

This makes all the more puzzling and troubling the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Golden v. PacificMaritimeAssociation,324 which
held that a class member was collaterally estopped from suing
class counsel for malpractice and fraud in negotiating a settle-

ment, in part because the class action court had made specific
325

findings on class counsel's competence and performance.
Golden relied on an earlier case that had collaterally estopped
a suit for fraud against lawyers (and other participants) involved
in a bankruptcy settlement. 326 That earlier case reasoned that
the Bankruptcy Act could not be administered by federal courts
without the participation of attorneys, who thus deserved as
much protection from relitigation as the parties to the original
action.327 Transposed to the class action arena, the Golden
court's reasoning suggests that because lawyers are necessary for
class actions, they deserve greater immunity from subsequent
suits. 328 But lawyers are just as necessary for divorce actions, or
324786 F.2d 1425 (9th Cir. 1986).

325 Id. at 1428.
326
Samuel C. Ennis & Co. v. Woodmar Realty Co., 542 F.2d 45 (7th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1096 (1977). In Ennis, the Seventh Circuit reversed a district court
order refusing to enjoin a state action for fraud allegedly committed in connection
with bankruptcy proceedings that had taken place five years earlier. Id. at 46. The
precedential value of Ennis in the Seventh Circuit is, we believe, somewhat diminished
in light of its later decision in Derrickson, 845 F.2d 715, which does not cite Ennis.
327Ennis, 542 F.2d at 49.
328It is possible to read Golden as standing for a narrower proposition, namely that
when a lawyer brings a subsequent suit merely to "harass," collateral estoppel will bar
it. 786 F.2d at 1429. The court in Ennis had stressed the fact the charges of fraud
made by the lawyer in the subsequent suit were made "in gross bad faith," 542 F.2d
at 47, suggesting that they were so frivolous as to amount to unethical conduct.
Golden not only relied on this aspect of Ennis, but also suggested that the charges
brought against the lawyers were frivolous and being brought for harassment purposes.
786 F.2d at 1428. The problem is that in Ennis there was more evidence that the
subsequent suit was in fact frivolous than there was in Golden, where the court relied
solely on the fact that the lower court "found an inference of harassment" in the state
suit. 786 F.2d at 1427.
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any other type of litigation, as they are for class actions. Although clients may be more dependent on lawyers in class actions, in our view this fact cuts in favor of a need for greater
client protection, not greater lawyer immunity. Moreover, if the
point is that lawyers would not participate in class actions unless
they were guaranteed greater leeway to engage in negligent or
fraudulent behavior, we believe that argument is highly implausible given the large amount of money lawyers can earn doing
class actions without misconduct. If the only way to get lawyers
to participate in class actions is to allow them to commit malpractice and fraud with impunity, then we should abolish class
actions (a solution we do not espouse).
Even if the Ninth Circuit's reasoning in Golden were more
defensible, the precedential weight of the case is substantially
undermined by Durkin v. Shea & Gould,329 the case that most
strongly supports our view that a class action court's finding of
adequacy does not preclude a second suit for malpractice. In
Durkin, the first court had ruled that a derivative suit settlement
was fair and reasonable, but the Ninth Circuit distinguished that
finding from the issues to be decided in the malpractice case
before it. In doing so, the Ninth Circuit recognized the obvious
relevance of the divorce settlement cases to the class action
settlement context:
[A]lthough the California courts have not considered issue preclusion in the context of a Rule 23.1 settlement, they have consistently held that a court-approved settlement or judgment does
not immunize an attorney from a subsequent malpractice action.
As the California Court of Appeal has observed: "To hold otherwise would be to rule that where an attorney's negligence has
caused a court to make an erroneous adjudication of an issue,
the fact that the court has made that adjudication absolves the
attorney of all accountability and responsibility for his negligence." 330

One might argue that Durkin does not broadly support the suits
we propose because it involved a malpractice suit against the
defendant's lawyers rather than against class counsel, and the
first court had not found that the defendant's lawyers had "ade329 92

330

F.3d 1510 (9th Cir. 1996).

Id. at 1517-18 (citations omitted).
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quately represented" the defendant. But much of the Durkin
court's reasoning applies equally to malpractice suits brought
against class counsel, as the court's reliance on the divorce cases
331
suggests.
Another case that supports our argument that a class action
court's finding that class counsel was adequate is not the equivalent of a finding that class counsel has fulfilled all duties owed
to class members is Zimmer PaperProducts v. Berger & Montague, P.C.332 In Zimmer, a corporate member of the plaintiff
class sued class counsel for negligence and breach of fiduciary
duty in failing to provide adequate notice to it of the class settlement, which allegedly caused Zimmer to lose its chance to
share in the recovery. 333 Zimmer made essentially two claims:
that class counsel's chosen notice procedure was itself negligent,
despite the fact that the class action court approved it; and that
even if the notice procedure itself was acceptable, class counsel
negligently implemented that procedure. 334 Although the court
rejected both claims, it did so on the particular facts before it,
leaving the door open to future malpractice suits against class
counsel. 335
As to the first claim, Zimmer argued that given the large sums
of money involved, class counsel was negligent to have proposed
notice by first class mail; instead, class counsel should have proposed notice by certified mail, return receipt requested, and
should have suggested follow-up procedures after the first notice
331As we have already noted, the court below in Durkin did dismiss the malpractice
claims against class counsel, although on what ground is not clear. As that dismissal
was not before the appellate court in Durkin, we cannot be sure whether the appellate
court would have accepted what we claim to be the implications of its reasoning. The
fact that the appellate court seemed to emphasize that the first court did not rule on
the adequacy of the defense lawyers may suggest that it might distinguish a suit against
class counsel. On the other hand, the court also emphasized that the plaintiff's
malpractice action "does not even accrue until after the settlement becomes final," id.
at 1517, which could serve as an independent basis to reject issue preclusion, and one
that would apply equally to a malpractice action by class members against class
counsel.
For further discussion of the "not accrued" point, see infra text
accompanying note 372.
332758 F.2d 86 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 902 (1985).
333Id. at 88.
334Id.

335Id. at 94.
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was sent.336 In rejecting this claim, what the Third Circuit did

not say is as important as what it did. The Third Circuit did not
say that court approval of the notice precluded class members
from a later malpractice suit against class counsel. The Third
Circuit did not say that satisfying due process or Rule 23 was
337
the equivalent of satisfying one's fiduciary duties to the class.
What the Third Circuit said was:
The bounds of fiduciary duty are undoubtedly not easy to define,
but certainly we must be guided by the fact that the practice here
alleged to breach such duties is a customary one, and has been approved, after careful judicial scrutiny, not only in this case but in
legions of others. If class counsel in this case have breached their
fiduciary duties, attorneys throughout the country who have complied with court orders and a Supreme Court-approved notice procedure may well be subject to malpractice lawsuits by anyone who
alleges that he or she did not receive notice of the opportunity to
file a claim.
We do not hold today that first-class mail and publication will
always suffice, either under a due process or a fiduciary duty analysis. Indeed, given the large sums involved and the low response
rate, it might have been preferable for the district court in the [underlying antitrust class action] to have required certified mail or
follow-up procedures. We hold only that in this case, where the
procedure employed was customary and court-approved, where
there was no suggestion before the district court that a different
type of notice be employed, and where the plaintiffs have offered
little support for the proposition that more was required, class counsel cannot be said to have breached their duties. 338

This language seems to say no more than that the plaintiff
failed in the case before the court to establish an element of
malpractice, performance that falls below that of a reasonably
competent lawyer. The fact that the court referred separately
336Id. at 91.
337The Zimmer court states,

however, that in challenging any action by counsel that
was explicitly approved by court order, such as the design of the notice plan to class
members, the plaintiff "faces a standard at least as high as abuse of discretion in
seeking to show malpractice by counsel who followed the court's order." Id. at 93.
We think this is the wrong standard even in the limited context suggested by the
Zimmer court. See supra notes 213 & 280 and accompanying text.
338 Id. at 91-93 (footnotes omitted).
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to due process and fiduciary analysis suggests that it accepted
the possibility that due process might be satisfied and a fiduciary
breach, actionable as malpractice, might nonetheless exist. In
addition, the court emphasized that the practice was customary,
not just court-approved. 339 This suggests that the Third Circuit
was applying standard tort doctrine to this suit. In every malpractice suit, whether a practice is customary is considered important in determining whether there has been a breach of
duty.34° Further, the Third Circuit suggested that even a customary practice might be negligent, also standard tort doctrine, 341
but that the plaintiff in this case had "offered little" to demonstrate that the customary practice here was, nonetheless, negligent.342
339 Id. at 93 n.8 ("[C]lass counsel did all they were ordered [by the court] and
expected [by custom] to do.").
340Keeton et al., supra note 74 § 33, at 193-4.
341 The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 287 U.S. 662 (1932).
342Zimmer, 758 F.2d at 93. In our view, it should not be hard to make such a
showing in most class actions. Custom as a defense works best when the tort victim
is a customer who can contract with the defendant for the desired amount of safety.
"But a firm will have no incentive to take precautions against accidents dangerous
only to people with whom the firm does not, and because of high transaction costs
cannot, deal." Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 168 (4th ed. 1992).
Class members typically fit this category of victim. And the available empirical
evidence seems to bear out the conclusion that at least with respect to the content of
the notice, class action "custom" is generally suboptimal. See Willging, Hooper, &
Niemic, supra note 109, at 131-34.
As to the court's reference to the fact that no one suggested to the district court that
different notice be employed, that comment runs counter to standard tort doctrine.
It seems to reward class counsel for failing to devise a better notice procedure in the
first place. But under standard tort doctrine that failure would work against counsel,
as it would help demonstrate that counsel's breach had caused the damage. Standard
tort doctine would sensibly exonerate class counsel who had fought hard for a court
to accept a better notice plan, not one who stood idly by while a defective plan was
adopted. That the district court heard no other plan would seem thus to be an
important, if not essential, part of the plaintiff's case. What then could the Third
Circuit mean by holding it against the plaintiff?
While not as clear as it could be in the opinion, what the Zimmer court apparently
had in mind was that the class member/plaintiff, a sophisticated player who had access
to lawyers other than class counsel and who had actual notice that the suit was
pending, should itself have suggested some other form of notice. Zimmer, 758 F.2d
at 92 (arguing that it would have been reasonable for Zimmer, given the amount of
money at stake, its sophistication, its access to independent counsel and its actual
notice of the suit, to have instructed its own lawyers to monitor the litigation and
presumably class counsel's performance).
Even in this context we think that suggestion unwise. If sophisticated clients cannot
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The court's response to Zimmer's second claim was even more
clearly grounded in tort, rather than preclusion, doctrine. The
court's response to the claim that the notice procedure was negligently implemented by class counsel even if it was not negligently crafted was that plaintiffs "extensive discovery has failed
to develop any material issue of fact regarding class counsel's
negligence." 343 Nowhere did the court suggest that the first
court's finding of adequacy means that class counsel took every
step carefully. Nor do we believe any court seriously considering what was "actually decided" by a ruling of adequacy could
justify any other result. In fact, the very nature of Zimmer's
second claim reinforces the absurdity of equating a finding of
adequacy with a finding that class counsel has not been negligent in any stage of the class action settlement process. 344
rely on class counsel to protect their interests, but instead must retain individual
lawyers to monitor class counsel's performance, why allow non-mandatory plaintiff
class actions with sophisticated class members? Be that as it may, it is certainly
ridiculous to expect ordinary class action plaintiffs to bring deficiencies with the notice
procedure or other matters to a court's attention or risk losing their right to complain
later of the performance of their lawyers.
The only other way to read the Third Circuit's reference to the arguments presented
to the class action court on notice is as some veiled reference to an estoppel argument:
No one raised the defects in the earlier proceeding, so the class (and individual
members) are precluded somehow from raising them now. This argument is not
supported by standard preclusion doctrine. Claim preclusion doctrine would prohibit
raising arguments later that could have been raised earlier, but that doctrine only
applies when the parties to both actions are identical. Class counsel, the defendants
in Zimmer, were not parties to the first suit.
343 Id. at 93.
344Judge Weis, dissenting from the majority opinion in Zimmer, assumed arguendo
that class counsel's proposed notice plan was non-negligent because it was customary,
but rejected the majority's conclusion that the plaintiff had not made out a prima facie
case of class counsel's negligence in implementing the notice plan. Id. at 94 (Weis, J.,
dissenting). He renounced the idea that "no further action" was required of class
counsel after so few class members responded to the notice in the case. Id. Further,
he commented on the class counsel's attempt to justify their inaction by suggesting it
too was customary. The lawyers had cited evidence showing that a return rate of 12%
was customary in similar class action suits. Id. at 95. Presumably they offered this
evidence to show that most class counsel took no further action to notify class
members of their right to a share in the recovery when there was such a low return.
Commenting on this argument, Judge Weis stated that the accepted low return rate
raised "a very serious question about the legitimacy of class action damage suits," in
which recovery and attorney's fees were calculated on the assumption that 100% of
the class would seek recovery from the fund. Id. at 95 n.2. He may have missed the
point here. The serious question about class action suits raised by the 12% return rate
may have more to do with the adequacy of the representation provided by class
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In addition to making findings on adequacy of representation,
courts in approving a class action settlement are supposed to
ensure that the settlement was not the product of collusion between the class lawyers and the defendant.

Unfortunately,

courts are no better at explaining what a finding of "no collusion" means than they are at explaining what they mean when
they find class counsel adequate. However, the few courts that
have addressed the question of what constitutes collusion seem

to equate collusion with intentional fraud. 345 It is thus plausible
to argue that whenever the class action court bothers to find no
collusion, it "actually decides" that class counsel and the defendant have not committed fraud, at least jointly. We disagree,

but we defer full discussion of this question for the moment to
consider the other necessary elements of issue preclusion.
2. Was Resolution of the Issue Necessary to the EarlierDecision?
In some instances the court that approved the settlement may
have opined on the precise issue raised in the later suit, but for
issue preclusion to apply the issue must have been necessary to
the first court's decision. For example, the district court in
Georgine might have said, although it did not, that the antitrust

laws were not violated by the provision giving certain plaintiffs'
firms an advantage in the market created by the settlement.
But could such a statement reasonably be construed to have
been necessary to any of the issues before the court: whether
counsel than with the legitimacy of making defendants pay for all the damage they
cause, instead of just 12%.
Judge Weis pointed out that class counsel were invested with important
responsibilities to protect absent class members and were "not only fiduciaries, but
well compensated ones as well." Id. at 97. To hold such "well compensated
fiduciaries" to any lesser standard of performance than ordinary lawyers makes no
sense to us and apparently made little to Judge Weis.
345 See Georgine,157 F.R.D. at 331 (citing Point Pleasant Canoe Rental v. Tinicum
Township, 110 F.R.D. 166, 169-70 (E.D. Pa. 1986)). The court quoted Black's Law
Dictionary to define collusion:
An agreement between two or more persons to defraud a person of his rights
by the forms of law, or to obtain an object forbidden by law. It implies the
existence of fraud of some kind, the employment of fraudulent means, or of
lawful means for the accomplishment of an unlawful purpose. A secret
combination, conspiracy, or concert of action between two or more persons for
fraudulent or deceitful purpose.
Id. (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 240 (5th ed. 1979)) (emphasis added).
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the settlement as a whole was fair and reasonable or whether
class counsel adequately represented the class? In Derrickson,
the first court in ruling that the consent decree was "fair, adequate and reasonable," had praised the city officials and city
lawyer, who would later become the Derricksondefendants, for
having negotiated such a fair decree:
The defendants did not violate their fiduciary relationship to the
city or secure a personal advantage in conflict with their duty to
serve the city.... If the Illinois statutes are in conflict with the
settlement, and I conclude they are not, then the state statutes
should give way to the policy of the federal law. I conclude that
the proposed decree is fair, adequate3 and
reasonable and that it
46
does not violate state or federal law
But, in analyzing the elements of issue preclusion, the Seventh
Circuit held that this comment was not necessary to the district
court's decision. 347 According to Judge Easterbrook, although
the district court had to find that the decree itself comported
with state law before approving it because parties cannot liber348
ate themselves from law through court-approved settlements,
it did not have to decide that the manner of negotiation was
lawful. Implicitly, then, Judge Easterbrook separated the findings a judge must make before approving a settlement-findings
on adequacy of representation and a lack of collusion-from a
finding that the conduct of the parties in reaching agreement
comported with other law.349
Concurring separately in Derrickson, Judge Cudahy acknowledged that the majority's distinction between the validity of the
decree and the alleged illegality of the negotiations was plausible, but argued that the distinction was unworkable in practice:
"[E]ither consent decrees must address and resolve all state law
problems, including the lawfulness of the means of settlement,
or there should be no consent decrees. '350 He argued that let346Derrickson, 845 F.2d at 723 (quoting district court order approving the consent
decree).
347Id.

349
Id.
349 The Seventh Circuit also found, despite the language from the district court
quoted in the text supra at note 346, that the district court had not actually decided
the question of whether the terms of the settlement violated state law. Id. at 723.
350Id. at 724 (Cudahy, J., concurring).
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ting a decree stand, while sending the negotiators to prison is
"the height of hypocrisy. '3 51 Although Judge Cudahy did not
elaborate on the hypocrisy charge, what he must have meant
was that the judgment in a subsequent suit implicitly criticizes
the protection afforded the class or the public in the first suit,

while leaving the first judgment intact. The law, however,
leaves settlements in ordinary suits in place in the interest of
finality, while allowing the plaintiff to sue his lawyer for negligently having advised the client to settle or negligently handling
the client's suit so that settlement was the best option. The
settlement is left intact but the lawyer is liable. What makes a

similar result unbearably "hypocritical" in the class action context? 352

351Id. at 725 (Cudahy, J., concurring).

352 Some insight into this question may be gleaned from court cases that bar a
criminal defendant who remains incarcerated from recovering damages against his
lawyer for malpractice on the ground, inter alia, that the justice system cannot tolerate
awarding damages for an imprisonment it otherwise affirms. See, e.g., Zeidwig v.
Ward, 548 So. 2d 209, 214-15 (Fla. 1989) which concludes that
approving a policy that would approve the imprisonment of a defendant for a
criminal offense after a judicial determination that the defendant has failed in
attacking his conviction on grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel but which
would allow the same defendant to collect from his counsel damages in a civil
suit for ineffective representation because he was improperly imprisoned .... is
neither logical nor reasonable.
The legal standard for obtaining a reversal of one's conviction on the ground of
ineffective assistance of counsel is more difficult to meet than the ordinary malpractice
standard. See Susan P. Koniak, Through the Looking Glass of Ethics and the Wrong
with Rights We Find There, 9 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 1, 5-12 (1995). The reality is that
we imprison some people, though their lawyers committed malpractice in defending
them. See, e.g., Smith v. Ylst, 826 F.2d 872, 874 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S.
829 (1988) (psychiatric reports showed that the defendant's lawyer suffered "paranoid
psychotic reaction[s]" during the trial, but the court upheld the conviction because the
defendant failed to show prejudice); Berry v. King, 765 F.2d 451, 454 (5th Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1164 (1986) (no presumption of prejudice on showing that
defense counsel was addicted to drugs, and prejudice not shown by counsel's
stipulation to virtually all elements of the crime when state could easily have proved
the elements). See generally Martin C. Calhoun, Note, How to Thread the Needle:
Toward A Checklist-Based Standard for Evaluating Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Claims, 77 Geo. LJ. 413 (1988) (advocating list of minimal criteria to evaluate
ineffective assistance of counsel claims). Denying that reality is a lot more hypocritical
than admitting the truth and trying to explain the societal interests that supposedly
justify using a tougher standard in cases aimed at reversing convictions. Having drawn
an analogy between the misconduct of criminal defense lawyers and that of class
counsel, we would like to point out that it is reasonable to assume that lawyers who
represent indigent defendants cannot bear the costs of their own misconduct because
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If some class actions approved by courts as fair and reasonable
involve collusion or malpractice, denying that fact seems to us
much more hypocritical than admitting it, providing some redress, and yet leaving the settlements in place. If there are legitimate reasons for the lax standards used by courts in approving class action settlements-standards that allow a fair amount
of collusion and malpractice to go unnoticed by the class action
court and the courts reviewing such settlements, then those reasons should be articulated. They should not, however, be used
as an excuse to deny the reality of abuse. That is hypocrisy.
3. Full and Fair Opportunity to Litigate

Although a finding that the first court did not actually decide
the issue to be litigated in the second suit or a finding that the
resolution of the issue was not necessary to the first action
would suffice to defeat issue preclusion, no court need rely on
such findings to allow the later suits we propose. The final requirement of issue preclusion is that a party against whom preclusion is sought had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the

issue in the first proceeding. 353 We maintain that in none of the
later suits that we propose could a court find that the class action provided a full and fair opportunity to litigate the kind of
misconduct we have described.
First, as class action courts now conduct fairness hearings,
these hearings are not adversary proceedings. 354 To hold that
hearings, which are in many cases essentially ex parte presentations to a judge, are the equivalent of a fair opportunity to litigate is absurd. 355 Second, even class members who appear
in general they are poorly compensated by the state for their efforts. Class lawyers

and defendants in class action are not similarly undercompensated for having
participated in a class action settlement. Thus, an important argument for restricting
later suits against criminal defendants is not available to support similar restrictions
on suits against class counsel and defendants in class actions.

353
Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 27 (1980). We note that a similar require-

ment applies to claim preclusion as well. In addition to showing that the parties are

the same and the transaction is the same, to establish claim preclusion, one must show
that "the procedure in the first action (including the possibility of appeal) did not
exclude an opportunity to present the matter advanced in the second action." James,
Hazard & Leubsdorf, supra note 288, § 11.15.

354See supra notes 177-196 and accompanying text.
355Once again, courts outside the class action context have recognized this point in
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through independent counsel to object to the settlement or to
object to class counsel's representation of the class do not receive a full and fair opportunity to litigate malpractice, fraud or
antitrust claims. This is so as a factual matter because courts
conducting fairness hearings severely restrict objectors' access to
the evidence that would be necessary to sustain a finding on any
of these matters. As we have already pointed out, discovery

during a fairness hearing is tightly controlled and considered a
privilege, not a right. 356 In any of the later suits we propose, the
access to evidence afforded to the plaintiffs would be far greater
than that typically available during the fairness hearing. 357
In Derrickson, Judge Easterbrook's rejection of issue preclu-

sion begins by making just this point about the availability of

evidence. 358 The Illinois Attorney General had not been af-

forded discovery rights in the class action proceeding, which
meant for the Seventh Circuit that he had not had a full and fair
opportunity to litigate whether the defendants and their counsel
rejecting the collateral estoppel defense in a malpractice action arising out of a
settlement. See Cook v. Connolly, 366 N.W.2d 287, 291 (Minn. 1985):
Neither is the hearing on a proposed minor settlement designed to afford a
full and fair opportunity to consider the issue of lawyer competence. The
minor's guardian, a layperson, is ill-equipped to raise the issue, much less
present it; counsel for both the minor and the defendant are interested in
obtaining approval, not disapproval, of the proposed settlement, and the minor's
attorney, surely, is unlikely to use the occasion to confess any professional
inadequacy.
356See supra notes 191-195 and accompanying text.
357 The Ninth Circuit ignored these problems in Golden, 786 F.2d at 1426. In
Golden, the plaintiffs who brought the later malpractice suit had objected to the
adequacy of counsel on the same ground during the fairness hearing, but their
objections had been rejected. Id. at 1426, 1428. The Ninth Circuit, without
considering the limited evidence available to objectors in the first proceeding, simply
asserted that their first opportunity to litigate had been full and fair. Id. at 1429. The
failure to consider the nature of the first proceeding and the impediments that might
have prevented the objectors from making their case limits the persuasive power of
the Golden decision. In any event, the holding in Golden seems limited to later suits
for malpractice brought by class members who had actually objected to class counsel's
adequacy during the fairness hearing on the same ground now being pressed in the
malpractice suit-the facts in Golden emphasized by the court. Whether after the
Ninth Circuit's recent decision in Durkin, 92 F.3d 1510, which did not bother to cite
Golden, even that limited holding would be adhered to by the Ninth Circuit is unclear.
Consider, for example, that Durkin emphasizes that issue preclusion is inapplicable to
malpractice claims because they do not accrue until the first proceeding has concluded.
Id. at 1517.
358 845 F.2d at 721-22.
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had violated state conflict-of-interest laws in negotiating the
settlement.3 59 Of course, one could imagine a procedural change
that would allow broad rights of discovery in fairness hearings.3 60
However, not only is no such change likely to occur any time in
the near future, 361 but even were such a change to be implemented it would not be enough to transform fairness hearings

359 Id. The Seventh Circuit suggested that the lack of discovery in the class action
settlement process was particularly decisive on the question of opportunity to litigate
because the Attorney General was denied an alternative forum for discovering the
information by the injunction that stopped his first attempt to convene a grand jury.
Of course, any class member or state attorney general who, while the class action
settlement was pending before a federal judge, tried to invoke an alternative forum
to investigate whether misconduct had occurred during the class action negotiations
would in all likelihood be similarly enjoined. If the class action was pending before
a state court that lacked the ability to enjoin the parallel proceeding because it was
brought in federal court or in a court of another state, the result would nonetheless
in all likelihood be the same. The parallel court probably would not exercise
jurisdiction during the pendency of the first filed suit. In either case, no alternative
forum would be available to get the information necessary to litigate fully and fairly
whether the conduct in the ongoing class suit was wrongful.
Moreover, we do not believe that the availability of another route to the information
necessary to litigate a matter fully should redound to the benefit of the forum that
denied the necessary information. The class action forum is not rendered any fairer
by the fact that some other forum assisted the litigant, at considerable added expense
to that litigant. We therefore assume that the Seventh Circuit's reference to the
injunction was meant to emphasize how inhospitable the first forum had been to the
litigant and was not meant to suggest that the availability of another forum makes the
primary forum fairer.
The Seventh Circuit did, however, make another point on the opportunity to litigate
that is important. Noting that the "district court was not the right forum for litigating
a criminal case," the court remarked that the state's attorney "was understandably
reluctant to try to prove" his case there and thus did "no more than express concern
about possible violations." Id. Would not a federal prosecutor or a federal attorney
from the antitrust division who suspected civil violations of the antitrust laws feel
similarly restrained, even assuming the class action settlement was pending before a
federal court? In the case of a potential criminal violation, the situation would be
almost directly analogous: Without a grand jury indictment a federal prosecutor would
have no more freedom to press his case that a crime had been committed than the
state attorney general in Derrickson. As for a civil claim, the federal attorney would
undoubtedly feel obligated not to make such allegations without having conducted an
appropriate investigation first. But how likely is it that that could be accomplished
before the fairness hearing proceeding commenced? Presumably, private lawyers
would be similarly reluctant to press forcefully any serious charges without an
opportunity to make their case or the evidence to back up those charges.
3 But see supra note 195 (discussing plausible objections to allowing broad
discovery rights in every fairness hearing).
361 See supra notes 264-271 and accompanying text.

1168

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 82:1051

into full and fair opportunities to litigate issues of misconduct
connected with the settlement.
Putting factual assertions about the nature of fairness hearings
aside, we see a deeper problem with equating fairness hearings
with a full and fair opportunity to litigate misconduct in connection with the settlement. To explain that problem we start with
a longstanding exception to the rules against relitigation (both
issue and claim preclusion). Preclusion will not be recognized
when claims were not presented or were unsuccessfully presented by a party because of fraud or concealment on the part
of one's adversary or one's own attorney.362 Implicitly, just such
a claim of concealment of (class or defense) counsel's negligence, of counsel's (and the defendant's) fraud, or of other misconduct by counsel lies at the heart of the later suits we propose. The Restatement (Second) of Judgments provides that
preclusion will not apply when "the party sought to be precluded, as a result of the conduct of his adversary or other special circumstances, did not have an adequate opportunity or
incentive to obtain a full and fair adjudication in the initial action. '363 The Comment to this section makes clear that "other
special circumstances" specifically includes concealment by a
fiduciary.364 The Comment also makes clear that the exception
is designed to protect persons not in a position to litigate the
matter fully in the earlier proceeding because, for example, they
were then suffering from some "mental or physical disability
that impeded effective litigation. '365 Absent class members are
in an analogous position to those suffering from some mental or
physical disability or those who otherwise lacked, through no
fault of their own, the "incentive" to obtain a full adjudication
362
See Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 26 cmt. j (1980):
A defendant [in a later action] cannot justly object to being sued on a part or
phase of a claim that the plaintiff failed to include in an earlier action [or a
fortiori failed to fully adjudicate] because of the defendant's own fraud.
The result is the same when the defendant [in the later action] was not
fraudulent, but by an innocent misrepresentation [or a fortiori a negligent
misrepresentation] prevented the plaintiff from including the entire claim in the
original action [or a fortiori failed to fully adjudicate the issue].
363Id. § 28(5)(c).
3" Id. § 28 cmt. j.
365 Id.
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in the earlier proceeding. Absent class members are told in the
class notice that they need not appear, that they will be represented and that their interests will be protected. The class notice thus in a sense disables them; it is designed to decrease
whatever incentive they might have to appear.366
At its core, our argument against preclusion is a variant of this
longstanding concealment exception. In the earlier suit, the
class was represented by the very party, class counsel, whose
conduct the class now wishes to place in issue.367 Moreover, the
defendants were aligned with class counsel in the first suit in
seeking court approval of the settlement. Together, class counsel and the defendants, central players in the first suit, have
every reason and opportunity to conceal from the class and the
class action court the true nature of their association. 368
366 Contrast Laskey, in which the Sixth Circuit disposes of all the elements of issue
preclusion in one sentence:
Since appellants had the opportunity to object to the legal representation at the
prior settlement hearing and since a finding that the class was adequately
represented is necessary for finding the settlement was fair and reasonable,
which in turn was essential to approving the settlement, appellants are
collaterally estopped from now asserting that the legal representation was not
adequate and that the UAW committed legal malpractice.
Laskey v. International Union, 638 F.2d 954, 957 (6th Cir. 1981) (internal citations
omitted).
The idea that class members who were not represented by independent counsel in
the class action proceeding had a full and fair opportunity to litigate an issue
(adequacy of representation), which no one in the former proceedings, including the
court, ever mentioned was a legal issue is untenable. See supra note 310 (explaining
how the class action court in Laskey appeared to ignore the issue of adequacy). The
Sixth Circuit suggested that class members should have retained independent counsel
during the class action proceeding, who then would have known that adequacy was an
issue to be raised. Laskey, 638 F.2d at 956-57. But those same class members had
been apprised that class counsel was their lawyer. They had been told in the Notice
they could seek independent representation, but they were also told they had a lawyer.
Id. at 956. The idea that class members, present or absent, have a full and fair
opportunity to litigate the adequacy of their own lawyer's conduct in the very
proceeding in which that lawyer is representing them, even when they are
unrepresented by independent counsel and when the court generally provides no funds
for such a lawyer, is ludicrous. We do not think the Laskey sentence constitutes a
precedent worth following.
367 If the plaintiff in the later suit is the prior defendant suing defense counsel, as in
Durkin, the point is the same. If it is a state agency who unsuccessfully objected as
an intervenor to the class settlement, the point is inapposite, but our other arguments
on claim and issue preclusion would apply.
368See also supra text accompanying notes 316-317 (noting that class action courts
rely on class counsel representations in assessing whether a settlement is fair and
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All the critical findings made by a class action court-that the
settlement was fair, class counsel adequate, and collusion absent-may be a product of class counsel's negligence or fraud,
either or both accepted without objection by the all-too-congenial defendant. Consider that in assessing the fairness of the
settlement the court is to consider, inter alia, the extent of discovery completed, the stage of the proceedings, and the experience and views of counsel.3 69 All those factors are subject to
manipulation by class counsel. The findings of the class action
court are thus not severable from class counsel's performance. 370
And that is true even when there are objectors who mount an
adversary challenge to the settlement terms because of the limited ability objectors have to discover what the settling parties
actually did and did not do. This intractable agency problem
accounts for the general rule that absent class members are
entitled to have a second court rule on whether they were adequately represented in the class suit, 37' and underlies our arguarguing that it is inappropriate to treat the fairness finding as preclusive on the issue
of whether the class suffered damages as a result of class counsel's alleged
malpractice).
369See, e.g., Officers for Justice v. Civil Service Comm'n, 688 F.2d 615, 625 (9th Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1217 (1983).
370 As the court pointed out in Grayson, 646 A.2d at 200 ("Indeed, the ... court may
be unable to elicit the information necessary to make a fully informed evaluation of
the settlement agreement if counsel for either of the parties has failed properly to
discover and analyze the facts that are relevant to a fair and equitable settlement.").
371 Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 45 (1940) acknowledges implicitly the seriousness
of this agency problem and seeks to solve it by guaranteeing that absent class
members have a chance to litigate for themselves subsequently the question of
whether they were adequately represented in the first suit. In a recent unanimous
decision by the Supreme Court, Hansberry was reaffirmed. Richards v. Jefferson
County, 116 S.Ct. 1761 (1996). See also Gonzalez v. Cassidy, 474 F.2d 67, 72 (5th Cir.
1973) (allowing class members to avoid claim preclusion by challenging the class acti6n
judgment on the ground that they were inadequately represented in the class action).
We believe that the rule of Hansberry-thatdue process requires that absent class
members be allowed to challenge the adequacy of the representation they received
before they can be considered bound by the first judgment-provides sufficient
justification by itself for rejecting the defenses of claim and issue preclusion in most,
if not all, of the later suits we propose. See infra text accompanying notes 409-414.
But we do not rest our arguments entirely on Hansberryfor two reasons. First, some
of the later suits might be held not to imply that class counsel was inadequate; for
example, suits brought by the defendant against defense counsel or an antitrust suit
brought by the class. Second, one might argue that Hansberry should be read
narrowly to prescribe only one remedy for the agency problem we describe, namely
relitigation of the original wrong against precisely the same defendants.
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ment that the first proceeding should not count as a full and fair
opportunity to litigate misconduct connected to the settlement.
In Durkin, the court stated that the earlier fairness hearing
could not have afforded the plaintiff a full and fair opportunity
to litigate because "a malpractice action does not even accrue
until after the settlement becomes final. ' 372 This statement can
be seen as another way of pointing out the absurdity of expecting parties to discover and adjudicate a wrong in a proceeding
tainted by the wrong itself. Any such requirement would make
a farce of the concept of "full and fair opportunity to litigate."
In sum, we argue that fairness hearings are intrinsically incapable of providing a full and fair opportunity to litigate whether
class counsel (and/or the defendant and/or its counsel) intentionally, recklessly or negligently breached a duty to the class (or to
the defendant), or whether class counsel or the defendant and
its agents violated any other duty in the course of negotiating
the settlement. For that reason alone there is no basis to hold
that the later suits we propose are precluded.
D. "But the Court Said I Could"-Or Why Equitable Estoppel
Will Not Do
After Derrickson, the state attorney general indicted and obtained a conviction of the city officials and the city lawyer who
had negotiated the Voting Rights Act consent decree, and on
appeal the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the conviction. 373
The Illinois Supreme Court accepted Judge Easterbrook's understanding of claim and issue preclusion in its opinion. 374 The
court also addressed another argument made by the defendants:
Even if the criminal prosecution was not estopped under ordinary preclusion rules, it should be estopped as a matter of equity.375 The defendants argued that they justifiably relied on the
372

Durkin, 92 F.3d at 1517.

373People v. Scharlau, 565 N.E.2d 1319, 1328-29 (I11.
1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S.

1252 (1991).
374Id. at 1329.
375Id.

at 1329-30. The equitable estoppel argument was also made in Chief Judge

Bauer's dissenting opinion in Wright v. DeArmond, 977 F.2d 339,350 (7th Cir. 1992),
cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1051 (1993) (Bauer, C.J., dissenting), another post-Derrickson
proceeding. In Wright, the Seventh Circuit denied a habeas petition filed by the city

officials and the city lawyer whose prosecutions Derrickson allowed. Id. at 340-41.
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blessing of their conduct by the federal judge.376 The Illinois
Supreme Court answered that any reliance on the federal
judge's statements was not justified, given that the federal
judge's comments did not deal with the "substantive issues underlying [their] eventual conviction. ' 377 Thus, findings on adequacy, the fairness of settlement terms and the lack of collusion
in a class action should be understood as limited-purpose statements and not as grants of immunity for all conduct in the
course of negotiating a settlement. Any broader statements by
the class action judge, approving of the parties' conduct, should
be seen as a form of extrajudicial comment. We will return
presently to this point. 378
But the problems with the justifiable reliance argument run
deeper. Although it possesses some superficial appeal, the justifiable reliance argument will not wash. In most cases it is counterfactual and, in all, it is inconsistent with well-accepted principles of law.
As to the factual difficulty, to paraphrase the Illinois Supreme
Court's rejection of the equitable estoppel argument in the postDerrickson proceeding: "What reliance are you talking about
anyway?"

379

The actions that violated state law-negotiating a

contract that secured the defendants a personal advantage-took
place prior to any court statements blessing the conduct. 380
Given that class action settlements are negotiated off-stage, so
to speak, and court approval comes only later, the same lack of
reliance will be present in almost every instance of abuse for
which we propose a later suit be allowed.
Judge Bauer asked "how these defendants were to know that what they were up to

was wrong-not just morally but criminally," given that a federal judge approved their
conduct. Id. at 350 (Bauer, C.J., dissenting).
Other cases that we have discussed make only suggestive references with respect to
equitable estoppel. Zimmer expresses concern about the fairness of imposing "new
notice requirements retroactively." 758 F.2d at 93. The equitable estoppel concern
also finds expression in the allusions in Golden to "harassment," 786 F.2d at 1427, and
the broad language in Ennis,542 F.2d 45, on which Golden relies regarding protection
of lawyers in the same degree as parties.
376Scharlau, 565 N.E.2d at 1329.
377 Id.
378See discussion infra notes 391-399 and accompanying text.
379Scharlau, 565 N.E.2d at 1329-30.
380 Id. at 1329.
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It is true that courts approve some actions of class counsel
before the action is taken; for example, courts evaluate a notice
plan for consistency with due process and Rule 23 requirements,
and approve the plan before it is implemented. But in the case
of settlement class actions, the plan is normally devised by class
counsel with the cooperation of the defendants, and is presented
to the court generally without adversarial challenge. 381 The key
point is that class counsel, with or without the defendants, drafts
a plan and urges it upon the court, not the reverse. If the court
accepts it, the court does so in large part because the court is
relying on counsel's arguments that the plan is adequate. It
bewilders us how those facts can give rise to a plausible claim
that class counsel justifiably relied on the court's ruling.382
As a matter of law, the reliance argument is particularly weak
when made by lawyers. Although courts are generally loath to
recognize policy exceptions to the rules of estoppel, 383 they have
long accepted one policy as capable of trumping the rules
against relitigation: the special obligation of courts to protect
clients from their lawyers.3 84 This exception was first articulated
in Spilker v. Hankin,385 which denied a lawyer the benefit of
claim preclusion in an action by the lawyer to collect a fee from
a client. The client sought to contest the validity of the underlying fee contract, and the lawyer claimed that the matter was res
judicata, having previously won a judgment against the client,
after trial on the merits, for payment on the fee contract. In
Spilker, the court held that the judiciary's special obligation to
protect clients from their lawyers was "more important to the

381
Even when the defendants oppose the notice plan, their interests are not coextensive with those of the class who might be damaged by inadequate notice.
382Our bewilderment is not idiosyncratic. Generally, people are not entitled to rely
on judgments they have induced by even innocent misrepresentations. Restatement
(Second) of Judgments § 26, cmt. j (1980).
383See, e.g., Westwood Chem. Co. v. Kulick, 656 F.2d 1224, 1229-31 (6th Cir. 1981)
(discussing the very few public policy exceptions that have been recognized to the
rules against relitigation).
384Id. at 1229 (discussing this exception, which was first articulated in Spilker v.
Hankin, 188 F.2d 35 (D.C. Cir. 1951)). Spilker is also cited as authority for there
being rare policy exceptions to the rules against relitigation in the Restatement
(Second) of Judgments § 26 reporter's notes on cmt. i (1980).
38 188 F.2d 35, 37-39 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
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public than universal application of res judicata. '' 386 The identical balancing of interests supports our position in this Article
and makes particularly unpersuasive any reliance argument put
forth by lawyers. 387 If the lawyer in Spilker, even absent actual
fraud, was not permitted to rely on a previous judgment in his
favor after a trial, why should class lawyers be allowed to claim
justifiable reliance on the findings of a court that relied on the
388
lawyers' representations to the court in making those findings?
A similar form of equitable estoppel argument is often heard
from persons or entities that claim to have relied on statements
by government agents to the effect that certain conduct is lawful
under some statute or other. There is, however, a long line of
Supreme Court cases rejecting equitable estoppel in those situations.389 Moreover, those cases, which many in the corporate
community bemoan as unfair, 390 reflect sound jurisprudential
theory. To estop the government, or anyone else for that matter, from arguing to a court that conduct was unlawful, on the
ground that a government agent had blessed the conduct would
be to transfer the power to say, with binding authority, what the
386 Westwood, 656 F.2d at 1229 (describing the holding in Spilker).
387An additional reason for the lawyer exception to equitable estoppel is that

lawyers understand better than others that seemingly inconsistent holdings are possible
in our legal system.
388As we have argued, we do not think standard estoppel doctrine provides for
estoppel in the cases we propose. For that reason we have not relied on the Spilker
exception to justify the suits we propose. It should, however, be noted that for those
who dispute our analysis of whether estoppel applies, Spilker provides an additional
doctrinal argument in favor of our position.
3s9 The modem line of cases runs from Office of Personnel Mgmt. v. Richmond, 496
U.S. 414 (1990) (holding that the government may never be estopped based on an
agent's erroneous disposition of government money and emphasizing that, if there is
any situation in which it would be appropriate to equitably estop the government
based on its agents words, the circumstances would have to be "extreme"), back to
Federal Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380, 384 (1947) (government not bound
by interpretation of law given by administrative agents). In Richmond the Court
expressed dismay that lower federal courts had read its longstanding refusal to rule out
any possibility of equitable estoppel as a license to find circumstances that justify
estopping the government based on its agents representations. Id. at 422. The Court
pointed out that it had "reversed every finding of estoppel that we have reviewed,"
in an effort to make it as clear as possible to the lower courts that in almost no
instance was such estoppel appropriate. Id. The only two Justices to dissent in
Richmond, Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall, are no longer on the Court.
390 See, e.g., Jay A. Sigler & Joseph E. Murphy, Interactive Corporate Compliance

160-65 (1988).
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law means from the judiciary391to thousands of executive branch
agents. The result would be a Tower of Babel of law-thousands upon thousands of binding interpretations of law privately
dispensed in conversations between government agents and
individuals or corporate entities.
Of course, the interpretations the Derrickson defendants
sought to invoke to estop later charges of illegality were offered
by a judge, not by an executive branch official, and were offered
in a court opinion, not a private conversation. The jurisprudential point is, nonetheless, important. A judge's power to interpret law extends only so far as the court's rightful jurisdiction.
A judicial determination made without a full and fair opportunity to litigate the matter before the judge differs from a statement by an executive branch agent only because it is made by
a person dressed in a black robe. But it is not the judge's costume, the court chamber or the mere fact that a judge writes his
thoughts down in an opinion that make what judges say about
the law authoritative. It is that they speak after process, not
before it and not in the absence of it.
Judge Easterbrook seemed to acknowledge this point at the
end of his opinion in Derrickson. There he returned to the
question of what the class action court actually decided, concluding that the district court "did not in fact resolve the lawfulness of the negotiating process [and therefore] ...

could not

enjoin the state proceedings. ' 392 He cited Chick Kam Choo v.
Exxon Corporation,393 interpreting the scope of the so-called
relitigation exception to the Anti-Injunction Act, which authorizes a federal court to issue injunctions "to protect or effectuate
its judgments. ' 394 In Chick Kam Choo, the Supreme Court
stated that the relitigation exception applied only to issues that
were "previously ... presented to and decided by the federal
'395 emphasizing

that these requirements were to be strictly
applied 396 and that the record, not merely the opinion of the
court, was to be examined in deciding what was actually decourt,

391
See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
392845 F.2d at 723 (emphasis added).
393486 U.S. 140 (1988).
39428 U.S.C. § 2283 (1994).
395
396

486 U.S. at 147 (emphasis added).
Id. at 148.
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cided.397 As we read the Seventh Circuit opinion, it uses Chick
Kam Choo to deny that all the holdings and findings that judges
make are entitled to equal respect. In effect, the Seventh Cir-

cuit refused to read a court opinion as having "actually decided"
matters the court should not have decided, given the evidence
and arguments presented to it.398
We agree. Words that judges speak without the benefit of
process are no more worthy to be called authoritative interpretations of law than the words any one of us speaks. That is the

397 Id. (quoting Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Locomotive Eng'rs, 398 U.S. 281,290
(1970)).
398 Having held that in deciding whether to approve a class action settlement, a judge
is not required to decide whether the negotiations leading to the settlement were
conducted in accordance with state law, the Seventh Circuit added, however, that the
better practice would be to consider such matters:
It is not wise to approve a consent decree if a crime has been committed. As
the concurring opinion soundly observes, "a consent decree purchased at such
a price should not be accepted, regardless of other benefits it may provide." A
court ought to avoid approving a decree negotiated by illegal means-it ought
to resolve on the merits all issues necessary to ensure that the decree is a lawful,
binding obligation of the persons who agree to it.
Derrickson, 845 F.2d at 723. In context, we believe it is wrong to read the "ought" in
the last phrase to mean "must." And to the extent that it is obvious that a settlement
was negotiated by illegal means, we agree. Any other position seems absurd.
Moreover, we take it this is all Judge Easterbrook meant. Or more precisely, we take
it he did not mean that a judge approving a class action should try to determine
conclusively, although he does not have to, whether any state or federal law was
violated in the course of negotiating the settlement. Proceedings devoted to that goal
would not only be unwieldy, but with no trained advocate present in most settlement
proceedings to make the case that other law had been violated in the course of
reaching the settlement, any such broad findings would also be inherently unreliable
and ultimately disrespectful of the interests underlying the state or federal laws under
consideration.
In a separate and strongly-worded concurrence, Judge Cudahy agreed with the
preclusion law articulated by the majority but only in light of the "case's strangely
contorted history." Id. at 724 (Cudahy, J., concurring). For Judge Cudahy, the critical
facts in Derrickson were that the state attorney general sought to raise his concerns
to the district court, was denied a full hearing and was nonetheless subjected to an
adverse determination of the question by the district court. Id. (Cudahy, J.,
concurring). Although Judge Cudahy seems most concerned about the possibility that
state action might undo federal policy reflected in the Voting Rights Act contrary to
the Act's intention and general principles of federalism, his argument sweeps more
broadly. Id. at 724-25 (Cudahy, J., concurring). See supra text accompanying notes
349-352.
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difference between a system based on due process and one
399
founded on idolatry or the arbitrary use of power.
We thus find no factual, legal or jurisprudential reason to accept the general argument of equitable estoppel. In the later
suit, the actor's intent should be judged as of the time the alleged breach or otherwise unlawful action was contemplated.
Moreover, the actor's role in convincing the court to accept a
particular course of conduct should be considered of critical
importance in assessing whether the actor can be held liable for
damages resulting from the license issued by the court. Inaction
by one charged with a duty to protect the class, like class counsel or a defendant with a pre-existing fiduciary relationship to
the class, should suffice to show not only a breach of duty but
also a causal relationship between the breach and the damage
to the class resulting from court approval against which no fiduciary argued.
One last matter before we move on: Should it matter in equity
that the plaintiff in the later suit chose not to appeal the fairness
determination, chose not to file a motion for relief from the
judgment under Rule 60(b) and chose not to relitigate the original matter as, at least, absent class members might under Hansberry v. Lee?4o Should these alternative avenues operate somehow to foreclose the later suits we propose? We have already
explained why those avenues are inadequate to deter the abuse
that we hope will be deterred by our later suits. 401 Thus, if precedent suggested that actions for damages should be estopped
even when the elements of estoppel were not satisfied so long
as some relief might be available in some other proceeding, like
an action to vacate the judgment, we would argue that prece399 It is true that Walker v. Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967) (holding that in general
the unconstitutional orders of a judge must be obeyed until they are overturned by a

higher court), runs contrary to this point. We believe the holding in Walker to be
misguided, but even that decision acknowledges that the order must be one issued by

a court of competent jurisdiction over the subject matter in dispute and that orders
with only a "frivolous pretense to validity" do not fall under the general rule. Id. at
315. Be that as it may, the judicial statements at issue in the present context are
generally not orders to the parties insisting that they take certain action, and the issue

is not the right to disobey them without resorting to court process. The statements are
more akin to blessings, a form of after-the-fact licensing, not orders at all.
4w0See discussion supra note 371 and accompanying text.
401 See text accompanying notes 175-187.
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dent should not be applied here. But there is no such line of

precedent 0 2 Indeed, what precedent there is suggests the opposite result.403
In Derrickson,Judge Easterbrook explained that claim preclu-

sion was particularly inappropriate in the context before the
court because Supreme Court precedent held that a governmen-

tal agent's "lack of power to bind the sovereign, overlooked in
negotiating a settlement, may be raised later on."
The Supreme Court cases he cited, however, United States v. Beebe,405
and Stone v. Bank of Commerce,4°6 both involved actions to set
402
The Seventh Circuit opinion in Kamilewicz v. BancBoston, 92 F.3d 506 (7th Cir.),
suggests, although it falls short of actually holding, that class members' remedies for
fraud or malpractice committed by their counsel are limited to reversing the judgment
on appeal or vacating the judgment under Rule 60(b) or some state equivalent. See
Id. at 511-12. The Seventh Circuit held that federal courts lack subject matter
jurisdiction over later actions for fraud and malpractice based on conduct connected
to a settlement approved by a state court. Id. at 512. The absence of subject matter
jurisdiction was grounded in the Rooker-Feldmandoctrine, which holds that Congress
has not vested subject matter jurisdiction in lower federal courts to hear appeals from
state court judgments. Id. at 509-10. Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413
(1923); District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). The
Seventh Circuit, in a unanimous opinion by Judge Evans, held in effect that the later
suit for fraud and malpractice was in the nature of an appeal. Id. at 512. We say that
this case suggests that appellate review or a 60(b) action are the exclusive remedies
open to class members, because if a malpractice/fraud action is in the nature of an
appeal no federal or state court has jurisdiction to hear the claims except the appellate
court above the original class action court. That is true because one trial level state
court has no more jurisdiction over an appeal from another trial level state court
(from the same state or from another state) than a lower federal court would have.
The logical extension of the Seventh Circuit's holding then would be that class
members are restricted to appeals or actions to vacate the class judgment that they
claim was tainted by fraud or other illegality. We believe the Seventh Circuit's
opinion is wrong for many reasons, one of which is that a malpractice action is not and
never has been an action in the nature of an appeal.
403
See Edmondson v. Dressman, 469 So. 2d 571, 574 (Ala. 1985) (rejecting defendant
lawyer's "contention that a party must have the underlying judgment set aside before
proceeding against an attorney who negligently caused the compromise or settlement
of his client's case for an unreasonable sum of money"); Cook v. Connolly 366 N.W.2d
287, 291 (Minn. 1985) (holding that "plaintiff's malpractice action is an independent
cause of action not subsumed in the plaintiff's personal injury action, and,
consequently that setting aside the court-approved settlement is not a prerequisite to
maintenance of plaintiff's malpractice action").
404Derrickson,845 F.2d at 721. This rule may be seen as a variation on the general
exception based on misrepresentation, innocent or fraudulent, in the first suit. See
supra text accompanying notes 362-365.
405
180 U.S. 343 (1901).
406174 U.S. 412 (1899).
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aside judgments agreed to by government attorneys, who lacked
the authority to enter into the agreements, not later actions to
punish the wayward government agents. Implicitly, then, Judge
Easterbrook, by relying on these cases to hold that a later suit
is permissible, is saying that there is no reason to confine the
government to one remedy, vacatur, as opposed to another,
damages or imprisonment, when a government agent has acted
unfaithfully. Indeed, for him the existence of one remedy implies the existence of the other.
If that is so, why should class members be limited in their
choice of remedy? Like the government, absent class members
may seek to avoid the effects of a settlement by claiming their
lawyer has exceeded her authority to enter into the settlement.
Specifically, absent members can allege that they were inadequately represented by counsel, notwithstanding that the class
action court appointed plaintiffs' counsel and apparently found
otherwise in its approval of the settlement. 407 Neither of the
Supreme Court opinions cited by Judge Easterbrook relies on
sovereignty as a ground for decision; both rely instead on the
general principle that agreements made by lawyers without authority are not binding on their clients. 408 Thus, neither citation
easily supports granting a choice of remedy to the government,
while denying that choice to others bound by settlements negotiated by unfaithful agents.
The State of Illinois did not appeal the Voting Rights Act
settlement or otherwise seek to nullify it, but the Seventh Circuit refused to restrict the government to that remedy. The
reason it makes sense not to restrict the government to an action to set aside the settlement is that the settlement overall
might be acceptable to the state, while the faithless conduct
might not be. The state might nonetheless have been harmed
by the faithless activity, and the conduct might nonetheless be
conduct worthy of deterring by a suit for damages or imprisonment. The same analysis would seem to apply whether the
Hansberry,311 U.S. at 41-46.
Beebe, 180 U.S. at 352 (relying on Robb v. Vos, 155 U.S. 13 (1894), for this
proposition); and Stone, 174 U.S. at 423 ("We are also of the opinion that as city
attorney he had no greater power to bind the city by that agreement than would an
attorney have in the case of an individual.").
107

408 See

1180

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 82:1051

faithless agent was negotiating on behalf of the state or on behalf of a class.
Moreover, only parties to an action have a right to appeal or
to seek relief under Rule 60(b) or its state counterparts. 4°9 At
least since Hansberrywas decided in 1940, it has been clear that
absent class members are considered parties and not strangers
to the class action litigation only if those absent class members
were adequately represented in the class proceeding, 410 a principle unanimously reaffirmed last term by the Supreme Court in
Richards v. Jefferson County.411 To hold that absent class members, seeking to sue their own lawyers for fraud or malpractice
or the class action defendant and its lawyers for fraud or some
other wrong, are limited to appealing the initial decision or
moving to vacate it is to presume conclusively that they are
parties to the first proceeding. That presumption is unjustifiable 412 so long as the claims they seek to raise in their later suit
necessarily include an allegation that they were denied adequate
representation or adequate notice 413 as the later suits we advocate by class members generally will. Any holding to the con-.
trary conflicts not only with the due process protection guaranteed by Hansberry and Richards, but also with the due process
analysis in Martin v. Wilks.414

We rest our case on estoppel.
409 Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b).
410 Hansberry, 311 U.S. at 41-46.
411116 S. Ct. 1761, 1764 (1996).
412It passes unjustifiable and moves to ridiculous in those jurisdictions in which
absent class members have no right to appeal a final judgment in a class action unless
they were granted a right to intervene. For cases holding that absent class members
have no absolute right to appeal, see supra note 172.
413The presumption is also unjustified in any later suit alleging denial of a
meaningful opportunity to opt out of the class action, at least when the original class

action involved a money suit for damages brought under Rule 23(b)(3) or in a state
court that otherwise would lack personal jurisdiction over the absent class members

having no minimum contacts with the state court presiding over the class action. Fed.
R. Civ. P. Rule 23(b)(3) (guaranteeing the right to opt out); Phillips Petroleum v.

Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 811-12 (1985) (allowing a state court to take jurisdiction over outof-state absent class members who otherwise lack minimum contacts with a state only
if those people are guaranteed adequate representation, adequate notice and an

opportunity to opt out of the suit).
414
490 U.S. 755, 758 (1989) (holding that nonparties are not bound by a class action
court's entry of a settlement or consent decree).
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IV. EVERYTHING THE ANTITRUST BAR SHOULD KNOW
ABOUT ANTITRUST LAW BUT Is AFRAID TO ASK

A. All I Want is a Room Somewhere
So far we have discussed the variety of lawyer wrongdoing
that can occur within class actions, the need for subsequent suits
to deter and punish such wrongdoing, and the fact that court
approval of class action settlements does not shield this wrongdoing as a matter of procedural law, such as collateral estoppel.
In this Part, we focus on a subset of lawyer wrongdoing, namely
antitrust violations. 4 5 The idea of antitrust suits against class
action lawyers is even more novel than the idea of malpractice
suits; no antitrust actions have ever been brought, let alone
brought successfully. Although making out a prima facie case
might sometimes be difficult, and finding a party other than the
government with standing to bring an antitrust claim arising
from conduct in a class action will not always be easy, we do not
believe that those problems explain the complete absence of the
antitrust claims we advocate. Rather, we think that the false but
nonetheless widely held belief that court involvement in the
class action settlement process somehow suspends the operation
of other laws threatens to lull lawyers into lapses in the antitrust
context, where longstanding immunity doctrines beckon lawyers
engaged in anticompetitive behavior to feel safe when a government actor-particularly a judge-blesses that behavior. The
three immunity doctrines that offer this siren song are the state
action doctrine, federal regulatory immunity, and the Noerr-Pennington doctrine.416 But as we shall argue, the imagined comfort
of these doctrines is ephemeral. The antitrust laws lie in waiting, a trap for the unwary.
415 We do not focus in this Article on state antitrust laws and the parallel immunity
doctrines that would apply, but these laws are largely similar in the relevant respects
to the federal antitrust counterparts, and where they are not, the arguments we would
make in favor of rejecting the immunity defenses would be essentially the same.
416 This doctrine, derived from the Supreme Court's decision in Eastern R.R.
Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight Co., 365 U.S. 127 (1961), and elaborated
upon in United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965), generally
immunizes from antitrust liability private petitioning of the government for favorable
legislative, judicial, or administrative action. The doctrine is commonly referred to as
the "Noerr-Penningtondoctrine," "Noerr immunity" or petitioning immunity.
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The essence of the three antitrust immunity doctrines can be
captured in terms of simple dichotomies. The antitrust laws
condemn private restraints, not governmental restraints; they
address competition, not regulation; they reach commercial activity, not petitioning activity. To illustrate, if lawyers who
make fee agreements in class actions are engaged in private,
commercial activity that restrains competition, the antitrust laws
should apply; if they are engaged in activity that seeks governmental restraints or activity that is subject to governmental regulation, the antitrust laws should not apply. Despite the attraction of such simple dichotomies, stating the issue in this way
does not get us very far.
The problem is that the anticompetitive restraints we allege
exist in some class actions raise unique issues in antitrust immunity. First, class actions are at the same time a form of litigation
and a form of regulation. 417 To the extent that the litigation
aspect of class actions predominates, the applicable immunity
doctrine would not be state action or federal regulatory immunity, but Noerr immunity. The typical issue in Noerr immunity
cases, however, is usually whether the litigation itself is an anticompetitive weapon, not whether the litigation provides a backdrop for anticompetitive (lawyer) activity. This suggests that
class actions, for antitrust immunity purposes, are more like a
kind of regulatory regime in which the court's role is like that
of an administrative agency. 4 8 Like administrative agencies,

courts in class actions are called upon to approve private contractual arrangements-settlements. But most antitrust immu417Regulation is usually viewed as characteristically different from litigation: it takes
place ex ante; it covers a broad range of persons; it is continuous; and it is done by
legislatures and administrative agencies thought to have expertise in a particular area.
Litigation, by contrast, takes place ex post; is narrow in scope, in that it covers only
the parties to the litigation; is a one-shot proposition; and is handled by nonspecialized courts. See Posner, supra note 342, at 367-69 (discussing the differences
between regulation and litigaton). Whatever the merits of distinguishing between
regulation and litigation in general, class actions certainly make the distinction less
tenable.
418 See generally Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 809 (1985) (noting
that, from the plaintiffs' perspective, the class action "resembles a 'quasi-administrative
proceeding, conducted by the judge') (citations omitted); Nagareda, supra note 156,
at 899 (1996) (drawing an analogy between recent class action settlements in mass tort
cases and administrative regimes, but not addressing the application of antitrust laws
to such regimes).
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nity cases involving administrative agencies involve anticompetitive conduct by the parties who are the primary subject of the
regulation, not the lawyers whose conduct is only incidentally
regulated, if at all. Thus, class actions present unique issues
which the Supreme Court has never explicitly addressed: How
do the immunity doctrines apply to litigation as a regulatory
system? How should the immunity doctrines view settlements
that must be approved by a court? How should the immunity
doctrines deal with regulatory schemes that predominantly regulate one area and only incidentally regulate another? We address these questions next.
B. When a Rose Is Not a Rose or Why State Action
Will Not Work
The state action doctrine, derived from the Supreme Court's
decision in Parker v. Brown,419 aims to promote the values of
federalism and state sovereignty by immunizing from antitrust
liability conduct mandated or permitted by state regulatory
schemes. 420 The Court in Parker reasoned that in enacting the
Sherman Act, 421 Congress did not intend "to restrain a state or

its officers or agents from activities directed by its legislature"
or "to nullify a state's control over its officers and agents. '422
419317 U.S. 341 (1943).
420 In light of this purpose,

class lawyers would probably be able to raise the state
action immunity defense only when they had brought the class action in state court.
The mere fact that a class action was filed in federal court under its diversity
jurisdiction, and so involved state substantive law (for example, tort law), would not
make the state action doctrine applicable, because the relevant regulation for state
action doctrine purposes would be the rules governing a class action, which are
federal. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. There would be no relevant state action. The only
possible exception would be if some state statute or ethics rule regulated the relevant
lawyer conduct. As we argue below, there are no such state statutes or ethics rules,
with the possible exception of state maximum contingent fee statutes. See infra note
457.
Although filing patterns could change (an unlikely event if the proposed changes to
Rule 23 are enacted), most class actions involving the types of provisions we are
concerned with have been filed in federal courts, not state courts. Thus, the state
action doctrine-probably the strongest defense that could be raised to an antitrust
challenge-is currently of limited applicability.
421 Act of July 2, 1890, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1-7 (1994)).
422317 U.S. at 350-51.
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However, the Court cautioned that "a state does not give immunity to those who violate the Sherman Act by authorizing them
to violate it, or by declaring that their action is lawful,... and
we have no question of the state.., becoming a participant in
a private agreement or combination by others for restraint of
trade. ' 423 Thus, federal competition policy does not automatically trump state regulatory policy, but neither can state regulatory policy freely displace federal competition policy. The two
must co-exist. Figuring out what that means in practice is the
trick.
The Supreme Court offered general guidance as to how federal competition and state regulatory policies might coexist in
California Retail Liquor Dealers Association v. Midcal Aluminum,424 by formulating a two-part test for determining whether
the state action exemption applies. First, the challenged activity
must be authorized by a "clearly articulated and affirmatively
expressed" state regulatory policy. 425 Second, any private activity authorized by such a policy must be "actively supervised" by
an appropriate government agency.4 26 Both prongs of the Midcal test attempt to determine how committed a state is to a regulatory regime that supplants the federal antitrust law policy of
competition. 427
Therefore, to qualify for state action immunity, the state must
supply evidence of its commitment to a regulatory regime ex
ante, by adopting a regulatory program that displaces existing
competition (a clear articulation), and must supply evidence of
its commitment ex post by enforcing that program (active super423 Id.

at 351-52 (citations omitted).

424 445 U.S. 97 (1980).
425Id. at 105 (citations omitted). To satisfy this prong, the state must establish a

"system of regulation, clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed, designed to
displace unfettered business freedom." New Motor Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox Co.,

439 U.S. 96, 109 (1978).

426Midcal, 445 U.S. at
427 See Federal Trade

105 (citations omitted).
Comm'n v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621, 636 (1992)
(noting that both prongs "are directed at ensuring that particular anticompetitive
mechanisms operate because of a deliberate and intended state policy") (citations
omitted). The Midcal test is an elaboration of the Court's reasoning in Parker that
the state action exemption applies if "it is the state.., which adopts the program and
which enforces it with ... sanctions, in the execution of a governmental policy."

Parker,317 U.S. at 352.
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vision).428 If the state demonstrates the requisite commitment,
the federal antitrust laws will not question the correctness of the
state's decision, as the concern of state action immunity is more
with the process and structure of state regulation-the demonstration of commitment-than with the substance of the state
regulation. 429 Still, the presumption is against finding immunity:
"[S]tate-action immunity is disfavored, much as are repeals by
implication." 430
In determining the applicability of the state action doctrine to
an antitrust suit against lawyer conduct, we first look to who
may articulate state regulatory policy in the class action context.
We next look carefully at the Midcal prongs and consider whether lawyers could demonstrate that the state action doctrine
ought to apply to their anticompetitive conduct in class actions.
We conclude that lawyers defending an antitrust suit against
their conduct in class actions would have a hard time showing
that their anticompetitive fee agreements made prior to or contemporaneously with class action settlements would satisfy either
of the Midcal prongs. States have not demonstrated any commitment to regulate such agreements, either ex ante or ex post,
in a way that displaces federal antitrust policy. The lawyers
creating and controlling the terms of these restraints are private
parties pursuing their own financial interests. They are not
428The active supervision requirement does not apply where the actor is a
municipality rather than a private party. Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471

U.S. 34, 46 (1985).
429
See, e.g., Hovenkamp, supra note 136, § 20.3, at 677 (1994) ("This [state-action]
test is 'non-substantive' in the sense that the state is free to regulate in as
anticompetitive a manner as it pleases, provided that it takes its own regulatory policy
seriously and ensures that private firms act consistently with the stated policy.") See
also Einer R. Elhauge, The Scope of Antitrust Process, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 667 (1991)
(discussing various "process views" of the state-action doctrine).
430Ticor Title, 504 U.S. at 636 (citation omitted). The more a state cedes
decisionmaking authority to private parties with financial, as opposed to political,
interests in the result of those decisions, the less likely the courts are to exempt the
resulting decisions under the state action doctrine. Id. at 633 ("Actual state
involvement, not deference to private price-fixing arrangements under the general
auspices of state law, is the precondition for immunity from federal law.") See also
Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 593 (1976) (When a case involves "a
mixture of private and public decisionmaking," the issue is whether "the private party
exercised sufficient freedom of choice to enable the Court to conclude that he should

be held responsible for the consequences of his decision.").
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pursuing a public anticompetitive interest articulated by the
state.
1.

Who May Articulate State Policy

As a preliminary matter, we need to identify the source of
state regulatory policy. The Supreme Court applies state action
immunity without requiring that the Midcal prongs be satisfied
when the challenged action is that of the "state itself" rather
than that of private actors.4 31

The "state itself' notion captures the idea that only certain
agents of the state may articulate a state policy to displace the

antitrust laws by some form of regulation. Nonsovereign state
representatives and private parties merely implement the policy
articulated by a sovereign state representative; they may not
articulate state policy themselves. When the "state itself' acts,
'432
"the danger of unauthorized restraint of trade does not arise.
However, because the anticompetitive conduct of nonsovereign
state representatives and private parties in implementing the
policy could diverge from the state policy articulated by the

sovereign, this conduct is subject to greater scrutiny (in the form
of the Midcal test).433
431 Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 567-69, 579 n.33 (1984); Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 52, 57 (1982) (citations omitted). In
determining whether challenged anticompetitive conduct is that of the "state itself,"
the answer cannot be determined by simply looking to what party is the named
defendant in the suit, because the state itself may be the real party in interest. See
Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conf. v. United States, 471 U.S. 48, 58-59 (1985) ("The
success of an antitrust action should depend upon the nature of the activity challenged,
rather than on the identity of the defendant."); Hoover, 466 U.S. at 575 (noting that
in Bates the Court had determined that the claims were "against the State" and that
the state "was the real party in interest" rather than party actually named in the
litigation) (quoting Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 361 (1977)).
Characteristic of its perhaps overly elaborate doctrinal machinations in this area, the
Court, in deciding whether the state itself has acted, has sometimes considered
whether the state policy is clearly articulated and actively supervised, despite the
Court's disavowal of the Midcal test in such cases. See, e.g., Bates, 433 U.S. at 361-62
(noting that appellants' claim was against an "agent of the court [the state bar] under
[the court's] continuous supervision", and that "disciplinary rules reflect a clear
articulation of the State's policy with regard to professional behavior"). Thus, the
analysis tends to be largely the same as it would be under the Midcal test.
432Hoover, 466 U.S. at 569.
433Id. at 568 ("Closer analysis is required when the activity at issue is not directly
that of the [state], but is carried out by others pursuant to state authorization."). It
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The question of who may articulate state policy is important
for the antitrust actions we propose because these actions would
not directly challenge any action of the two entities that most
clearly articulate the state's regulatory policy as the "state itself," namely the state legislature and the state supreme court
acting in its rulemaking capacity. 434 State statutes and supreme
court rules govern the conduct of lawyers in class actions, and
supreme court ethics rules govern the conduct of lawyers generally.435 But although state action protection is strongest when the
regulatory policy articulated by the state legislature or the state
supreme court is challenged directly, 436 an antitrust suit challenging anticompetitive lawyer conduct in class actions would not
directly challenge either statutes or procedural rules governing
class actions or any ethics rule. 437 At most, such a suit would
is important to note that the Court uses "authorization" in two distinct ways. The
usage we are concerned with in this section (and the one in the passage just quoted)
refers to the power to articulate an anticompetitive policy. But in the quotation in the
text accompanying note 432, the Court uses "authorization" to denote whether a
nonsovereign state representative or private party is implementing a state policy in
accordance with state law or rather is engaging in "unauthorized" anticompetitive
conduct. The usages are distinct because a state agent may be unauthorized to
articulate an anticompetitive policy but may be authorized to implement an
anticompetitive policy articulated by others.
On the "authorization in
implementation" requirement, see discussion of City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor
Advertising, 499 U.S. 365, 370-72 (1991), infra notes 449-452 and accompanying text.
434
There is no question that state legislatures articulate state regulatory policy as the
"state itself." State supreme courts are likewise authorized to articulate state
regulatory policy when acting legislatively, rather than in a judicial capacity. Hoover,
466 U.S. at 568.
The Court has not decided whether other state actors are sovereign for purposes of
articulating state policy. In Hoover, the Court explicitly reserved the question of
whether "the Governor of a state stands in the same position as the state legislature
and supreme court for purposes of the state-action doctrine." Id. at 568 n.17. But we
know of no executive orders or similar directives from state governors that apply to
class actions.
435
See, e.g., id. at 569 n.18 ("[R]egulation of the bar is a sovereign function of the
Arizona Supreme Court.").
436See, e.g., id. at 558 (state supreme court committee's decision to reject bar
applicant held immune); Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (state supreme court
ethics rule restricting lawyer advertising held immune); Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341
(1943) (state statute restricting competition among food producers held immune).
437
The fact that no state statute is being challenged on its face makes inapplicable
the doctrine of "preemption" espoused by the Court in Rice v. Norman Williams Co.,
458 U.S. 654, 661 (1982) (holding that "a state statute, when considered in the
abstract, may be condemned under the antitrust laws only if it mandates or authorizes
conduct that necessarily constitutes a violation of the antitrust laws in all cases, or if
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challenge an inferior state court's application of the state's class
action rules which govern the approval of settlement agreements
by private parties. Thus, unless the trial court acts as the "state
itself," the protection afforded by the state action doctrine to

anticompetitive lawyer conduct in class actions is governed by

the Midcal test.438

The trial court does not act as the "state itself' in making or
approving either class action settlements or class counsel fee
arrangements. Political subdivisions of the state cannot articulate state regulatory policy for state action doctrine purposes. 439
Nor can state regulatory agencies acting alone authorize antiit places irresistable pressure on a private party to vioalte the antitrust laws in order
to comply with the statute"). The precise relationship between the preemption
doctrine and state action immunity is unclear. Professor Hovenkamp argues that the
two should be merged into a single standard. Hovenkamp, supra note 136, § 20.1, at
672.
438Laywers who make agreements concerning their fees for acting as advocates are
certainly not authorized to articulate state policy. Federal Trade Comm'n v. Superior
Ct. Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411, 424 (1990) (lawyers cannot immunize private
agreements concerning their fees by invoking the need to protect the public interest
generally or their clients' interests in particular). In Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,
421 U.S. 773 (1975), the Supreme Court held that a local bar association's rule
providing that a member's deviation from its minimum fee schedule could lead to
disciplinary action did not enjoy state action immunity precisely because lawyers
adopted the rule acting in their private capacity. The state action doctrine was found
to be inapplicable despite the Court's explicit recognition that "[t]he interest of the
States in regulating lawyers is especially great since lawyers are essential to the
primary governmental function of administering justice, and have historically been
'officers of the courts."' Id. at 792. Cf. Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head,
486 U.S. 492, 501-02 (1988) (private standard-setting association engaged in private
conduct in promulgating safety standards, even though state legislatures regularly
adopt them as law, because no offical authority was conferred on it by any government
and because its members were not accountable to the public). By contrast, lawyers
who serve on a disciplinary board, which enforces the state supreme court's ethics
rules, are immune from antitrust liability for their enforcement activities because they
act as agents of the state. See Lawline v. American Bar Ass'n, 956 F.2d 1378, 1384
(7th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 992 (1993).
439
For example, because "municipalities 'are not themselves sovereign,"' they cannot
authorize anticompetitive ordinances without the legislature granting them the specific
and affirmatively expressed authority to regulate. Community Communications Co.
v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 54 (1982) (citations omitted). On the other hand, the
mere passage of an anticompetitive ordinance by a municipality and the adherence to
that ordinance by private individual is insufficient to establish a conspiracy under § 1
of the Sherman Act. Fisher v. City of Berkeley, 475 U.S. 260 (1986) (upholding
municipal rent control ordinance as not preempted by the Sherman Act because no
private anticompetitive agreement was proved).
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competitive behavior merely because the state creates them and
gives them broad powers. 40 Therefore, it seems that in the
judicial sphere, a trial court, as a subordinate court, could not by
itself authorize a state regulatory policy even if the state grants
that court broad powers which could be construed as "legislative" or "rulemaking" powers in the class action context.
If, however, the trial court acts as an arm of the state supreme
court in its supervisory capacity, the trial court may speak for
the "state itself." In Hoover v. Ronwin,441 a disgruntled applicant to the bar challenged the denial of his admission, alleging
that the lawyer members of the court-appointed bar committee
had conspired to "artificially reduc[e] the numbers of competing
attorneys in the State of Arizona." 442 The Court found that
because the state supreme court "retained strict supervisory
powers and ultimate full authority over [the committee's] actions," 443 the applicant was challenging conduct of the state supreme court itself despite the fact that the committee administered and graded the bar examination. In addition, to support
its conclusion that the applicant was challenging conduct of the
state supreme court itself, the Court pointed to the following
facts: that the committee's authority was limited to making recommendations directly to the state supreme court, which "itself
made the final decision to grant or deny admission to practice"; 444 that the state supreme court required the committee to
submit its grading formula to the court before each exam; 445 and
that "a disappointed applicant was accorded the right to seek
440
Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conf. v. United States, 471 U.S. 48, 62-63 (1985).
We therefore disagree with Professor Elhauge's assertion that Southern Motor Carriers
stands for the proposition that, "all that must be clearly shown ... [to establish clear
articulation] is a general intent to create a regulatory agency." Elhauge, supra note

429, at 692 n.123.
466 U.S. 558 (1984).
442 Id. at 565.
443 Id. at 572.
441

444 Id. at 573. See also id. at 575-76 ("Only the Arizona Supreme Court had the
authority to grant or deny admission to practice in the State."); id. at 575 n.27 ("Under
Arizona law, the responsibility is on the court-and only on it-to admit or deny

admission to the practice of law."); and id. at 581 (noting "the incontrovertible fact
that under the law of Arizona only the State Supreme Court had authority to admit

or deny admission to practice law").
445 Id. at 572.
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individualized review by filing a petition directly with the
court. "446

In the class action context, by contrast, there is no similarly
direct state supreme court supervision and control over trial
courts. The trial court makes a final judgment, not a mere rec-

ommendation, in approving settlements. Even if objectors to an
approved settlement can appeal the trial court's decision to the
state supreme court,447 the state supreme court does not use its
supervisory powers to oversee specific class action rules on ap-

448
peal; it merely acts in its judicial role as a court of last resort.

Although the trial court is not "authorized" to speak as the
state itself of its own authority, a trial court's approval of a class
action settlement that includes an anticompetitive agreement by
lawyers may still be an "authorized" implementation of state
law. In City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising,449 the
Supreme Court held that "in order to prevent Parker['s state
authorization requirement] from undermining the very interests

of federalism it is designed to protect, it is necessary to adopt a
concept of authority broader than what is applied to determine
the legality of the [nonsovereign state actor's] action under state
law." 450 Omni stands for the principle that, for purposes of the
state action doctrine, the authority of a nonsovereign state actor
can be established even if "the nature of [the nonsovereign ac'451
tor's] regulation is substantively or procedurally defective.
446Id.

at 576.

447See supra note 172.
448 The Court in Hoover suggests that the state supreme court's denial of the
applicant's petition after initially denying him admission was itself state action.
Hoover, 466 U.S. at 577 ("[T]here was state action by the court itself explicitly
rejecting Ronwin's Claim.") This statement raises the possibility that the supreme
court acting in its adjudicative capacity alone might constitute state action. But the
Court seems to back off from this notion in an accompanying footnote, which states:
"Our holding is based on the court's direct participation in every stage of the
admissions process, including retention of the sole authority to admit or deny." Id.
at 577 n.30.

449499

U.S. 365 (1991).

U.S. at 372. When the Court refers to authority in this context, it
refers to "authority to implement" rather than "authority to articulate" an
anticompetitive state policy. On the two meanings of "authorization," see supra note
433.
451 Omni, 499 U.S. at 371. The Court held that "an expansive interpretation of the
Parker-defense authorization requirement would have [the] unacceptable
consequence[ ]" of transforming "state administrative review into a federal antitrust
450 Omni, 499
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In the class action context, many states' laws authorize trial
courts to approve class action settlements so long as they are
fair, adequate, and reasonable. 452 Under this standard, a trial
court might be able to approve, consistent with state law, a class
action settlement containing an anticompetitive agreement
among lawyers. But even if class action settlements that contain
anticompetitive lawyer agreements violate state law, under the
Court's reasoning in Omni, the trial court's approval of those
anticompetitive agreements may still be "authorized" for purposes of the state action doctrine.
But although under Omni a settlement agreement containing
anticompetitive provisions could be considered "authorized" for
state action purposes, even if unlawful under state law, that type
of authorization is not sufficient to establish a state action immunity defense. The "clear articulation" and "active supervision" requirements set forth in Midcal would still have to be
met to establish antitrust immunity. Thus, we must look to the
pronouncements of the state legislature and state supreme court
(in its rulemaking capacity) and evaluate these pronouncements
under the two Midcal prongs. We turn to these prongs next.
2.

Clear Articulation

We must first look to see whether a state's rules governing
class actions contain a "clear articulation" of a policy to displace
competition in some market. If these rules evidence a state
policy to promote competition in a particular market 453 or to
job." Id. at 371-72 (citations omitted).

452See, e.g., Adams v. Robertson, 676 So. 2d 1265 (Ala. 1995), cert. granted, 1996
U.S. LEXIS 4538; 65 U.S.L.W. 3254 (October 1, 1996). This standard usually derives
from case law rather than the class action rules themselves. Many states have class
action rules based in whole or in part on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; thus,
the rules on settlement typically track the language of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e), which
simply states that "[a] class action shall not be dismissed or compromised without the
approval of the court." See, e.g., N.Y. Civ. Practice Law, Rule 908; II1. Civil Practice
Law, 735 I.L.C.S. 5/2-806; Mass. R. Civ. P. 23(c); Pa. R. Civ. P. 1714(a); Tex. R. Civ.
P. 42(e).
413An explicit statement that a particular regulatory regime is not intended to
displace competition also precludes a finding of clear articulation. See Goldfarb v.

Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 789 & n.19, 791 (1975). However, the party seeking
federal antitrust enforcement is not required to show an explicit intent not to displace
competition to avoid the state action defense.
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remain neutral with respect to competition in a particular market,454 state action immunity does not apply. On the other hand,
if the state mandates conduct that would be considered anticompetitive under the federal antitrust laws, that is a sufficiently
clear articulation. 455 For example, if a state statute or supreme
court rule established a required fee schedule for lawyers in
class actions, that would be a clearly articulated policy to displace competition. 456 No state has done so, however. 457 But
454 See Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 55 (1982)
("Plainly, the requirement of 'clear articulation and affirmative expression' is not
satisfied when the State's position is one of mere neutrality respecting the ... actions
challenged as anticompetitive.").
455 See, e.g., Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 360, 362 (1977) (holding
that restrictions on lawyer advertising contained in the state supreme court's
disciplinary rules are "'compelled by direction of the State acting as sovereign"' and
so "reflect a clear articulation of the State's policy") (quoting Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at
791).
456Cf. Hoover, 466 U.S. at 579 n.32 (distinguishing the Court's holding of no state
action immunity in Goldfarb on the ground that in that case, "state law did not refer
to lawyers' fees, the Virginia Supreme Court Rules did not direct the State Bar to
supply fee schedules, and the Supreme Court did not approve the fee schedules
established by the State Bar").
457 Some state legislatures and supreme courts have regulated lawyer fees by
adopting schedules of maximum percentages to apply to contingency fee arrangements.
See, e.g., N.Y. Ct. Rules 603.7(e), 691.20(e) (McKinney 1996) (rules of the New York
Appellate Division, First and Second Departments, delineating schedule of reasonable
fees in personal injury and wrongful death, but excluding medical, dental or podiatric
malpractice); N.Y. Jud. Law § 474-a (McKinney 1996 Supp.) (schedule governing
contingency fee contracts in medical, dental, or podiatric malpractice); Cal. Bus. &
Prof. Code § 6146(a) (West 1993) (schedule governing contingency fee contracts in "an
action for injury or damage against a health care provider"); Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code
§ 6147.5(a) (West 1996) (schedule governing contingency fee contracts in claims for
recovery between merchants); Fla. Stat. Ann. Bar Rule 4-1.5(f)(3)-(4) (West 1994 &
1996 Supp.) (schedule governing personal injury claims); NJ. Gen. Application Rule
1:21-7 (1994) (schedule governing contingency fees in tort actions).
Although these statutes could be interpreted as clearly articulating a policy to
displace competition among lawyers, we think that they would not pose a significant
threat to most of the suits we envision. First, only a minority of states have these
statutes, and in some states, the statutes apply only to a small subset of cases, normally
medical malpractice actions, which to date have not been the subject of class actions.
Hazard, Koniak, & Cramton, supra note 249, at 537. In class actions that extend to
claimants in multiple jurisdictions, it is unlikely that all of these jurisdictions will have
fee cap statutes. Second, it is not clear that the statutes apply to the conduct we are
concerned with, namely bid rotation and price fixing in the private administrative
system.
In addition, all state ethics rules proscribe "unreasonable" fees, but none attempts
to establish a fee schedule. See ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.5
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mandated anticompetitive conduct is not necessary. Express
statements in state statutes or procedural rules that permit or
contemplate anticompetitive conduct would also be sufficient to
satisfy the clear articulation requirement. 458 None of the applicable state statutes or procedural rules specifically contemplates
lawyer agreements concerning fees or class counsel selection,
however. 459

But express statements permitting or contemplating anticompetitive conduct are also not necessary to satisfy the clear articulation requirement.460 The state need not authorize the specific
restraint challenged, nor need it articulate an intention to permit
(1994); ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 2-106 (1981). These
rules certainly express no state policy to displace competition.
458 Southern Motor Carriers,471 U.S. at 61 (stating that "a state policy that expressly
permits, but does not compel, anticompetitive conduct may be 'clearly articulated'
within the meaning of Midcal") (citation omitted). This conclusion was implicit in
New Motor Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96 (1978), in which the Court
held that a regulatory scheme that expressly allowed, but did not require, an
automobile franchisee to protest the establishment of a competing dealership in its
market area was "clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed, designed to displace
unfettered business freedom." Id. at 109.
459 Some state class action rules based on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have
no explicit provision on attorney's fees at all, leaving it up to case law. See, e.g., Mass.
R. Civ. P. 23; Tex. R. Civ. P. 42. States that do have rules on fees neither set these
fees nor say anything about lawyer agreements concerning them. See, e.g., N.Y. Civ.
Prac. L., Rule 909 (McKinney 1976) ("If a judgment in an action maintained as a class
action is rendered in favor of the class, the court in its discretion may award attorney's
fees to the representatives of the class based on the reasonable value of legal services
rendered and if justice requires, allow recovery of the amount awarded from the
opponent of the class."); Pa. R. Civ. P. 1716 ("In all cases where the court is authorized under applicable law to fix the amount of counsel fees it shall consider, among
other things, the following factors .... "). The Uniform Class Action Act does
contain a provision concerning attorney's fee agreements that could be interpreted as
covering the type of agreements we are concerned with, but simply requires the class
lawyers to file such agreements with the court. Uniform Class Action Act, § 17; see
also id. §12(c)(3) (requiring notice of proposed settlement sent to class members to
include "any agreements made in connection with the dismissal or compromise"). In
our view, this provision expresses no state policy against competition among lawyers.
In any event, only two states, Iowa and North Dakota, have adopted the Uniform
Class Action Act. See 12 Uniform Laws Annotated, 1995 Supplementary Pamphlet,
at 28-29 (prefatory note to Uniform Law Commissioners' Model Class Actions Act
Rule).
4o The Supreme Court has made this clear in Southern Motor Carriersand Omni,
both of which we discuss more fully infra notes 463-480 and accompanying text. See
also Hovenkamp, supra note 136, § 20.4, at 679 (noting that "most of the details of the
regulatory scheme itself may be left to the state agency or governmental subdivision
that carries it out").
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anticompetitive effects. 461 It is sufficient if the state demonstrates a commitment to displace competition by adopting a
regulatory scheme that is clearly inconsistent with competition. 462
For example, in Southern Motor CarriersRate Conference, Inc.

v. United States,463 the Court held that a statute requiring a state
agency to prescribe "just and reasonable" rates for intrastate
transportation satisfied the clear articulation requirement, and
authorized the agency to allow private common carriers to combine into "rate bureaus" for the purpose of collectively proposing rates which the agency could accept or reject. 64 The Court

read the statute to create an "inherently anticompetitive ratesetting process," which demonstrated that the state "clearly in-

tend[ed] to displace competition in a particular field with a regu-

461 See Hoover, 466 U.S. at 574 ("The reason that state action is immune from
Sherman Act liability is not that the State has chosen to act in an anticompetitive
fashion, but that the State itself has chosen to act."). The Court in Hoover rejected
the plaintiff's argument that even though the state supreme court regulated bar
admissions, the state did not intend to restrict the number of lawyers
anticompetitively, but was in effect duped by the private bar into doing so. The
Court's point seems to be that as long as the state supreme court "knew and approved
the number of applicants," id. at 576 n.28, the state supreme court had endorsed a
regulatory structure inconsistent with competition-the lack of expressed
anticompetitive intent being irrelevant. For further discussion of this point, see infra
note 471.
462 Southern Motor Carriers,471 U.S. at 64. According to Professor Hovenkamp,
there must be "something suggesting that the state contemplated the activity being
challenged and decided to permit it." Hovenkamp, supra note 136, § 20.4, at 679.
Professor Elhauge interprets these pronouncements as effectively eliminating the clear
articulation requirement. See Elhauge, supra note 429, at 691-92 (asserting that is has
"become increasingly evident that nothing has to be very clear or affirmative about
state authorization to immunize regulation" and that the "test that ... really drives
the Court's conclusions" is that "antitrust review should not apply whenever a
financially disinterested state agency regulates"). But that interpretation is correct
only if "clear" means "specific language." In the Court's view, actions can speak as
clearly as words.
463

471 U.S. 48 (1985).

464Id. at 50, 63. The main holding of the case, ostensibly, was that state statutes that

expressly permitted, but did not require, collective ratemaking by truckers constituted
a clearly articulated state policy. Id. at 63.
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latory structure." 465 But just what makes the state's intent so
clear is not so clear from the Court's opinion.
The Court's only explanation of what made the state's intent
clear comes in a footnote, inwhich the Court stressed the fact
that under the statute, the agency "is not authorized to choose
free-market competition. Instead, it is required to prescribe

rates for motor common carriers on the basis of statutorily enumerated factors. ...[which] bear no discernible relationship to
the prices that would be set by a perfectly efficient and unregulated market. '466 The Court's implicit assumption in Southern
Motor Carriersseems to be that the state statute reduced the
incentive of any individual trucker to propose lower rates than
other truckers, because the state agency would determine just
and reasonable rates and apply them in any event. The Court
thus seems to be saying that once the state chooses to preclude
individuals from setting their own prices, there is no competition in the sense that matters for antitrust purposes, so it is fair
to assume that the state has clearly authorized other forms of
anti-competitive behavior, such as the creation of cartels to propose rates to the state. 467
465 Id. at 64. The Court acknowledged that it had reached a different result in
Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 324 U.S. 439 (1945), in which the question was
"whether Congress intended to immunize a federal regulatory program from the
antitrust laws." Southern Motor Carriers,471 U.S. at 56 n.18. We discuss this
inconsistency infra at note 554.
466Southern Motor Carriers,471 U.S. at 65 n.25.
467 Although this interpretation is consistent with the Court's view that antitrust
policy is a price competition policy above all else, it is inconsistent with another part
of the reasoning in Southern Motor Carriers. In an earlier part of the opinion rejecting
the notion that a state must compel anticompetitive conduct to get the protection of
state action immunity, the Court stated:
Most common carriers probably will engage in collective ratemaking, as that will
allow them to share the cost of preparing rate proposals. If the joint rates are
viewed as too high, however, carriers individually may submit lower proposed
rates to the Commission in order to obtain a larger share of the market. Thus,
through the self-interested actions of private common carriers, the States may
achieve the desired balance between the efficiency of collective ratemaking and
the competition fostered by individualsubmissions.
Id. at 59 (emphasis added). The Court was referring to the states that had statutes
expressly allowing collective rate-setting, which evidence a stronger intent to allow
anticompetitive behavior. But if a state statute does not mention collective ratesetting and if the possibility of individual submissions to the state "fosters
competition," then how has the statute "not authorized [the state or its commission]
to choose free-market competition." Id. at 65 n.25. In other words, in what sense has
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In City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising,468 the state
statute restricted competition, not by directly interfering with
price competition by authorizing rate setting or cartels that
might propose rates to the state but by restricting free entry into
a market. Free entry facilitates undercutting of a competitor's
prices, and because new firms are attracted to industries with
excessive profits (that is, high prices relative to costs), excessive
costs, or both. Free entry also drives a firm's prices down to its
costs and forces it to minimize its costs. 469 In Omni, the Court
held that a city ordinance regulating billboards was entitled to
state action immunity. The Court reasoned that a state statute
authorizing a city to regulate zoning was sufficient articulation
of a policy to displace competition in the market for land use.470
The basis of this reasoning is that a zoning statute inherently
allows local governments to grant restrictive licenses that deny
free entry.471 Thus, zoning (like collective rate-setting) is a form
the state "clearly articulated" a policy that allows cartels to propose rates? The state
commission did choose to allow collective rate-setting, but the agency itself, as the
Court recognized, could not authorize anticompetitive conduct for state action
purposes. Id. at 62-63. Perhaps the Court was assuming, however tacitly, that the
statute in question prohibited the state agency from approving an individual rate
simply because it was lower than those of competitors. To that extent, although some
competition could exist, the state agency could not choose completely free
competition. Although we do not believe that our attempt to rescue the Court from
the inconsistency inherent in Southern Motor Carriersis very powerful, we believe our
argument's weakness reveals not our failure of imagination but the fundamental flaws
in the Court's decision in this case. We return later to a criticism of Southern Motor
Carriers. See infra note 554. For the time being, however, we treat it as binding
precedent, however flawed, that we have no reason to believe will soon be reversed
and proceed to analyze whether this flawed case presents major problems for the suits
we propose.
468499 U.S. 365 (1991).
469 Economists refer to these beneficial effects of competition as allocative and
productive efficiency, respectively.
470According to the Court:
The very purpose of zoning regulation is to displace unfettered business freedom
in a manner that regularly has the effect of preventing normal acts of
competition, particularly on the part of new entrants. A municipal ordinance
restricting the size, location, and spacing of billboards (surely a common form
of zoning) necessarily protects existing billboards against some competition from
newcomers.
Id. at 373.
471We can now see why Hoover, despite all its discussion of whether the "state
itself" acted, can be viewed as merely an application of the clear articulation
requirement. In Hoover, the Court placed great reliance on the fact that, "the
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of state regulation inconsistent with one of the basic premises of
competition (as defined for antitrust purposes)-in this case,
free entry.472

The class action context presents a different situation. Consider first lawyer agreements to make proposals to a trial court
concerning the selection of class counsel and the proper fee to

be paid to class counsel. At first glance, these agreements seem
similar to the collective rate bureaus permitted (but not
required) by the state statutes in Southern Motor Carriers. The
key difference, however, is that the rules governing class actions
do not in any way inhibit meaningful competition from occurring. They do not direct the court to determine just and reasonCommittee could not reduce the number of lawyers in Arizona." Hoover, 466 U.S.
at 575. Instead, the state supreme court by its rules "reserv[ed] the ultimate authority
to control the number of lawyers admitted to the Arizona Bar." Id. at 578 n.31. Like
the zoning statute in Omni, the state supreme court rules controlling the number of
lawyers inherently restrict free entry. In fact, controlling entry is the essence of
creating a profession. To allow an antitrust claimant to base a claim on the restriction
of entry, therefore, would inevitably interfere with the state's regulatory interest.
The restriction of free entry was also the very point of the regulatory scheme in New
Motor, which required a car manufacturer to seek agency approval before opening a
retail dealership in the territory of an existing franchisee if the existing franchisee
protested to the agency. New Motor Vehicle v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 98, 98-100
(1978). Like the state supreme court in Hoover, the agency had the authority to
restrict the number of dealers in an area. Such authority is inconsistent with a regime
of competition in which free entry is a prerequisite.
472In addition to price-setting and free entry, a third aspect of competition is that
other than offering a superior product, acts that exclude a competitor are
impermissible. Antitrust law has long included the notion that a monopolist may not
refuse to deal if its purpose is solely to perpetuate its monopoly. In Town of Hallie
v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 42 (1985), the Court held that a statute authorizing
a city to provide sewage services within a self-defined district and to refuse to provide
sewage services outside this district clearly articulated an intent to allow the city to
engage in anticompetitive conduct, namely a refusal to deal. It is not hard to see why
the statute at issue in Hallie is inconsistent with this third premise of competition.
To the extent that Hallie-with its focus on the "foreseeability" of the
anticompetitive results, id. at 42-43-and Omni-with its broad notion of
authorization, see supra notes 449-450 and accompanying text-imply a greater scope
for state action protection than does Southern Motor Carriers,it may derive from the
fact that the Court has given special treatment to municipalities under the state action
doctrine. The Court in Hallie stressed that it can presume that "[a] municipality acts
in the public interest," 471 U.S. at 45, because "municipal conduct is invariably more
likely to be exposed to public scrutiny than is private conduct." Id. at 45 n.9. By
comparison, trial courts in class actions often do not operate under the same degree
of public scrutiny in approving class counsel fees and settlements as do municipalities
in enacting ordinances. See supra notes 233-235 and accompanying text.
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able rates according to specified criteria, and then apply these
rates to all counsel within some group over a range of cases,
which would be the equivalent of the regulatory scheme in Southern Motor Carriers. Rather, the most the rules do is to require the court to approve class counsel in the case before it as
adequate and class counsel's fee in that case as reasonable; that
is, the rules contemplate that the court is, in effect, buying services on behalf of the class.
But as the court recognized in In re Oracle Securities Litigation,473 lawyers could compete for the right to be class counsel
by offering bids undercutting the bids of the other lawyers.
More to the point, not only do the state statutes that require
courts to approve class counsel fees as reasonable not preclude
such competition, nothing in those statutes precludes a judge
from requiringsuch competition. 474 If he did, then the fee chosen by the court would, unlike the fees in Southern Motor Carriers, bear a "discernible relationship to the prices that would be
set by a perfectly efficient and unregulated market." 475 In short,
nothing in the need for a class to have counsel or the requirement that a court approve of that counsel and counsel fees is
inherently inconsistent with competition to be that counsel or
more to the point here, with the idea that lawyers would compete on the basis of price to be chosen as class counsel. 476
Southern Motor Carriersand Omni provide even less support
for finding a clearly articulated state policy to displace competition among lawyers for claimants who seek to recover under the
473 131
474See

F.R.D. 688 (N.D. Cal. 1990).
supra notes 148-52 and accompanying text.
475Southern Motor Carriers,471 U.S. at 65 n.25. In fact, this type of competition is
similar to what the Court was trying to preserve in Federal Trade Comm'n v. Superior
Ct. Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411 (1990), in which the Court held that a boycott
by a group of trial lawyers against a local government in hopes of forcing the
government to increase the lawyers' hourly compensation was a per se violation of the
antitrust laws. If anything, the potential for competition in situations like Oracle is
greater than the potential in Trial Lawyers because in Trial Lawyers the lawyers could

not negotiate prices individually; they could only decide individually whether or not
to accept employment at the rate offered by the city.

476According to Professor Hovenkamp, "[i]f the statute is neutral on the question
and there appear to be both competitive and non-competitive ways of operating under
the statute, the court may insist on the former." Hovenkamp, supra note 136, § 20.4,
at 681. This is nothing more than the common antitrust technique of condemning a

questionable restraint when a less restrictive alternative is available.
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private administrative system established by class action settlements like Georgine v. Amchem Products and other mass tort

cases. When such a system is set up as part of a class action
settlement, counsel representing individual claimants in the private system are not class counsel within the meaning of the
state's class action rules. State class action statutes say absolutely nothing about lawyer fees other than fees for class counsel. 477 In fact, these statutes do not even contemplate private
administrative systems that might require counsel, let alone
foresee the anticompetitive effects of such systems Nor is there
anything inherent in the structure of class action regulation, or
even in statutes setting maximum contingency fees in certain
classes of cases, that precludes price competition by lawyers
representing individual claimants outside of the court system, or

that precludes new lawyers from freely entering the market for
representing these individual claimants, and thereby displacing
class counsel or other lawyers who may have previously represented those claimants. The most that can be said is that these
private administrative systems are consistent with the class action rules and maximum fee statutes, and that lawyer anticompetitive agreements concerning these administrative systems may
be consistent with state policy, 478 which is insufficient to establish the state's clear intent to displace competition under Southern Motor Carriersand Omni.

It is true that in some sense a class action is like a regulated
monopoly.479 Class actions can be said to displace competition
among lawyers for individual litigants by consolidating individual
cases into the class monopoly. Under Southern Motor Carriers,
477 See supra note 459.
478 Whether or not the administrative systems violate state law is irrelevant for
purposes of determining whether the state action doctrine applies. See supra notes
449-453 and accompanying text. If the state has a clearly articulated policy to displace
competition, the fact that a particular agent of the state violated the policy in acting
anticompetitively does not remove the immunity. See Hovenkamp, supra note 136,

§ 20.4, at 680-81. On the other hand, if the state has no clearly articulated policy, the
fact that a particular agent of the state complied with state law does not create

immunity.
479 See Oracle, 131 F.R.D at 693 n.12. (asserting that "the need to prosecute the
claims of the class collectively rather than individually may create a so-called 'natural
monopoly,"' but that this should not preclude use of market mechanisms in choosing
class counsel).
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it could be argued that once the state displaces this competition
by creating class actions and by authorizing judicial review of
settlements and class counsel fees, it demonstrates a clear intent
to regulate all aspects of lawyer behavior concerning class actions. Trial courts must be given great leeway, under this view,
"because they are able to deal with problems unforeseeable to,

or outside the competence of, the legislature." ' 480
The Court, however, rejected exactly this argument in Cantor
v. Detroit Edison Co. 481 In Cantor, the Court held that a regu-

lated utility that provided "free" light bulbs to its paying electricity consumers was not immune from the antitrust laws under
the state action doctrine, even though the utility submitted tar-

iffs including the light bulbs to a state agency. The Court found
that the mere fact that the state pervasively regulates a monopoly does not mean that federal antitrust policy cannot reach

anything concerning that monopoly.482 In support of its position,
the Court advanced several arguments relevant here.
First, the Court found that although the state had demon-

strated an intent to displace competition in the market for electricity, it did not demonstrate a similar intent with respect to the
market for light bulbs. 483 Because the Court found that the state
480
Southern Motor Carriers,471 U.S. at 64.
481 428 U.S. 579 (1976).
482 This finding is consistent with the Court's approach with respect to patents. The
mere fact that a patent confers a licensed monopoly on the patent holder does not
immunize that party from the antitrust laws. See Hovenkamp, supra note 136, § 7.11
at 290 (noting that the "power to exclude [conferred by a patent] is not unlimited, and
courts have often found patentees guilty of exclusionary practices"). The Court has
also reached essentially the same conclusion with respect to professionals. Although
they are regulated with respect to some of their activities, when they act to restrain
markets in which the state has no regulatory interest, the antitrust laws sometimes
reach their conduct. See, e.g., National Soc'y of Prof. Eng'rs v. United States, 435
U.S. 679 (1978) (canon of ethics prohibiting competitive bidding for the purpose of
minimizing risk of inferior work held unlawful under the Sherman Act); Arizona v.
Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982) (maximum fee arrangement
among competing physicians violated Sherman Act); Federal Trade Comm'n v.
Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411 (1990) (collective boycott by lawyers
targeted at forcing local government to increase pay to lawyers violated Sherman Act).
483
Specifically, the Court found that:
The distribution of electricity in Michigan is pervasively regulated .... [But
t]he distribution of electric light bulbs in Michigan is unregulated. The statute
creating the [regulatory] Commission contains no direct reference to light bulbs.
Nor, as far as we have been advised, does any other Michigan statute authorize
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did not intend to displace competition in the light bulb market,
the Court saw no reason to prevent antitrust law from regulating
that market.484 Cantor thus mandates that in deciding whether
to apply the state action doctrine to a regulated firm, a court
must identify the market in which the state has displaced competition and determine whether that market is the same as or
separable from the markets in which the alleged restraint of
trade is occurring.
In our context, the fact that a class action is a single "case"
does not mean that there is a single market any more than a
single tariff filing in Cantor meant that there was a single market that included both electricity and lightbulbs. The only possible market in which the states, by permitting class actions, displace competition is the market for lawyer services in bringing
claims against the class action defendants in the state court system. After the court's approval of the class action, lawyers can
no longer compete to represent clients in the state court system
by offering better terms to these clients because the class action
precludes private suits arising out of the same transaction as the
class action by class members who have not opted out.
Contrast this market with the markets in which we suggest
plaintiffs' lawyers may have restrained competition in Oracle
and Georgine. The market in which the lawyers might have restrained competition in Oracle is the market for the right to
represent the class action monopoly. 485 The market in which the
the regulation of that business. Neither the Michigan Legislature, nor the
Commission, has ever made any specific investigation of the desirability of a
lamp-exchange program or of its possible effect on competition in the light-bulb
market. Other utilities regulated by the Michigan Public Service Commission
do not follow the practice of providing bulbs to their customers at no additional
charge. The Commission's approval of respondent's decision to maintain such
a program does not, therefore, implement any statewide policy relating to light
bulbs. We infer that the State's policy is neutral on the question whether the
utility should, or should not, have such a program.
Cantor,428 U.S. at 584-85; see also id. at 594 (finding that "the option to have, or not
to have, such a program is primarily [the utility's], not the Commission's").
4 See id. at 596 ("There is no logical inconsistency between requiring [the utility]

to meet regulatory criteria insofar as it is exercising its natural monopoly powers and
also to comply with antitrust standards to the extent that it engages in business activity
in competitive areas of the economy.").
485Cf. Fishman v. Estate of Wirtz, 807 F.2d 520, 533-35 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding that
restriction on "competition to acquire a natural monopoly" is an antitrust injury).
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lawyers might have restrained competition in Georgine is the
market for lawyer services in representing individual claimants
in the private administrative system. Although the buyers
(claimants) and sellers (plaintiffs' lawyers) in these markets are
the same as in the "regulated" market, and the "product"

bought and sold in each market is lawyer services, the markets
involved are very different in the sense that matters for antitrust
purposes under Cantor-namelythat elimination of competition
in the first market does not necessarily affect competition in the
other two markets. 48 6 Nothing in the class action rules suggests
the states are interested in regulating these markets simply be-

cause they want to eliminate individual claims in the court system.487
Of course, the mere fact that a separate market can be identified does not answer the question of whether a court should

consider the two (or more) markets separately for antitrust purposes. The Court's second argument in Cantor was that whatever the state's regulatory goals were in the electricity market,
they were not inconsistent with antitrust enforcement in the
light-bulb market.488 The Court reasoned that if the light-bulb
exchange program were held to violate the antitrust laws, "there
[would be] no reason to believe that Michigan's regulation of its
electric utilities [would] no longer be able to function effect486The tying doctrine in antitrust law requires a similar determination that there are
two separate products being tied together. Whether or not there are two products
does not depend on the physical characteristics of the products but on whether the
products could be offered separately at reasonable cost and in a way that consumers
might demand. See generally Jefferson Parish Hosp. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984)
(discussing the requirement of two products in tying analysis). The Georginerestraints
could be viewed as tying arrangements in that class counsel could be trying to tie the
sale of their services as class counsel to the sale of their services as lawyers for
individual claimants in the private administrative system.
487See sources cited supra notes 452 and 459. Lawyer competition in fees is
generally unregulated. See Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
Furthermore, class action rules make no direct reference to lawyer competition. With
the possible exception of state maximum fee statutes, neither state legislatures nor
state courts have ever investigated the desirability of regulating lawyer competition.
And not all class actions involve settlements that establish private administrative
systems that require claimants to secure a lawyer's services. The choices made seem
to be the lawyers' choices, not the court's.
488Cantor,428 U.S. at 596 ("[The state's] regulation of respondent's distribution of
electricity poses no necessary conflict with a federal requirement that respondent's
activities in competitive markets satisfy antitrust standards.").
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ively."48 9 In fact, if anything, the light-bulb program might have
hindered the state's regulatory efforts by artificially increasing
the rate base on which the state calculated the utility's rates,
and by distorting consumer choices for electricity as compared
to substitute energy sources. 490 Thus, just as an overly narrow
state action immunity might unduly interfere with state regulatory efforts, there is a danger that "[fior States [seeking] to benefit their citizens through regulation, a broad doctrine of stateaction immunity may serve as nothing more than an attractive
nuisance in the economic sphere." 491
In the class action context, too broad a view of the state action
immunity could interfere with the state's regulatory goal-namely, fair resolution of claims at the lowest cost. Competition in
the market for the right to be class counsel and in the market

489 Cantor,428 U.S. at 598. The Court reached the same conclusion 30 years earlier,
in United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944), which held
that the antitrust laws could apply to the business of insurance. The Court in South-

Eastern Underwritersstated:
The argument that the Sherman Act necessarily invalidates many state laws
regulating insurance we regard as exaggerated. Few states go so far as to permit
private insurance companies, without state supervision, to agree upon and fLx
uniform insurance rates. Cf. Parkerv. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350-52. No states
authorize combinations of insurance companies to coerce, intimidate, and
boycott competitors and consumers in the manner here alleged ....
South-Eastern Underwriters, 322 U.S. at 562.
The decision in South-Eastern Underwriters prompted Congress to enact the
McCarran-Ferguson Act, 59 Stat. 33 (1945) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 10111015 (1994)), which specifically exempts the insurance industry from the federal
antitrust laws. It should be noted, however, that the McCarran-Ferguson Act does not
exempt boycotts from antitrust immunity. 15 U.S.C. § 1013(b) (1994).
490 The Cantor Court noted:
In 1972 [the utility] provided its residential customers with 18,564,381 bulbs at
a cost of $2,835,000. In its accounting to the Michigan Public Service
Commission, [the utility] included this amount as a portion of its cost of
providing service to its customers. [The utility's] accounting records reflect no
direct profit as a result of the distribution of bulbs.
428 U.S. at 583-84. In an accompanying footnote, the Court added that of the total
cost reported, "$2,363,328 was paid to the three principal manufacturers of bulbs from
whom [the utility] made its purchases; the other $471,672 represented costs incurred
in the use of [the utility's] personnel and facilities in carrying out the program." Id.
at 583 n.8. A 20% markup might lead one to suspect that the utility had engaged in
some creative accounting. If so, the light-bulb program might have allowed the utility
to evade the state's regulatory goals and unduly increase prices to consumers.
491 Federal Trade Comm'n v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621, 637 (1992).
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for representing claimants in the private administrative system
would arguably further that goal.492
The Court's third argument in Cantor was that the state's regulation of the market for electricity did not conflict with antitrust policy because the state's policy itself was not anticompetitive.493 Unlike regulation whose "very purpose... is to avoid
the consequences of unrestrained competition," state regulation

of natural monopolies "does not necessarily suppress competition" because there might not have been competition to begin

with.494 Thus, by regulating natural monopolies, states demonstrate no intent to displace competition. 495

In the class action context, the Court's argument makes sense.
Class actions that aggregate small claims, by grouping cases
together, create economic incentives to bring cases that would
be uneconomical if filed individually. These class actions do not
necessarily displace competition that would otherwise exist; rather, they make possible claims that would otherwise not be brou496
ght. There is no competition for bringing uneconomical cases.
Even when class actions consolidate cases that could otherwise
be brought individually, as is often the case in the mass tort
context, class actions are not necessarily inconsistent with the

competition policy of the federal antitrust laws. A class action
492One might argue that improving imperfect state regulation is no business of the
federal antitrust laws. But that argument misses the point. The antitrust laws do not
apply because they further the state's regulatory goal (though that is an incidental
benefit). They apply because in the class action context, the states have not
committed to a regime of regulation that displaces competition, and thus, there is no
state action immunity.
493 Cantor,428 U.S. at 595-96 (noting that "public utility regulation typically assumes
that the private firm is a natural monopoly and that public controls are necessary to
protect the consumer from exploitation.").
494 Cantor, 428 U.S. at 595. See also id. at 596 n.33 (stating that "the 'very reason
for the regulation of private utility rates ... is the inevitability of a monopoly that
requires price control to take the place of price competition."') (quoting Otter Tail
Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 389 (1973) (Stewart, J., dissenting)).
495The Court's assertion that regulation of natural monopolies does not necessarily
suppress competition may be wrong as a factual matter in the case of utilities. The
fact that a utility is a natural monopoly simply means that one utility can serve the
entire market at lower cost than if several utilities compete in the market. That may
make competition undesirable, but it does not make it impossible or even unlikely.
Generally, the antitrust laws preclude the argument that competition is undesirable.
496In this sense, class actions that aggregate small claims are somewhat like natural
monopolies.
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may be more like a joint venture than a natural monopoly. The
antitrust laws have long recognized that not all cost-saving joint
ventures are antitrust violations, even if some competitors cannot effectively compete against the joint venture. 497 The joint
venture view of class actions is supported by the fact that class

action statutes and rules often protect lawyer competition for

clients through opt out procedures. 498 In these cases, lawyers

have every incentive to compete by trying to entice class members to opt out by offering them a better deal than they would
get if they stayed in the class.499 Even if opting out is almost
meaningless as a practical matter, the mere fact that an option
for individual competition is available makes class actions generally consistent with federal antitrust policy. 500
In short, if class actions are not necessarily anticompetitive
monopolies, it is hard to see why the regulation of class actions
necessarily displaces competition. And if there is no necessary
displacement of lawyer competition-if, in the Omni Court's

language, displacement of competition is not the "very purpose"
497 See, e.g., Broadcast Music v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 441 U.S. 1 (1979)
(holding that blanket licensing arrangements were not per se unlawful). As for the
inability of competitors to compete against a joint venture, it is useful to recall that
one of the most repeated phrases in antitrust jurisprudence is that the antitrust laws
protect competition, not competitors. See, e.g., Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370
U.S. 294, 320 (1962) ("Taken as a whole, the legislative history illuminates
congressional concern with the protection of competition, not competitors.").
498 See, e.g., Tex. R. Civ. P. 42(c)(2).
499 Though the purpose of these opt-out provisions may be to protect due process for
litigants rather than to promote competition among lawyers, the effect these provisions
have on competition seems to preclude the state (or lawyers) from arguing that the
state intends to displace competition by regulating class actions. The same could be
said of provisions allowing objectors to appear at a fairness hearing. As v'e have
already discussed, objectors are rarely represented by counsel. See supra notes 180187 and accompanying text. When counsel appear on behalf of objectors, it is fair to
assume that those counsel have a financial stake in overturning the settlement. This
financial stake could come from the potential to act as class counsel in a new class
action or to represent substantial numbers of individual clients if no class action
settlement occurs, both of which would be to the economic detriment of the lawyer
proposing the settlement. Thus, we would expect to see represented objectors only
when their counsel have a competitive interest in the rejection of the settlement. See
supra note 184.
M In BroadcastMusic, the Court relied in part on the fact that individual bargaining
was available to purchasers of music (although individual bargaining rarely occurred)
to find that blanket licenses offered by joint ventures of composers were not per se
illegal. 441 U.S. at 11, 12, 23.
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of class action regulation-it is hard to see what could possibly
make the state's intent to displace competition "clear" within
the meaning of Southern Motor Carriersand Omni.
3.

Active Supervision

Even if class action lawyers could successfully show that procedural rules governing class actions represent a clearly articulated
policy to displace competition among lawyers, they would still
have to satisfy the second Midcalprong-that of "active supervi-
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sion."5 01 Class action lawyers would have a tough time showing
that the courts actively supervise the restraints.
The active supervision doctrine requires the state to do more

than leave private parties to their discretion in carrying out state
regulatory policy; the state must have some oversight or supervisory role in monitoring and ensuring compliance with its clearly
articulated regulatory policy. In Midcal, the Court held that

although a state statute clearly authorized resale price maintenance in the wine industry, it violated the Sherman Act because
501 See, e.g., Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94, 100 (1988) ("Only if an anticompetitive
act of a private party meets both [the clear articulation and active supervision]
requirements is [the conduct deemed state action]."); Southern Motor Carriers,471
U.S. at 62 ("A private party may claim state action immunity only if both prongs of
the Midcal test are satisfied."). Thus, a state cannot declare that its regulatory policy
favors competition and at the same time argue that it actively supervises those carrying
out its regulatory policy to make sure that they adequately protect competition. Were
this allowed, it would stand the Supremacy Clause on its head by allowing states to
preempt the enforcement of the federal antitrust laws by enacting antitrust laws and
other procompetition statutes at the state level.
On the other hand, if a state does not have a clear regulatory policy specifically
promoting or displacing competition, but actively enforces the regulatory policy that
it has adopted, the question arises whether the active supervision alone can effectively
satisfy the clear articulation requirement. The Supreme Court position on this issue
is unclear because in its cases involving disputes over the scope of the active
supervision requirement since Midcal, the existence of a clearly articulated policy to
displace competition was either found or not discussed. Federal Trade Comm'n v.
Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. at 631 (noting that because the FTC had conceded that
the clear articulation prong was satisfied, the immunity question turned only upon the
proper interpretation and application of the active supervision requirement); Patrick,
486 U.S. at 100 ("In this case, we need not consider the 'clear articulation' prong of
the Midcal test, because the 'active supervision' requirement is not satisfied."); 324
Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 479 U.S. 335, 344 (1987) (holding that state statute imposing
mandatory resale price maintenance in liquor industry meets the clear articulation
requirement). The case that comes closest to active supervision of a regulatory policy
without a clearly articulated policy on the facts is the pre-Midcal case of Cantor.
Recall that in Cantor, the state regulatory agency repeatedly approved the utility's
light bulb sales as part of its tariff approval, but the Court found that approval did not
suggest that the state's policy was to displace competition in the market for light bulbs.
See Cantor,428 U.S. at 584 ("Neither the ... Legislature, nor the Commission, has
ever made any specific investigation of the desirability of a lamp-exchange program
or of its possible effect on competition in the light-bulb market."). Perhaps Cantor
suggests that active supervision could sometimes establish a clearly articulated policy.
But to the extent the clear articulation requirement is about fair notice to both
regulated parties and citizens, allowing aggressive agency regulation in the face of state
inaction to constitute a clearly articulated regulatory policy for state action doctrine
purposes is troubling.
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there was no active supervision by the states 02 The Court reasoned:
The State simply authorizes price setting and enforces the prices
established by private parties. The State neither establishes
prices nor reviews the reasonableness of the price schedules; nor
does it regulate the terms of fair trade contracts. The State does
not monitor market conditions or engage in any 'pointed reexamination' of the program. The national policy in favor of competition cannot be thwarted by casting such a gauzy cloak of
state involvement over what is essentially a private price-fixing
agreement.5 03
In Patrick v. Burget,5 4 the Court interpreted this active supervision test as laid out in Midcal to mean that "state officials have
and exercise power to review particular anticompetitive acts of
private parties and disapprove those that fail to accord with
state policy. 5 05 In both of these cases, the Court found that
there was no state procedure to review the reasonableness of
prices or the anticompetitive nature of the restraint.
In the class action context, trial courts must approve class
action settlements. In doing so, they must consider whether the
settlements are in the interest of the class. As part of this determination, they may take into account the reasonableness of fees
502Midcal, 445 U.S. at 105-06.
503 Id. at 105-06 (footnote omitted).

The Court reached essentially the same
conclusion in Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384 (1951). The
basic difference was that Schwegmann arose during the reign of the Miller-Tydings
Act, ch. 690, Title VIII, 50 Stat. 693 (1937) (repealed in 1975), which allowed states
to permit resale price-maintenance contracts. The Court held in Schwegmann that the
Miller-Tydings Act did not exempt from antitrust scrutiny a state-supported resale
price maintenance program in which retailers who did not want to contract with
distributors to maintain minimum resale prices were compelled to do so.
Schwegmann, 341 U.S. at 388-89.
On the other hand, in Fisher v. City of Berkeley, 475 U.S. 260 (1986), the Court
upheld a municipal rent control ordinance against antitrust challenge because:
[It] places complete control over maximum rent levels exclusively in the hands
of the Rent Stabilization Board. Not just the controls themselves but also the
rent ceilings they mandate have been unilaterally imposed on the landlords by
the city.... Adopted by popular initiative, the Ordinance can hardly be viewed
as a cloak for any conspiracy among landlords.. .. "
Id. at 269. Our argument, of course, is that judicial approval of class action
settlem..nts can and should be viewed as a potential cloak for conspiracies among
lawyers.
504486 U.S. 94 (1988).

505

Id. at 101.
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charged by class counsel as well as the reasonableness of attorney's fees permitted to be charged in any private administrative
system set up by the settlement. It is the fixing of these fees
that constitutes an anticompetitive restraint. Because the court
has the authority to review the reasonableness of prices, and to
disapprove of any settlement that contains fees failing to accord
with state policy, the court's supervision over class action settlements does not suffer from the same defects that led the Court
to deny state action immunity to the restraints in Midcal and
Patrick.
But the trial court's authority to engage in a substantive review of lawyer fees may not be sufficient to satisfy the active
supervision requirement. The Court in Patrick left open the
question "whether judicial review of private conduct ever can
constitute active supervision. ' 506 If the court were to hold that
only administrative agencies can provide adequate (for state
action purposes) review, that would not, however, mean that
court review of class settlements was inadequate under the state
action doctrine. 507 The "judicial review of private conduct" that
the Court had in mind in Patrick was ordinary litigation to review the merits of a peer-review decision by a group of doctors
to terminate a competing doctor's hospital privileges. 508 But, as
we argued above, trial courts in class actions could be viewed as
more akin to administrative agencies than courts, which normally "review" private conduct through ordinary litigation.
Moreover, the fact that the restraint in the class action context
506Id. at 104. On the facts of the case, the Court found that even if judicial review
could constitute active supervision, it did not here because:
[I]f [judicial] review exists at all, [it] falls far short of satisfying the active

supervision requirement.... [I]t is not clear that Oregon law affords any direct
judicial review of private peer-review decisions... . Moreover, the Oregon
courts have indicated that even if they were to provide judicial review.., the
review would be of a very limited nature.
Id.
507At least one commentator argues that the Court will say judicial review is

sufficient under certain circumstances. Michal Dlouhy, Note, Judicial Review as
Midcal Active Supervision: Immunizing Private Parties from Antitrust Liability, 57
Fordham L. Rev. 403, 416-23 (1988). See also Bolt v. Halifax Hosp. Medical Center,

851 F.2d 1273, 1282 (11th Cir. 1988), vacated en banc and per curiam, 874 F.2d 755
(11th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S.Ct. 1960 (1990) (holding that judicial review may
constitute "active supervision").
508Patrick,486 U.S. at 96-97.
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does not occur until the trial court approves a settlement could
further support interpreting court approval of class action settlements as "active supervision. 50 9 Thus, whatever the Court
eventually decides about judicial review in the Patrick context,
court supervision in the class action context presents a different
case.
Even if judicial review can at least in some cases satisfy
Midcal's active supervision prong, the question of whether a
trial judge is authorized to engage in the necessary review remains. In reviewing a class action settlement, a trial judge faces
a situation unlike that faced by the typical administrative agency
in one crucial respect: The judge is not predominantly regulating lawyer conduct, but is supposedly approving a settlement in
a way that protects the rights of the litigants. The judge cannot
consider agreements concerning lawyer fees, such as those in
Georgine, separately from the rest of the settlement; the judge
must evaluate the settlement as a whole. 510 Thus, one could
argue that the judge lacks the authority to actively supervise in
the way that Midcal contemplates.
Moreover, if active supervision means continuous supervision,
the argument that class action judges actively supervise a regulatory system is significantly weakened. Midcal is unclear on the
question of whether active supervision requires continuous supervision so long as there is at least one review of the reasonableness of price schedules. A later and similar case, 324 Li5 sent mixed signals on this question in the
quor Corp. v. Duffy,si
509Professor Elhauge considers the timing of judicial review as a crucial factor in
deciding whether judicial review can satisfy the active supervision requirement: "The
key question ... is not whether a court or agency provides the disinterested state
process for controlling the terms of restraints, but whether that process occurs before
or after the market injury." Elhauge, supra note 429, at 716. Thus, he argues that
judicial review should satisfy the active supervision requirement only when the review
is "disinterested, substantive, and provided before the restraint becomes effective." Id.
at 716-17 (emphasis added). He continues: "Because pre-injury review is typically
more common for agencies than courts, agerlcy review will provide active supervision
more often than will judicial review. But that does not mean that judicial review
never provides active supervision or that agency review always does." Id.
510Courts can and do review class counsel fees separately from the rest of the

agreement, but the actions we are discussing here do not directly challenge the class
counsel fet, award. It is less clear whether courts can review the fee caps for the
private administrative systems separately from the rest of the agreement.
511479

U.S. 335 (1987).
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footnotes. The Court held invalid a state regulatory system that
required retailers to charge at least 112% of the "posted"
wholesale price for liquor, but allowed wholesalers to sell at less
than the "posted" price.5 12 The Court stated that a "simple
'minimum markup' statute requiring retailers to charge 112 percent of their actual wholesale cost may satisfy the 'active supervision' requirement. '513 But, in the very next footnote, the
Court rejected the argument that "periodic reexaminations by
the state legislature" and the potential for the regulating agency
to allow individual wholesalers and retailers to depart from the
regulated prices constituted active supervision.51 4 The Court
found that neither of the above "exerts any significant control
over retail liquor prices. 515
At the very least, the Court's opinion suggests that if continual
monitoring is required, it must be comprehensive monitoring of
prices by the agency that regulated in the first place. But requiring continual monitoring would not always make sense. In
particular, recall the situation in Oracle, where the antitrust
allegation would be that the lawyers colluded in choosing class
counsel and proposing class counsel fees. It is not apparent
what monitoring the court could do other than examining the
bid submitted and deciding if the proposed fee was reasonable.
If the lawyers are engaging in bid rotation,51 6 only monitoring
from one class action to the next would catch it. There is no
assurance that any one judge will have every (for example) securities class action in a particular state. Of course, this is not so
much a question of the authority to monitor as the likely effectiveness of monitoring.
When, however, antitrust allegations concern the fees to be
charged in the private administrative system established under
a class action settlement, it makes a big difference if active supervision requires continuous supervision. Although courts
retain continuing jurisdiction to adjudicate disputes that arise
from the implementation of the settlement,5 17 it is not clear that
512Id.
513Id.
514Id.

at 352.
at 344 n.6 (emphasis added).
at 345 n.7.

515 Id.
516 See supra
517 See, e.g.,

note 154.
Ivy v. Diamond Shamrock Chem. Co. (In re "Agent Orange" Prod.
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that jurisdiction would qualify as continuing supervision over the
fees paid to lawyers within the administrative system. First,
continuing jurisdiction does not normally empower courts sua
sponte to "engage in any 'pointed reexamination' of the [system's operation]." Parties or aggrieved others must bring disputes to the court for adjudication and there is obviously no

guarantee that any party would do so. Thus, there is no assurance that continuing jurisdiction would amount to continuing
supervision or even sporadic supervision. Second, although in
theory it is conceivable that the settlement itself could include
terms that try to confer on a court the responsibility to conduct

periodic pointed reexamination on its own initiative, it is questionable whether by contract (which is what a class settlement

is) private parties could effectively confer such new responsibilities on state judges, or any state actor for that matter,518 or how
Liab. Litig.), 996 F.2d 1425, 1432 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1140 (1994)
("[The judge] has continuing jurisdiction over the Agent Orange I class action, not
only to administer the settlement fund ....
but also to ensure that the Settlement
Agreement as a whole is enforced according to its terms.") (citations omitted); Price
v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., No. 94-0647-B-S, at 58 (S.D. Ala. 1995) ("The Court shall retain
jurisdiction ... with respect to future performance of, and any claims relating to
performance of, the Settlement agreement and judgment.")
518 If A and B wrote a contract that provided that a state judge would come check
every six months to see that building construction was proceeding in accordance with
the contract terms, it is inconceivable that a state would accept that the judge had thus
effectively been given some new power of office. The responsibilities of state judges
are defined by the state's laws and its constitution, not the private agreement of
parties. It is generally accepted that court approval of a settlement does not change
that agreement into "public law." See, e.g., Derrickson v. City of Danville, 845 F.2d
at 718 (stating that "a consent decree is fundamentally a contract and therefore does
not bind a governmental body to any greater degree than a contract"); Air Line
Stewards & Stewardesses Ass'n, Local 550 v. Trans World Airlines, 713 F.2d 319, 321
(7th Cir. 1983) ("A settlement agreement is a contract and as such, 'the construction
and enforcement of settlement agreements are governed by principles of local law
applicable to contracts generally."') (quoting Florida Educ. Ass'n v. Atkinson, 481
F.2d 662, 663 (5th Cir. 1973)). In any case, it is not clear that class action settlements
attempt to expand the court's role beyond the traditional one. Compare Price v. CibaGeigy Corp., No. 94-0647-B-S, Exhibit A III.B (Stipulation of Settlement) (S.D. Ala.
1995) ("The COURT shall retain jurisdiction over this case and the DCA and MMT
FUNDS and shall use its equitable powers to enforce this STIPULATION and to
protect its jurisdiction over this case and all parties and SETTLEMENT CLASS
MEMBERS.
The COURT shall have jurisdiction over all phases of this
STIPULATION.") with id. I XXIII.E ("No modification of this STIPULATION may
be made except by written agreement of CLASS COUNSEL and CIBA-GEIGY
CORPORATION approved by the COURT.")
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a court could as a practical matter carry out such responsibilities
assuming they could legally be conferred on state judges.
In addition to the question of whether the court has the authority to supervise, Ticor Title directs that the State must have
also "played a substantial role in determining the specifics of the
economic policy." 519 In particular,

[w]here prices or rates are set as an initial matter by private
parties, subject only to a veto if the State chooses to exercise
it, the party claiming the immunity must show that state officials have undertaken the necessary steps to determine the
specifics of the price-fixing or ratesetting scheme. The mere
potential for state supervision
is not an adequate substitute for
a decision by the State.5 20
The Court stressed that especially where price fixing is involved,
active supervision should not be casually inferred.5 21 Although
the involvement of courts in approving class action settlements
is greater than the involvement of the agencies in Ticor Title,
the features the Court found crucial point toward an absence of
active supervision. The lawyers set fee terms as an initial matter
subject only to a potential veto by the court. The court may not
be at all aware of potential price fixing. And even if it is,
though the court may examine the specifics of the scheme, it
does not "determine" these specifics in any meaningful way,
given its obligation to consider the settlement as a whole.
It appears, therefore, that class action lawyers cannot demonstrate that the courts actively supervise their anticompetitive
restraints. Thus, they cannot satisfy the second Midcal prong,
and state action immunity does not exempt anticompetitive lawyer conduct from the federal antitrust laws.

519504
520Id.

521 Id.

U.S. at 635.
at 638.
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4. Summary of State Action
We can summarize the preceding discussion in a straightforward way. The anticompetitive conduct that lawyers involved
in class actions may engage in would not, under current doctrine, and should not, in light of the serious potential for abuse,
enjoy the cloak of state action immunity. Neither of Midcal's
two prongs would be satisfied. No authorized state actor has
clearly articulated any state policy to displace competition in the
markets where we claim the potential for anticompetitive behavior exists. These markets are the market to be class counsel in
any pending and future class action, and the market to represent
claimants in a private administrative system established by a
class action settlement. Cantorteaches that even if class actions
themselves represent state regulation that the antitrust laws
cannot reach, state action immunity does not attach to collateral
markets that the state does not intend to regulate. The market
to be class counsel and the market to represent claimants in a
subsequent non-court system are such collateral markets.
Even if there were a clearly articulated state policy to displace
competition in these markets, there is no active supervision of
such a policy. Courts approving class action settlements must
evaluate the settlement as a whole; therefore, they cannot effectively monitor anticompetitive behavior occurring in and around
class actions. Certainly monitoring is impractical when anticompetitive behavior can occur over the course of several class
actions, such as in the bid rotation scenario. And in the private
administrative system cases, monitoring is either not in fact done
or is beyond the court's competence or authority to do. The
court in such a system cannot serve as a roving regulator that
continuously reevaluates the specific terms of the settlement, but
merely as an arbiter of disputes that may arise. If the court
tries to do more, on its own initiative or at the behest of the
parties, the court risks straying beyond its constitutional function. For these reasons, a state action immunity defense to an
antitrust suit brought agains class action lawyers charged with
the types of anticompetitive conduct we have discussed would
likely fail.
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C. Class Actions as FederalRegulation
1. Reasonable Does Not Mean Right
The Supreme Court has developed a strong presumption in
favor of the antitrust laws when they conflict with other federal
regulatory statutes. Congress must demonstrate a "clear intent"
to displace the antitrust laws, just as state legislatures must
clearly articulate a policy inconsistent with competition. 522 Unlike state legislatures, Congress may demonstrate its clear intent
by providing express antitrust immunity. 523 Yet even when Congress provides for express immunity, the Court strictly construes
these exemptions. 524
When no applicable federal statute contains an express antitrust immunity, the Court has been quite reluctant to imply
immunity. Immunity from the antitrust laws by implication has
been found only "in cases of plain repugnancy between the antitrust and regulatory provisions. ' ' 525 Further, the Court has found
522National Gerimedical Hosp. & Gerontology Ctr. v. Blue Cross, 452 U.S. 378, 389
(1981) (citing United States v. National Ass'n of Secs. Dealers, 422 U.S. 694 (1975);
Gordon v. New York Stock Exch., 422 U.S. 659 (1975)).
523 Congress has often provided just such express antitrust immunity, and several
Supreme Court cases address the scope of such immunity. See United States v.

Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321,350 n.27 (1963) (citing various statutes in which
Congress provided express antitrust exemption); see also Hughes Tool Co. v. Trans
World Airlines, 409 U.S. 363 (1973) (construing express grant of antitrust immunity
under the Federal Aviation Act of 1958); Carnation Co. v. Pacific Westbound Conf.,
383 U.S. 213, 220-22 (1966) (discussing previous application of express grant of
immunity under the Shipping Act of 1916); Maryland & Virginia Milk Producers Ass'n
v. United States, 362 U.S. 458 (1960) (applying antitrust exemption under the Capper-

Volstead Act of 1922); see generally E.H. Schopler, Annotation, Applicability of
Federal Antitrust Laws as Affected by other Federal Statutes or by Federal
Constitution-Supreme Court Cases, 45 L. Ed. 2d 841 (1976) (collects and discusses
Supreme Court cases applying individual statutes).
524Federal Maritime Comm'n v. Seatrain Lines, 411 U.S. 726, 733 (1973) (citing the
Court's "frequently expressed view that exemptions from antitrust laws are strictly
construed"). In following its policy of strict construction, the Court has not hesitated
to find that some restraint exceeded the scope of the express antitrust immunity. See,
e.g., Pacific Westbound Conference, 383 U.S. at 217-20; Maryland & Virginia Milk
Producers, 362 U.S. at 469-70; United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188, 204-05
(1939).
5- PhiladelphiaNat'l Bank, 374 U.S. at 350-51 ("Repeals of the antitrust laws by
implication from a regulatory statute are strongly disfavored, and have only been
found in cases of plain repugnancy between the antitrust and regulatory provisions.")
(footnote ommitted). For other cases similarly indicating reluctance to imply
immunity, see National Gerimedical Hospital, 452 U.S. at 388; Gordon, 422 U.S. at
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such repeals by implication "only if necessary to make the [regulatory law] work, and even then only to the minimum extent
necessary." 526
In National Gerimedical Hospital & Gerontology Center v.
Blue Cross of Kansas City,5 27 the most recent Supreme Court

case discussing implied federal regulatory immunity, the Court
reaffirmed its reluctance to imply antitrust immunity. The
Court also offered additional guidelines to its federal regulation
immunity jurisprudence. First, although Congress may displace
the antitrust laws if it demonstrates a clear intent to do so, pervasive regulation alone is not sufficient to establish the requisite
clear intent.5 28 Second, "antitrust repeals are especially disfavored where the antitrust implications of a business decision have
not been considered by a governmental entity. '529 On the other
hand, if Congress empowers a regulatory agency "to authorize
or require the type of conduct under antitrust challenge," it
530
expresses a "much clearer" intent to repeal the antitrust laws.
682; Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 372 (1973).
526Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341, 357 (1963).
527452 U.S. 378 (1981).
528 National Gerimedical Hospital, 452 U.S. at 389 ("Even when an industry is
regulated substantially, this does not necessarily evidence an intent to repeal the
antitrust laws with respect to every action taken within the industry.") (citing Otter
Tail Power, 410 U.S. at 372-75; United States v. Radio Corp. of America, 358 U.S.
334, 346 (1959)). In National GerimedicalHospital, the Court held that the National
Health Planning and Resources Development Act of 1974 did not "create a 'pervasive'
repeal of the antitrust laws as applied to every action taken in response to the healthcare planning process." National GerimedicalHospital, 452 U.S. at 393. The idea that
pervasive regulation does not create immunity with respect to all aspects of the
industry parallels the Supreme Court's decision in Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428
U.S. 579 (1976), in the state action context.
See supra notes 481-484 and
accompanying text.
529National Gerimedical Hospital, 452 U.S. at 390. The Court compared this
statement with Otter Tail Power, 410 U.S. at 374 ("When ... relationships are
governed in the first instance by business judgment and not regulatory coercion, courts
must be hesitant to conclude that Congress intended to override the fundamental
national policies embodied in the antitrust laws."). This notion parallels the Court's
active supervision requirement in the state action context. See supra Section IV.B.3.
530 National GerimedicalHospital,452 U.S. at 389. Professor Hovenkamp offers the
following summary:
[T]he less the regulatory regime interferes with the workings of the market, the
more room for antitrust. Intervention under the antitrust laws is generally
appropriate with respect to market decisions that (a) are actually or potentially
anticompetitive; and (b) are made according to the discretion of private firms
without effective agency supervision.
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National Gerimedical Hospital suggests that lawyers involved
in class actions have little hope of prevailing in antitrust suits on
federal regulatory immunity grounds. Congress has not expressed a clear intent to exempt lawyers from the antitrust laws.
Neither the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, nor the Rules
Enabling Act, nor any other federal statute expressly immunizes
lawyer conduct in and around class action suits from the antitrust laws. Whatever "pervasive regulation" means, it would not
seem to include the regulation of class actions. Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23, which governs class actions, gives very little
direction and very broad discretion to federal judges overseeing
class actions. In particular, neither the text of Rule 23, nor of
the other Federal Rules, nor of the Rules Enabling Act purports
to regulate competition among lawyers-whether for the position of class counsel or in the private administrative systems set
up as part of class action settlements (themselves not contemplated by the regulatory regime). Not surprisingly, then, federal
district judges who approve class counsel and class action settlements almost never consider the antitrust implications of business decisions made by the lawyers. That means, under National Gerimedical Hospital, that antitrust immunity would be
denied. While at least two federal judges have tried to mandate
competitive bidding for the position of class counsel and have
reminded the lawyers that they are subject to the antitrust laws,
as we have noted, even those judges did not consider all the
5 31
possible antitrust implications of the conduct before them.
Thus, the only possible argument for lawyers in class actions
that might entitle them to federal regulatory immunity is that
Congress and the Supreme Court, by giving district courts broad
discretion to oversee class actions, have "empowered" them to
"authorize" anticompetitve conduct by lawyers.
As we shall see, however, a close examination of these Supreme Court cases reveals that the authority of and discretion
Hovenkamp, supra note 136, § 19.2, at 649. Professor Hovenkamp's summary is
somewhat misleading in that the cases finding no immunity view the degree of agency
supervision as not dispositive. See infra text following note 581. Also, his test would
seem to require a result contrary to the Court's finding of immunity in United States
v. National Ass'n of Secs. Dealers, 422 U.S. 694 (1975) [hereinafter NASD]. For a
discussion of NASD, see infra Section IV.C.1.c.
531See supra note 152-153 and accompanying text.
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given to district courts to choose class counsel and approve class
action settlements would not suffice to confer federal regulatory
immunity. Moreover, this would probably remain true even if
the courts, when approving class settlements, began to consider
explicitly-as they should-the possible antitrust implications of
lawyer conduct. We consider three groups of cases: (1) railroad
rate cases, in which railroad cartels submitted joint rate proposals to a federal agency, and the Court declined to find implied
immunity; (2) contract approval cases, in which regulated firms
negotiated a potentially anticompetitive deal which required and
received agency approval, and the Court declined to find implied immunity; and (3) authorized restraint cases, in which the
Court found implied immunity. If the cases in the first two
groups make one central point, it is this: A federal agency's
approval of private anticompetitive conduct does not by itself
immunize that conduct from a later antitrust suit. This conclusion holds even if the agency can and does take antitrust considerations into account in making its decision, and even if the
antitrust suit would completely undermine the agency's decision. 532

Federal agency approval of private anticompetitive con-

duct may immunize conduct only if Congress either grants the
agency specific antitrust enforcement powers or specifically approves of anticompetitive conduct; instances in which Congress
has done so are found in the cases in the third group. Class
actions do not fall into that category.

532 Justice White, in his dissent in NASD (a case granting immunity) summarized the
cases rejecting immunity as follows: "Absent express immunization or its equivalent,
private business arrangements are not exempt from the antitrust laws merely because
Congress has empowered an agency to authorize the very conduct which is later
challenged in court under the antitrust laws." NASD, 422 U.S. at 737-38 (White, J.,

dissenting).
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I've Been Colluding on the Railroad

The idea that agency approval does not by itself create immunity is implicit 533 in the very first antitrust cases that the Court
decided on the merits, United States v. Trans-MissouriFreight
535
Association534 and United States v. Joint Traffic Association.
In both cases, railroad cartels had filed rate schedules with the
Interstate Commerce Commission ("ICC").536 The Interstate
Commerce Act required railroads to make such filings (though
it did not require joint filings) 537 and also required that the ICC
approve the rates as "reasonable," 538 which the ICC apparently
did. The railroads argued that because their rates were "reasonable" within the meaning of the Interstate Commerce Act, their
price fixing agreements to establish and maintain these rates did
not and could not violate the Sherman Act, as, they argued,
Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibited only unreasonable
restraints of trade.
The Court flatly rejected this argument. In Joint Traffic, the
Court stated that railroads could not "combine as one consolidated and powerful association for the purpose of stifling competition.., even though the rates provided for in the agreement
' 539 This
may for the time be not more than are reasonable.
holding was grounded in the Court's reasoning in Trans-Missouri Freightthat the Interstate Commerce Act neither expressly
prohibited nor permitted price-fixing agreements, 54° nor did it
533 The Court made the implicit explicit in Keogh v. Chicago & Nw. Ry. Co., 260

U.S. 156, 162 (1922) ("The fact that these rates had been approved by the Commission
would not, it seems, bar proceedings by the Government."); id. at 161-62 (interpreting
Trans-Missouri Freight and Joint Traffic to hold that even though the ICC had
established that the rates "were reasonable and non-discriminatory," nevertheless,

"under the Anti-Trust Act, a combination of carriers to fix reasonable and non-

discriminatory rates may be illegal; and if so, the Government may have redress by
criminal proceedings.., by injunction.., and by forfeiture").
534 166 U.S. 290 (1897).

535 171 U.S. 505 (1898).
536Trans-MissouriFreight, 166 U.S. at 303; Joint Traffic, 171 U.S. at 562.
537Interstate Commerce Act, ch. 104, § 6, 24 Stat. 379, 380 (1887).

538Id. at 379 (1887) ("All charges made for any service rendered or to be rendered

...shall be reasonable and just; and every unjust and unreasonable charge for such
service is prohibited and declared to be unlawful.").
539 Joint Traffic, 171 U.S. at 571.
540 Trans-MissouriFreight, 166 U.S. at 314-15, 335. In particular, the Court noted

that the Interstate Commerce Act "was not directed to the securing of uniformity of
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"furnish[ ] a complete and perfect set of rules and regulations
which... cover all cases concerning transportation by railroad
and all contracts relating thereto. '541 These cases thus led to the
establishment of a bedrock principle of antitrust: A price fixing
claim may not be defended on the grounds that a cartel's prices

are reasonable.5 42
Both Trans-Missouri Freight and Joint Traffic were suits

brought by the federal Government, so the Court could have
limited their holdings-that antitrust suits can be brought despite agency approval-to suits brought by the Government and
not to suits by private parties.5 43 But in Georgiav. Pennsylvania
Railroad Co.,44 the Court allowed a suit by the state of Georgia,

as parens patriae, seeking injunctive relief545 against a railroad

cartel for fixing rates that the ICC had approved.5 46 The Court

found that "[tihe fact that the rates which have been fixed may
or may not be held unlawful by the Commission is immaterial
rates to be charged by competing companies, nor was there any provision therein as
to a maximum or minimum of rates." Id. at 315.
541Id. at 316. This concept-that an incomplete and imperfect set of rules and
regulations establish implied antitrust immunity-is the source of the suggestion made
in some of the later cases that "pervasive regulation" might sometimes be enough to
establish implied antitrust immunity.
542See, e.g., Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 353-54
(1990) ("If any proposition is firmly settled in the law of antitrust, it is the rule that
the reasonableness of the particular price agreed upon by defendants does not
constitute a defense to a price-fixing charge."). Perhaps the most often quoted
rationale for this rule is found in United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392
(1927), in which the Court stated that "[t]he reasonable price fixed today may through
economic and business changes become the unreasonable price of tomorrow." Id. at
397.
543The Court's statement in Keogh v. Chicago & Nw. Ry. Co., 260 U.S. 156 (1922)
that "[tjhe fact that the[ ] rates had been approved by the Commission would not...
bar proceedings by the Government" could have supported such an interpretation.
Id. at 162.
544
324 U.S. 439 (1945).
545Id. at 446-47. Georgia also sought damages, but the Court rejected the state's
claim on the authority of Keogh. PennsylvaniaR.R., 324 U.S. at 453. We discuss the
Keogh doctrine and its applicability to damage suits against class action lawyers infra
Section IV.C.2.
546 In so deciding, the Court found it necessary to distinguish a line of previous cases
holding that § 16 of the Clayton Act barred injunction suits against private carriers
subject to the Interstate Commerce Act and regulated by the ICC. PennsylvaniaR.R.,
324 U.S. at 454. The Court found § 16 inapplicable because "the relief which Georgia
[sought was] not a matter subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission[.]" Id. at 455.
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to the issue before us," 547 and stressed that the ICC's finding

that the potentially fixed rates fell within a "zone of reasonableness" did not mean that the conduct leading to those rates could

escape antitrust scrutiny.5 48 Moreover, because the ICC neither
had the authority to grant the injunctive relief sought by the
state549-namely dissolving the combination or confining it within legitimate boundaries to remove the cartel's influence in the
field of rate-making 55 0-nor supervisory authority over the cartel
as such, the Court deemed ICC approval of rates irrelevant to
the antitrust question. The Court concluded that Congress did

not intend the regulatory scheme to "eliminate the emphasis on
competition and individual freedom of action in rate-making," 551
and that to hold otherwise would permit "monopoly power [to
be] created under the aegis of private parties without Congressional sanction and without governmental supervision or control."

552

Taken together, the railroad rate-fixing cases support our

claim that lawyers in class actions would not be successful in
asserting federal regulatory immunity from the antitrust laws.
547Id. at 460.
548 Id. at 460-61. The Court added that "[d]amage must be presumed to flow from
a conspiracy to manipulate rates within that zone." Id. at 461.
549Id. at 456, 459-62. On the question of the ICC's authority to grant injunctive
relief, the Court stated that
Congress has not given the Commission ...authority to remove rate-fixing
combinations from the prohibitions contained in the anti-trust laws. It has not
placed these combinations under the control and supervision of the Commission.
Nor has it empowered the Commission to proceed against such combinations
and through cease and desist orders or otherwise to put an end to their
activities.
Id. at 456.
550
In discussing the injunctive relief sought by the state of Georgia, the Court also
found that:
The aim [of the injunction] is to make it possible for individual carriers to
perform their duty under the Act, so that whatever tariffs may be continued in
effect or superseded by new ones may be tariffs which are free from the
restrictive, discriminatory, and coercive influences of the combination. That is
not to undercut or impair the primary jurisdiction of the Commission over rates.
It is to free the rate-making function of the influences of a conspiracy over
which the Commission has no authority but which if proven to exist can only
hinder the Commission in the tasks with which it is confronted.
Id. at 460.
551Id. at 458-59.
552
Id. at 459.
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These cases emphasize that an agency determination that rates
fall within the "zone of reasonableness" under some statutory
framework does not preclude competition from producing rates
that are even more "reasonable. 5 5 3 There is no conflict be-

tween the regulatory policy in the railroad cases and the antitrust policy of competition. 554 Similarly, the fact that district
court judges may oversee and cap lawyer fees-both for class
counsel and for lawyers in private administrative systems set up
by class action settlements-does not obviate or conflict with the
555
antitrust policy that competition ought to influence these fees.
-53This is essentially the same point courts have made in allowing malpractice actions
against lawyers who mishandle a settlement negotiation even though a court approves
the settlement as reasonable. See, e.g., Ziegelheim v. Apollo, 607 A.2d 1298, 1305
(N.J. 1992) ("The fact that a party received a settlement that was 'fair and equitable'
does not mean necessarily that the party's attorney was competent or that the party
would not have received a more favorable settlement had the party's incompetent
attorney been competent.") (quoted in Durkin v. Shea & Gould, Nos. 95-55432 &
95-55434, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 20695 at *18-*19 (9th Cir. Aug. 19, 1996).
554But cf. Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conf. v. United States, 471 U.S. 48 (1985),
which reaches a result-in the state action, as opposed to federal exemption,
context-that seems inconsistent with the railroad rate cases cited above, which found
no conflict between the regulatory policy and the antitrust policy of competition. The
only rationale the Court offers for its differing view in the state action context is that
Congress can easily correct a federal court that erroneously rejects an exception to the
antitrust laws, while state legislatures cannot "overrule" a holding by a federal court
that the state action doctrine does not apply. Southern Motor Carriers,471 U.S. at 5758, n.21. This rationale is weak: A state can almost always "overrule" a court
rejection of state action immunity by regulating more clearly. See Hovenkamp, supra
note 136, § 19.1, at 648-49. For example, had Southern Motor Carriersrejected the
state action immunity argument on the ground that a statute simply requiring an
agency to approve "reasonable" rates does not clearly articulate a policy to displace
competition, the state could have passed a statute explicitly permitting collective ratemaking (as several of the states in Southern Motor Carriersdid). It is true that states
lack Congress's ability to simply draft statutes evidencing an intent to have the federal
antitrust laws not apply and have it be so merely by virtue of that legislative
statement. But nothing seems to be stopping the states from writing into their statutes
that it is their intent to have their regulations qualify for state action immunity,
although they do not seem to do so. Thus, although we have offered a rationale for
the approach taken in Southern Motor Carriers, see supra notes 466-467 and
accompanying text, on the assumption that the Court was correct in concluding that
a "reasonable rate" statute clearly articulates a state policy favoring collective
ratemaking, and although we have argued that even the standard adopted by that case
does not help lawyers involved in class actions, see supra notes 473-478 and
accompanying text, we think the case was wrongly decided on this issue and that the
Court's approach in the federal regulatory immunity cases is superior.
555Indeed, the recent federal statute revising securities class actions uses language
similar to the Interstate Commerce Act when discussing attorney's fees. 15 U.S.C.
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Moreover, the Court's concern that the ICC did not have sufficient authority to remedy antitrust violations in Pennsylvania
Railroad is, if anything, magnified in the class action context.
The ICC was a single agency charged with continuous supervision over rates. By contrast, federal district court judges are
independent and do not form a coordinated agency. Lawyers
may file class actions in many different districts before many
556
different judges, subject to jurisdictional and other constraints.
It would seem impossible for a single judge even to begin to
control bid rotation behavior by lawyers of the type that may
have been going on in Oracle. And as for class action settlements, the court's role is even more limited than the ICC's role
was: The district court has the authority only to approve or
disapprove the settlement. It cannot, while serving as class action overseer, issue injunctions extending beyond the class action before it, impose criminal sanctions55 7 or award damages in
response to anticompetitive conduct.
b. Let's Make a Deal-And Get the Agency to Approve
Just as the Court had concluded that federal agency approval
of "reasonable rates" did not establish antitrust immunity in the
trilogy of railroad cases, in another trilogy of cases, the Court
held that agency approval of private contracts under a "public
interest" standard-essentially the standard applicable to class
action settlements-was also not enough to displace the antitrust
laws. The Court reached this conclusion even though in each of
the three cases, the agency involved had considered the potential
anticompetitive effects of the conduct in question in making its
determination.
§ 77z-1(a)(6) provides: "Total attorneys' fees and expenses awarded by the court to
counsel for the plaintiff class shall not exceed a reasonablepercentage of the amount
of any damages and prejudgment interest actually paid to the class." (emphasis added).
556The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation can transfer to a single jurisdiction
cases involving "one or more common questions of fact." 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (1994)
(emphasis added). Thus, the statute does not confer the authority to transfer all
securities (or other) cases involving common questions of law to a single jurisdiction.
557 Cf. Derrickson,discussed supra notes 291-306,346-352, 373-414 and accompanying
text (judicial approval of class action settlement in voting rights case does not preclude
subsequent criminal prosecution of agents for city who negotiated the settlement for
violating state conflict of interest laws).

1224

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 82:1051

In the first case of this trilogy, United States v. Radio Corpora-

tion of America,558 the Government attacked a contract between
NBC and Westinghouse under which NBC was to acquire a
Westinghouse-owned television station in Philadelphia in exchange for an NBC-owned station in Cleveland and three million dollars in cash. 559 The Government alleged that NBC had
conspired with RCA, then NBC's parent company, to force
Westinghouse to agree to the contract by threatening to end the
NBC network affiliation of Westinghouse's Boston and Philadelphia stations and to withhold NBC affiliation from Westinghouse's Pittsburgh station.5 60 The Communications Act 561 required the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to review such transactions under a "public interest, convenience,
and necessity" standard. 562 The FCC did not hold a hearing, but
"decided all issues relative to the antitrust laws that were before
it,"563 and approved the contract of sale. Although the Justice
Department had a right to request a hearing by the FCC and to
of the FCC's decision, it instead opted to
seek judicial review 564
file an antitrust suit.
The Court unanimously held that FCC approval did not bar
the Government's antitrust suit.5 65 It relied primarily on the fact
that the language of the Communications Act as well as the
legislative history specifically recognized the continuing validity
of the antitrust laws and court enforcement of those laws.5 66 But
the Court went on to explain why agency approval of a private
558358 U.S. 334 (1959).
559 Id. 358 U.S. at 335-36.
560Id. at 336. Because NBC was a wholly-owned subsidiary of RCA, the § 1 suit
would today be barred under Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467
U.S. 752 (1984), which rejected the "intraenterprise conspiracy" doctrine in such cases.
Id. at 759-66.
561 Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (current version
codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (1994)).
562RCA, 358 U.S. at 337 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 310(b) as it was codified in 1959).
563Id. at 338.
564 Id. at 338.
565Id. at 352-53.
566
The Court held that the "[legislative] history compels the conclusion that the FCC
was not intended to have any authority to pass on antitrust violations" and that "it is
equally clear that courts retained jurisdiction to pass on alleged antitrust violations
irrespective of Commission action." Id. at 343-44.
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contract does not necessarily create a "pervasive regulatory
scheme" to which antitrust immunity may attach:
[Defendants RCA and NBC], like unregulated business concerns, made a business judgment as to the desirability of the
exchange. Like unregulated concerns, they had to make this
judgment with knowledge that the exchange might run afoul
of the antitrust laws. Their decision varied from that of an
unregulated concern only in that they also had to obtain the
approval of a federal agency. But scope of that approval in
the case of the FCC was limited to the statutory standard,
"public interest, convenience, and necessity." The monetary
terms of the exchange were set by the parties, and were of
concern to the Commission only as they might have affected
the ability of the parties to serve the public. Even after approval, the parties were free to complete or not to complete
the exchange as their sound business judgment dictated. In
every sense, the question faced by the parties was solely one
of business judgment (as opposed to regulatory coercion), save
only that the Commission must have found that the "public
interest" would be served by their decision to make the exchange. No pervasive regulatory scheme was involved.567
In two subsequent merger cases, the Supreme Court reaffirmed and expanded the RCA approach towards agency apThe Court's discussion from the quoted
567 Id. at 350-51 (citations omitted).
paragraph is clouded by the fact that it comes in a section of the opinion in which the
Court purported to decide whether "the over-all regulatory scheme of the Act requires
invocation of a primary jurisdiction doctrine." Id. at 346. But as the "primary
jurisdiction doctrine" is a doctrine of temporary abstention by a court until an agency
decides issues within its expertise, and not a doctrine of immunity, the placement
seems somewhat odd. See Hovenkamp, supra note 136, § 19.4, at 655 ("The 'primary
jurisdiction' doctrine, as its name implies, is not an antitrust exemption but a
jurisdictional mechanism for proceeding with a case that may involve an antitrust
claim."). As Justice Harlan seemed to think, the fact that the FCC had already
approved the transaction would seem to make any discussion of "primary jurisdiction"
pure dictum. See RCA, 358 U.S. at 353 (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment) (The
Court's holding that a "Commission determination of 'public interest, convenience,
and necessity' cannot either constitute a binding adjudication upon any antitrust issues
that may be involved in the Commission's proceeding or serve to exempt a licensee
pro tanto from the antitrust laws" alone is "dispositive of this appeal."). Perhaps the
Court simply meant to suggest that a comprehensive regulatory scheme could create
some limited form of immunity. In any event, whatever the Court meant by the
primary jurisdiction doctrine, if agency approval of a private anticompetitive
agreement does not even call this limited immunity into play, then a fortiori it cannot
give rise to full regulatory immunity.
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proval of private transactions. In California v. FederalPower

Commission,568 the Federal Power Commission ("FPC") approved a merger between a natural gas company and a pipeline
company under the Natural Gas Act's 569 "public convenience

and necessity" standard.570 The case arose after the state of

California intervened in the FPC hearing and sought review by
the federal court of appeals, which affirmed the FPC's approval
of the merger.571 It was from this judgment that the petition for
certiorari was filed and granted. Although the FPC had invited
the Justice Department to participate in its hearings, the Justice
Department declined, and instead proceeded with an antitrust
suit to block the merger.57 2 Thus, in FederalPower Commission,

unlike RCA, not only was there a hearing held by the agency
but there was also judicial review of the agency's approval. Still,
the Court found no antitrust immunity. The Court found that
the Natural Gas Act provided no express exemption;573 that the
FPC had not been given the power to enforce the antitrust
laws;574

and, as in RCA, that "there [was] no 'pervasive regula-

tory scheme' including the antitrust laws that has been entrusted
to the Commission. ' 575

568 369 U.S. 482 (1962).
569 Natural Gas Act, ch. 556, 52 Stat. 821 (1938) (current version codified at 15
U.S.C. § 717 et seq.).
570 Federal Power Comm'n, 369 U.S. at 484-85.
571California v. FederalPower Comm'n, 296 F.2d 348 (D.C. Cir. 1961), rev'd, 369
U.S. 482 (1962).
572Federal Power Comm'n, 369 U.S. at 484.
573 See id. at 485-86.
574 See id. at 486. The Court noted that § 7 of the Clayton Act did contain an
antitrust immunity for "transactions duly consummated pursuant to authority given by
the ...Federal Power Commission ...under any statutory provision vesting such
power in such Commission," id. at 486, but the Court found that § 7 itself does not
vest such power. See Id. at 486. Moreover, the Court noted that § 11 of the Clayton
Act omits the FPC from a list of agencies authorized to enforce § 7. Id. at 486.
575Id. at 485 (quoting RCA, 358 U.S. at 351). The Court did not even see the
immunity, question as the main issue in the case; rather, the Court considered the main
issue to be whether the FPC should have awaited the outcome of the antitrust suit
before considering the merger application. In a reversal of the primary jurisdiction
doctrine, the Court held that the agency "should have held its hand until the courts
had acted." Id. at 488. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963),
addressed the case in which the agency acts prior to filing of the antitrust suit. See
infra notes 576-581 and accompanying text.
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In the second merger case, United States v. PhiladelphiaNationalBank,5 76 the Comptroller of the Currency approved a merger between two banks pursuant to the requirements of the
Bank Merger Act.5 7 7 The Court followed essentially the same

analysis as in FederalPower Commission, but went further because the suit in PhiladelphiaNational Bank arguably undermined not only the agency's decision, but the Bank Merger Act
itself.57 8 The Court found that the Bank Merger Act did not

give banking agencies the authority to enforce the antitrust laws
or to grant immunity from those laws. 579 The Court also noted
that "[a]lthough the Comptroller was required to consider [the]
effect upon competition in passing upon [the banks'] merger
application, he was not required to give this factor any particular weight." 580 Finally, the Court again found that the regulatory
374 U.S. 321 (1963).
57 Id. at 332. The Court noted that the statute required the Comptroller to "take
into consideration the effect of the transaction on competition (including any tendency
toward monopoly), and ... not approve the transaction unless, after considering all
of such factors, it finds the transaction to be in the public interest." Id. at 333 n.8
(quoting Bank Merger Act, 74 Stat. 129 (1960) (current version at 12 U.S.C. § 1828)
576

(1994)).
578See id. at 384-85 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (arguing that as a result of the majority
opinion, "the Bank Merger Act is almost completely nullified," the "only vestige"
remaining being "that the banking agencies will have an initial veto"). Of course, the
Bank Merger Act would not be completely nullified in the sense that the Government
might simply decline to challenge a merger which the Comptroller had approved on
antitrust grounds. Moreover, the only issue in PhiladelphiaNat'l Bank was whether
a suit could be brought under the Clayton Act; there was no dispute that the Bank
Merger Act did not immunize an antitrust challenge under the Sherman Act. Id. at
354.
57 Id. at 351. The Court reached its conclusion despite the fact that at the time the
Bank Merger Act was passed, at least some members of Congress as well as the
Justice Department assumed that § 7 of the Clayton Act did not apply to bank
mergers. Id. at 348. The Court found that because "the appplicability of § 7 to bank
mergers" was a "subject of speculation" this assumption was largely irrelevant in
determining Congressional intent in passing Section 7, see id. at 348-49, and therefore,
irrelevant to the immunity question.
Justice Harlan's dissent, on the other hand, emphasized the importance of the fact
that this assumption was held by members of Congress and the Justice Department.
See id. at 373-74, 377-79, 381, 384 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice Harlan also relied
on statements in the legislative history to the effect that competition was not supposed
to be the controlling factor in merger approvals by the Comptroller. Id. at 382-83
(Harlan, J., dissenting).
580 Id. at 351. The Court went on to state that the Comptroller "was not even
required to (and did not) hold a hearing before approving the application; and there
is no specific provision for judicial review of his decision." Id. at 351. But given the
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regime established under the statute did not amount to "pervasive regulation" of the banking industry, as banking regulation,
though extensive, did not for the most part cover the type of
conduct most likely to conflict with the antitrust laws: There was
no rate regulation, no prohibition on discrimination, and no
restriction on where banks could make loans and solicit deposits.581

The trilogy of cases reviewed in this section stand for the proposition that agency review of private transactions under a public interest standard does not confer antitrust immunity. Such
review does not amount to "pervasive regulation," even if the
agency considers the antitrust implications of the challenged
conduct, even if the antitrust plaintiff can make its case before
the agency at hearings, and even if appellate courts review the
agency decision. Although the Court has never fully articulated
why the antitrust laws take priority over agency approval of
private conduct, we think this approach makes sense from both
a political and pragmatic perspective. Politically, the Court's
decisions recognize that absent some clear indication from Congress, agencies lack the authority to determine the scope of
possibly conflicting statutes. Pragmatically, the decisions implicitly recognize that the dangers of capture, corruption, and collusion-however great they are at the legislative level-may be
even greater at the agency level.
What implications do these three cases have in the context of
anticompetitve lawyer conduct in class actions? Each of the
three cases involved statutory schemes with far stronger claims
to creating antitrust immunity than has Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23. Rule 23 does not even contemplate the possibility of anticompetitive lawyer conduct, let alone direct the court
to consider the effects of class action settlements on competition
fact that in FederalPower Comm'n, there had been both a hearing and judicial review,
it is hard to see why these facts mattered. FederalPower Comm'n, 369 U.S. at 484.
In any case, the Court elsewhere in the opinion suggests that the existence of judicial
review is not critical to the immunity question. See PhiladelphiaNat'l Bank, 374 U.S.
at 351 n.30 (suggesting that judicial review of the Comptroller's decision might be
possible, but intimating no view on the question); see also id. at 354 ("But here there
may be no power of judicial review of the administrative decision approving the
merger, and such approval does not in any event confer immunity from the antitrust
laws.") (emphasis added).
581Id. at 352.
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policy. Further, with regard to the pragmatic perspective that
these cases implicitly endorse, courts in class actions seem to be
exposed to the same capture, corruption, and collusion influences as federal agencies. Those who think courts immune have
not paid sufficient attention to court behavior in class actions.
Judges have a strong self-interest in settling these lawsuits-docket clearance being perhaps the strongest-even if
those settlements have various troubling features.5s2
c.

Has the Court Retreated?

Since it decided RCA, the Court has found implied federal
regulatory immunity from the antitrust laws in three cases. 583
One of the three cases involved airline regulation under the
Federal Aviation Act; the two other cases involved securities
regulation under several different statutes. These cases do not
signal a retreat from the position that agency approval of private
conduct alone is insufficient to create antitrust immunity; instead, they represent fairly narrow exceptions to the general
presumption against finding implied immunity. In each of these
cases there was explicit language in the statute that either endorsed specific, potentially anticompetitive conduct that the
agency had the authority to approve, or empowered the agency
with antitrust enforcement authority. No similar features exist
in any statute governing class actions.
The first case, Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. United
States,584 involved allegations of anticompetitive activity by Pan
Am in connection with Panagra, a joint venture between Pan
Am and W.R. Grace. The lawsuit, which the Civil Aeronautics
582 See supra Section II.C.
583In another case, Hughes Tool Co. v. Trans World Airlines, 409 U.S. 363 (1973),

the Court found antitrust immunity based on an express provision in the statute
immunizing agency approval of certain private transactions from antitrust liability. Id.
at 384-85. Hughes Tool held that because the agency involved had engaged in
continuous supervision and approval, the statute's express immunity applied although
in approving the transactions the agency did not specifically consider and approve the
anticompetitive aspects of the conduct. Id. at 389. Lawyers involved in class actions
have no plausible claim of express immunity; therefore, we find Hughes Tool
inapplicable to our discussion of antitrust suits controlling lawyer conduct in class
actions and do not discuss this case further (although it can be distinguished on other
grounds as well).
584371 U.S. 296 (1963).
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Board ("CAB") had asked the Government to file, alleged that
Pan Am had formed Panagra pursuant to a market division
agreement in which Pan Am had agreed not to compete in certain locations and Panagra had agreed not to compete in others,

and further alleged that Pan Am had used its control over Panagra to prevent Panagra from seeking the CAB's approval to
extend its routes into the United States. 585
The Court found that Section 411 of the Federal Aviation
Act,586 which gave the CAB authority to determine whether any

air carrier had been or was engaged in unfair methods of competition, and which further empowered the CAB to issue a
cease and desist order to respond to unfair methods, created an

implied antitrust immunity.5 87 The Court reasoned that the antitrust challenge involved division of territories, the limitation of
routes and the relations of common carriers to "air carriers,"
each "precise ingredients of the Board's authority. ' 588 Also, the
Government sought only injunctive relief and divestiture, and
the Court found that the CAB had the power under the statute
to grant both of those remedies against the specific conduct
alleged.589 Most important to its holding, the Court found that
the "unfair methods of competition" language of Section 411 of
585Id. at 298.

586 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. 85-726, § 411, 72 Stat. 731, 769 (1958)
(similar contemporary provision at 49 U.S.C. § 41712 (1994)).
587 See Pan Am, 371 U.S. at 309-310. Section 414 of the Federal Aviation Act of
1958 contain[ed] an express immunity provision for certain transactions approved by
the Civil Aeronautics Board. 49 U.S.C. § 1384 (1958) (similar contemporary provision
at 49 U.S.C. § 41308 (1994)). In Pan Am, express immunity did not apply both
because the CAB had not issued an "order" approving the conduct, id. at 298 (noting
that CAB had asked the government to file the antitrust suit), and because even if it
bad, the alleged conduct was not specifically covered by the statutory exemption
because it originated before the enactment of the statute, id. at 309 (noting that § 414
would apply to prospective application of the statute, but § 411 applies even to
conduct predating the statute); id. at 320 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting that the
Court conceded that the Board could not have issued an order that would qualify for
express immunity). In Hughes Tool, the Court relied on § 414's express immunity
provision. Hughes Tool, 409 U.S. at 386-87.
588 Pan Am, 371 U.S. at 305.
589 The Court contrasted Pan Am with Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 324 U.S.
439, 455-56 (1945), describing the two cases as "quite unlike" one another due to the
fact that in Pennsylvania R.R. the agency involved (the Interstate Commerce
Commission) lacked the authority to issue an injunction against the conduct in
question. See Pan Am, 371 U.S. at 305-06 & 306 n.11.
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the Federal Aviation Act derived from Section 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act,590 and that Section 411 was therefore

591
"designed to bolster and strengthen antitrust enforcement."
The Court concluded that "the Act leaves to the Board under

Section 411 all questions of injunctive relief" against the anticompetitive conduct alleged by the Government.5 92
PanAm creates a fairly narrow exception to the presumption

against implying immunity. It merely holds that if a statute
specifically grants an agency the equivalent of antitrust enforcement powers, conduct within the agency's normal regulatory
authority is immune from antitrust suits when those antitrust
suits seek a remedy that the agency could grant.5 93

590 Id. at 303 ("[S]ection [411] was patterned after § 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act."). See also id. at 306-307 (discussing the relevance of the Federal
Trade Commission Act in determining the scope of the language "unfair methods of
competition" in the Federal Aviation Act).
591 Id. at 307. As the dissent points out, however, § 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act was not intended to displace antitrust enforcement, either by the
Justice Department or by private parties. See id. at 324 (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(asserting that "§ 5 has uniformly been construed to provide for dual enforcement by
courts and agency of the antitrust laws, not exclusive enforcement by the agency").
It is not clear from the Court's opinion whether private antitrust suits seeking
injunctive relief would be barred, though the Court does note that the unfair methods
of competition language as used in § 411 of the Federal Aviation Act "do[es] not
embrace a remedy for private wrongs but only a means of vindicating the public
interest." Id. at 306.
592 Id. at 310. The Court further noted that "[i]f it were clear that there was a
remedy in this civil antitrust suit that was not available in a § 411 proceeding before
the C.A.B.," there would be no immunity, but the antitrust court would have to give
primary jurisdiction to the CAB to make factual findings. Id. at 313 n.19. As Justice
Brennan points out in his dissent, the Court's approach suggests that a suit for
damages might still have been available. Id. at 321, 326 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
593
The fact that Pan Am predates United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S.
321 (1963), in which the Court rejected a claim of immunity in the absence of such a
statutory provision, supports this narrow interpretation of Pan Am. Ricci v. Chicago
Mercantile Exch., 409 U.S. 289 (1973), further supports this interpretation of Pan Am.
In Ricci, the Court declined to find that the Commodity Exchange Act conferred
general antitrust immunity on exclusionary conduct by commodity exchanges. The
Court's rationale, in part, was that the area of administrative authority created by the
statute did not appear to be particularly focused on competitive considerations, as the
statute contained no express provision directing administrative officials to consider the
antitrust law policies in carrying out their duties nor any other indication "that
Congress intended the adjudicative authority given the Commission and the Secretary
to be a complete substitute for judicial enforcement." Ricci, 409 U.S. at 302-03 n.13.
However, in Ricci, the Court applied the primary jurisdiction doctrine to require that
the antitrust court stay its hand until the agency had ruled on whether the challenged
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The two securities cases create equally narrow exceptions to
the presumption against immunity. In Gordon v. New York
Stock Exchange,594 the Court unanimously found that the
NYSE's rule fixing broker commissions was immune from antitrust challenge. The Court relied primarily on language in
Section 19(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, which it found
gave the SEC direct regulatory power over exchange rules and
practices with respect to "the fixing of reasonable rates of
commission." Not only was the SEC authorized to disapprove
rules and practices concerning commission rates, but the
agency also was permitted to require alteration or supplementation of the rules and practices . . . .595
Because the SEC could not merely approve or disapprove of the
price fixing but could also require alteration or supplementation
of private rules and practices, the Court found a direct conflict
between the regulatory regime and the antitrust laws not present
in the RCA group of cases denying immunity.5 96 The conflict
was that "the exchanges might find themselves unable to proceed without violation of the mandate of the courts or of the
SEC. '597 But the Court did not seem to rely solely on the statconduct violated the Commodity Exchange Act. Id. at 302.
594 422 U.S. 659 (1975).
595 Id. at 685.
596See supra Section IV.C.I.b.
597 Gordon, 422 U.S. at 689 (emphasis added). In a nearby footnote, the Court
distinguished PhiladelphiaNat'l Bank, in part, on the "lack of conflict between the
Bank Merger Act and Clayton Act standards." Id. at 689-90 n.14. But because the
standards of the Bank Merger Act and Clayton Act did in fact conflict in Philadelphia
Nat'l Bank, what the Court must have meant was that because the Comptroller could
not mandate mergers (the anticompetitive conduct), but could merely approve them,
banks would never face conflicting mandates from the Comptroller and an antitrust
court. The same was true in California v. Federal Power Commission, 369 U.S. 482
(1962).
A harder case is presented if a party asks the agency not to approve but to stop
anticompetitive conduct. This was the situation in Otter Tail Power Co. v. United
States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973). In that case, Otter Tail Power refused to sell wholesale
power to municipalities. Some of the municipalities asked the Federal Power
Commission (FPC) to compel the utility to provide the power. The Court held that
the FPC's authority to compel "procompetitive" conduct did not provide antitrust
immunity. Otter Tail Power, 410 U.S. at 375-76 ("[T]here is no basis for concluding
that the limited authority of the Federal Power Commission to order interconnections
was intended to be a substitute for, or to immunize Otter Tail from, antitrust
regulation for refusing to deal with municipal corporations."). The Court explicitly
reserved the question of what would happen if the FPC had issued an order refusing
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ute's explicit grant to the SEC of the power to alter exchange
rules and practices;598 in addition, it emphasized active regulatory oversight by the SEC5 99 as well as repeated congressional

approval of exchange commission rate practices
holding.

0 in

reaching its

The other securities law case finding implied antitrust immunity, United States v. NationalAssociation of Securities Dealers,60 1

goes beyond Gordon and seems to present a more expansive
approach to federal regulatory immunity than the Court has
taken in its other cases.6m In NASD, the Government alleged

that mutual fund underwriters and broker-dealers entered into
agreements "to restrict the sale and fix the resale prices of mu-

tual-fund shares in secondary market transactions between dealers, from an investor to a dealer, and between investors through
brokered transactions.

' 60 3

The Court held the NASD's activities

to compel interconnection. Otter Tail Power, 410 U.S. at 375-77.
598See Gordon, 422 U.S. at 685 (noting that "this case involves explicit statutory
authorization for SEC review of all exchange rules and practices dealing with rates of
commission and resultant SEC continuing activity."); see also id. at 691 (resting
immunity on "the statutory provision authorizing regulation, § 19(b)(9), the long
regulatory practice, and the continued congressional approval" together).
599
See id. at 685 (noting the SEC's "active role in review of proposed rate changes
during the last 15 years"); see also Gordon, 422 U.S. at 689 ("[T]he commission rate
practices of the exchanges have been subjected to the scrutiny and approval of the
SEC."); id. at 690 ("[T]he SEC has been engaged in deep and serious study of the
commission rate practices of the exchanges and of their members, and has required
major changes in those practices.").
It is also interesting to note that the Court distinguished PhiladelphiaNat'l Bank, in
part, on the basis of "an absence of continuing regulatory oversight." Id. at 690 n.14.
Because PhiladelphiaNat'l Bank involved a merger, it is not clear what "continuing
oversight" would accomplish. Perhaps the Court is suggesting that when an agency
approves a transaction that has continuous anticompetitive effects, the Court will
almost never find immunity because "continuous oversight" by the agency is infeasible.
In the class action context, courts do not exercise "continuous oversight." See supra
notes 516-518 and accompanying text.
w See Gordon, 422 U.S. at 690 (stating that "Congress has indicated its continued
approval of SEC review of the cbmmission rate structure").
601 422 U.S. 694 (1975) [hereinafter NASD].
602 See Gail Yvonne Norton, Comment, The Antitrust Immunity Doctrine and
United States v. National Association of Securities Dealers: Stepping on Otter Tail,
28 Hastings L.J. 387 (1976) [hereinafter Hastings Comment].
603NASD, 422 U.S. at 700. The Government also alleged that the NASD had
conspired with its member dealers to prevent the growth of a secondary market in
mutual fund shares. Id. at 701-02.

1234

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 82:1051

immune from antitrust liability in light of the regulatory scheme
created by the Investment Company Act of 1940.04
The Investment Company Act had been "designed to restrict

most of secondary market trading" in mutual fund shares, and
thereby curb the perceived abuses in that market. 605 One section of the Act eliminated price competition in certain secondary market sales, and arguably created an implicit antitrust im-

munity, but that section was inapplicable in NASD.
The section that did apply, Section 22(f), 607 did not explicitly eliminate
price competition, but merely authorized funds "to impose restrictions on the negotiability and transferability of their shares,"
provided they "do not contravene any rules and regulations the
[SEC] may prescribe."' 608 The SEC had not prescribed any such
rules and regulations, but had left it up to the underwriters and
broker-dealers to develop the restrictions themselves.
Without bothering to distinguish its prior cases refusing to find
immunity in the face of agency approval of private conduct, the
Court stated simply: "Congress has made a judgment that these
604 Id. at 729-30 (construing § 22 of the Investment Company Act of 1940, codified
at 15 U.S.C. § 22 (1970)).
605 See id. at 700. The problem addresed by the Act was the "two-price system"
problem. The price of mutual fund shares was typically set daily, based on the prior
day's prices of the securities in the fund's portfolio. After the close of the stock
exchange, there was a divergence between the existing mutual fund price, based on the
prior day's stock prices, and the next day's mutual fund price, based on the closing
stock prices. Insider dealers and others were able to take advantage of this spread in
prices by engaging in arbitrage trading in the secondary market. See id. at 706-07.
See also Hastings Comment, supra note 602, at 417-18.
606 Section 22(d) of the Act eliminated price competition in dealer sales of mutual
fund shares by prohibiting dealers from selling these shares "to any person except a
dealer, a principal underwriter, or the issuer, except at a current public offering price
described in the prospectus." NASD, 422 U.S. at 711 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 80a-22(d)
(1970)). By its terms, § 22(d) excepts sales between dealers, and the Court held that
§ 22(d) also does not cover sales made by a broker-dealer acting as a broker, that is,
selling as an agent for an investor rather than for the broker's own account. Id. at
at 711-20.
607 This section provides:
No registered open-end company shall restrict the transferability or negotiability
of any security of which it is the issuer except in conformity with the statements
with respect thereto contained in its registration statement nor in contravention
of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe in the interests
of the holders of all of the outstanding securities of such investment company.
15 U.S.C. § 80a-22(f) (1970).
608 NASD, 422 U.S. at 720-21.
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restrictions on competition might be necessitated by the unique
problems of the mutual-fund industry, and has vested in the
SEC final authority to determine whether and to what extent
they should be tolerated ....
w" Having divined congressional
intent to immunize private conduct from antitrust liability, the
Court noted that the fact that the SEC had merely acquiesced
in fund-initiated restrictions for over thirty years did not mean
the SEC was asleep at the wheel, but rather that it had made
"an informed administrative judgment that the contractual restrictions employed by the funds to protect their shareholders
were appropriate means for combating the problems of the industry. ' 610 Ultimately, the Court held that the Act's encouragement of restrictions in the secondary market by NASD and its
members immunized their conduct from antitrust attack, because the "close relationship 61 1 between the challenged activity
and "the restriction that the SEC consistently has approved
pursuant to § 22(f)" 612 made "the SEC's exercise of regulatory
authority.., sufficiently pervasive to confer an implied immunity." 613
NASD lends the strongest support to a claim of federal regulatory immunity for lawyers in federal class actions. It is the only
case in which the Court has found antitrust immunity arising out
of no more than an agency's approval of private conduct and
the pervasiveness of the regulatory regime. 614 It involved a stat609 Id.
610 Id.

at 729.

611Id.
612Id.

at 733.

at 728. See also id. at 734 (noting that "the history of [SEC] regulations
suggests no laxity in the exercise of [its] authority.").
at 733.

613Id.

at 730. The Court summarized its holding as follows:
In this instance, maintenance of an antitrust action for activities so directly

related to the SEC's responsibilities poses a substantial danger that appellees
would be subjected to duplicative and inconsistent standards. This is hardly a
result that Congress would have mandated. We therefore hold that with respect
to the activities [of NASD and its members] challenged in Count I of the

complaint, the Sherman Act has been displaced by the pervasive regulatory
scheme established by the Maloney and Investment Company Acts.

Id. at 735.
614The Court had suggested in a prior securities case, Silver v. New York Stock
Exchange, 373 U.S. 341 (1963), that because the Securities Exchange Act expressly
contemplated a degree of self-regulation and mandated a duty of self-policing by stock
exchanges, there might be antitrust immunity for anticompetitive acts by exchanges.
Silver, 373 U.S. at 360-61. In reaching this conclusion, the Court considered § 6(b) of
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ute that does not grant antitrust enforcement powers to the
SEC, as the Federal Aviation Act granted the CAB in Pan
Am. 615 Nor was there active agency and congressional oversight,
as there was in Gordon.6 6 Moreover, the Court did not focus
on the possibility that the SEC might require anticompetitive
the Securities Exchange Act, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b)(6), which requires
exchanges that register with the SEC to maintain rules providing for the expulsion of
a member for conduct "inconsistent with just and equitable principles of trade."
Silver, 373 U.S. at 353.
In Silver, however, the Court held that NYSE's termination of a nonmember's wire
connections with NYSE members was not immune from the antitrust laws because
NYSE had not provided any procedural safeguards against abuse. Silver, 373 U.S. at
364 ("Our decision today ... holds that [the Securities Exchatnge Act] affords no
justification for anticompetitive collective action taken without according fair
procedures."). Invoking PennsylvaniaR.R., Silver, 373 U.S. at 357, the Court held that
the statute was "not sufficiently pervasive to create a total exemption [for exchange
self-regulatory acts] from the antitrust laws," Silver, 373 U.S. at 360-61, because the
SEC lacked "jurisdiction over particular applications of exchange rules." Id. at 358.
And although the Court suggested that if the exchange provided procedural safeguards
there might be partial immunity for "particular instances of exchange self-regulation,"
id. at 358-60, 361, the Court found "no need ... to define further whether the
interposing of a substantive justification in an antitrust suit brought to challenge a
particular enforcement of the rules on its merits is to be governed by a standard of
arbitrariness, good faith, reasonableness, or some other measure." Id. at 365-66.
In Ricci v. Chicago Mercantile Exchange, 409 U.S. 289 (1973), the Court took a
slight step beyond Silver, rejecting a total exemption from the antitrust laws but
suggesting that a limited immunity might apply where a member of the Chicago
Mercantile Exchange claimed the Exchange had wrongfully transferred his
membership. Id. at 303. The Court suggested limited immunity might apply because
the Commodity Exchange Act required that all dealers in commodity futures be "a
member of a board of trade," id. at 303, and therefore, it "clearly contemplate[d] a
membership organization and hence the existence of criteria for the acquisition,
transfer, and loss of membership." Id. at 303. But because the Commodity Exchange
Commission had jurisdiction over the Exchange's conduct (unlike the SEC in Silver),
the Court held that under the primary jurisdiction doctrine, the antitrust court should
wait until the agency decided whether the conduct was lawful under the Commodity
Exchange Act before deciding the antitrust immunity question. Id. at 304-06. The
Court did not, therefore, hold that agency approval of the conduct would result in
antitrust immunity.
615 See supra notes 590-591 and accompanying text; see also Hastings Comment,
supra note 602, at 424-25.
616 See supra notes 598-600 and accompanying text; see also Hastings Comment,
supra note 602, at 423-24. In this sense, NASD suggests that federal regulatory
immunity can sometimes be stronger (more likely to be applied) than state action
immunity, in that federal statutes can give more leeway to private conduct with less
active supervision. However, comparing Pennsylvania R.R. with Southern Motor
Carrierssuggests that federal regulatory immunity is generally weaker than state action
immunity.
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conduct and therefore subject regulated firms to inconsistent
mandates, a point the Court had emphasized in Gordon.
Rather, the Court in NASD suggested that the mere fact that
the statute permits private parties to enter anticompetitive agreements is alone sufficient to establish "clear repugnancy" with
617
the antitrust laws.

Was the Court in NASD trying to undermine its prior jurispru-

dence on federal regulatory immunity? 618 We think the answer
is no.619 NASD is unique because the regulatory regime in-

volved in the case is unique. Congress had essentially decided
in the Investment Company Act that competition in the secondary market for mutual funds should be restricted to promote
competition in the primary market. Congress sought to restrict
competition in the secondary market directly through Section
22.620 Congress thereby reversed the ordinary presumption in
617 See NASD, 422 U.S. at 729 ("There can be no reconciliation of [the SEC's]
authority under § 22(f) to permit these and similar restrictive agreements with the
Sherman Act's declaration that they are illegal per se.").
618The dissenting Justices thought so. See id. at 735-48 (White, J., dissenting, joined
by Justices Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall). A case can be made that NASD
represents an example of the new Burger Court majority trying to undo Warren Court
precedents with which it disagreed. (The same could be said of Southern Motor
Carriersin the state action context). We prefer the explanation that follows in the
text, however.
619Several courts trying to interpret the NASD decision agree. See North Carolina
ex rel. Edmisten v. P.I.A. Asheville, Inc., 740 F.2d 274, 284 n.10 (4th Cir. 1984) (en
bane), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1003 (1985) (recognizing that NASD "represents
something of an aberration" from the line of prior implied regulatory immunity cases,
but finding that "[m]ore recent cases," such as Cantor reaffirmed the prior "plain
repugnancy test"); Oahu Gas Serv. v. Pacific Resources, 460 F. Supp. 1359, 1373 (D.
Haw. 1978) ("NASD's rationale is quite puzzling and the import of the decision is
unclear," but "NASD cannot be given so expansive a reading as to discard three
decades of well-established and consistent antitrust immunity precedent, for the preNASD axioms were reaffirmed in Cantor...."); cf. Hastings Comment, supra note
602, at 429 ("Having failed either expressly to discard traditional immunity criteria on
the one hand, or to unambiguously promulgate new ones on the other, the NASD
holding is little more than a legal conundrum, and simply cannot be said to be the
stuff of which judicial revolutions are made. It would not appear unreasonable to
predict that the lower courts and the antitrust bar will agree ....). But see Finnegan
v. Campeau Corp., 915 F.2d 824, 828-29 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 976
(1991) (relying on NASD, Gordon, and Silver to find implied antitrust immunity and
ignoring all prior cases).
620See NASD, 422 U.S. at 724-25 (explaining how § 22(d) and § 22(f) work together
to restrict secondary market sales). Not all agree that the purpose of § 22 was
anticompetitive. Recall that the specific purpose of § 22 was to end the arbitrage
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favor of competition policy,621 which makes this statutory
scheme unlike those in RCA, FederalPower Commission and
PhiladelphiaNational Bank. This difference may explain why
the NASD Court never attempted to distinguish those cases and
why it relied on reasoning that those cases had seemed to
reject. 622 None of the regulatory schemes involved in those
cases had as their primary purpose the restriction of competition
trading opportunities arising out of the mutual fund two-price system. See supra note
605. According to one critic of NASD, although § 22 "could arguably be interpreted
as having an anticompetitive regulatory objective"--to curb those abuses in the
secondary market- "it does not follow that the underlying regulatory objective was
to eliminate competition categorically in the market for mutual funds." Hastings
Comment, supra note 602, at 418. This criticism misses the Court's point. It is evident
that § 22 cuts more broadly than simply restricting arbitrage trading to eliminate the
two-price system problem in the secondary market. It is also evident that Congress
could have, see id. at 421 (noting prior version of bill that would have granted the
SEC power to eliminate "backward pricing"), and later did, see id. at 419, n.196
(discussing "forward pricing system" established in 1968), regulate more narrowly to
eliminate that problem.
The Court's point is that Congress, in enacting § 22(0, deliberately chose an
overbroad regulatory scheme, a scheme that expressly allowed the SEC to approve
private agreements restricting competition in the secondary market. Once Congress
enacted a statute that permitted private anticompetitive restraints, it did not matter
that some competition in the secondary market would be consistent with both the
purpose of § 22 and the antitrust laws. Cf. id. at 419 (arguing that if § 22's "main
function was simply to insure a generally orderly distributive system, it is still not
apparent from the rather superficial economic analysis in NASD that such an orderly
system could not in fact accommodate secondary market transactions").
621For the sake of clarity in doctrine, it would have been helpful if the Court had
made this point more explicitly.
622The reasoning rejected includes: (1) the idea that an agency's authority to
disapprove of private conduct, which authority has not been exercised, is sufficient to
create immunity, see RCA, 358 U.S. at 352-53 (no immunity even though agency
approved contract); Federal Power Comm'n, 369 U.S. at 485-86 (no immunity even
though agency approved merger); Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. at 351 (no
immunity even though agency approved merger); (2) the idea that whether an agency
weighs competitive concerns in the absence of a statutory mandate is relevant to
whether the Court should find implied immunity, see RCA, 358 U.S. at 338 (no
immunity even though agency "decided all issues relative to the antitrust laws that
were before it"); Federal Power Comm'n, 369 U.S. at 484-86 (no immunity even
though agency invited Justice Department to participate in hearings because agency
did not have the power to enforce the antitrust laws); Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374
U.S. at 351 ("Although the Comptroller was required to consider [the] effect upon
competition in passing upon [the banks'] merger application, he was not required to
give this factor any particular weight; . . ."); and (3) the idea that there is a danger
that regulated firms will face inconsistent standards simply because an antitrust court
might disapprove of conduct that an agency had previously approved, see supra note
597.
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in some market. 6 3 Even in the railroad rate regulation cases,
although the Interstate Commerce Act arguably did seek to
restrict competition in rates, the reasonableness standaid of that
statute did not declare all price competition in the market suspect. 6 4 By contrast, the statute attempting to eliminate unwanted arbitrage at issue in NASD cannot tolerate a zone of
reasonableness; any undercutting of the set market price is undesirable. Viewed this way, NASD squares with the rest of the
Court's federal regulatory immunity jurisprudence. If Congress
adopts a policy against competition in some market and expressly permits private anticompetitive conduct subject to
agency oversight, it creates an immunity from the antitrust
laws.62613For further evidence that this factor was important to the Court's decision, see
Otter Tail Power v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 374 (1973) (refusing to find a
"pervasive regulatory scheme" creating antitrust immunity where the regulatory statute
evidences "an overriding policy of maintaining competition to the maximum extent
possible consistent with the public interest").
624 Recall that in the state action context, however, the Court in Southern Motor
Carriersconcluded that rate regulation-at least where accompanied by a requirement
that the regulatory agency set rates based on noncompetitive factors-was inconsistent
with competition policy.
w This reading of NASD would arguably lead to a different result in Finnegan v.
Campeau Corp., 915 F.2d 824 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 976 (1991). In
that case, the Second Circuit held that bidding agreements in corporate
takeovers-including agreements to refrain from such bidding-enjoy antitrust
immunity because the Williams Act implicitly repealed the Sherman Act with respect
to the regulation of such agreements. Finnegan,915 F.2d at 828. The court reasoned
that the Williams Act and accompanying regulations explicitly contemplate joint
bidding arrangements, which Congress and the SEC have chosen to regulate only by
requiring their disclosure. Finnegan,915 F.2d at 830. The court then concluded: "We
cannot presume that Congress has allowed competing bidders to make a joint bid
under the Williams Act and the SEC's regulations and taken that right away by
authorizing suit against such joint bidders under the antitrust laws." Id. In our view,
the mere fact that the Williams Act contemplates joint bidding does not express a
policy against competition any more than a partnership statute does. Not all joint bids
to achieve a corporate takeover would restrain competition or violate the antitrust
laws. See Edward B. Rock, Antitrust and the Market for Corporate Control, 77 Calif.
L. Rev. 1365, 1393 (1989) ("Allowing individuals to band together to make tender
offers may be procompetitive: It may permit some bidders to enter the bidding, or
create new bidders for larger targets, thereby increasing the competition in the market
for corporate control."). Most important for present purposes, there is no indication
in the text or legislative history of the Williams Act that Congress intended to allow
restraints of trade in the market for corporate control; if anything, Congress' intention
seems to be to promote competition in this market. See id. at 1393-94. Thus,
Congress in the Williams Act did not reverse the general presumption in favor of
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Most important for our purposes, in the class action context,
NASD can have no application. Congress has adopted no policy
against competition in class actions in Rule 23 or any federal
statute. Even if class actions themselves could be viewed as anticompetitive, as we argued in the state action section, 626 the
fact that Congress permits class actions does not mean that Congress intends to displace competition in either the market for
class counsel or the market for lawyer services in a private administrative system created by a class action settlement. NASD
is perfectly consistent with the theme of Cantor-thatin deciding questions of antitrust immunity, courts must focus on the
relevant market. 627 It does not adopt a "pervasive regulation"
approach to immunity. Rather, NASD adopts a particularistic
regulation approach: The market at issue must be examined to
see whether Congress has adopted a policy against competition
in that market. There is no such policy as to the markets on
which we have focused. NASD, therefore, does not support a
claim of antitrust immunity for lawyers in cases involving conduct like that in Oracle and Georgine.
Furthermore, if NASD does not apply, the ordinary presumptions of the federal regulatory immunity cases kick in. That is,
the fact that an agency approves a rate as reasonable or a private transaction as consistent with the public interest is not sufficient to displace the antitrust laws. Courts appointing class
counsel, approving class action settlements and retaining jurisdiction over subsequent private administrative systems do no
more than the federal agencies whose actions the Court has held

competition. It did not intend in the Williams Act to restrict competition in the
market for corporate control by allowing joint bidding; it intended to improve
competition in this market by facilitating bids that might not otherwise be made. For
a further critique of the case, see Comment, Implied Repeal of the Sherman Act Via
the Williams Act: Finnegan v. Campeau Corp., 65 St. John's L. Rev. 965 (1991).
In any event, those class action lawyers who would seek solace in Finnegan, because
the challenged activity in that case (agreements not to bid) may be similar to some of
the activity we have discussed here, should think again. There is no statute
comparable to the Williams Act that permits or contemplates bidding agreements of
any sort by lawyers.
626See supra notes 479-487 and accompanying text.
627
The relevant market for immunity purposes is the market in which the legislature
intends to displace competition. See supra notes 484-487 and accompanying text.
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insufficient to create immunity. Once again, we conclude that
class action lawyers do not have the cloak they imagine.
2.

The Keogh Doctrine and Damage Suits

Even if private conduct is not fully immune from the antitrust
laws as a result of federal regulation, it might enjoy a limited
immunity: immunity from private treble damage actions. In
Keogh v. Chicago & Northwestern Railway Company,628 the

Court held that a shipper could not sue a cartel of railroad carriers for damages resulting from fixing a rate "higher than that
which would otherwise have prevailed," 629 when this rate had
been properly filed with, and after a formal hearing approved
by, the Interstate Commerce Commission. 630 The Court reaffirmed Keogh in Square D Company v. NiagaraFrontierTravel
Bureau, Inc.,631 and extended it to situations in which the ICC

had not held formal hearings before allowing the tariffs filed

with the agency to take effect. 632 If lawyer fees in class actions

prevent
are like tariffs in ICC regulation, then Keogh would
633
private treble damage actions by class members.
628260 U.S. 156 (1922).
629Id. at 163.
630Id. at 162.
631476 U.S. 409 (1986).
632Id. at 417.

633
We note at the outset that even if courts decided to apply the Keogh doctrine to
bar antitrust damage suits by class action members, Keogh would not bar injunctive
suits or criminal actions by the government. Keogh, 260 U.S. at 161-62. Nor would
it likely bar damage suits by competitor law firms harmed by the anticompetitive
activity. See Barnes v. Arden Mayfair, 759 F.2d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 1985) ("Keogh did
not.., hold that carriers are immune from all antitrust actions, only those for which
relief may be sought readily from the regulatory agency.... Because [the alleged]
activities would be beyond the scope of the ICC's jurisdiction, the antitrust action was
not subject to [summary judgment] dismissal."); City of Kirkwood v. Union Elec. Co.,
671 F.2d 1173, 1179 (8th Cir. 1982), cert denied, 459 U.S. 1170 (1983) (allowing
plaintiff's claim of antitrust injury caused by an alleged "price squeze" applied by
competitors and holding that neither "an award of antitrust damages nor the granting
of properly conditioned injunctive relief" would be barred); Essential Communications
Systems v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 610 F.2d 1114, 1122 (3d Cir. 1979)
(holding that damages and injunctive relief were not barred despite FCC oversight and
state tariff regulatory schemes). But see Pinney Dock & Transp. Co. v. Penn Central
Corp., 838 F.2d 1445, 1457 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 880 (1988) (holding Keogh
doctrine applicable to competitor suits); Lifschultz Fast Freight v. Consolidated
Freightways Corp., 805 F. Supp. 1277, 1295-96 (D.S.C. 1992) (holding filed rate
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But the Square D Court's reaffirmation of Keogh was lukewarm at best. Acknowledging criticisms of the doctrine, the
Court decided to preserve Keogh merely for stare decisis reasons. It noted that "the Keogh rule has been an established
guidepost at the intersection of the antitrust and interstate commerce statutory regimes for some 6 1/2 decades. ' '634 Moreover,
the Court was reluctant to overrule established doctrine "in an
area that has seen careful, intense, and sustained congressional
attention." 635 Given the Court's dim view of Keogh, lower
courts would probably be reluctant to expand the doctrine into
a new area not traditionally viewed as one of the "interstate
commerce statutory regimes," such as the class action area. 636
doctrine applicable to actions by competitors).
634Square D, 476 U.S. at 423.
635Id. at 424. In particular, Congress had passed the Reed-Bulwinkle Act, Pub. L.
No. 80-662, ch. 491, 62 Stat. 472 (1948) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 10706
(1994)), which immunized from the antitrust laws approved collective ratemaking
activities, 49 U.S.C. § 10706(b)(2), and the Motor Carrier Act of 1980, Pub. L. No.
96-296, 94 Stat. 793 (1980) (codified in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.), but had left
Keogh undisturbed. The Reed-Bulwinkle Act was at least in part a response to
Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 324 U.S. 439 (1945), which had allowed private
antitrust suits to enjoin collective ratemaking procedures used by railroads. See
Southern Motor Carriers,471 U.S. at 70 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The exemption
created by the Reed-Bulwinkle Act did not bar the antitrust suit in Square D because
the plaintiffs allegation was that the defendants had engaged in conduct that was not
authorized by the terms of the agreement approved by the ICC. Square D, 476 U.S.
at 413-14.
636It is true that outside of the antitrust arena, the Court has applied the Keogh
limitation to public utilities as the "filed rate doctrine." See Maislin Inds. v. Primary
Steel, 497 U.S. 116 (1990); Arkansas La. Gas Co. v. Hall, 453 U.S. 571 (1981);
Montana-Dakota Utils. Co. v. Northwestern Pub. Serv. Co., 341 U.S. 246 (1951).
Moreover, lower courts after Square D have strengthened and expanded the filed rate
doctrine to cover RICO claims, to cover state regulation as well as federal regulation,
and to reject a "fraud on the agency" exception. See, e.g., Sun City Taxpayers' Ass'n
v. Citizens Utils. Co., 45 F.3d 58, 62 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 115 S. Ct. 1693 (1995)
(RICO suit for submitting false information to state agency; no fraud exception);
Wegoland, Ltd. v. Nynex Corp., 27 F.3d 17, 22 (2d Cir. 1994) (RICO class action; no
fraud exception); Taffet v. Southern Co., 967 F.2d 1483, 1494-95 (11th Cir.) (en banc),
cert denied, 506 U.S. 1021 (1992) (RICO suit against state-regulated utility; no fraud
exception); H.J., Inc v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 954 F.2d 485, 488-92, 494 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 957 (1992) (RICO class action against state-regulated
utility alleging that regulated utility bribed state agency; court holds no fraud
exception to filed rate doctrine and that filed rate doctrine applies to state agencies).
We do not focus on the recent lower court "filed rate doctrine" cases for several
reasons. One reason is that these cases do not involve antitrust claims. Thus, to the
extent they establish broader standards of immunity than Keogh and Square D., these
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A close examination of the reasoning in Keogh supports the
conclusion that courts would be unlikely to extend it to the class
action settlement context. 637 First, the Keogh Court noted that
the Commerce Act already provided a damage remedy for the
charging of "illegal" rates, so if the ICC had found the rates to

be "unreasonably high" the shipper would have been able to
recover any damages in an action either before the ICC or in
federal court.63 The Court then asked rhetorically whether
Congress should be presumed to have intended an "additional
remedy" under the antitrust laws. 639 In the class action context,
the Court would not reach its rhetorical question: There is no
comparable damage remedy under Rule 23 available to a class
member charged an "unreasonably high or discriminatory" fee
by class counsel or individual counsel in the administrative proceeding. The only possible remedy would be a motion under
Rule 60(b), which, if available in this context, is a far cry from
an equivalent damage remedy. 640 Moreover, since Keogh the
standards may not apply to the antitrust laws, which enjoy a privileged position among
federal statutes. Moreover, there is no reason to think that courts would extend these
cases beyond public utilities to class actions, because the rationale used in the utility
cases just does not fit. For example, in Taffet the court pointed out that allowing
consumer suits against public utilities would inevitably raise the prices that those same
consumers would have to pay, as the utilities would add legal expenses to their rate
base. Taffet, 967 F.2d at 1492. In contrast, allowing suits against class lawyers would
have no such necessary effect because offending firms would still have to compete with
other firms in future class actions. See also supra notes 556-557 and accompanying
text (discussing other differences between ICC rate regulation and class actions).
637Judge Friendly's opinion for the court of appeals in Square D argues that the
rationales in Keogh no longer support the Court's holding in that case due to
subsequent developments. Square D, 760 F.2d at 1352-56. Professor Hovenkamp
suggests that at the very least, the problems with the Court's reasoning inKeogh
supports narrowly construing the case. Hovenkamp, supra note 136, § 19.6, at 660
(asserting that "a doctrine as indefensible as Keogh should be narrowly construed").
Our argument is that even if the rationales are accepted on the terms laid out by
Keogh, they do not apply to the class action context.
638 Keogh, 260 U.S. at 162.
639Id. at 162 ("Can it be that Congress intended to provide the shipper, from whom
illegal rates have been exacted, with an additionalremedy under the Anti-Trust Act?")
(emphasis added).
640 See supra Section II.B (discussing the difference between disgorgement remedies
and remedies that provide damages, particularly punitive or treble damages). Rule
60(b) operates to vacate an earlier judgment, reversing whatever relief the first court
ordered. It does not provide damages to the party who succeeds in getting a judgment
reversed. Moreover, it is not clear that an antitrust violation by class lawyers
constitutes "fraud... or other misconduct of an adverse party" or a "fraud upon the
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Court has disavowed the notion that an alternative remedy is
alone enough to justify antitrust immunity, which suggests that
the duplicative remedy rationale of Keogh is not that important.6 41

The remaining rationales in Keogh derived from the Court's
view that once the Commission approved the rate, it was "for all

practical purposes, the legal rate," 642 and "[t]o be legal a rate
must be non-discriminatory. 643 The Court reasoned that allowing an individual shipper to recover damages would violate the

non-discrimination (or uniform rate) principle, because it would
64

"operate to give him a preference over his trade competitors." 4
The Court further reasoned that any allegation that the Commission would have accepted a lower rate would be extremely
difficult to prove, because "it is possible that no lower rate...
could have been legally maintained without reconstituting the

whole rate structure for many articles moving in an important
section of the country." 645 Finally, the Court stressed that if the
court," grounds upon which relief might be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) (emphasis
added).
641Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 373-75 (1973) (holding that
the availability of a remedy for the alleged anticompetitive conduct before an
administrative agency is not sufficient to create antitrust immunity). This holding
suggests that the Court would not rely too heavily on the duplicative remedy rationale
in deciding whether to extend Keogh.
642Keogh, 260 U.S. at 163.
643Id. at 164. What the Court meant by "non-discriminatory" is not clear from the
opinion, but at the very least it seems to mean that it is important to the regulatory
scheme that all railroad customers pay the "same" rate in some sense; that is, there
must be some form of price uniformity in the system.
644 Id. at 163 ("If a shipper could recover under § 7 of the Anti-Trust Act for
damages resulting from the exaction of a rate higher than that which would otherwise
have prevailed, the amount recovered might, like a rebate, operate to give him a
preference over his trade competitors."). As Judge Friendly pointed out in his opinion
in Square D, 760 F.2d 1347, 1352 (2d Cir. 1985), the Supreme Court has since rejected
the nondiscrimination rationale in Carnation Co. v. Pacific Westbound Conf., 383 U.S.
213, 219 n.3 ("There is no reason to believe that Congress would want to deprive all
shippers of their right to treble damages merely to assure that some shippers do not
obtain more generous awards than others.").
Judge Friendly also pointed
out-interestingly in light of our topic-that class actions, unavailable at the time
Keogh was decided, would alleviate the Keogh Court's concerns. 760 F.2d at 1352
("Furthermore, the argument is scarcely applicable to class actions ....a means of
avoiding Justice Brandeis' concerns that was unavailable in actions at law in 1922.").
But cf. Wegoland Ltd. v. Nynex Corp., 27 F.3d 17, 22 (2d Cir. 1994) (finding class
action challenge by utility ratepayers insufficient to overcome filed rate doctrine).
61 Keogh, 260 U.S. at 164. Judge Friendly's response to this concern was that the

1996]

Under Cloak of Settlement

1245

Commission had in fact approved a lower, noncollusive rate for
all shippers, the shipper would have gained no advantage over
its competitors because it would have been forced to pass on
any cost savings to its customers.6
By contrast, when courts in class actions approve lawyer fees,
they do not establish "for all purposes, the legal rate" 647 between
lawyers and clients in the sense intended by the Court in Keogh.
Class actions do not regulate lawyer fees in the Keogh sense
because they do not impose any requirement of nondiscrimination (uniform rate setting) on courts when they approve class
counsels' fees for representing the class. As for a court that
approves a settlement that sets caps on the fees lawyers may
charge in the administrative system created by the settlement,
unlike the ICC, that court is not obliged to approve any rates at
all for this market. And because it has no mandate to regulate
this market, the court has no more reason to approve uniform
fees than it does to regulate lawyer fees generally. In fact, the
courts do not typically approve uniform fees; they approve maximum fees. There would be no disruption to the regulatory
system-no need for "reconstitution of the whole rate structure" 4 -if injured class members proved that the maximum
rate approved by the court resulted from collusion and resulted
in excessive fees. Moreover, because the lawyers' services are
sold to the ultimate consumer (the claimants), none of the
Court's concerns about unfair competitive advantage or pass-on
is relevant.

ICC would have to make precisely the same calculations in a damages case under the
Interstate Commerce Act, and the antitrust court could always refer the issue to the
ICC before resolving the case. Square D, 760 F.2d at 1352-53. The same, of course,

would be true of a Rule 60(b) motion in the class action context (assuming it is held
to be a substitute for an antitrust damage action).

646Keogh, 260 U.S. at 165. Judge Friendly's response to this rationale was that the
Court had subsequently held that a plaintiff can recover damages even if it is able to

pass on these damages to its customers. Square D, 760 F.2d at 1353 (citing, inter alia,
Hanover Shoe v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 487-94 (1968)).
647 Keogh, 260 U.S. at 163.
648 Id. at 164. Note the same would be true for the rate regulation by the states in

Southern Motor Carriers.Thus, under our interpretation of Keogh, if Southern Motor
Carriershad come out the other way then private damage suits against the cartels
would have been allowed.
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This interpretation of Keogh is consistent with the Court's
reading of the case in Square D. The plaintiffs in Square D had
argued that Carnation Company v. Pacific Westbound Conference649 supported overruling Keogh. Carnation allowed a ship-

per to bring a treble-damage action against a group of shipping
companies that had engaged in collective ratemaking. The gov-

erning regulatory statute was the Shipping Act,6 50 which created
an exemption from antitrust liability for collective ratemaking

pursuant to agreements that the Federal Maritime Commission
("FMC") had approved.6 51 The defendants had not obtained
this approval, but argued nevertheless that the antitrust laws

could not reach their conduct. 652 The Court rejected this argument.653 The Square D Court distinguished Carnation from
Keogh in part on the ground that in Carnationthe FMC had not
approved the challenged ratemaking agreements. 654 But the
Court went on to note that "the Shipping Act gives the Federal
Maritime Commission far more limited authority over rates than
the Interstate Commerce Act gives the ICC."655 The import of
this statement seems to be that the scope of the Keogh doctrine
is narrower when the agency merely approves agreements rather
than regulates rates. 656 The role of the FMC under the Shipping
649 383 U.S. 213 (1966).
650 Id. at 215 (stating the issue as whether "the Shipping Act, 1916, 39 Stat. 728, as

amended, 75 Stat. 762, 46 U.S.C. §§ 801-842 (1964 ed.), precludes the application of
the antitrust laws to the shipping industry").
651Id. at 216 (citing § 15 of the Shipping Act, codified at 46 U.S.C. § 814).
652Id. at 217.
63 Id. at 217.
654 Square D, 476 U.S. at 420-21.
655 Id. at 422 n.29. The Court also quotes approvingly from Judge Friendly's opinion
in the court of appeals below: "Although the [Federal Maritime Commission] can and
does take effects on competition into account in approving conference agreements
under 46 U.S.C. § 814, ... the Shipping Act does not give the Commission any
mandate to regulate rate competition and, indeed, the statutory scheme was designed
to minimize the role of the FMC in this regard." Id. at 422-23 n.29 (quoting Square
D, 760 F.2d at 1363).
656 Thus, the Carnation Court explicitly rejected the application of the Keogh
"nondiscrimination" rationale in the context of the Shipping Act. Carnation,383 U.S.
at 219 n.3 ("There is no reason to believe that Congress would want to deprive all
shippers of their rights to treble damages merely to assure that some shippers do not
obtain more generous awards than others.") See also United States v. Radio Corp. of
America, 358 U.S. 334 (1959). In RCA, the Court distinguished contract approval
cases from common carrier rate regulation cases. Whereas common carrier regulatory
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Act is closer to the role of a district court under Rule 23. The
court can approve private agreements, but it has no mandate to
regulate lawyer fee competition. This suggests that Keogh
would not apply to Rule 23.657
This interpretation of Keogh is also consistent with the Court's
later decision in the state action immunity case of Cantor v.
Detroit Edison Company.658 Cantor, by rejecting the utility's

state action immunity defense, implicitly held that private damage actions would be available against a regulated utility for

anticompetitive conduct in an unregulated market (the dissent
made much of this point).659 As we argued in the state action
schemes were based on some notion of uniformity of rates, with which antitrust
enforcement might interfere, in contract approval cases like RCA, there were "no rate
structures to throw out of balance," and therefore "sporadic action by federal courts
can work no mischief." RCA, 358 U.S. at 350.
657Carnation did restrict the damages that could be recovered: The plaintiff could
recover only damages resulting from agreements that were not approved by the FMC.
Carnation, 383 U.S. at 216 (holding that "the implementation of rate-making
agreements which have not been approved by the Federal Maritime Commission is
subject to the antitrust laws"). But the Shipping Act explicitly exempted from
antitrust liability agreements that the FMC had approved. The Court ordered the
antitrust action stayed until proceedings were held to determine whether the conduct
was covered by prior agreements that the FMC had approved. Id. at 223-24. It is a
plausible reading of Square D, however, that absent a statute explicitly immunizing
conduct approved by an agency from antitrust liability, Keogh would not bar damage
suits when an agency had approved of certain conduct, if that agency had limited
regulatory authority. This argument is important because RCA and the other contract
approval cases in which the Court denied immunity all involved suits by the
Government, rather than private treble damages suits. Thus, the Court has not
definitively resolved the question of whether Keogh would bar damage suits when an
agency approves a contract, though we think Carnation points in the direction of
allowing such suits.
658428 U.S. 579 (1976).
69 Id. at 598-99 (plurality opinion) (responding to criticism of availability of treble
damages as a result of Court's opinion), id. at 603 (plurality opinion) (rejecting
dissent's proposed rule that "no matter how peripheral or casual the State's interests

may be in permitting [a private proposal] to go into effect, the state act would confer
immunity from treble-damage liability"). One could argue that Cantor is irrelevant

because it involves the state action doctrine rather than federal regulatory immunity.
It is true that none of the Cantoropinions cited Keogh. But significantly, the Court
in Cantor viewed the scope of state action immunity as identical to the scope of
federal regulatory immunity. Id. at 596-97 ("Congress could hardly have intended
state regulatory agencies to have broader power than federal agencies to exempt
private conduct from the antitrust laws. Therefore,. .. the standards for ascertaining
the existence and scope of such an exemption surely must be at least as severe as
those applied to federal regulatory legislation."); id. at 596-97 nn. 33-37 (relying on
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section, neither the market to represent the class nor the market
to represent individual claimants in a subsequent administrative

66
procedure should be viewed as the relevant regulated market. 0
Even if consumers would be barred from seeking damages,

competitor law firms might not be, assuming they show injury.
Competitors might have a hard time proving "antitrust injury"
in cases alleging maximum price fixing, because as the Court
recognized in Atlantic Richfield Company v. USA Petroleum

Company,661 maximum price fixing should induce firms either to
undercut the cartel if the maximum in fact is a minimum, or to
provide superior service at higher prices if the maximum forces
the cartel members to cut back on service. 662 A firm that re-

fuses to take these actions has not suffered an antitrust injury.
The exception is if predatory pricing is alleged. Some lower
courts have held that Keogh does not apply when competitors
allege predatory pricing. 663 The settlement agreement in Geor-

gine does not involve classic predatory pricing, but it raises

many of the same concerns. 664 Recall that the settlement provided that certain law firms would automatically be offered
higher recoveries for their clients. In this regime, a disfavored
law firm would have to lower its rate because a plaintiff coming

federal regulatory immunity cases). Although the Court later rejected this view in
Southern Motor Carriers,which implicitly held that state action immunity was broader
than federal regulatory immunity, Southern Motor Carriers reaffirmed the basic
holding of Cantor. See supra notes 554 and 616.
660 See supra notes 483-487 and accompanying text. Cantor also provides another
reason why we find the recent filed rate cases inapplicable here. Those cases all
involve attempts to challenge rates set by an administrative agency in the market the

government sought to regulate.
661 495 U.S. 328 (1990) (holding that independent gasoline dealers could not sue
other dealers subject to an alleged maximum retail price maintenance scheme because,
absent predatory pricing, the independent dealers had been harmed by competition,
and so had not suffered an antitrust injury) [hereinafter ARCO].
662 Id. at 337. The Court's holding was that a competitor distributor does not suffer
an antitrust injury, and therefore may not recover damages, when it complains that a
rival manufacturer has imposed a maximum resale price maintenance scheme on its
distributors, unless the maximum price is a predatory price.
663 See supra note 633.
664 Of the three possible antitrust problems we have raised, the Georgine scheme of
allowing designated law firms to get higher recovery for their clients would seem to
be the best candidate for a competitor law firm antitrust suit. This scheme involves
a type of predation in that the disfavored law firms, because a plaintiff coming to them
will get a lower recovery, must lower their rates to perhaps below-cost levels. We
leave a full discussion of this problem for another day.
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to it would get a lower recovery, but it might be unprofitable to
charge the lower rate.
3.

The Relevance of the Rules Enabling Act

Putting aside all the arguments we have already made, there

is another reason why federal regulatory immunity from the
antitrust laws should not apply to lawyer conduct in class actions. The federal "regulatory" scheme is Rule 23 and the case
law interpreting that Rule. The scope of Rule 23, like all the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, is governed by the Rules En-

abling Act. 665 The Rules Enabling Act provides that the Federal
Rules "shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive
right." 666 Rights under the antitrust laws are certainly substantive rights. To bar a plaintiff from bringing an antitrust suit on
the ground that a court's approval of a class action settlement

under Rule 23 created an immunity from the antitrust laws
would be to interpret a Federal Rule so as to "abridge" a substantive right.
A recent case supports that reading of the Rules Enabling Act:
McCoy v. Massachusetts Institute of Technology.667 In McCoy,

the First Circuit held that a union's trust fund administrator
could not rely on Rule 64668 to justify asserting a lien under a
state mechanic's lien law,669 which would otherwise be pre-

empted by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1994).
28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (1994).
667 950 F.2d 13 (1st Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 910 (1992).
668 Rule 64 provides that during the course of an action in federal court, subject to
certain exceptions:
all remedies providing for seizure of person or property for the purpose of
securing satisfaction of the judgment ultimately to be entered in the action are
available under the circumstances and in the manner provided by the law of the
state in which the district court is held, existing at the time the remedy is sought
665

66

The remedies thus available include arrest, attachment, garnishment, replevin,
sequestration, and other corresponding or equivalent remedies, however
designated and regardless of whether by state procedure the remedy is ancillary
to an action or must be obtained by an independent action.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 64.
669 The Massachusetts statute "allow[ed] the trustee of an employee benefit plan to
assert a lien against property improved through the labor of plan participants in order
to collect overdue benefit contributions." McCoy, 950 F.2d at 15.
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1974 ("ERISA").670 The fund administrator argued that Rule 64
triggered ERISA's own anti-abridgment rule.671

Citing the

Rules Enabling Act's anti-abridgment provision, the court held
that "[i]f [the administrator's] argument were correct, the upshot
would be to give birth to a new, independent cause of action," 672
which "would obviously affect substantive rights and thus alter

substantive law" in contravention of the Rules Enabling Act. 673
If the Federal Rules cannot trigger a federal statute's "anti-a-

bridgment" provision, it would certainly seem that they cannot
trigger the antitrust laws' immunity doctrines. 674

67029 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. (1994).
671ERISA's anti-abridgment rule is found at section 514(d), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(d)
(1994), which provides that ERISA shall not "be construed to alter, amend, modify,
invalidate, impair, or supersede any law of the United States ... or any rule or
regulation issued under any such law."
672 McCoy, 950 F.2d at 21.
673Id. at 21. Other cases have similarly held that no federal cause of action arises
from the violation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, because to do so would
enlarge substantive rights in violation of the Rules Enabling Act. See Port Drum Co.
v. Umphrey, 852 F.2d 148 (5th Cir. 1988) (Rule 11); Rogers v. Furlow, 729 F. Supp.
657 (D. Minn. 1989) (Rule 35).
674McCoy is consistent with the views of commentators who see a primary purpose
of the Rules Enabling Act as regulating the allocation of power between the Supreme
Court and Congress. See Stephen B. Burbank, Of Rules and Discretion: The Supreme
Court, Federal Rules and Common Law, 63 Notre Dame L. Rev. 693, 700 (1988)
(arguing that "there can be no doubt that the major purpose of those who wrote and
defended the bill that became the Enabling Act was to allocate power to make federal
law prospectively between the Supreme Court as rulemaker and Congress .... );
Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1015, 1106
(1982) ("Nothing could be clearer from the pre-1934 history of the Rules Enabling Act
than that the procedure/substance dichotomy in the first two sentences was intended
to allocate lawmaking power between the Supreme Court as rulemaker and
Congress."); Karen N. Moore, The Supreme Court's Role in Interpreting the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 44 Hastings Li. 1039, 1043 (1993) (agreeing with Professor
Burbank's historical argument "that the major purpose of the limiting language in the
Rules Enabling Act was to confine the Court to the procedural arena and restrain it
from making substantive law, which was to remain the prerogative of Congress");
Note, The Conflict Between Rule 68 and the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Statute:
Reinterpreting the Rules Enabling Act, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 828,834-35 (1985) ("The real
purpose of the Enabling Act-allocating power between the Court and
Congress-dictates that the Court not exercise its rulemaking authority to nullify
'important' statutorily created rights.").
The Supreme Court, however, has interpreted the Rules Enabling Act largely in the
context of diversity cases, in which the conflict between a Federal Rule and some state
rule, law, or practice raised federalism concerns. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460
(1965); Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1 (1941). Moreover, in West v. Conrail, 481
U.S. 35 (1987), the Court ignored the Rules Enabling Act in holding that when a
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Some might argue that this interpretation of the Rules Enabling Act renders all class actions suspect because they inevitably abridge substantive rights under the antitrust laws by regulating how lawyers and others must conduct themselves in litigation, i.e., how participants in the system may compete. This
argument misperceives the role of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. The Rules are a regulatory system. They regulate
the rights of litigants in federal court. More important for our
purposes, they regulate the conduct of lawyers in litigation.
They tell lawyers what papers to file, what deadlines to meet,
what motions to make, and so on. The Rules may incidentally
affect various markets, even the market for lawyers, as long as
the primary purpose of any Rule is to regulate litigation activity.
In this sense the Rules are like the zoning laws at issue in City
of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising.675 They restrict access to, and use of, the federal courts just as zoning laws restrict
access to, and use of, land. Just as access to land is necessary
for the provision of various goods and services, so access to
litigation in federal court is necessary for the provision of various services.
Rule 23 restricts the right of people to bring suits individually
in federal court by allowing these suits to be combined. But
class actions are not antitrust violations. They "abridge" procedural rights which are themselves defined by the Rules in the
first instance. Rule 23, like all the other Rules, is intended to
further the fair and orderly administration of justice in the federal courts. With that aim it modifies to some extent the right
to bring an individual suit, which is a right delineated by the
other Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. It is just one in a series
of restrictions on access to the courts that together make up the
Rules, an overall sceme of regulated access akin to zoning regulation and no more violative of substantive antitrust rights than
zoning laws are.
federal court must borrow a statute of limitations from another federal statute, Rule
3 determines whether an action has been commenced within the borrowed limitations
period, and so is not barred. Id. at 39. Although it is possible to read these decisions
as rendering the Rules Enabling Act irrelevant in federal question cases, we have
difficulty seeing how such a reading is either necessary to these cases or compatible
with the language and intent of the statute.
675499 U.S. 365 (1991).
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On the other hand, as we argued above, the market for lawyer
services in a private administrative system is not the same as the
market for litigation in federal court. That does not mean that
a court lacks the authority to approve a class action settlement
that has effects in a market outside of litigation in federal court.
Rather, it means that other law can regulate these effects. Thus,
when a court approves a settlement that regulates lawyer fees
outside of litigation in federal court, the validity of that provision of the settlement under the antitrust laws cannot, under the
Rules Enabling Act, depend on the fact that the court approved
it.
The question of class counsel fees is only slightly harder. Rule
23 allows the court to approve class counsel and set class counsel's fee. Moreover, Rule 23 does not require the court to adopt
any particular method for appointing class counsel and setting
fees, such as Judge Walker's auction method discussed above. 676
These decisions by the court affect procedural rights; they regulate by restricting access to the court. 677 But the court's approval cannot abridge the substantive right of competing lawyers
and consumers to be free from collusion outside of litigation.
If court reporters collude to fix prices, the fact that the court
chooses one and pays the price does not immunize the conduct.
If one lawyer breaks the knees of another and renders her unavailable to be class counsel, the court's appointment of the first
lawyer to be class counsel does not immunize the wrongful conduct from prosecution. Similarly, if lawyers collude to rotate
class counsel appointments, the court's appointment of the
anointed lawyers cannot, under the Rules Enabling Act, immunize the anticompetitive conduct from antitrust scrutiny.

676See supra notes 148-152 and accompanying text.
677Some commentators have suggested that any judicial rulemaking on fees violates
the Rules Enabling Act because it affects substantive rights. See Resnik, Curtis &

Hensler, supra note 14, at 296, 328 n.99 (1996). Whatever the merits of that position,
the argument we are making here does not depend on its acceptance.
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D. Nor isit Noerr
Under the doctrine established in EasternR.R. PresidentsConference v. NoerrMotor Freight,678 private efforts to restrain trade
by petitioning government officials are generally immune from
antitrust liability.679 The immunity applies whether the private
actors petition the legislature, courts or administrative agencies. 680 Lawyers involved in anticompetitive conduct in seeking
appointment as class counsel or in drafting class action settlements might claim that their submission of proposals to the
court for approval constitute petitions to the government immune from the antitrust laws. Such a claim is untenable, however, in light of the purposes of the Noerr doctrine.
In Noerr, the Court unanimously held that "the Sherman Act
does not prohibit ... persons from associating together in an
attempt to persuade the legislature or the executive to take
particular action with respect to a law that would produce a restraint or a monopoly." 681 The immunity applies despite any
anticompetitive purpose the private actors might have,6s2 despite
(at least in the legislative arena) any deceptive or unethical
practices the private actors might use 683 and despite any "incidental" anticompetitive effects the private actors might
"directly" cause.684 The Noerr Court gave two reasons justifying
this immunity. First, it found that applying the antitrust laws to
"political activity" through which "the people ...freely inform
the government of their wishes" would "substantially impair the
power of government to take actions through its legislature and
executive that operate to restrain trade," a result that Congress
did not intend. 685 In this sense, petitioning immunity is deriva678
679

365 U.S. 127 (1961).
Id. at 136.

60 California Motor Transp.
681 Noerr, 365 U.S. at 136.

Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510 (1972).

6 Id. at 138-40. The Court reaffirmed that anticompetitive intent alone is
insufficient to defeat Noerr immunity in Professional Real Estate Invs. v. Columbia
Pictures Indus., 508 U.S. 49, 55-60 (1993).
683 Noerr, 365 U.S. at 140-41 (Although the means used by defendants was "one
which falls far short of the ethical standards generally approved in this country," this
did not affect the determination of whether the activity constituted an antitrust
violation.).
W Id. at 142-44.
685 Id. at 137.
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tive of state action and federal regulatory immunity. 686 Second,
the Court sought to avoid an interpretation of congressional
intent that could result in a clash between the value of competition underlying the antitrust laws and the value of political participation underlying the First Amendment's right to petition.687
Noerr recognized one exception to petitioning immunity: the
"sham" exception. The Court stated that there would be no
immunity when petitioning activity, "ostensibly directed toward
influencing government action, is a mere sham to cover what is
actually nothing more than an attempt to interfere directly with
the business relationships of a competitor." 688 The Court declined to apply the exception it had recognized on the facts in
Noerr itself. The fact that a publicity campaign by railroads
seeking legislation harmful to truckers was "not only genuine
but also highly successful," demonstrated for the Court that the
railroads' efforts were genuine, not a sham for cover. 689
The Court now interprets the sham exception quite narrowly.
It has defined sham activity, "in whatever forum," as "private
action that is not genuinely aimed at procuring favorable government action. '690 In practical terms, this means that the sham
exception can apply only when the alleged restraint is the act of
petitioning itself and not the result of that petitioning; that is,
sham activity must involve the "use [of] the governmental process-as opposed to the outcome of that process-as an anticompetitive weapon. '691
In CaliforniaMotor Transport, the Court held that the sham
exception applied to a complaint alleging that a group of truckers filed repeated objections to competitors' license applications
before an administrative agency "with or without probable
686 The Noerr Court in fact cited Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943), twice,
emphasizing the link the Court saw between the doctrines. Noerr, 365 U.S. at 136
n.15, 137 n.17.
687Id. at 138.

688Id.
689Id.

at 144.
at 144.

690 Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, 486 U.S. 492, 500 n.4 (1988). The
Court rejected a broader definition of sham activity as conduct by one "who
'genuinely seeks to achieve his governmental result, but does so through improper
means."' Id. at 508 n.10 (quoting Sessions Tank Liners v. Joor Mfg., 827 F.2d 458, 465
n.5 (1987)).
691 City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, 499 U.S. 365, 380 (1991).
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cause, and regardless of the merits of the cases.

' 692

Although

the Court stressed the truckers' improper purpose to deny their
competitors meaningful access to governmental entities, 693 its
more recent view of the case is that the truckers could not reasonably have expected their filings to produce a result favorable
to them. 694 In ProfessionalReal Estate, the Court confirmed this
newer and more restrictive understanding of the sham excep-

tion, holding that litigation could not be deemed a sham unless
the lawsuit is "objectively baseless in the sense that no reasonable litigant could realistically expect success on the merits." 695

Under this definition of sham, class action lawyers who seek
court approval of a fee arrangement or settlement are not en-

gaging in sham activity. Though their intentions might be to
exclude competitors, they are genuinely seeking the "outcome"

of the governmental process, namely, court approval. And assuming that the ProfessionalReal Estate standard would apply
to court approvals of class action settlements, the lawyers' petitions would almost never be "objectively baseless" in the sense
that they could not realistically expect the court to approve the
settlement.
692 CaliforniaMotor Transport,404 U.S. at 512.
693 Id. at 512 (noting that the truckers had "sought

to bar their competitors from
meaningful access to adjudicatory tribunals and so to usurp that decisionmaking
process" and referring to the truckers' "purpose to deprive ... competitors of
meaningful access to the agencies and courts").
694See Omni, 499 U.S. at 380-82. "A classic example [of a 'sham'] is the filing of
frivolous objections to the license application of a competitor, with no expectation of
achieving denial of the license but simply in order to impose expense and delay." Id.
at 380 (citing CaliforniaMotor Transport). In Omni, the Court limited California
Motor Transport to its facts, id. at 382, and held that the denial of 'meaningful access
to the appropriate city administrative and legislative fora"' might "render the manner
of lobbying improper or even unlawful, but does not necessarily render it a 'sham.'
Omni, 499 U.S. at 381.
695 Professional Real Estate, 508 U.S. at 60.
This rule is actually somewhat
inconsistent with CaliforniaMotor Transport in that the defendants in that case had
actually prevailed in over half the cases filed. See Einer Elhauge, Making Sense of
Antitrust Petitioning Immunity, 80 Cal. L. Rev. 1177, 1184 (1992). Professor Elhauge
harmonizes the two cases somewhat by asserting that, although the defendants won
21 of 40 cases, "the crux of the complaint was that the defendants were instigating
litigation automatically, without regard to whether the litigation had merit or not."
Id. This, however, does not fully answer the inconsistency that most of the cases filed
in CaliforniaMotor Transportwere probably not "objectively baseless" under the rule
of ProfessionalReal Estate.
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The narrow "sham" exception is not, however, the only way
around Noerr-afact the Court has explicitly recognized.6 96 The
sham exception now applies only to conduct that is anticompetitive solely because it abuses some government process. But
what if private parties engage in conduct that is anticompetitive
apart from any government action, and seek to use government
endorsement of that conduct to cloak the private conduct in
petitioning immunity? The Court has held in two recent cases
that even though such conduct does not qualify as "sham" petitioning, Noerr immunity does not apply.
In the first case, Allied Tube & Conduit Corporationv. Indian
Head,697 steel conduit makers stacked a meeting of the National
Fire Protection Association, a private standard-setting association, to defeat the approval of rival plastic conduit for inclusion
in the group's National Electric Code.698 The Court held that
this activity was not immune from antitrust liability, despite the
fact that the association regularly submitted the code to state
legislatures and local governments, which routinely adopted it
with little or no change. The Court first held that the source of
the restraint was "private action," because it was "imposed by
persons unaccountable to the public and without official authority, many of whom have personal financial interests in restraining competition. ' 699 Next, the Court decided that the essential
character of the conduct was not political, but rather that it was
"commercial activity that has traditionally had its validity determined by the antitrust laws. ' '700 The steel conduit makers and
their supporters were "economically interested part[ies] exercis[ing] decisionmaking authority. ' 701 Finally, the Court noted
that the defendants "can, with full antitrust immunity, engage in
concerted efforts to influence ... governments through direct

696See Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, 486 U.S. 492, 503 (1988)
(noting that although the sham exception does not apply, "[w]e cannot agree with [the]
absolutist position that the Noerr doctrine immunizes every concerted effort that is
genuinely intended to influence governmental action.").
697486 U.S. 492 (1988).
698 Id. at 495-97.
699Id. at 502.
700 Id. at 505.
701Id. at 509.
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lobbying, publicity campaigns, and other traditional avenues of
'702
political expression.
The second case, FederalTrade Commission v. Superior Court
Trial Lawyers Association,70 3 involved what was essentially a
strike for higher wages by court-appointed lawyers representing
indigent criminal defendants in Washington, D.C.7°4 Holding the
lawyers' conduct to be a per se illegal boycott, 705 the Court rejected the lawyers' claim to Noerr immunity in three short sentences. The Court stated that
in the Noerr case the alleged restraint of trade was the intended consequence of public action; in this case the boycott
was the means by which respondents sought to obtain favorable legislation. The restraint of trade that was implemented
while the boycott lasted would have had precisely the same
anticompetitive consequences during that period even if no
legislation had been enacted. In Noerr,the desired legislation
702 Id.

at 510.

703 493 U.S. 411 (1990).
704 Id. at 414-18. Section

6 of the Clayton Act states:
The labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of commerce.
Nothing contained in the antitrust laws shall be constured to forbid the existence
and operation of labor... organizations,.... or to forbid or restrain individual
members of such organizations from lawfully carrying out the legitimate objects
thereof; nor shall such organizations, or the members thereof, be held or
construed to be illegal combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade, under
the antitrust laws.
Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 6, 38 Stat. 731 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 17
(1994)).
Section 20 of the Clayton Act provides:
No restraining order or injunction shall be granted by any court of the United
States ... in any case between an employer and employees ....

involving, or

growing out of, a dispute concerning terms and conditions of employment ....
And no such restraining order or injunction shall prohibit any.., persons ....
in concert, from ... ceasing to perform any work or labor, or from
recommending, advising, or persuading others by peaceful means so to do;...
nor shall any of the acts specified in this paragraph be considered or held to be
violations of any law of the United States.
Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 20, 38 Stat. 738 (1914) (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 52)
These statutes represent the so-called "statutory labor exemption" from the antitrust
laws. Hovenkamp, supra note 136, § 19.7, at 662. The lawyers did not try to argue
that they qualified for this exemption. See Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n v.
Federal Trade Comm'n, 856 F.2d 226, 230 n.6 (D.C. Cir 1988). See also 1 Phillip
Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Antitrust Law § 229c, at 195-98 (1978) (focus of Clayton
Act only on bona fide labor organizations and not on independent contractors or
entrepreneurs).
705 Trial Lawyers, 493 U.S. at 422-23.
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would have created the restraint on the truckers' competition; in this case the emergency legislative response to the
6
boycott put an end to the restraint.7

In the remainder of the opinion, the Court rejected the lawyers'
argument that their boycott deserved First Amendment protection because it was "political" and contained an "expressive
component."707
Allied Tube and Trial Lawyers stand for exactly the same pro-

position for which we have argued the state action and federal
regulatory immunity cases stand: namely, that private anticompetitive conduct does not become immunized from antitrust liabil-

ity simply because a governmental entity approves the result of
that conduct. Both Allied Tube and Trial Lawyers involved

private anticompetitive conduct that was separable from petitioning conduct-"private" in the sense that the conspirators
had a financial interest in restraining competition but no public
authority to do so; "separable" in the sense that the anticompetitive conduct could be punished without at the same time punishing the type of petitioning that Noerr seeks to protect. 708 In
Allied Tube, the Court condemned the steel conduit makers'
self-interested corruption of a standard-setting association's decisionmaking process. As the Court noted, the steel conduit
makers could lobby all they wanted for a statute banning plastic
conduit. 70 9 In Trial Lawyers, the Court condemned lawyers'
706 Id.
707 Id.

at 424-25.

at 429-32. The Court finally concluded that:
In sum, there is thus nothing unique about the 'expressive component' of
respondents' boycott. A rule that requires courts to apply the antitrust laws
'prudently and with sensitivity' whenever an economic boycott has an
'expressive component' would create a gaping hole in the fabric of those laws.
Respondents' boycott thus has no special characteristics meriting an exemption
from the per se rules of antitrust law.
Id. at 431-32.
708 The source of this notion of "separability" is Noerr itself, in which the Court
rejected the argument that an antitrust plaintiff could recover for "direct injury" that
was an "incidental effect" of petitioning because holding the conduct causing the direct
injury to be unlawful would "be tantamount to outlawing" the petitioning activity
itself. Noerr, 365 U.S. at 143-44. Thus, as long as subjecting specific anticompetitive
activities to the antitrust laws would not "be tantamount to outlawing" petitioning
activity, Noerr does not stand in the way of the antitrust claim.
709Allied Tube, 486 U.S. at 510 ("Petitioner ...can, with full antitrust immunity,
engage in concerted efforts to influence ...governments through direct lobbying,
publicity campaigns, and other traditional avenues of political expression.").
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concerted refusal to deal, which served their private financial
interests. Nothing prevented the lawyers from lobbying to their
hearts' content for higher wages. Thus, in neither case were the
defendants punished for asking for something from the government; they were punished for doing something other than petitioning. The power to petition remained in both cases.
In this crucial respect, anticompetitive lawyer conduct in class
actions strongly resembles the conduct at issue in Allied Tube
and Trial Lawyers. Lawyers who rig bids in vying for the position of class counsel, and lawyers who write class action settlement agreements containing fee caps and other restraints, are
economically interested actors engaging in anticompetitive conduct that is separable from petitioning activity. Condemning
such activity would do nothing to hinder the ability of such lawyers to lobby state legislatures or Congress, or even supreme
courts with rulemaking authority, for exactly the same types of
anticompetitive restraints. 710
The fact that the lawyers' self-interested activity affects petitioning activity that is protected under Noerr-the filing and
litigating of class action lawsuits-does not in itself establish
Noerr immunity. In Allied Tube, the fact that the steel conduit
makers' self-interested activity affected the standard-setting
association's code-the submission of which to state legislatures
was protected under Noerr-was likewise insufficient. And in
Trial Lawyers, the fact that the lawyers' self-interested activity
affected the representation of indigent criminal defendants in
court-certainly protected activity under Noerr-was also insufficient. In effect, Allied Tube and Trial Lawyers establish a kind
of "Noerr standing" requirement. The steel conduit makers
could not usurp the petitioning rights belonging to the standardsetting association by corrupting the association's decisionmaking process. The trial lawyers could not assert the constitutional
rights of their clients to justify self-interested behavior that was
at best imperfectly correlated with the clients' interests. Simi710 For example, if class action lawyers prevailed upon a bar association to lobby for
a change in the state's Rules of Professional Conduct that permitted such restraints,
this activity would be fully protected by Noerr. See Lawline v. American Bar Ass'n,

956 F.2d 1378, 1383 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 992 (1993) (citing Allied
Tube, 486 U.S. at 499, for the proposition that 'those urging the governmental action
enjoy absolute immunity from antitrust liability for the anticompetitive restraint"').

1260

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 82:1051

larly, class action lawyers cannot piggy-back on their clients'
petitioning rights to justify self-interested behavior. Moreover,
these lawyers are exercising decisionmaking authority in a way
that corrupts the procompetitive benefits of class actions (the
amalgamation of small claims that could not be brought individually), just as the steel conduit makers exercised their ability to
affect the decisionmaking process to corrupt the procompetitive
benefits of private standard-setting associations.
There are, of course, differences between anticompetitive conduct in class actions and the c6nduct at issue in Allied Tube and
Trial Lawyers. In particular, in Allied Tube and Trial Lawyers,
the private restraint preceded, and caused harm independent
from, the government action. In Allied Tube, the exclusion of
plastic conduit from the National Electric Code preceded legislative approval of the code, and caused immediate, independent
harm by stigmatizing plastic conduit. In fact, the Court decided
the case based on the court of appeals' judgment that the plaintiff "did not seek redress for any injury arising from the adoption of the [Code] by the various governments, ' 711 but merely
for damages arising from the stigma that the restraint caused in
states that allowed the plaintiff's product to be used. In Trial
Lawyers, the boycott preceded the government's acceptance of
higher wages, and caused immediate, independent harm by disrupting the normal functioning of the criminal defense system. 712
711 Allied Tube, 486 U.S. at 498 n.2 (quoting Allied Tube, 817 F.2d 938, 941 n.3
(1987) [bracketed text and emphasis in original]. See also id. at 500 (noting that "no
damages were imposed for the incorporation of th[e] Code by any government); id.
at 502 (referring to petitioner's argument that "the effect that exclusion [from the
code] had of its own force in the marketplace [was] incidental to a valid effort to
influence government action"); id. at 509-10 (holding that "where, as here, an
economically interested party exercise decision-making authority in formulating a
product standard for a private association that comprises market participants, that
party enjoys no Noerr immunity from any antitrust liability flowing from the effect the
standard has of its own force in the marketplace").
712 Trial Lawyers, 493 U.S. at 418.
Within 10 days, the key figures in the District's criminal justice system 'became
convinced that the system was on the brink of collapse because of the refusal
of CJA lawyers to take on new cases.' [Shortly thereafter,] they hand-delivered
a letter to the Mayor describing why the situation was expected to 'reach a crisis
point' by early the next week and urging the immediate enactment of a bill
increas[ing] all CJA rates ...
Id. at 418.
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In the class action situation, by contrast, the alleged anticompetitive harm does not precede governmental action and does not
cause harm independent of the governmental action. In general,
neither the charging of class counsel fees nor the charging of
fees under the private administrative system occurs without
court approval.713
In our view, these differences are not sufficient to create immunity in the class action context. Although the Court in Allied
Tube emphasized that the only injury for which the plaintiff
recovered was the stigmatizing effect of the defendant's anticompetitive conduct in states that had not adopted the code,
much of the Court's reasoning is consistent with allowing damages even in states that had adopted the code.74 Even if the
Court intended to suggest it would not allow damages in states
that had adopted the code, such a judgment might stem, not
from Noerr, but from the fact that there would be serious difficulties trying to separate out damages caused by valid government action-the adoption of the code-from damages caused
by the private action. But the more passive the government's
role, the easier it would be to make this separation, because the
chances are greater that, but for the anticompetitive private
conduct, the government's action would be different. 715 Govern713 In Georgine, the class action defendants were "operating to settle claims under
the terms of the Stipulation" some seven months before the court approved the
settlement agreement. Georgine, 157 F.R.D. at 286. Moreover, side agreements
between the defendants and class counsel purported to bind class counsel to critical

terms of the settlement regardless of court approval. See Koniak, supra note 15, at
1128-36.
714E.g., Allied Tube, 486 U.S. at 502 ("But where, as here, the restraint is imposed
by persons unaccountable to the public and without official authority, many of whom
have personal financial interests in restraining competition, we have no difficulty
concluding that the restraint has resulted from private action."); id. at 505 (noting that
"the context and nature of petitioner's activity make it the type of commercial activity
that has traditionally had its validity determined by the antitrust laws themselves");
id. at 507 ("Although one could reason backwards from the legislative impact of the

Code to the conclusion that the conduct at issue here is 'political,' we think that, given
the context and nature of the conduct, it can more aptly be characterized as
commercial activity with a political impact.").
715Professor Hovenkamp posits the following hypothetical variation on Allied Tube.
Suppose all state legislatures simply adopted the code pursuant to statutes that said:

"the standard for electric installations in this state is that promulgated by the National
Fire Protection Association." Hovenkamp, supra note 136, § 18.5, at 647. He writes:
The question then becomes whether those private market participants engaged
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ment is at its most passive when its role is simply to evaluate
private agreements. The fact that in Allied Tube the Court
favorably cited PennsylvaniaR.R.716 suggests that Noerr does not

bar suits when the government simply acts to approve private
conduct.
As for the Trial Lawyers case, although the reasoning in that
opinion does seem to emphasize the anticompetitive effect of
the boycott before the government acted, it is hard to believe

that the Court intended to suggest that such an independent
effect is necessary when the government is buying goods and

services,717 as it is effectively doing in the Oracle-type bid rigging
in standard setting or rule making have a kind of "fiduciary duty" to the
public-and, if so, whether the duty is to be enforced by the antitrust laws. As
the degree of government abdication grows stronger, so does the case for
denying Noerr immunity.... In [the hypothetical case posed above], corruption
of the NFPA that results in the exclusion of plastic conduit should not enjoy
Noerr immunity even if the injury results entirely from subsequent government
"enactment" of the NFPA standard. The government's "pre-commitment" has
effectively made its act nothing more than ministerial.
Hovenkamp, supra note 136, § 18.5, at 647. But cf. Massachusetts School of Law v.
American Bar Ass'n, 937 F. Supp. 435 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (suit by law school denied
ABA accreditation barred by Noerr on the ground that the only injury to the school
stemmed from state statutes allowing only graduates from ABA-accredited schools to
sit for their bar examinations). Professor Hovenkamp does not argue that reason for
reduced Noerr protection in the "government abdication" case is that it would be
easier to prove causation and damages, but that is one possible justification for his
view. Whatever the justification, however, we note that Professor Hovenkamp's
argument would have particular force for lawyers who engage in "rule making" in
class action settlements, as these lawyers certainly owe a "fiduciary duty" to the class
and face, in the form of the high settlement approval rate, a high degree of
"government abdication."
716Allied Tube, 486 U.S. at 503. See also id. at 508 n.10 (stating that "the types of
activity we describe supra,at 503-504, could not be immune under Noerr"). Of course,
Noerr had not yet been decided at the time Pennsylvania R.R. was decided. But
nothing in Noerr suggests the Court meant to cast any doubt on any of its prior cases.
The citation of Pennsylvania R.R. in Allied Tube merely confirms this point.
717It is also hard to believe the Court meant what it said in Trial Lawyers when it
said that the boycott "would have had precisely the same anticompetitive
consequences during that period even if no legislation had been enacted." Trial
Lawyers, 493 U.S. at 425. If by "that period," the Court meant the fixed number of
days the boycott actually lasted, the statement is technically true, but misleading. If
no legislation had been enacted, or if legislation unsatisfactory to the lawyers had been
enacted, the boycott might have lasted longer, resulting in additional anticompetitive
consequences. More importarit, the Court found that "[in Noerr, the desired
legislation would have created the restraint on the truckers' competition; in this case
the emergency legislative response to the boycott put an end to the restraint." Id. at
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situation. If such an independent effect were necessary, the

government could never sue for damages for price fixing against
the government. But the Clayton Act specifically contemplates
such an action. 718
But even if the fact that the restraint preceded, and was independent from, governmental action really did matter in Allied
Tube and Trial Lawyers, this fact should not matter in the class
action context. In Allied Tube and Trial Lawyers, the defen-

dants directed their alleged petitioning activity to legislative
bodies, 719 which traditionally have enjoyed the strongest degree
of Noerr immunity.7 20 More important, in both cases, the relevant legislative body enacted legislation that enjoyed state action

immunity. This fact provides an additional explanation of why
the Court seemed to take pains in the two cases to separate the
72
private conduct from the government conduct. '
In the class action context, however, the problem the Court
implicitly recognized in Allied Tube and Trial Lawyers does not

exist. Lawyers in class actions are not seeking anticompetitive
legislation or rulemaking; they seek approval of private conduct

from a court acting in a quasi-administrative capacity. We have
already demonstrated why court approval in this context confers

neither state action nor federal regulatory immunity. Thus, if
425. Again, the Court's statement is a little misleading, because if, as the Court
acknowledged later in the opinion, the lawyers were engaged in price fixing, the
government action did not end the restraint (though it did end the boycott); rather,
the governmental action adopted the restraint, namely the higher wages.
718Clayton Act, § 4A, 15 U.S.C. § 15a. Professor Hovenkamp argues that Trial
Lawyers would not have come out any differently if the restraint had not occurred
until the government acted. He sees the case as an example of the government as
purchaser, and suggests that if a group of sellers to the government agreed to fix prices
or engage in predatory pricing against competitors, Noerr immunity would not attach
despite the fact that no private injury precedes the government decision. See
Hovenkamp, supra note 136, § 18.2b, at 634-35.
719In Trial Lawyers, the lawyers were seeking to amend the District of Columbia
Criminal Justice Act, D.C. Code Ann. § 11-2601 et seq. (1981), which, inter alia, set
the fees for court-appointed lawyers representing indigent criminal defendants. Trial
Lawyers, 493 U.S. at 414-17.
720See infra note 730.
721The lack of state action rationale also provides an alternative justification for
Professor Hovenkamp's hypothetical discussed supra note 715. In his hypothetical,
"government abdication" could be interpreted as "lack of active supervision," which
means that the state action doctrine would not apply. In fact, Allied Tube itself could
be viewed as a "lack of active supervision" case.
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the difference between Allied Tube and Trial Lawyers and the

class action context means anything, it cuts in favor of denying
Noerr immunity in the class action context, not against it.
It is true that the Court has never explicitly decided whether

Noerr immunity applies when private conduct separate from the
use of governmental processes is the source of the restraint, and
when the government approval of that conduct does not result
in state action or federal regulatory immunity. 722 There can be
little doubt, however, that Noerr immunity does not and should

not apply in such cases. If it did, most of the cases denying
state action or federal regulatory immunity would essentially
mean nothing. In most of those cases, 723 the defendants "petitioned" an agency to take some action. The cases implicitly
assume that once the governmental immunity claim was defeated, no further immunity related to the government action
could bar the antitrust claim.724 Moreover, the statements the
722It is important to note that we are not talking about cases in which the only
private anticompetitive conduct alleged is the petitioning activity itself. In such cases,
courts have held that the mere fact that the governmental action is not protected
under the state action doctrine does not deprive the petitioning conduct of Noerr
immunity, unless the sham exception applies. Using the antitrust laws to punish such
conduct would threaten the type of petitioning activity Noerr sought to protect. See
Hovenkamp, supra note 136, § 18.3e, at 644-45.
723See, e.g., Federal Trade Comm'n v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621 (1992) (no
state action immunity protection for private price-fixing arrangemetn where title
insurance rates become effective only in not rejected by the agency within a set time);
Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976) (denying state-action immunity
claim that state regulation of public utilities authorizes monopolization in the market
for electric light bulbs); United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963)
(no federal regulatory immunity where proposed merger requiring approval was
approved by Comptroller of the Currency); California v. Federal Power Comm'n, 369
U.S. 482 (1962) (no federal regulatory immunity for merger approved by Federal
Power Commission where statutory grant of authority did not allow commission to
enforce antitrust laws); United States v. Radio Corp. of Am., 358 U.S. 334 (1959) (no
federal regulatory immunity for exchange of television stations approved by Federal
Communications Commission where legislative history revealed that Commission
approval was not intended to prevent enforcement of antitrust laws); Georgia v.
Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 324 U.S. 439 (1945) (denying federal regulatory immunity
claim that authority to fix joint through-rates with other carriers allows conspiracy and
coercion in the fixing of those rates).
724In the words of one court of appeals, "[i]f extensive substantive regulation does
not warrant an antitrust exemption, then surely an essentially procedural aspect of
regulation-tariff filing--cannot." Litton Systems v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 700
F.2d 785, 807 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1073 (1984). The court went on
to state that "AT&T cannot cloak its actions in Noerr-Penningtonimmunity simply
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Court has made are consistent with the notion that no Noerr
immunity attaches when agency approval of private conduct
does not create state action or federal regulatory immunity.
With respect to state action immunity, a portion of Cantor v.
Detroit Edison Company725 joined only by a plurality of justices
explicitly states that
nothing in the Noerr opinion implies that the mere fact that a
state regulatory agency may approve a proposal included in a
tariff, and thereby require that the proposal be implemented
until a revised tariff is filed and approved, is a sufficient reason for conferring antitrust immunity on the proposed conduct.

726

Nothing in the opinions of the concurring justices disagreed with
the plurality's interpretation of Noerr. With respect to federal
regulatory immunity, the Court in Allied Tube cited Georgia v.
PennsylvaniaR.R. Company727 as an example of a case in which

because it is required, as a regulated monopoly, to disclose publicly its rates and
operating procedures." Id.
m2428 U.S. 579 (1976).

Id. at 601-02. Several courts of appeals have relied on this language to conclude
that the mere filing of a tariff by a regulated firm does not confer Noerr immunity on
private restraints. See, e.g., City of Kirkwood v. Union Elec. Co., 671 F.2d 1173, 1181
(8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1170 (1983) (claim that utility created a "price
squeeze" through its rates submitted to and approved by state and federal agencies not
barred by Noerr); Litton Systems, 700 F.2d at 806-09 (claim that AT&T monopolized
the market by filing tariffs requiring customers to connect equipment made by rival
companies to the telephone system only through an "interface device" made by AT&T
not barred by Noerr).
Although two courts of appeals have implicitly suggested that tariff filings might
enjoy Noerr immunity, these cases involved allegations that the act of filing and the
ensuing delay were themselves the antitrust violations, in contrast to the allegations
that could be made against lawyers in class actions. See MCI Communications Corp.
v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1153-58 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
891 (1983); Clipper Exxpress v. Rocky Mountain Motor Tariff Bureau, 690 F.2d 1240,
1251-54 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1227 (1983). Moreover, in both cases,
the courts actually rejected the Noerr claim because they found the petitioning to be
sham. Thus, the cases could actually be read to leave open the question of whether
filing tariffs should ever enjoy Noerr protection. See MCI, 708 F.2d at 1155 n.114
(noting that "Noerr-Penningtonmight not apply if a tariff filing is only a pro forma
publication perhaps required by law and not an exercise of the right to petition the
government," and stating that "[w]e do not reach this issue").
r7324 U.S. 439 (1945).
726
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Noerr immunity does not apply despite the fact that there was
no "sham" activity.72 8
It is also true that the Court has never definitively decided
whether the standards for immunity are different depending on
which political body is being petitioned. Allied Tube does state
that the scope of petitioning immunity depends on the "source,
context, and nature of the anticompetive restraint at issue." 729
In addition, the Court has strongly suggested that petitioning
immunity is broader in the legislative sphere then in the judicial
or administrative spheres. For example, the Court has referred
to the fact that in the legislative sphere "unethical and deceptive
methods" are more tolerated than in the judicial and administrative sphere, where such methods may constitute abuse of process "that may result in antitrust violations."' 730 But if Noerr has
its roots in state action and federal regulatory immunity, the
scope of immunity in the legislative sphere must be broader.
Only the legislature can "restrain trade" in ways that would
otherwise violate the antitrust laws. In general, the power of
courts and agencies to restrain trade is entirely dependent on
their authority from the legislature to do so, as is their ability to
stop private restraints.
Another difference between the class action context and the
Allied Tube and Trial Lawyers cases also suggests the case for
denying Noerr immunity is stronger in the class action context.
The steel conduit makers in Allied Tube did not violate association rules by stacking the meeting and did not do any harm to
the association that the association could not itself remedy. The
lawyers in Trial Lawyers were probably in the best position to
petition on behalf of protecting their clients' Sixth Amendment
728 Allied Tube, 486 U.S. at 503.

79 Id. at 499.
730 Id. at 499-500 (noting that although antitrust immunity applies to "unethical and
deceptive" conduct used to influence legislature, "in less political arenas, unethical and
deceptive practices can constitute abuses of administrative or judicial processes that
may result in antitrust violations"). See also CaliforniaMotor Transport,404 U.S. at
512-13 (noting that "unethical conduct in the setting of the adjudicatory process often
results in sanctions" and that "[m]isrepresentations, condoned in the political arena,
are not immunized when used in the adjudicatory process"). But cf. ProfessionalReal
Estate, 508 U.S. at 62 n.6 ("We need not decide here whether and, if so, to what
extent Noerr permits the imposition of antitrust liability for a litigant's fraud or other
misrepresentations.").
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rights, and no one denied that the higher wages the lawyers
sought would do just that. In the class action context, by contrast, if the anticompetitive allegations are correct, the lawyers
are acting at the expense of their clients and, in particular, their
clients' own right of petition under the First Amendment. One
would think that if ever there were a case in which a court
would hesitate to apply Noerr immunity, it would be when applying such immunity could harm the First Amendment rights
of other petitioners to whom the defendants owed fiduciary
obligations.
The one case that has considered the applicability of Noerr
immunity in the context of settlement, though not an antitrust
case, supports the interpretation we advocate here. That case
732
is Wright v. DeArmond,731 a successor case to the Derrickson

case discussed above in connection with collateral estoppel. 733
In Wright, a habeas corpus action, the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit held that Noerr did not bar the state of Illinois
from prosecuting city commissioners and the city's lawyer for
violating state conflict of interest laws in negotiating a settle734
ment on behalf of the city in a federal Voting Rights Act suit.
The officials had argued that because they submitted the settlement, which kept them on the city payroll as "administrators,"
to a federal district court for approval, they were engaging in
protected "petitioning" activity analogous to the type of activity
protected by Noerr.735

The court started from the proposition that the officials "were
prosecuted because they participated in the negotiation of a
settlement agreement which involved... their private employment interests." 736 It then held Noerr inapplicable for two reasons. First, the court found that the petitioning by the officials
was analogous to sham petitioning. The officials had used their
bargaining leverage "to obtain personal benefits" and because
731977

F.2d 339 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1051 (1993).

732Derrickson

v. City of Danville, 845 F.2d 715 (7th Cir. 1988)].

733See

supra text accompanying notes 296-305 (claim preclusion), 347-351 (issue
preclusion), 358-359 (issue preclusion), 373-380 (equitable estoppel), 392-398 (equitable
estoppel), 404-408 (equitable estoppel).
734Wright, 977 F.2d at 345-49.
735
Id. at 344-45.
736

Id. at 345.
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their "petition to the court was a petition for approval of this
illegal and fraudulent act. .. [it amounted to] 'unethical conduct
in the setting of the adjudicatory process,' analytically analogous
to the sort of conduct held to be unprotected by the First
Amendment in California Motor Transport.' 737 Second, the
court noted that the officials retained their rights to petition the
government for jobs with the city, but could "not do so while
' 738
simultaneously representing the interest of the government."
Although the court's first argument misconstrues and misapplies the sham exception, 739 the reasoning and result of the case
are consistent with Supreme Court precedent and the argument
presented here. Like the defendants in Allied Tube and Trial
Lawyers, the city officials in Wright engaged in unlawful, selfinterested conduct that was separable from any petitioning activity. Nothing prevented the city officials from petitioning the
government to further their own interests. The fact that the
unlawful conduct did not cause harm that preceded or was independent from court approval of the settlement did not make
Noerr applicable. Because the Voting Rights Act did not preempt or otherwise displace state conflict of interest rules (as the
court implicitly held),740 the mere fact that the officials asked a
court to approve a settlement in a Voting Rights Act case did
not create Noerr immunity. The Wright court also recognized
the greater scope for condemning "unethical" methods in the
judicial context that Allied Tube suggests. Finally, the officials
737Id. at 348 (quoting CaliforniaMotor Transport,404 U.S. at 512).
738 Id. at 348.49.

739 As noted above, the Court has limited the sham exception to cases in which the
petitioner is not seeking the result of the governmental action. See supra notes 690695 and accompanying text. Allied Tube, which first articulated this notion of sham,
had already been decided when Wright was litigated. The Wright court did try to
shoehorn its holding into this notion of sham by focusing on the fact that the city
officials "had no hope of successfully defending against" the Voting Rights Act suit.
Wright, 977 F.2d at 348. But this fact had absolutely nothing to do with the "leverage"
the court spoke of. In fact, as the dissenting judge correctly recognized, the settlement
if anything avoided sham litigation. Id. at 349 (Bauer, C.J., dissenting). Nor was the
assertion of sham relevant to the court's argument that the officials retained the
petitioning rights Noerr sought to protect.
740The dissenting judge concluded that "[ijf the Illinois statutes are in conflict with
the settlement, and I conclude they are not, then the state statutes should give way to
the policy of the federal law." Wright, 977 F.2d at 349 (Bauer, C.J., dissenting). The
majority did not respond directly to Judge Bauer's contention.
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by writing a settlement that feathered their own nests might
very well have acted at the expense of the interests of the city
to which they owed fiduciary obligations. In all these respects,
the conduct in Wright is analogous to the anticompetitive conduct we have identified in connection with class action settlements, and supports our argument that Noerr immunity should
not apply to lawyer anticompetitive conduct in class actions.
Although the antitrust immunity doctrines we have discussed
are varied and somewhat complex, our argument that they do
not apply to lawyer conduct in class actions is straightforward
and simple. The market in which lawyers compete is separate
from any market the courts seek to regulate through the class
action device. And there is no intention on the part of any
authoritative government body, either at the state or the federal
level, to restrict competition in those separate lawyer markets.
This argument complements the argument in Part III concerning
collateral estoppel. Just as lawyers are incidental to and separate from the litigational features of the class action for collateral estoppel purposes, so they are incidental to and separate
from the regulatory features of the class action for antitrust
purposes. Although lawyers may instigate, orchestrate, and
dominate class actions, in the final analysis they are just lawyers-lawyers who may not cloak their unlawful conduct in judicial approval of a settlement in which they participate.
CONCLUSION

In the Preface to Bleak House,741 Dickens reported a Chancery
Judge's defense of his court: "though the shining subject of
much popular prejudice [the court and its processes were] almost immaculate."

Any "trivial blemish ...

was exaggerated

and had been entirely owing to 'the parsimony of the public."' 742
Dickens found this "too profound a joke to be inserted in the
body of [the novel]."743 But had he chosen to insert it in the
74, Charles Dickens, Bleak House (Signet Classic ed. 1980) (1853).
742 Id.

743 Id.

at vii.

Dickens explained that "everything set forth in [the novel] concerning the
Court of Chancery [in which the Jamdyce case is set] is substantially true, and within
the truth." Id. To back up his statement he described several cases pending in that
court as of 1853 in which the money absorbed by the lawyers was exorbitant. One
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mouth of some appropriately odious character, he said he might
have coupled it with the following lines from Shakespeare:
My nature is subdued
To what it works in, like the dyer's hand:
Pity me, then, and wish I were renewed! 744
We believe that those who claim that only trivial blemishes mar
our system for settling class actions are as deluded, or as eager
to delude, as was Dickens' Chancery Judge. We write to show
the dyer his hand and to offer a scrub brush with which he
might clean it.
EPILOGUE
Much has happened as this Article was proceeding through the
editing process. With so much breaking news, we decided to
append this Epilogue, which allowed us to include several last
minute developments.
In the fall of 1995, Dexter Kamilewicz of Maine, his wife,
Gretchen, and Martha Preston of Wisconsin (the Kamilewicz
plaintiffs) filed a class action suit against Bank of Boston, its
lawyers and class counsel, who had purported to represent them
in the Hoffman v. BancBoston Mortgage Corporation745 class
action suit filed and settled in an Alabama state court. These
plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and the other class members
in Hoffman, sued the bank, its lawyers and class counsel for
negotiating a class settlement that allegedly cost many class
members more money than they recovered from the settlement
and allegedly resulted in all class members being charged in
attorney's fees more than one-third of the economic benefit
conferred on them by the suit.746
The Kamilewicz plaintiffs brought suit in federal district court
in Chicago because that is where the two law firms that served
case involved 30 or 40 lawyers and costs of 70,000 (1853) pounds had been thus far
incurred; in the other, "more than double [that amount] has been swallowed up in
costs." Id. at viii.
744 Id. at vii (quoting, with slight alterations, William Shakespeare, Sonnet cxi).
7456 No. CV-91-1880 (Ala. Cir. Ct. Jan. 24, 1994).
74Kamilewicz v. Bank of Boston Corp., No. 95-C6341, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18973,
at *1-*9 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 15, 1995).
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as lead counsel in Hoffman were located. 747 The suit alleged
violations of RICO, a conspiracy to deprive the plaintiffs of
their constitutional rights to due process and property, fraud,
breach of fiduciary duty, and malpractice. 748 The defendants
promptly filed a motion to dismiss the federal suit, but the Hoffman class counsel went further-all the way to Alabama. The
Hoffman class counsel asked the Alabama court to order the
Kamilewicz plaintiffs to show cause in Alabama state court as
to why they were not bound by that court's approval of the class
settlement and thus, inferentially, estopped from proceeding in
federal court. The Alabama court scheduled a hearing on this
order for December 18, 1995, while the motion to dismiss the
federal suit was pending. The Kamilewicz plaintiffs responded
by asking the federal district court in Chicago to enjoin the Alabama court from proceeding. 749
The federal district court in Chicago scheduled a hearing for
Friday, December 15, before the Alabama court's Monday
morning show-cause hearing was to be held, and dismissed the
plaintiffs' complaint. The district court held that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the complaint because the complaint was in the nature of an appeal from the state court approval of the settlement, and, under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine,7 0 federal district courts lack jurisdiction over matters that
are in essence appeals of state court rulings.751 He thus refused
to enjoin the Monday morning Alabama hearing. That hearing
was held, although the Kamilewicz plaintiffs did not show up,
refusing to submit to the jurisdiction of the Alabama court,
which they claimed had no right to have ordered money withdrawn from their escrow accounts in Hoffnan and now had no
right to order them to forego their federal suit. The Alabama
court proceeded without them.

747 Id. at *2-*3.

748 Id.

at *9-*10.

749 Id. at *10-'11.
7s0 The Rooker-Feldman doctrine, derived from Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263

U.S. 413 (1923), and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462
(1983), holds that the only federal court authorized to exercise appellate review over
a state court's civil litigation judgment is the Supreme Court of the United States.
751 Kamilewicz, No. 95-C6341, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18973, at *17.
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The same Alabama state court judge who had approved the
Hoffman settlement held the hearing and issued an opinion that
stated he had two matters before him: the motion from Edelman to show cause, and the allegations in the federal complaint,
which he decided to treat as if they had been made by the Kamilewicz plaintiffs in a motion for relief from a judgment under
Alabama's Rule 60(b).752 The Alabama judge decided that the
allegations in the federal complaint were baseless; reaffirmed his
prior ruling that the settlement was fair and the attorney's fees
awarded were proper; and ended by ordering the Kamilewicz
plaintiffs not to "reassert[ J the claims dismissed in the Federal
753
Class Action in any forum.
The Kamilewicz plaintiffs, nonetheless, appealed the federal
district court order to the Seventh Circuit. This time they were
joined by nine state Attorneys General, who filed an amicus
brief urging the court to reverse the district court's dismissal.
The Kamilewicz plaintiffs and the Attorneys General argued
that the Kamilewicz plaintiffs' allegations were not in the nature
of an appeal, but were independent actions not subject to the
Rooker-Feldman bar and that, in any event, Rooker-Feldman
was inapplicable to any state court judgment entered without
proper personal jurisdiction over the parties who now sought to
challenge that ruling. The Kamilewicz plaintiffs claimed the
jurisdiction of the Alabama court was defective under Phillips
Petroleum Company v. Shutts754 because the Notice they re ceived did not tell them that they might lose money or that attorney's fees might be well in excess of one-third of the economic
benefit, and that they were consequently denied their constitutional right to opt out. Moreover, they claimed they could not
be considered parties to the Alabama proceeding because they
were absent class members denied adequate representation by
their lawyers' self-dealing, and Hansberry v. Lee755 says that
without adequate representation absent class members are not
to be considered parties to the class action.756 Put an752Ala. R. Civ. P. 60(b).

753
Hoffman v. BancBoston Mortgage Corp., No. CV-91-1880, at 7, 10 (Ala. Cir. Ct.
Jan. 30, 1996) (emphasis added) (on file with the Virginia Law Review Association).
754
472 U.S. 797 (1985).
755311 U.S. 32 (1940).
756See Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 14-32, Kamilewicz v. Bank of Boston Corp.,
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other way, the Kamilewicz plaintiffs were saying that the Alabama state court judgment could not be given any effect
throigh the doctrine of Rooker-Feldman or any other doctrine
because out-of-state residents who are denied their rights under
Shutts (and any absent class member denied adequate representation under Hansberry) must be treated as any out-of-state residents who lack minimum contacts with the forum state court;
they are free to ignore the judgment of the state court because
it is null and void as to them. An incontrovertible proposition,
or so one would have thought.
The Seventh Circuit did not, however, think, or so it appears
to us. In a unanimous opinion, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the
dismissal, holding that Rooker-Feldman barred the action in
federal court. 757 The opinion by Judge Evans, joined by Judges
Cummings and Ripple, is remarkable for its failure to justify its
conclusions. For example, the Attorneys General argued (as did
the Kamilewicz plaintiffs) that the Kamilewicz plaintiffs were
free to attack the Alabama judgment in any way they chose, just
as a party is free to attack a default judgment entered against
him without personal jurisdiction. The response by the court:
"We see significant differences between default judgments and
the judgment under attack here. ' 758 That's it. The panel chose
to give no explanation of what those differences might be. The
court did explain that Alabama had a procedure by which "a
litigant can assert an independent action for fraud upon the
court ....
Alabama Rule 60(b)."759 Of course, that assumes
that these absent, out-of-state class members had been "litigants," a proposition that seems to assume the jurisdictional
point at issue and to run counter to the teachings of Shutts and
Hansberry.
Before the Seventh Circuit issued its opinion-indeed before
the briefs were filed in the appeal-the Hoffman class counsel
was back in Alabama, this time to file suit against the Kamilewicz plaintiffs for malicious prosecution and abuse of process for
92 F.3d 506 (7th Cir. 1996) (No. 96-1019); Brief of Arnici Curiae at 6-19, Kamilewicz

(No. 96-1019).
757 Kamilewicz v. Bank of Boston Corp., 92 F.3d 506, 512 (7th Cir. 1996).
758Id. at 510.

759 Id. at 511.
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their actions in connection with the federal suit. They also sued
the lawyers for the Kamilewicz plaintiffs in the federal suit. The
suit sought damages of $25 million or thereabouts. 76° Now the
Kamilewicz plaintiffs needed another set of lawyers and their
lawyers in the federal action needed lawyers too; by now it
seemed clear to at least the authors of this Article that Alabama
had its own notion of "justice" and so the Alabama suit needed
to be taken quite seriously. This new set of lawyers for the
Kamilewicz plaintiffs-the third since the beginning of this ordeal-asked the Alabama court to dismiss the malicious prosecution suit, hoping that even in Alabama a suit in federal court
backed by nine Attorneys General and pending on appeal would
be seen as a ridiculous candidate for a malicious prosecution
suit. And then everyone waited.
The very day that the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district
court's dismissal, the Alabama trial court ruled that the Alabama malicious prosecution case could proceed. Discovery was
ordered and legal bills began to pile up in earnest. The Kamilewicz plaintiffs petitioned the Seventh Circuit for rehearing by
the panel or en banc. With no dissent from the panel opinion,
this appeared a long shot, but they decided to try. The day
after the rehearing petition was filed, the Seventh Circuit ordered the federal defendants to reply. Someone up there was
paying attention. Weeks passed: three, six, nine, twelve.
In the meantime, without knowing about the Kamilewicz case,
another absent class member had filed suit against the Bank of
Boston for the Bank's involvement in the Hoffmnan settlement.
Ted Benn, a corporate lawyer from Dallas, Texas, filed suit in
state court in Texas, alleging that the bank deducted about $144

760 See Complaint, Edelman v. Wildman, Harrold, Allen & Dixon, No. CV-96-91
(Ala. Cir. Ct.) (copy on file with the Virginia Law Review Association).
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from his escrow account in connection with the settlement in
Alabama and deposited zero dollars in recovery. He alleged
that he had read the Notice, just as our fictional law professor
had, had understood that he was in the subclass entitled to zero
recovery and had figured that he would owe no attorney's fees
because one-third of zero is zero. He had thus not opted out.
Then, he alleged that he had over $100 deducted from his escrow account, as a miscellaneous disbursement, which turned
out to be money paid to the class lawyers as attorney's fees. He
tried to get the Bank to return this money to him and when the
Bank refused, he sued. 761
The Bank, fresh off its victory before the district court in Chicago, removed Benn's case to federal court and then-pay attention here-sought to have the federal district court in Dallas
dismiss the suit with prejudice, on the grounds that under the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine the suit could not be brought in federal court!7 62 Moreover, while this motion was pending, the
Bank, taking a page from the Hoffman class counsel's book,
petitioned the Alabama state court for relief, arguing that Benn,
like the Kamilewicz plaintiffs, was bound not to challenge the
Alabama judgment in any other court. Once again, the Alabama court obliged, 763 although Benn, like the Kamilewicz plaintiffs, refused to recognize the Alabama court's right to order
him to do anything and did not show up for the hearing in Alabama on the Bank's motion-a motion in effect for Alabama to
enjoin a Texas citizen from proceeding against the Bank in any
federal court or in Texas state court, which motion the Alabama
court granted, a fact we repeat because it may be difficult to
believe.
When Benn asked the federal district court in Texas to enjoin
the Bank from proceeding against him in Alabama, the district
court judge apparently became as eager to rid herself of this
case as the district judge in Chicago had been when the
Kamilewicz plaintiffs made a similar request of him. She
761Benn v. BancBoston, No. 3:96-CV-0974-J, at 2-4 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 4, 1996) (Order
Denying In Part Defendant's Motion to Dismiss) (on file with the Virginia Law

Review Association).
762

Id. at 4-5.

763 Hoffman v. BancBoston Mortgage Corp., No. CV-91-1880 (Ala. Cir. Ct. Oct. 17,
1996) (on file with the Virginia Law Review Association).
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promptly issued an opinion, tracking that of the panel in the
Seventh Circuit, but refused the request to dismiss with prejudice and remanded the fraud and breach of fiduciary claims filed
by Benn back to Texas state court.764 Back in state court, Benn
decided to join Fannie Mae as a defendant, alleging, inter alia,
that Fannie Mae, the owner and holder of Benn's mortgage, was
responsible for the actions of the bank, its agent-the servicer
of the mortgage. That addition landed Benn back in federal
court. Fannie Mae removed the case again, the district court's
recent opinion that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction notwithstanding. Moreover, according to Benn, the bank consented to
this removal in writing. Fannie Mae apparently removed to
federal court with the further plan to have the case transferred
to Chicago, where cases involving escrow practices across the
nation have been transferred for consolidation by the panel on
Multi-District Litigation.
Benn intends to argue that his case is essentially about fraud
in the course of a settlement, not escrow practices, and to fight
transfer to Chicago. He also intends to argue that the law of
the case is that the federal court lacks subject matter jurisdiction
over this dispute under the misguided application of RookerFeldman. Just as Benn was ordered back to federal court for
the second time, the Seventh Circuit finally decided the rehearing petition in Kamilewicz.
The petition was denied. 765 The Kamilewicz plaintiffs learned
of that order on November 22, 1996, the day it was issued. But
there was a dissent. Finally, some support, and formidable support it was. Judge Easterbrook, joined by Chief Judge Posner
and Judges Manion, Rovner and Wood, filed a forceful and
detailed dissent, which took serious issue with the panel's failure
to see the Kamilewicz plaintiffs as analogous to those against
whom a default judgment had been entered. Judge Easterbrook
first considered the federal plaintiffs claims against the bank,
which he apparently considered to be in the nature of a collateral attack on the state judgment:
764 Benn v. BancBoston, No. 3:96-CV-0974-J, at 12.
765Kamilewicz v. Bank of Boston Corp., No. 96-1019, at 2 (7th Cir. Nov. 22, 1996)
(Order denying Petition for Rehearing En Banc) (on file with the Virginia Law
Review Association).
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Collateral attacks based on lack of personal or subject-matter
jurisdiction are proper, no less in class actions than in other casesindeed, they are especially appropriate where class members are
stunned to find that, although aligned as plaintiffs, they are net
losers, just as if the original defendants had filed and prevailed on
a counterclaim of which they received no notice and over which the
state court had no jurisdiction. In effect, though not in name, this
was a defendant class, attempting (unbeknownst to its members) to
fend off predatory lawyers' claims to the balances in the escrow
accounts. 766
We agree, although we have also argued that, questions of
personal and subject matter jurisdiction aside, the claim against
the bank should not be collaterally estopped. Because Judge
Easterbrook was analyzing this case under Rooker-Feldman,
which the Seventh Circuit has held is not coextensive with the
doctrines of claim and issue preclusion, 767 his analysis does not
conflict with our argument on estoppel. On the other hand, we
did not consider whether Rooker-Feldman barred challenges in
federal court to state court settlements because frankly that
issue did not even occur to us until the defendants raised it in
the district court. Once it was raised, we decided not only that
Rooker-Feldman properly applied should not bar federal courts
from taking jurisdiction (as Judge Easterbrook and his four
colleagues said), but that the issue was not worth separate discussion because even if federal courts lacked jurisdiction over
state court settlements, state courts would not. Thus, some
court could entertain the later suits we were discussing as long
as we showed that issue and claim preclusion did not bar such
suits.
And Judge Easterbrook's dissent supports our preclusion argument as to malpractice actions against class counsel as we would
have predicted from his opinion in Derrickson v. City of DanviUle. 768 In his Kamilewicz dissent from the denial of rehearing,
he wrote:
Next consider plaintiffs' claim against the Hoffman class
counsel, which is not a collateral attack on a judgment. It takes
766Id. at 5 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
767 See, e.g., GASH Associates v. Village

1993), and cases cited therein.
768845

F.2d 715 (7th Cir. 1988).

of Rosemont, 995 F.2d 726,728-29 (7th Cir.
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the judgment as a given-indeed, it is only so long as the judgment stands that the litigant has a compensable loss. Neither
state nor federal law requires a malpractice suit to be filed in the
same court that handled the initial litigation. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine therefore does not apply to malpractice suits,
which may be litigated in federal courts without regard to the
location of the initial case. If the panel is right, no malpractice
suit growing out of state litigation in which the judge awarded
attorneys' fees-maybe no malpractice suit, period-may be
brought in federal court, even if all requirements of the diversity
jurisdiction have been satisfied. This holding is sufficiently troubling and affects so many other cases that it is worth the time of
our court to consider the subject en banc.
...The attorneys representing the Hoffman class were not
parties to the Alabama case. Neither were the class members.
Absent class members are represented by the named plaintiffs
and their lawyers, but they aren't parties, a point reflected in
federal litigation by disregarding their citizenship. They are
ignored in negotiating settlements as well. A real party's lack
of assent means that there is no settlement; but the missing class
members don't sign the settlement, and their objection is not
dispositive. It is crammed down the throats of objectors, which
cannot be done to real parties.... For some purposes missing
class members are treated like parties, but only if the named
plaintiffs adequately represent the interests of the class, and only
if the unnamed members of the class receive adequate notice
and elect not to opt out-which in this case is the very thing in
dispute! It gets the cart before the horse to reject, as barred by
a judgment, an effort by the absent class members to show that
they were not properly brought into the state case and therefore
are not affected by the judgment.
From all of this it follows that a malpractice action is not
affected by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Does the fairness
hearing required to approve the settlement of a class action
make a difference? I think not. For the reasons just explained,
absent class members (especially those who deny the state
court's jurisdiction over them) are not parties and cannot be
treated as bound by the findings implicit in the approval of the
settlement and the award of fees to attorneys....
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All jurisdictional doubts to one side, a settlement followed
by a fairness hearing remains more like a contract than like
litigation. Accordingly there is even less reason to apply the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine than in a normal malpractice case,
where the loss ensues from a genuine contest. Representative
plaintiffs and their lawyers may be imperfect agents of the other
class members-may even put one over on the court, in a staged
performance. The lawyers support the settlement to get fees;
the defendants support it to evade liability; the court can't vindicate the class's rights because the friendly presentation means
that it lacks essential information....
The Kamilewicz class asserts that it suffered harm from the
Hoffnan class lawyers' breach of their duties of care and loyalty
in negotiating the settlement, which was concealed from the
Alabama judge (and the class) by a further breach of the duty
of loyalty in drafting the notice about the settlement. The notice not only didn't alert the absent class members to the impending loss but also pulled the wool over the state judge's eyes.
Suing faithless agents is far from the core of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which should not be extended to block suits like
this ....
...
If the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies to suits by the
absent class members because a malpractice action is a collateral
attack on the order approving the settlement and awarding attorneys' fees, then the law of preclusion (res judicata) should bar
malpractice actions in any court, state or federal, and without
regard to which judicial system handled the first case. Yet no
one thinks that. A malpractice suit is an independent action. A
(potential) defense of issue preclusion is defeated by the very
theory of the claim: that the first judgment is unreliable because
of the attorney's bungling. The bungler cannot point to the adverse judgment produced by his own incompetence to ward off
the client's demand. The Kamilewicz class may fail in its proof,
or it may encounter other obstacles, but the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine does not close the door of the federal courthouse. 769

The Kamilewicz plaintiffs must now decide whether to risk
further repurcussions in Alabama by seeking certiorari from the
Supreme Court. Mr. Benn has to fight transfer and decide what
769 Kamilewicz, No. 96-1019, at 6-11 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).

1280

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 82:1051

position to take on Rooker-Feldman in this second round for
him in federal court. That is the stage of play as we go to press.
And what do we make all of this? A significant number of
judges, as we feared, prefer to twist the law out of all recognizable shape and subject ordinary citizens to outrageous treatment
at the hands of foreign courts and unwanted "champions" rather
than face the reality of class action abuse and improperly approved class settlements. We have in mind particularly the majority of judges on the Seventh Circuit who, despite a powerful
dissent, were willing to leave Dexter and Gretchen Kamilewicz,
Martha Preston, and the lawyers who tried to help them by
bringing suit in federal court to the not-so-tender mercies of the
Alabama court system, which had already harmed the Kamilewicz's and Preston-at least in their eyes. On the other hand,
five judges did dissent. We can only hope that the publication
of this Article will help more judges see what needs to be done
and will help tear down the facade of estoppel law that some
would use as an excuse not to do it.

